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THE ROYAL NAVY 

A HISTORY 

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT 







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A History 
From the Earliest Times to the Present 



By 

Wm. Laird Clowes 

Fellow of Kings College, London ; Gold Medallist U.S. Naval Institute ; 
Hon. Member of the R.U.S. Institution 

Assisted by 

Sir Clements Markham, K.C.B., P.R.G.S. 

Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N. 

Mr. H. W. Wilson 

Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, Assist. Sec, U.S. Navy 



Mr. L. Carr Laughton 

etc. 



Twenty^five Photogravures 

and 

Hundreds of Pull Page and other 
Illustrations 

Maps, Charts 

etc. 



/;/ Five Volumes 

Vol. II. 



LONDON 

Sampson Low, Marston and Company 

LIMITED 

^t. iBuii£(tan'£i ?^ou£ie, .iFetter Hane, 3£.C. 

1898 



LONDON: 
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LrMiTED, 

STAMFOKD STKEET AND CIIAKING CROSS. 



INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II. 



The present volume appears at a date three months later than that 
at which it was originally hoped to produce it. It appears also with 
a slight change in the names which were originally intended to 
figure on its title-page. !E^or the delay I am, I fear, myself mainly 
responsible. Continuous ill-health, which has rendered it impossible 
for me to live, except for brief periods at a time, anywhere . save in 
high altitudes, has made it particularly hard for me to work with 
steady regularity upon the book, and has of course, complicated in 
an extreme degree the difficulty of preparing a history which is 
largely based upon the study of original documents. The delay is, 
however, in some measure due also to the same cause which has 
necessitated the substitution on the title-page of the name of 
Mr. L. Carr Laughton for that of Mr. E. Fraser. Mr. Edward 
Eraser, in the early part of 1896 undertook to contribute to this 
volume the chapters dealing with the operations of the Navy in the 
period 1603-1660. Not until long after the expiration of the limit 
at first assigned to him for the completion of those chapters did I 
reluctantly realise that I could afford to grant him no further con- 
cession of time. He assures me that he regrets that he has been 
unable to keep faith with me, and through me, with the publishers 
and with my readers ; and I need scarcely add that I regret it also. 
Yet I believe that in a son of Professor Laughton, the veteran 
writer on naval history, I have found no inefficient substitute. 
Mr. Laughton describes the active work of the Navy under James I., 
Charles I., and the Commonwealth. For the remainder of this 
volume Sir Clements Markham and myself are responsible. 

Mr. Laughton has succeeded in throwing some fresh light upon 
the history of the operations of the fleets of the early Stuarts, and 
upon the events of the First Dutch War. I have spent 'a large 



VI INTRODUCTION 20 VOLUME 11. 

amount of time in researches among the vokiminous Dutch records 
relating to the Second and Third Dutch Wars ; and I trust that 
I have thus obtained many hitherto unpuhHshed facts concerning 
them. I have also been granted by the French Ministry of Marine 
opportmiities of consulting the departmental archives which illus- 
trate the Second Dutch "War and the Wars of the League of 
Augsburg and of the Spanish Succession. But I have been happy 
in being able to draw upon yet other sources of original information. 
A few years ago I chanced to acquire — strangely enough, from a 
Gei-man bookseller — a large mass of papers relating to the Eoyal 
Navy under William and Mary and their immediate successor. I 
suspect that some at least of these papers must at one time have 
belonged to the Admiralty, seeing that the collection includes 
numerous orders, etc., bearing the autograph signatures of Thomas, 
Earl of Pembroke, Edward Eussell, Prince George of Denmark, 
Sir John Leake, Josiah Burchett, and other leading Admiralty 
otiicials. Whether they were improperly removed, or were, long 
ago, sold as rubbish by persons who were ignorant of their value, 
I have no means of determining. I regard myself, however, as 
unusually fortmiate in having been able to utilise some of the 
information contained in them. 

The indexing of Vol. I. left, I am aware, somewhat to be desired. 
I took all possible pains with it, but full materials for the prepara- 
tion of a thoroughly satisfactory index were lacking. Owing to 
defective records, it was often impossible to decide, for example, 
whether a given Captain Smith, who was mentioned on one page, 
was or was not identical with a Captain Smith, who was mentioned 
on another page. The records of the period which is dealt with in 
the present volume are naturally more perfect, and those of the 
latter part of the period are, indeed, much more so. I have there- 
fore been able to prepare what is, I hope, a proportionately more 
thorough and serviceable index. I have not, in this index, thought 
it necessary to attempt to distinguish between successive British 
ships bearing the same name ; but I have endeavoured to distinguish 
between homonymous persons, and especially between homonymous 
naval officers. In cases where there were serving at the same, or 
nearly at the same time, two officers of one name, I have been 
careful, wherever possible, to indicate in the index the seniority of 
each by means of the figures (1), (2), etc.; and I think that it ^\ill 
be found that should there arise in the mind of the reader any doul)t 



INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME IL Vll 

as to the identity of two or more homonymous officers who are 
mentioned in the text, that doubt can be quickly set at rest by 
reference to the index, I would also point out that all naval officers, 
from 1660 onwards, are here indexed according to the highest rank 
to which each had attained at the conclusion of his career in the 
service. Thus, Captain Arthur Herbert must be looked for, not 
under "Herbert," but under " Torrington " ; Captain Edward 
Eussell under " Orford," and so on. Again, a student who may 
wish to turn to the services of Clowdisley Shovell as a lieutenant 
will find them indexed under " Shovell, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir 
Clowdisley." But I have, of course, introduced such cross references 
as will prevent even the most uninstructed reader from becoming 
confused. 

It has long been a favourite project of mine to prepare some 
record which should be available for enabling officers and others who 
may be now or henceforth serving in Her Majesty's ships to readily 
discover the history and services of previous ships bearing the same 
name. It cannot but be a healthy and inspiring thing for the ships' 
companies of our present Boyal Sovereign, Swiftsure, Besolution, 
Grafton and Sioallow to know what perils and what glories have 
been associated with those fine ship-names in the past. I have 
often, where requested, compiled historical records for certain ships, 
such, for example, as the Britannia, the Vernon, the Dreadnought, 
the Edgar and the Indus; and copies of these are, I believe, 
exhibited in the existing vessels for the information and encourage- 
ment of those who take an interest in the Navy's work in bygone 
days. The manner in which these volumes are being indexed wiU, 
I hope, not only assist the project to which I allude, but also enable 
any one who cares to devote an hour or two to the subject to compile 
for himself a tolerably full record of the history of any given ship- 
name. Many a Queen's ship nowadays has the great exploits of her 
wooden ancestors emblazoned about her decks, on the break of her 
poop, on her wheel, or in other suitable positions. It is to be hoped 
that the practice may become general. In the French Navy it is, 
I am informed, encouraged by the Ministry of Marine. 

I have seized the opportunity here and there throughout this 
volume to acknowledge my indebtedness to various officers and 
gentlemen who have in various ways specially assisted me, either 
by the loan of documents, etc., or by granting permission for the 
reproduction of portraits. But it is fitting that I should acknow- 



viii INTRODUGTION TO VOLUME II. 

ledge here the great and kindly help which I have received at the 
hands of H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Battenberg, E.N., G.C.B., 
who, besides taking a lively interest in the progress of the work, has 
placed at my disposal for reproduction the finest specimens from his 
unrivalled collection of naval medals. Some of these are shown in 
this volume ; many more will be shown in the volumes which are 
still to come. 

To have brought down the history of the Royal Navy to the 
year 11 &1 would have involved the expansion of this instalment to 
almost unmanageable dimensions. On the other hand, to have 
begun the history of the period 1714-1762, and not to have com- 
pleted it in the same volume, would have been unsatisfactory and 
disappointing. It has been thought well, therefore, to take the 
death of Queen Anne and the accession of the House of Brunswick 
as a convenient halting place. Volume III., in the preparation of 
which I have the assistance of Sir Clements Markham, Captain 
A. T. Mahan, Mr. H. AY. Wilson, and Mr. L. Carr Laughton, will, 
I hope, carry the story as far as the outbreak of the AVar of the 
French Revolution ; and it is already so far advanced that I trust I 
am not too sanguine in promising it for publication in the early 
spring. 

W. L. C. • 



Davos- A ji-Pl atz, Sw itz i; i; i . a x n. 
Bee. 1897. 



CONTENTS 

VOLUME II. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

Civil History of the Royal ISTavy, 1603-1649 



PACE 



CHAPTER XVIII. 
Military History op the Royal Navy, 1603-1649 ... 29 

CHAPTER XIX. 

Voyages and Discoveries, 1603-1649 ..... 82 

CHAPTER XX. 

Civil History of the Navy, 1649-1660 ..... 94 

CHAPTER XXI. 

Military History of the Na.vy, 1649-1660 . . . .117 

CHAPTER XXII. 

Civil History of the Royal Navy, 1660-1714 .... 219 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

Military History of the Royal Navy, 1660-1714: 

Major Operations ........ 252 



CONTENTS OF VOLUME 11. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 



PAGE 



Military History of the Royal Navy, 1660-1714 : 

Minor Operations . . . . . . . .418 

Appendix to Chapter XXIY. : 

Losses of H.M. Ships from the Revolution to 1714 . . 535 

CHAPTER XXY. 

Voyages and Discoveries, 1660-1714. ..... 538 



INDEX 549 



LIST OF ILLUSTEATIONS, 



VOLUME II. 



PHOTOGRAVURE PLATES. 

Samuel Pepys, Secretary op the AdxMiralty 
Robert Blake, Admiral and Gekeral-at-Sea 
M. A. De Ruijter, Lieut.-Admiral-General 
Edward, Lord Hawke, Admiral of the Fleet 
The Hon. Edward Boscawen, Admiral 



PAGE 

. Frontispiece 

To face 120 

268 

416 

500 



FULL-PAGE ILLUSTRATIONS. 

H.M.S. "Royal Prince," 55: built in 1610 

H.M.S. " Royal Sovereign," 100 : Built in 1637 : cut 

DOWN IN 1652 ....... 

The Action op November 30th, 1652 
English Second-rate op the smaller class : about 1670 
Dutch Second-rate: about 1670 .... 
French Second-rate op 1670 ..... 
The Third Day op " The Four Days' Fight," June 3rd, 

1666 

View of Rochester, Chatham and the Medway on 

the occasion of the Descent of the Dutch under 

De Ruijter, in 1667 ...... 

H.M.S. "Royal Charles": built in 1673. 

A Chart of the English Channel with the adjacent 

Coasts op England and France .... 
Model (in frame) of an English First-rate 
The West Indies, and part of the Spanish Main 



To face 2 

6 
172 

222 
242 
248 

274 



292 
310 

336 
350 

368 



Xll 



ILLUSTRATIONS. 



The Western Mediterranean ..... 
The " Mart Rose," 48, Captain John Kempthorne, 

R.N., AND SEVEN Algerines, 1669 
A Chart of the Coast of France from l'Orient to 

St. Gilles ........ 



PAGE 

To face 396 



438 

488 



ELEVA 



Century : sectional 
Century : spars, rigging 



he Dutch Fleet, 1653 



1 



ILLUSTRATIONS IN THE TEXT. 

IThe Illustrations marked thus (i) ai-e take it from "A Naval Expositor,' bi/ Tliomas Riley Blanckley : 
with engravinns hii Paul Fojirdrinirr. London, 1750.] 

^ Cathead .... 

A Man-of-War of the Seventeenth 

tion ..... 
A Man-of-War of the Seventeenth 

AND sails . 
The English Flag before 1603 
The Scots Flag before 1603 
The Union Flag, as ordered in 1606 

1 Hoy 

^ Main Capstan 

Plan of Weddell's Action 

The Bristol Channel 

Admiral Sir John Penington, Kt. 

Chart of Cadiz Harbour 

Chart of La Rochelle 

1 Anchor .... 

^ Watch Glass 

' Barraco, or Breaker 

^ Jeer Capstan . 

Gold Medal for the Action with t 

The Commonwealth ship " Speaker ' 

Commonwealth Flag . 

' Barge ..... 

' FiRESHip's Sheer Hook . 

H.R.H. Prince Rupert, Vice-Admiral of England 

Marten Harpertszoon Tromp, Lieut. -Admiral of Holland 

The Battle off Dover, May 19th. 1652 . 



3 

25 

25 

25 

28 

29 

41 

47 

58 

62 

67 

81 

82 

93 

94 

102 

113 

115 

116 

118 

119 

145 

147 



ILLU8TEATI0NS. 



XlU 



The Action off Elba, August 28th, 1652. . 

The Battle of the Kentish Knock, September 28th, 1652 (2 plans) 

The Action in Leghorn Road, March 4th, 1653 

The Battle off Portland, February 18th, 1653 

The Battle off Portland, February 18th, 1653 

The Strait of Dover, and part of the North Sea . 

Dutch Medal Commemorative of M. H. Tromp 

^ Ship's Copper. ..... 

Angel op Charles II. .... 

Page op Official Navy List, 1700 

Page of Official Navy List, 1700 

Seaman's Pass against Impressment, 1691 . 

Dockyardman's Pass against Impressment, 1691 

English Bomb Ketch op 1692 . 

1 Crane ....... 

Medal Commemorative of the Claim to the Dominion op the 

Seas, 1665 . . . . . . . ... 

H.R.H. James, Duke of York, Lord High Admiral . 

Jacob van Wassenaer, Lord op Obdam, Lieut. -Admiral . , 

Cornelis Tromp, as Lieut. -Admiral of the Maze 

Egbert Meussen Cortenaer, Yice-Admiral 

Medal Commemorative of the Victory off Lowestoft 

Naval Reward op Charles II., 1665 .... 

George Monck, Duke op Albemarle, Admiral and General-at-Sea 
The Four Days' Fight, June 1st, 1666 .... 

The Four Days' Fight, June 4th, 1666 (3 plans) 
Dutch Medal Commemorative op the Four Days' Fight 
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Holmes, Kt. .... 

Stern Carving from H.M.S. "Royal Charles" . 

Medal Commemorative op the Peace op Breda, 1667 

Edward Montagu, Earl op Sandwich, Admiral and General 

at-Sea ......... 

French Medal Commemorative op the Battle op Solebay . 
The Southern Netherlands ...... 

The Northern Netherlands ...... 

Sir Cornelis Tromp, Bart., Lieut. -Admiral-General . 
Medal Commemorative of the Landing of William III., 1688 



PAGE 

163 
167 
177 
179 
181 
186 
196 
218 
219 
232 
233 
236 
237 
249 
251 

253 
255 
257 
260 
261 
264 
266 
268 
270 
275 
277 
282 
292 
298 

305 
308 
312 
318 
320 
325 



XIV 



ILLUSTBATIONS. 



PAGE 

Dutch Ship of the Line " Hollandia "..... 338 

The Battle off Beach y Head ....... 339 

Edward Russell, Earl of Orford, Admiral of the Eleet. . 347 

Medal Commemorative of Barfleur and La Hougue. . . 350 

Barfleur, La Hougue, and Cherbourg ..... 352 

Tourville's Elagship " Le Soleil Royal " . . . . . 353 

Medal Commemorative op La Hougue, etc. .... 355 

Vice-Admiral John Benbow . . . . . . . 371 

The Coast near Cartagena ....... 374 

Plan of Cadiz 378 

Vigo Bay 383 

Medal Commemorative of the Action in Vigo Bay, 1702 . . 385 

Sir George Rooke, Kt., Admiral of the Fleet. . . . 387 

The Strait and Bay of Gibraltar ...... 392 

Medal Commemorative of the Capture of Gibraltar, 1704 . 395 

Admiral Sir James Wishart, Kt. ...... 401 

Lieut. -Admiral Geerit van Callenburgh ..... 403 

Sir John Leake, Kt., Admiral op the Eleet .... 405 

Admiral Sir Clowdisley Shovell, Kt. . . . . .411 

Minorca ........... 413 

Medal Commemorative of the Reduction of Sardinia and 

Minorca .......... 415 

Gun, probably of the early Eighteenth Century . . .417 

1 Ketch 420 

George Legge, Lord Dartmouth, Admiral of the Eleet . .421 

Admiral Sir Thomas Allin, Kt 424 

Dutch Medal Commemorative of the Action at Bergen, 1665 . 427 

Medal Commemorative of the Recovery of Treasure, 1687 . 461 

The Harbour of Brest ........ 476 

Matthew, Lord Aylmer, Admiral op the Eleet . . .497 

Medal Commemorative of the Eailure of the Attempt against 

Scotland, 1708 517 

^ Double Kettle ......... 534 

1 Shallop ... ....... 537 

1 Hagboat .......... 538 

Captain "William Dam pier, R.N. ...... 545 

' Half-AVatcii Glass ......... 548 



NAVAL HISTOEY. 



CHAPTEE XVII. 

CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL N-AVY, 1603-1649. 

James I. and the Navy — Shipbuilding — Sheathing — Girdling — The Royal Prince — The 
Sovereign of the Seas — The ships of James I. — Fate of Elizabethan vessels — 
(J^ Additions to the fleet nnder Charles I. — Guns — Kestrictions on trade in ordnance 

— Shot — Extravagant salutes — Pay — Lievitenants — Inefficiency of the Service — 
Neglect of the seamen — Increase of pay in 1647 — Contributions to the Chest — 
Changes in the Administration — Corruption — The Commissions of 1608 and 1618 
— Malversation — Pluralist officers — Pursers' profits — The Dockyards — The Chatham 
chain — Punishments — Bounties for hired ships — Pirates in the home seas — Duty 
on sea-borne coal — Eations — Prize-money — Flags — Signalhng — Ship-money — The 
origin of the Dutch troubles — Improvements in navigation — Colonial shipping. 

T^LIZABETH had brought the Navy to a 
-^ pomt of force and efficiency to which it 
had never before attained. She had made 
England respected abroad, and she had pre- 
served peace and order in the Narrow Seas. 
On March 24th, 1603, James VI. of Scotland 
became also King of England, and received the 
glorious legacy of the fleet which, under his 
predecessor, had created for itself a world-wide 
. reputation. 

There is no evidence that James took less 
interest than Elizabeth in the Navy ; indeed, 
in some respects, he may be said to have taken 
more ; and, undoubtedly, he spent more money 
on it. Yet, owing to his weakness of character, his usually unfor- 
tunate choice and employment of officials, and perhaps also the 
growing softness and corruption of the times, the Navy, during the 
greater part of his reign, went steadily downwards ; and, but for 

VOL, II. B 



T' 




CIVIL BISTORT, 1603-1649. 



[1618. 



Buckingham's exertions in 1618, would have become absolutely 
contemptible ere Charles I. succeeded to the throne in 1625. 
Buckingham was a meritorious re-organiser, and Buckingham was, 
of course, James's selected favourite. Save, however, in the 
appointment of Buckingham to share in the management of naval 
affairs, James, in spite of his excellent intentions, did considerably 
more harm than good to the service. The numerical decrease of the 
fleet during the two and twenty years, was not particularly striking, 
though there was a decrease. "What was significant was that 
whereas Elizabeth left a Nav}^ fit to go anywhere and do anything. 




A SHIP OF WAR OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. 

Sectional elevation. 

(From the ' Architectum Navalis' of J. Furttcnhach (Ulm, 1695.)) 

James left one largely composed of vessels unfit for any duty 
wliatsoever. 

The art of the shipbuilder^ does not seem to have greatly 
advanced during the reign. Among the ships built under James, 
one, the Boijal Prince, was a larger man-of-war than had up to that 
time been constructed in England ; but there is no evidence that 
she was a more seaworthy or less leewardly craft, or that she 
carried her guns better than the l^est of her EHzabethan prede- 
cessors. Speaking generally, indeed, the ships of the period gave 
dissatisfaction to those who bad to handle them and to all who 

^ The Shipwriglits' Company, liuwever, was incorporated in 11)0'); and tliis may be 
taken as evidence tliat the subject was receiving attention. 



1618.] 



CRUDE SHIPBUILDING. 



were best qualified to criticise them. Ralegh/ after enumerating 
the most desirable qualities in a man-of-war, i.e., strong build, 
speed, stout scantling, ability to fight the guns in all weathers, 
ability to lie to easily in a gale, .and ability to stay well, declared 
that in none of these requirements were the King's ships satis- 
factory. And Captain George Waymouth,^ a professional expert, 
and a contemporary authority on the theory of shipbuilding, 
lamented that he " could never see two ships builded of the like 
proportion by the best and most skilful shipwrights, though they 
have many times undertaken the same . . . because they trust 




A SHIP OF WAR OF TIIF SEVENTEENTH CENTUKY. 
Spars, rigging and sails. 

(From the ' ArclUtectura Navalis' of J. Furttcnbach {Ulm, 1695.)) 



rather to their judgment than their art, and to their eye than their 
scale and compass." Mr. Oppenheim^ cites, as an illustration of 
the loose methods of calculation in vogue, that when the Boijal 
Prince was built, Phineas Pett and William Bright, her constructors, 
estimated that 775 loads of timber would be required, whereas 
1627 loads were actually used, with a consequent increase of j£5908 
in the cost. 

Lead sheathing, which had been employed in the Spanish Navy 

^ ' Observations on the Xavy.' 

2 Add. MSS. 19,889: 'The Jewell of Artes,' 135, etc. 

=* ' Admin, of Royal Navy,' 186, (quoting Add. MSS. 9294, Nov. IGIO. 

B 2 



4 CIVIL HISTORY, 1603-1G49. [1610. 

since 1514,^ and which had been appHed to Enghsh merchant ships 
since 1553, was still untried in the Navy, possibly because it had 
been found to set up galvanic action with the iron of the rudder 
pintles, etc. Nor was Hawkyns's sheathing of double planks, with 
tar and hair between them, as generally adopted as it should have 
been, though it remained in some favour until late in the seven- 
teenth century. Much more care, in fact, was devoted to making 
ships look well than to making them really serviceable ; and the 
result often was that after her completion a vessel was found to be 
so crank that it was deemed necessary to "fur" or "girdle" her 
with a partial, or even an entire external planking beyond her 
original skin.^ 

As the Boyal Prince ^ was the greatest constructive effort of the 
reign of James I., some account must be here given of her. Her 
keel was laid at Woolwich on October 20th, 1608, her chief con- 
structor being Phineas Pett. Her nominal tonnage was 1200, 
but, measured according to the rules in force in 1632, it was 1035 
nett, and 1330 gross. After the work had been some time in 
progress, and had met with much adverse criticism from rival 
shipwrights, a commission, consisting of Captain George Waymouth, 
INIatthew Baker (who had been a principal constructor for more than 
half a century), WiUiam Bright, Edward Stevens, and others, was 
ordered to report on what was being done. Pett hated Waymouth, 
and Baker despised the Pett family, while Bright was particularly 
jealous of Phineas. But Pett had powerful protectors in the Lord 
High Admiral and Sir Eobert Mansell ; and after there had been 
not only inquiry and further inquiry, but also a special scrutiny by 
the King and Prince Henry, Phineas Pett emerged triumphant. 
An attempt to launch the ship was made on September 24th, 1610, 
but it failed, owing to the dockhead being too narrow to allow 
her to pass. She was, however, successfully launched a little 
later.* 

Pett, on this occasion, owed more to his protectors than to 
the merits of his work, for the Boyal Prince, though a striking 
object in the water, was both ill-designed and ill-built. As early as 
1621, it was reported to Buckingham^ that although she had cost 

' Duro's ' Armada Espanola,' 121. 

2 Harl. MSS. 2801 : ' Nomenclator Navalis ' (Manwayring's 'Dictionary '). 

•'* Often called Prince Hoi/al, or simply I'rince. 

* Oppenlieini, ' Admiu. of lioyal Navj-,' 204. 

^ Coke MSS. i. 114. 



1610.] TEE "ROYAL PRINCES 5 

^20,000, a further £6000 would be needed to make her fit for service, 
she being built of decaying timber and of green unseasoned stuff. 
At that time she had, nevertheless, been tried by no hard work.^ 

The Boyal Prince has often been described as the first three- 
decker of the Royal Navy ; but, in the modern sense, she v^as not 
a three, but a two-decker. She had, that is to say, two complete 
covered batteries, and an armed upper deck. Stow says of her : 
" This year the King builded a most goodly ship for warre, the keel 
whereof was 114 feet in length, and the crossbeam was 44 feet in 
length ; she will carry 64 ^ pieces of ordnance, and is of the burthen 
of 1400 tons. This royal ship is double built, and is most 
sumptuously adorned, within and without, with all manner of 
curious carving, painting, and rich gilding." Writing in 1801, 
Charnock^ says, with some degree of truth: "The vessel in 
question as most worthy of remark, as it may be considered the 
parent of the identical class of shipping which, excepting the 
removal of such defects or trivial absurdities as long use and 
experience have pointed out, continue in practice even to the 
present moment. Were the absurd profusion of ornament with 
which the Boyal Prince is decorated removed, its contour, or 
general appearance, would not so materially differ from the modern 
vessel of the same size as to render it an uncommon sight, or a ship 
in which mariners would hesitate at proceeding to sea in, on 
account of any glaring defect in its form, that, in their opinion, 
might render it unsafe to undertake a common voyage in it." 

Stow's expression, " double built," means double planked. All 
the bulkheads were also double bolted with iron.* Both these 
features were innovations. Yet by far the greatest amount of 
attention was given to the decorations. The carvings, including 
fourteen lions' heads for the round ports, cost .£441,^ and to Eobert 
Peake and Paul Isaackson was paid at one time a sum of £868 for 
painting and gilding. 

The Boyal Prince remained the show ship of the service until 
1637, when the Sovereign of the Seas was launched. She was the 
first of the real three-deckers ; and it is curious and significant that, 

^ She was rebuilt in 1611, and was renamed ResoJution under the Commonwealth. 

2 She eventually mounted fifty-five, but had vacant ports to which some of these 
could be shifted in case of need. 

=* ' Mar. Architecture,' ii. 1119. 
* Add. MSS. 9294. 

3 Pipe Off. Accts. 2249. 



6 CIVIL HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1637. 

although the authorities of Trinity House, as late as 1634, declared 
that "the art or wit of man cannot build a ship fit for service, 
with three tier of ordnance," ^ the very vessel which they stigmatised 
as impossible was afloat three years later. 

In January, 1635, an estimate for a ship of 1500 tons was called 
for ; and in the following March, Phineas Pett was ordered to 
prepare a model of the projected craft, and w^as informed that he 
was fixed upon to superintend the building of her.^ In April, Pett 
met, and consulted as to the dimensions, with Sir John Penington, 
Sir Eobert Mansell, and John AVells, storekeeper at Deptford ; and 
it was determined that the tonnage should be 1466 by depth, 1661 
by draught, and 1836 by beam.^ The estimated cost was only 
£18,680 ; but the sum finally expended on the vessel was, ex- 
cluding the cost of her guns, no less than <£40,833 8s. l\d} 

In his jom^nal, under the date May 14th, 1635, Pett writes : — 

"I took leave of his Majesty at Greenwich, -witli his command to hasten into tlie 
north, and prejiare the frame, timber, pLank, and tressels for the new ship to be built at 
Woolwich. ... I left my sons to see the moulds and other necessaries shipped in a New- 
castle ship, hired on jDurpose to transport our provisions and workmen to Newcastle. 
Attended the Bishoji of Durham with my commissions and instructions, whom I found 
wonderfully ready to assist us with other knights, gentlemen, and justices of the 
county, who took care to order present carriage; so that in a short time there was 
enough of the frame ready to lade a large collier, which was landed at Woolwich : and 
as fast as provisions could be got ready, they were shipped off from Chapley ^ Wood, at 
Newcastle, and that at Barnspeth'^ Park, from Sutherland. . . . The 21st of December we 
laid the ship's keel in the dock. Most part of her frame, coming safe, was landed at 

Woolwich The 16th of January, his Majesty with divers lords came to Woolwich to 

see part of the frame and floor laid, and that time he gave orders to myself and my son 
to build two small pinnaces out of the great ship's waste. The 28th'' his Majesty 
came again to Woolwich with the Palsgrave his brother, Duke Eobert,** and divers 
other lords, to see the pinnaces launched, which w^ere named the Greyliound and 
Boebuch." 

The great ship herself was launched in October, 1637. 

The dimensions, etc., of the Boijal Prince of 1610, and of the 

J Oppenheim, ' Admin, of Royal Navjv 204, n., 260 ; S. P. Dom. cclxxiii. 25. 
2 S. P. Dom. cclxiv. 67a, 87a. 

^ Ih. cclxxxvi. 44; but it is not apparent how the various computations were made, 
nor what they mean. 

* Ih. cclxxxvii. 73; Aud. Ofl". Dec. Accts, 1703-77, cited by Oppenheim. 
" Chopwell. 

" Pirancepcth. 

"^ Muntli missing; obviously not January, 1636. 

* Better known in English naval history as Prince Rupert. The " Palsgrave " 
was the Elector Friedrich A', of the Palatinate, who married Elizabeth, sister of 
Charles T. 







o 
o 

H 

o 



p ^ 



^ s 

o 

o 

m 



1637.] 



THE "SOVEREIGN OF THE SEAS." 



Sovereign of the Seas of 1637 respectively, were, according to 
statistics which appear to possess official authority, as follows : — 



Boyal Prince 
Sovereign of the Seas ^ 



Length of 
keel. 


Length 
over all. 


Beam. 


Depth. 


Tons 

gross. 


Guns. 


Feet. 
115 

127 


Ft. in. 
167 9 


Ft. in. 
43 

48 4 


Ft. in. 

18 

19 4 


1187 
1683 


55 

100 



Men. 
500 

600 



During the interregnum, the Sovereign of the Seas was, on 
account of her crankness, cut down in 1652 to a 100-gun two- 
decker. There was a disposition to rename her the Com7no7uvealth, 
but eventually she became known as the Sovereign simply. After 
the Restoration she became Boyal Sovereign. She saw much 
service throughout the Dutch and French wars, and existed until 
January 27th, 1696, when, being laid up at Chatham in order to 
be rebuilt, she was accidentally burnt, owing to a candle having 
been carelessly left alight in the cook's cabin. 

Thomas Heywood, who is supposed to have designed the very 
elaborate decorations of the Sovereign, published a long account of 
the ship,^ with a picture of her. His facts, so far as they relate to 
the ornaments, are probably correct enough ; but the remaining 
details, and the picture, seem to be quite untrustworthy. The 
figure-head, or beakhead, represented King Edgar on horseback, 
trampling upon seven kings ; upon the stern-head was a cupid 
bestriding a lion ; upon the forward bulkhead were six emblematic 
statues ; and the stern was a mass of useless carving and 
gilding. 

In the last year but one of the reign of James L, the Eoyal 
Navy consisted of the following effective vessels.^ (See pp. 8 and 9.) 

Of Elizabethan ships which existed during part of the reign of 
James, the Foresight, of 1570, had been condemned in 1604 ; the 
St. Andrew and St. Mattheiv, prizes of 1596, had been given to 
Sir John Leigh in 1604 ; the Mercury, of 1592, had been sold in 1611 ; 

^ From a list in the Dept. of the Cont. of the Navy. The number of gims is 
nominal. She really carried one hundred and two, all brass, which cost £24,753 8s. 8d. 
S. P. Dom. ccclxxiv. 30, and ccclxxxvii. 87. Pett's original design was for ninety 
guns onl3^ 

^ ' A True Description,' etc., 1637. 

^ S. P. Dom. clxi. 68 (1624), supplemented, as to details, from numerous sources too 
numerous to specify. 



8 



CIVIL EISTOBT, 1603-1649. 



[1624. 



First rates : — 

1. Prince 

2. Bear . 

3. Merhououi 



4. Anne Boijul 

Second rates : — 

5. Mepulse . 

6. Warspite . 

7. Victory 

8. Assurance. 

0. Nonsuch . 
h >. Defiance . 

1 1. Lion . 

12. Vanguard 

l-'l. Itainliow . 

14. Constant Be 

formation 

15. Swiftsure . 

16. St. George 

17. St. Andrew 

18. Triumph . 

Third rates : — 

10. Dreadnought . 

20. Antelope . 



Hnilt, or 
•Rebuilt. 



' 16U 
*1599 

♦1611-14 



^1608 



Tons. L»^|:i Beam. 



*1610 
1596 
1620 

*1603-5 

*1603-5 

*l(ill-14 

*1609 

*1615 
*1618 

1619 

1621 
1622 

1622 
1623 



1187 
915 
800 



800 



700 
648 
875 

600 
636 



Feet. 

115 

110 

104 
103 



97 

90 

108 

95 

88 



700 97 



650 91 



650 102 
650 102 



752 

887 
895 

895 
922 



Depth, j Guns. 



Ft. In. Ft. In. 



43 
37 
38 



106 

106 
110 

110 
110 



*1011-14 450 84 
*1618 450 92 



37 

36 
35 9 

33 
34 



35 2 

35 
35 

35 6 

36 10 
37 

37 
37 

31 
32 



18 
18 
17 



16 



15 
16 
17 



44 



40 
29 
42 



14 6 38 



15 

15 

16 

14 
14 

15 

16 8 



16 6 


42 


16 6 


42 


17 


42 


13 


32 


12 6 


34 



38 

40 

38 

40 
40 

42 

42 



55 

40 , Sold in 1629. 

44 I Sold in 1650. 

/The Ark Boyal, of 
1 1587, rebuilt and 
I renamed. She was 
bilged on her anchor 
in 1636, raised at 
great cost, and then 
broken up. 

Broken up about 1645. 
I Cut down to a lighter 
for harbour service, 
[ 1635. 

The Hope, of 1559, 
rebuilt and renamed. 
Broken up about 
1645. 

The Nonpareil, of 
1584, rebuilt and re- 
named. Sold under 
Charles I. 

Sold in 1650. 
(Ov Bed Lion, the 
Golden Lion, of 
1582, rebuilt and 
renamed. 



'Named to celebrate 
Buckingham's acces- 
sion to office. Car- 
ried off, 1648, to the 
Prince of Wales. 

jEenamed George under 
\ the Commonwealth. 
[■Renamed A7idrew 
under the Common- 
' wealth. 



Broken up about 1645. 
'Carried off to the 

Prince of Wales, 

1648. 



* In several cases there is much doubt as to how far the ships were rebuilt. Some 
of those thus marked may have merely undergone extensive repairs. 



1624.] 



SHIPS OF JAMES I. 



9 





Built, or 
*RebuUt. 


Tous. 


Leugth 
of keel. 


Beam. 


Depth. 


Guns. 










Feet. 


Ft. In. 


Ft. In. 




Lost, Nov. 1624, near 
Fhishing. She was 


21. Speedwell . 


*1607 


400 


• • 


• • 


• • 


•  


the SvMftsure, of 
1592, rebuilt and 
renamed. 


22. Adventure 


1594 


343 


88 


26 


12 


26 


Broken up about 1645. 
ex Destiny, of Ralegh's 


23. Convertine 


1616 


500 


•  






34 


last voyage. Carried 
off to the Prince of 

. Wales, 1648. 

Named to celebrate 


24. Happy En-\ 
trance . . j 


1619 


582 


96 


32 6 


14 


32 


Buckingham's acces- 
sion to office. Burnt 
, at Chatham, 1658. 


25. Bonaventure . 


1621 


675 


98 


33 


15 8 


34 


/Taken by the Dutch, 
\ 1652. 


26. Garland . 


1620 


683 


93 


33 


16 


34 


/Taken by the Dutch, 
1 1652. 


27. Mary Bose 


1623 


394 


83 


27 


13 


26 


Wrecked off Flanders, 
\ 1650. 


Fourth rates : — • 
















28. Phoenix . . 


1612 


250 


70 


24 


11 


20 


Sold under Charles T. 


29. Seven Stars . 


1615 


140 


60 


20 


9 


14 


# 


30. diaries . . 


. . 


80 


63 


16 


7 


16 




31. Desire . 


1616 


80 


66 


16 


6 


6 




With four crallevH 














, 


ftud several hoj^s. 

















* In several cases there is much doubt as to how far the ships were rebuilt. Some 
of those thus marked may have merely undergone extensive repairs. 

the Garland, of 1590, and Marij Bose, of 1589, had been used m the 
construction of a wharf at Chatham ; and the Nuestra Seriora del 
Bosario, the prize of 1588, after having been placed in support of 
her ancient antagonists in the dockyard, had been finally broken up 
in 1622. Most of the remaining ships had been broken up or 
disposed of.^ James also rebuilt two vessels which were disposed of 
or broken up ere his reign ended. These were the Lion's Whelp, 
purchased in 1601 and rebuilt in 1608, and the Primrose, purchased 
in 1560 and rebuilt in 1612. He also seems to have ordered the 
purchase in 1622" of the Mercury and Spy, built by Phineas Pett for 



^ The Answer and Crane, of 1590, and the 3Ioon and Merlin, however, survived 
into the reign of Charles I., though they were then ineffective. 
^ The order is dated August 31st. 



10 



CIVIL EISTOBY, 1603-1649. 



[1649. 



his own pui-poses in 16-20, and sent out to Algier, under Captains 
Phineas Pett and Edward Giles, to Mansell, whom they joined on 
February '26th, 1621 ; but there is no evidence that these vessels 
were ever added to the Navy. 

The additions under Charles I. were as follows : — 



Built. 
♦Rebuilt. 
I fPrize. 
+ Bought. 



1. ISt. Claude 

2. St. Denis . . . 

3. St. Mary . . . 

4. St. Anne . 

5. Esperance. 

6. Henrietta . 

7. Maria .... 

8. Spy .... 
9-18. Lion's Whetps\ 

(loy . . . ./ 

19. Fortune . 

20. St. Esprit . . 

21. Vanguard . 

22. CTiarhs . . . 



tl625 

tl625 

tl626 

tl626 

tl626 

1626 

1626 

1626 

1627 

tl627 

tl627 

*1630 

1632 



23. Henrietta Maria 1632 



24. James 

25. Unicorn . 

26. Leopard . 

27. Su-aUow . 



1633 
1634 
1634 
1634 



Tons. 



Length ' 

of 

keel. 



Beam. Depth. Guns. 



Ft. In. Ft. In. Ft. In. 



300 . . 

528 104 
100 . . 
350 . . 
250 .. 



32 511 9 



68 
68 
20 

185 

200 
800 



52 
52 



15 

15 



62 '25 



105 



750112 



810105 



93106 



6 6 
6 6 



35 

36 413 10 

33 716 3 



875 
823 
515 
478 



110 

107 

95 

96 



35 9 

37 6 

36 4 
33 

32 2 



15 8 

16 2 
15 1 
12 4 
11 7 



38 



jGiveu to Sir Joliu Chud- 
1 leigh, 1629. 



,> ("Sold under the Cominon- 

\\ wealth. 
6 



12 



42 
40 



44 



42 

48 
46 
34 
34 



One only survived to the 
days of the Common- 
wealth. 



[Built in 
I France. 
Texel. 



Holland for 
Taken in the 



'Eenamed Liberty imder 
the Commonwealth. 
Wrecked off Harwich, 
1650. 
Eenamed P«r«r/o?i under 
the Commonwealth. 
Accidentally burnt, 
1655, in 'the West 
Indies. 



Taken bv the Dutch, 
f Carried off, 1648, to the 
I Prince of Wales. 



' Two of the Whelps differed slightly in size from the rest. All were square rigged 
with three masts, and were fitted for using sweeps. The original armament of each 
was four culverius, four demi-culverius, and two brass sakers ; but to these two demi- 
cannon were added. Two were lost, returning from La Eochelle, while quite new ; one 
blew np in action with a Dunquerquer ; No. 6 had disappeared by 1631 and seems to 
be the one which was given by the King to Buckingham, on August 11th, 1625, for an 
attempt at the North- West Passage; No. 4 was lost on August 14th, 1G36 ; another 
was e.\i)ended for exiK3rimental purjwses ; No. 5 sank off the Dutch coast in 1637. 
No. 10, the last survivor, remained iu commission till 1654. The Whelps were built 
by contract at £3 5s. a ton. S. P. Dom. Iviii. 25 ; cccl.xiii. 29, etc. 



1649.] 



SHIPS OF CHARLES I. 



11 





Built. 
*Eebuilt. 

tl'rize. 
J bought. 


T. ns. 


Length 

of 

keel. 


Beam. 


Depth. 


Guns. 












Ft. In. Ft. In. Ft. In. 




















n'aken from the Duii- 
querquers. Lost off 


28. 


Swan 


tl636 


, , 


. . 1 


. , 




















Guernsey, Oct. 1638. 


















Taken from the Dun- 


29. 


Nicodemus . 


tl636 


105 


63 


19 


9 6 


6 


querquers. Sokl under 
( the Commonweakli. 


30. 


Boehuch . 


1636 


90 


57 


18 1 


6 8 


10 


jCarried off, 1648, to the 
\ Prince of Wales. 
Blown up in action, 1656, 


31. 


Greyhound . 


1636 


126 


60 


20 3 


7 8 


12 


by her captain, Geo. 
( Wager. 


32. 


Expedition . 


1637 


301 


90 26 


9 8 


30 




33. 


Providence . 


1637 


304 


90 


26 


9 9 


30 




34. 


Sovereign of f]if'\ 
Seas . . . j 


1637 


1683 


127 


48 4 


19 4 100 




35. 


Lio7i .... 


*1640 


717 


108 


35 4 


15 6 


52 


■Renamed Resolution 


3G. 


Prince . 


*1641 


1187 


115 


43 


18 


64 


under the Common- 
wealth. E e n a m e d 
Prince, 1660. 


37. 


Crescent . 


tl642 


150 






• • 


14 


/Carried off, 1648, to the 
. Prince of Wales, 


38. 


Lihj .... 


tl642 


80 








8 




39. 


Satisfaction . 


1646 


220 




_ 


• * 


26 


1 Carried off, 1648, to the 
\ Prince of Wales. 


40. 


Adventure . 


1646 


385 


94 


27 


9 11 


38 




41. 


Nonsuch . 


1646 


389 


98 


28 4 


14 2 


34 




42. 


Assurance 


1646 


341 


89 


26 10 


11 


32 


C Built as a privateer. 


43. 


Constant Warivick 


1646 


379 


90' 


28 


12 


30 


1 Bought by Parliament 
■( Jan.^20th, 1649. 
(Taken by the Dutch, 


44. 


Phoenix . 


1647 


414 


96 


28 6 


14 3 


38 


Sept. 7th, 1652. Re- 
taken, Nov. 1652. 


45. 


Dragon . 


1647 


414 


96 


30 


12 


38 




46. 


Tiger. . . . 


1647 


447 


99 


29 4 


12 


38 




47. 


Elizabeth 


1647 


471 


101 6 


29 8 


14 10 


38 




48. 


Old Warivick . 


tl646 










22 




49. 


Falcon . 


t 
















• • 


(Merchantman taken from 
I the Cromwell ians. 


50. 


Hart. . . . 


t 


. . 














10 


Do. do. 


51. 


Hove .... 


t 


, , 














6 


Do. do. 


52. 


Truelove . 


t 


259 






* 








20 


Do. <lo. 


53. 


Concord . 


t 


, . 






. 






• 


. . 


Do. do. 


54. 


Dolj}hin . 


t 


100 














. . 


Do. do. 


55. 


Felloivship . 


t 


300 


. 












28 


Do. do. 


56. 


Globe . . . 


t 


300 














24 


Purchased merchantman. 


57. 


Hector 


t 


300 














20 


Do. do. 



12 



CIVIL mSTORY, 1603-1649. 



[1G49. 



Although the Sovereign of the Seas was nominally a 100-gun 
ship, 102 brass guns were thus classed and distributed in her : — 





Leugth. 


Weight. 








Ft. 


Cwt. 


Lower deck : 










Broadside o;uns . 


20 


cannon drakes ^ 


9-0 


45 


Steru chasers . 


4 denii-cannon drakes .... 


12-5 


53 


Bow chasers 


2 


5> >»•••• 


11-5 


48 


Lufts 


2 


)) ))••-• 


10-0 


44 


Middle deck : 










Broadside suns. 


2-1 


culverin drakes 


8-5 


28 


Stern chasers 


4 


culverins 


11-5 


48 


Bow chasers 


2 


)> 


11-5 


48 


Main deck : 










Broadside suns. 


24 


demi-culverin drakes 


8-5 


18 


Stern chasers 


2 


denii-culverins 


10-0 


30 


Bow chasers 


2 


?j , . . . . 


10-0 


30 


Ujii^er deck : 










Forecastle .... 


8 demi-culverin drakes 


9-0 


20 


Half-deck .... 


6 


)) 5> ... 


9-0 


20 


Quarter-deck 


2 


9) J> ... 


5-5 


8 


Forecastle, pointing aft 


2 


cidverin drakes 


5-5 


11 



Throughout the reign of James I. and Charles I., ships were 
systematically over-gunned, and, in consequence, when at sea, 
captains often dismounted some of their pieces and stowed them in 
the ballast in the hold. The price of guns varied from ^612 to £15 a 
ton, and the manufacture of them was practically the monopoly of 
a few, chief among whom was John Browne, King's Gunfounder, 
who in 1626 gained a reward of £200 for casting lighter pieces than 
had been previously made, yet pieces capable, nevertheless, of 
standing double proof. The place of proof for all guns was Eatcliff 
Fields. Their export without licence was forbidden ; they might be 
bought and sold only at East Smithfield, and shipped and landed 
only at Tower Wharf. Yet in spite of these restrictions, many 
went abroad, and of these not a few had been stolen from royal 
forts, and probably from ships as well. 

Stone shot continued to be carried in certain small proportions 
until about 1625, after which they seem to have been w^holly dis- 
continued. It was not until James I. had been for several years on 
the throne that the extravagant practice of firing shotted charges 

' The afli.x "drake" signified that the gun was suited for heavy charges of powder, 
whereas " perier," after it had ceased to mean a gun throwing a stone shot, meant one 
suited for low charges. 



1649.] NAVAL PAY AND WAGES. 13 

as salutes ceased, and up to the time of the Eevolution the 
expenditure of powder in salutes was enormous, although repeated 
orders were issued in order to check waste. On joyous occasions 
the number of rounds, as is still the rule, was generally odd ; on 
occasions of death, etc., it was even, but the exact number of rounds 
was not prescribed, and all sorts of excuses were invented for firing 
them. In 1628, the fleet at Plymouth " shot away i;iOO of powder 
in one day in drinking healths," ^ and Mr. Oppenheim, who cites the 
above, says elsewhere : ^ "In one gunner's accounts we find : ' One 
faucon when the master's wife went ashore . . . One minion the 
master commanded to be shot off to a ship his father w^as in.' " 
The evil was not materially abated until the close of the seventeenth 
century. 

During the reign of James I., the lunar monthly pay of a seaman 
was 10s. On the occasion of the attack upon Cadiz, in 1625, it 
was temporarily raised to 14s., and it was raised permanently, in 
1626, to 15s., subject to deductions of 6d. for the Chatham Chest, 
4cZ. for the chaplain, and '2d. for the surgeon ; and so the scale 
remained until the Civil War. 

The Caroline Navy was the first to be divided into six rates. 
The rates of ships were not always determined by the size and 
importance of the vessels, as was the case in later periods. Indeed, 
the rating only gradually assumed a systematic plan. But upon the 
rating of a ship always depended the rate of pay of the officers 
serving in her. The maximum (first-rate), and minimum (sixth- 
rate) scales, up to the time of the Eevolution, per month of twenty- 
eight days were : captains, £14 to £4 14s. 4:d. ; lieutenants (allowed 
only in the first three rates), £3 10s. to £S ; masters, £S 13s. 9c?. to 
£2 6s. 8cZ. ; pilots, <£2 5s. to £1 10s. ; masters' mates, £'2 5s. to £1 10s. ; 
boatswains, £2 5s. to £1 3s. IcZ. ; boatswains' mates, £1 6s. Sd. to 
£1 Os. 8d. ; pursers, £2 to £1 3s. 4:d. ; surgeons, £1 10s. ; surgeons' 
mates, £1 ; quartermasters, £1 10s. to £1 ; quartermasters' mates, 
£1 5s. to 17s. 6d. ; yeomen of sheets, jeers, tacks, or halliards, £1 5s. 
to £1 Is. ; carpenters, £1 17s. 6d. to £1 Is. ; carpenters' mates, £1 5s. 
to 18s. 8d. ; corporals,^ £1 10s. 4c?. to 18s. 8cZ. ; gunners, £2 to 
^61 3s. 4c?. ; gunners' mates, ,£1 2s. 6c?. to 18s. 8c?. ; cooks, £1 5s. to 
£1 ; master trumpeters, £1 8s. to £1 5s.; other trumpeters, £1 3s. 4d. ; 

^ Yonge's ' Diary ' : Camden Soc. 

2 ' Admin, of Eoyal Navy,' 290. 

* Then newly allowed. The corporal drilled the men in small-arms. 



14 CIVIL EISTORY, 1603-1649. [1625. 

drummers,' i'l ; fifers/ A'l ; armourers, £1 Is. ; gunmakers, £1 Is. 
The pay of gi'omets was lis. 'M., and that of boys, 7s. 6f7.- 

The rank of lieutenant had, as has been seen, existed in the Navy 
at the time of the Armada. It had subsequent^ disappeared, to be 
revived under Charles I. Mr. Oppenheim^ cites the Egerton MSS. 
(2541, f. 13), as declaring that the appointment of lieutenants 
was — 

" to breed young gentlemen for the sea-service. . . . The reason wliy there are not now 
so many able sea-captains as there is use of is because tliere hath not been formerly 
allowance for lieutenants, wherein* gentlemen of worth and qualitj- miglit be encouraged 
to go to sea. And, if peace had held a little longer, the old sea-captains would have 
been worn out, as that the State must have relied wholly on mechanick men that have 
been bred uj) from swabbers, and .... to make many of them would cause sea 
service in time to be despised bj^ gentlemen of worth, wlio will refuse to serve at sea 
under sucli captains." 

The efficiency of the Navy, which had steadily deteriorated under 
James I., continued to decrease during the early years of his son 
and successor, although Charles took a much more intelligent 
interest in the lieet than James had ever been capable of taking. 
In the opinion of Mr. Oppenheim, the Cadiz expedition of 1625 
probably indicated the low water mark of English seamanship. 
" There have," he says, " been many previous and subsequent 
occasions when fleets were sent to sea equally ill-found and ill- 
provided, but never before or since have we such accounts of utter 
incapacity in the mere everyday work of a sailor's duties. The 
shameful picture of that confused mass of ships crowded together 
helplessly, without order or plan, colliding with each other, chasing 
or deserting at their own will, the officers losing spars and sails from 
ignorance of the elementary principles of their art, is the indictment 
against the government of James I., which had allowed the seaman- 
ship of Elizabeth to die out in this generation." ^ 

The worst feature in the situation — and it was a feature which 
grew darker as the years of Charles's reign went on — was that the 
seamen, being ill-fed, ill-clothed, and irregularly paid, were terribly 
discontented. Wages, as has been seen, were raised, but for many 
years the increment was practically a paper one only. The men 
got neither the old scale nor the new, except at uncertain intervals. 

' In the first four rates only. 

2 S. P. Dom. .xxxv. 10: Add. MSS. 9339, 24. 

■' ' Admin, of Royal Xavy,' 226. 

' Il>. 220. 




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1629.] NAVAL DISCONTENT. 15 

They mutinied, they rioted, they turned marauders in order to 

supply their empty stomachs ; they even threatened to besiege the 

Court at Whitehall,^ and they actuahy seized the Guildhall at 

Plymouth.'-^ In 1629, Sir Henry Mervyn, commanding in the 

Narrow Seas, officially set forth the sad state of the men, and 

prophetically concluded : " His Majesty will lose the honour of his 

seas, the love and loyalty of his sailors, and his Eoyal Navy will 

droop." ^ In course of time wages were paid more regularly, but 

there was no other improvement. The provisions were bad and 

scanty ; the ships were floating pest-houses ; the sick were turned 

ashore starving. And so it is hardly astonishing that soon after the 

beginning of the Civil "War large bodies of sailors offered their 

services to the Parliament, and that when King and Parliament 

appointed rival commanders in the persons of Penington and 

Warwick, there was a general adhesion to the latter, in spite of the 

fact that Penington, the Boyalist, was personally popular in the 

Navy. The opinion among the seamen seems to have been that 

things were so bad that any change must be a change for the better. 

If so, it was justified by the event. Wages were raised to 19s. a 

month, and were regularly paid ; the food improved in quality, and 

the sick were taken care of. The pay of officers was not raised by 

Parliament until 1647, when it became as follows : Captains, £21 to 

£1 ; heutenants, £4 4s. to £3 lO.s. ; masters, £7 to £3 18s. 8d. ; 

masters' mates, £3 5s, Ad. to £2 2s. ; pilots, £3 5s. M. to £2 2s. ; 

carpenters, £3 3s. to £1 15s. ; boatswains, £3 10s. to £1 17s. 4cZ., and 

gunners, £3 3s. to £1 15s. 

The prescribed contributions to the Chatham Chest were still 
invariably deducted, but the fund itself was mismanaged, and often 
misapphed. Sums, for example, were taken from it to pay wages. 
A Commission appointed in December, 1635, to inquire into the 
administration of the Chest, reported in April, 1637, and as a result 
some reforms were effected.'* 

At the accession of James I., Charles Howard, Earl of Notting- 
ham, was still Lord High Admiral. Before deahng more particularly 
with the changes and reforms effected in the Administration, it may 
be convenient here to set down in a succinct form the successive 

1 S. P. Dom. liii. 9, 10 ; xxxv. 44 ; xli. 56 ; Ixiv. 76 ; Ixxxv. 61, etc. 

^ lb. xcviii. 26. 

3 lb. cxlix. 92. 

* lb. ccclii. 78 ; Add. MSS. 9301, f. 156. 



16 



CIVIL BISTORT, 1603-1649. 



[1649. 



alterations in the high, persoyinel of the Admiralty during the period 
now under review. These were : — 



Lord High Admiral. 

July 8, 1585— 

Charles Howard, Eaii of Nottingham. 
Jan. 28, 1619— 

George Yilliers, Duke of Buckingham, 
Sept. 20, 1628— 

Eichanl, Lord AVeston. 

Enbert, Earl of Lindsey. 

AVilliam, Earl of Pembroke. 

Edward, Earl of Dorset. 

Dudley, Viscount Dorchester. 

Sir John Coke. 
Nov. 20, 1632— 

Eichard, Lord Weston. 

Eobert, Earl of Lindsey. 

Edward, Earl of Dorset. 

Sir John Coke. 

Francis, Lord Cottington. 

Sir Francis Windebank. 

Sir Henry A^ane, senior. 
March 16, 1636— 

William Juxon, Bishop of London 

Francis, Lord Cottington. 

Eobert, Earl of Lindsey. 

Edward, Earl of Dorset. 

Sir John Coke. 

Sir Francis AVindebank. 

Sir Henry A'ane, senior. 
March 18, 1638— 

Prince James, Duke of York. 
April 13, 1638— 

Algernon Percy, Earl of Northumber- 
land (acting substitute). 



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"PEINCIPAL OFFICEKS. 
Treasurer of the Navy. 

Dec. 22, 1598. Fulke Grevill, Lord Brooke. 
1604. Sir Eobert Mansell. 



May 10, 1618. Sir William Eussell. 
April 5, 1627. Sir Sackville Crowe. 

1629. Sir AVilliam Eussell. 
Jan. 12, 1639. Sir AVilliam Eussell. j 
Sir Henry Vane, junior./ 

1642. Sir AVilliam Eussell. 

1642. Sir Henry A^aue, junior. 



Aug. 



Surveyor of the Navy. 



Dec. 20, 1598. Sir John Trevor. 

1611. Sir Eichard Bingley. 

Contkoller of the Navy. 

Dec. 20, 1598. Sir Henry Palmer. 

1611. Sir Guildford Slingsby. 
[In 1618, the Surveyor and Controller 
were " sequestered from their posts," and 
their duties were entrusted to a Board of 
Navy Commissioners,] 

Navy Commissioners. 

Feb. 12, 1619.1 Sir Lionel Cranfield,^ 
Sir Thomas AVeston. 
Sir John Wolstenholme. 
Sir Thomas Smith. 
Nicholas Fortescue. 
John Osborne. 
Francis Gofton. 
Eichard Sutton. 
AVilliam Pitt. 
John Coke.^ 
Thomas Norreys. 
AA^illiam BurrelL* 

Surveyor of the Navy (re-apjoointed 
1628). 

1628. Sir Thomas Aylesbury. 
Dec. 19, 1632. Kenrick Edisbury (alias 

AVilkinson). 
Sept. 26, 1638. AVilliam Batten. 



^ Date of Letters Patent. These, with few changes, held office until 1628. Pepys 
('Diary,' March 14, 1669) calls this the Grand Commission. It was renewed, with 
alterations, in 1625. 

'^ Created a baron in 1621, and later Earl of Middlesex. He was impeached and 
imprisoned in 1624, and died in 1645. 

3 Knighted 1624. 

* Burrell liad been Master Shipwright to the East India Company, and was one of 
the chief shipwrights in tlie reign of James I. He was succeeded as Master Shipwright 
by Peter Pett in 1629, and died in 3630. 



1649.] 



NAVAL ADMINISTRATION. 



17 



CoNTKOLLER OP THE Navy (re-appoiiited 
1628). 

Feb. 1628. Sir Guildford Slingsby. 
1632. Sir Henry Palmer. 

Clerk of the Navy (later " of the 
Acts"). 
1600. Peter (later Sir Peter) 
Buck. 
Denis Fleming. 
Feb. 16, IGai). Thomas Barlo\v. 

Extra Principal Officers. 

1629. William Burrell (assist.). 
Phineas Pett (assist.). 



Oct. 
Jan. 



1630. Sir Kenelm Digby. 

1631. Phineas Pett. 



Surveyors of Victualling. 

1595. Marmaduke Darell. 
Aug. 16, 1603. Sir Marmaduke Darell."* 
Sir Thomas Bludder. J 
Dec. 31, 1612. Sir Marmaduke Darell.' 

Sir Allen Apsley.- 
Jan. 8, 1623. Sir Allen Apsley. \ 
Sir Sampson Darell.j 
1630. Sir Sampson Darell. 
Nov. 20, 1635. John Crane. 



After the commencement of the Civil War the greater part of 
the civil staff of the Admiralty went over to the service of the 
Parliament, w^hich assumed control through the medinmship of 
committees. 

Nottingham was already fifty-two at the time of the defeat of 
the Spanish Armada. At the accession of James I., he was sixty- 
seven. Yet he remained Lord Admiral mitil he was eighty-two. 
He was, midoubtedly, an honest man ; but in his old age he left far 
too much to his subordinates, some of whom, especially Sir Kobert 
Mansell, the Treasurer, were not honest, and, in consequence, the 
administration of the Navy became most corrupt and inefficient. 
As early as 1608, the numerous scandals compelled the formation 
of a commission of inquiry, w^hich consisted of the Earls of Notting- 
ham and Northampton, Lord Zouche, Sir Edward Wotton, Sir 
Juhus Csesar, Sir Eobert Cotton, and others ; and this sat from 
May, 1608, to June, 1609. But the only experienced seaman on 
the commission was the Earl of Nottingham, who never attended 
the meetings. A report^ was drawn up, and the King himself 
lectured the parties who were found to have been guilty of 
malpractices ; but no effective steps were taken for securing 
reforms. 

The evils, in consequence, continued and increased. In 1613, 
Cotton attempted to obtain another inquiry, but failed. In 1618, 
however, when, as Gardiner says, "the household was one mass of 
peculation and extravagance," the efforts of the party of reform met 

> Darell died in 1622. 

2 Later Apsley became Lieutenant of the Tower. He died in 1630. 

3 S. P. Dom. Jac. L xli. The depositions are in Cott. MSS. Julius, F. iii. 

VOL. II. C 



18 CIVIL HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1618. 

with more success, mainly, perhaps, because Buckingham, who was 
in the height of his power, desired to have the post of Lord Admiral 
for himself. Nottingham was superseded and pensioned. Mansell 
was got rid of ; Bingley, the surveyor, and Slingsby, the controller, 
were " sequestered " ; Navy Commissioners inquired, reported, and 
were given charge of the surveyorship and controllership ; and 
various radical changes were effected. 

The report ^ issued by the Commissioners upon their assumption 
of office was a very long and searching one. It showed, among 
other things, to quote Mr. Oppenheim,^ that — 

" All the frauds of 1608 were still nourishing, with some new ones due to the lapse 
of time. Places were still sold, and at such high prices that the buyers ' profess openly 
that they cannot live unless they may steal ' ; the cost of the Navy had of late been 
some £53,000 a year, ' that could not keep it from decay.' For building a new shiii in 
place of the Bonaventure £5700 had been allowed, but, although £1700 had been paid 
on account of it, no new vessel had been commenced ; and, though this same ship ' was 
broken up above seven years past, yet the King hath paid £63 yearly for keeping her.' 
Further, ' the Advantage was burnt about five years since, and yet keepeth at the 
charge of £104 9s. 5c?. ; the Charles was disposed of in Scotland two years since, and 
costeth £60 16s. \0d. for keeping.' For repairing the Merhonour, Defiance, Vanf/uaiil, 
and Dreadnought, £23,500 had been paid, ' for which eight new ships might have been 
built as the accounts of the East India Company do prove; yet all this while the 
King's ships decayed : and if the Merhonour were repaired, she was left so imperfect 
that before her finishing she begins again to decaj^.' In nine years £108,000 had lieen 
charged for cordage : and the Commissioners express their intention of reducing the 
exi^enditure on this item by two-thirds." 

The Commissioners made very great reforms in many directions, 
and, at the close of their first five years of office, delivered a report ^ 
of the work done by them. They had, they said, found in 1618, 
twenty-three serviceable and ten unserviceable ships, of together 
15,670 tons, with four decayed galleys and four hoys, costing 
i653,000 a year ; and they had, in 1624, thirty-five serviceable ships 
of 19,339 tons, besides the galleys and hoys, though the expense 
was little more than £30,000 a year, inclusive of the charges for 
building ten new vessels.'* But even the Commissioners themselves 
were not beyond suspicion. Coke suspected some of his colleagues 
of bribery in connection with the Algier Expedition, and kept them 
under espionage.^ And several gross abuses, such, for example, 

' S. r. Doni. c. and ci. 3. 
•^ ' Admin, of Royal Navy,' 195. 
•'' S. P. Dom. clvi. 12. 

■• But the Pipe Office Accounts show the total naval expenditure in 1623 (inclusive 
of that for the fleet sent to Spain for Prince Charles) to have been £62,000. 
" S. P. Dom. cli. 35. 



1628.] CORRVPTION IN THE SERVICE. 19 

as the employment as captains of influential landsmen, were 
not corrected, nor even seriously attacked, until a luucli later 
period.-^ 

And, in course of time, direction by Commissioners was found to 
be slow and cumbersome. Charles I. complained of it to Bucking- 
ham in 1627."^ After Buckingham's assassination, it was deemed 
more convenient to put the office of Lord High Admiral into 
commission, and to allow the Principal Officers of the Navy to 
resume their full duties. The Treasurer's office had by that time 
become almost entirely financial. In 1630 his emoluments were 
increased by the grant of a house at Deptford, and of a poundage 
of threepence on all payments, including wages, made to him. In 
1634, his fixed salary was raised from £270 13s. 4cZ. to £645 13.s. 4fZ.^ 

The other Principal Officers flourished correspondingly, by foul 
means as well as by fair. Palmer once excused himself for selling 
government cordage and pocketing the proceeds, by saying that 
" his predecessors had done the like." Digby, who had no defined 
duties on the Board, proposed at one time to purchase from Sir 
Henry Mervyn the latter's command in the Channel ; but Mervyn 
seems to have asked too much, viz., his arrears of pay to the amount 
of £5000, and the £3000 which he himself had given for his position. 
In 1628, the Principal Officers met in St. Martin's Lane ; but in 
1630 rooms for them were taken in Mincing Lane at a rent of £30 
a year. They cost £150 to furnish ; twelve months' beer for the 
officers and their staff cost £13 8s. at a time w^hen beer was but 
£1 10s. a tun ; and, upon the whole, it is clear that so long as 
comfort and perquisites were obtainable, the efficiency of the 
service was a secondary consideration. In 1634, Palmer, Pett, and 
Fleming, Clerk of the Acts, were suspended for malversation of 
stores. They were no worse than their inferiors. The dockyard 
officials robbed wholesale ; the captains turned their ships into 
cargo boats for their own profit, and conspired with the pursers to 
forge and sell seamen's tickets ; carpenters, gunners, boatswains, 
and pursers, cheated and swindled ; imaginary men were borne in 
nearly all ships, and their wages were shared among the officers ; 
and government storehouses were converted into surreptitious 

^ A Special Commission appointed in 1626 to inquire into tlie State of the Xavy 
produced no results. 

2 ' Eoyal Letters' (Halliwell), ii. 277. 

3 Add. MSS. 9301, f. 110. 

c 2 



20 CIVIL HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1633. 

residences for governraent servants and their families.-^ There were 
also sinecurists and phirahsts. In 1626, a Rochester man, to sell it 
again, offered £100 for the piirsership of the Anne Royal, which he 
could not himseK hold. Another man was simultaneously purser of 
the George and cook of the Bear, and filled both offices by deputy. 
And the pursers made ever increasing profit on the sale of slop- 
clothes, the issue of which had begun in 1623 ;- and derived illegiti- 
mate fees from the contractors who delivered them on board. 
As a result, the seamen bought hardly any slops, and preferred 
to go ragged. 

The Earl of Northumberland, as acting Lord High Admiral, 
reduced and regulated the pursers' profits on slop clothes by orders 
issued in 1641 f and, at about the same time, public opinion within 
the Navy apparently began to improve, and, if not actually to 
condemn, at least to look askance on, peculation, fraud, and the sale 
of places. But there was no noticeable cessation of the evil practices 
until the establishment of the Commonwealth ; and they flourished 
again with full vigour for many years after the Kestoration. 

In the reign of James I., Deptford was still the principal dock- 
yard, but Chatham was beginning to rival it. In the reign of 
Charles I., Portsmouth drew a little to the front, and Woolwich, 
temporarily discarded, was leased in 1633 to the East India 
Company for £100 a year.^ Under James, the dry dock at Deptford 
was enlarged , and the yard was surrounded by a paling ; and a 
ropebouse was established at Woolwich. In 1619, the paling at 
Deptford gave place to a brick wall. Four years later, the dry dock 
at Portsmouth, the earliest of the kind built in England, w^as filled 
up, apparently because that part of the yard was threatened by 
incursions of the sea.^ Chatham obtained two mast docks in 1619 
and 1620, and much additional ground, on part of which a dock, a 
ropehouse, and various brick and lime kilns were erected.'' Another 
dock was under construction in 1623. The chief officers of the yard 
had up to about that time lodged at Winchester House ; they appear 
to have then removed to a house on Chatham Hill, leased from the 
Dean and Chapter of Rochester. Portsmouth largely owed to 

' For an exposure of these and other evils, see John Holloud's ' Discourse of tlie 
Navy' (Add. MSS. 9335), printed by the Navy Eecords Society, 1896. 

^ " To avoyde nastie beastlyness bj' continuall wearinge of one suite of clothes, and 
tlierebie boddilie diseases and unwholesome ill smells in every ship." 

•'' S. r. Dom. ccccxxix. 33. * Add. MSS. 9302, f. 42. 

^ Pipe Off. Accts. 2201. « lb. 2260. 



1635.] NAVAL PUNISHMENTS. 21 

Buckingham its growth in importance, and from his time some 
vessels were always stationed there ; but not till 1638 was a master 
shipwright ordered into permanent residence at the yard ; and a 
new dry dock was not begun there until 1656. As a naval centre, 
indeed, Portsmouth was still far behind Chatham.. 

The chain, drawn by Hawkyns across the Medway at Upnor, 
was repaired in 1606, and, in 1623, gave place to a boom composed 
of masts, iron, cordage, and the hulls of two ships and two pinnaces. 
A new boom or a new chain was probably placed in position 
about 1635.^ 

Naval punishments were, as in previous periods, of a barbarous 
type, ducking, keel-hauling, tongue-scraping, and tying up with 
weights about the neck being common. The ancient custom of 
lashing to the bowsprit a seaman who had four times slept upon his 
watch, and of letting him drown or starve there, also survived. 
But some of these punishments were not strictly legal ; and in the 
days of Charles many officers, and especially Penington and 
Mervyn, leant in the direction of a less ferocious regime. Yet the 
regulations were still strict. 

" Prayer," says Mr. Oppenlieim,^ " was said twice daily^before dinner, and after the 
psalm sung at setting the evening watch ; and anyone absent was liable to twenty-four 
hours in irons. Swearing Avas ])unished bj^ three knocks on the forehead with a lioat- 
swain's whistle, and smoking anywhere but on the upper deck, ' and that sparingly,' by 
the bilboes. The thief was tied up to the capstan, ' and every man in the ship shall 
give him five lashes with a three-stringed whip on his bare back.' This is, I think, the 
first mention of any form of cat. The habitual thief was, after flogging, dragged ashore 
astern of a boat and ignominiously dismissed with the loss of his wages. For brawling 
and fighting the offender was ducked three times from the yardarm, and similarly 
towed ashore and discharged ; while for striking an ofticer he was to be tried for his 
life by twelve men, but whether shipmates or civilians is not said. If a man slept on 
watch, three buckets of water were to be poured upon his head and into his sleeves ; 
and anyone, except * gentlemen or officers,' jjlaying cards or dice incurred four hours of 
manacles. It is suggestive to read that ' no man presume to strike in the ship but such 
officers as are authorised.' " 

Neither the public sense nor the law, however, seems to have 
been outraged when the letter of legality was overstepped by 
captains, either in the Navy or in the merchant service. The 
master of a Virginia trader hung up an insubordinate boy by the 
wrists, and tied two hundredweights to his feet. The boy laid 
a complaint before the Admiralty Court, but the judge. Sir H. 

1 S. P. Dom. cccii. 27. 

2 ' Admin, of Eoyal Navy,' 239, citing S. P. Dom. Ivi. 101 (1627), and ccccvii. 32. 



22 CIVIL EI6T0BT, 1603-1649. [1627. 

Martin, refused redress, on the ground that the maintenance of 
sea discipHne was necessaiT.^ 

During the whole of this period it was usual, when extra vessels 

were needed for naval purposes, to hire ships from the merchants, 

and to arm them. But Penington, hke other commanders, had 

but a lo\\- opinion of such craft, considering fifteen of them not 

a match for two regular men-of-war, their guns being defective, and 

their ammunition small in quantity.^ Their discipline also was bad. 

" In 16-25. they had to be forced under fire at Cadiz by threats ; in 

16-28, at Eochelle, they fired vigorously, but well out of any useful 

or hazardous range. In this year, the captain of one of them killed, 

injured, and maltreated his men, while he and five gentlemen 

volunteers consumed sixteen men's allowance of food every day ; 

and in January, 1627, when some of them, lying in Stokes Bay, 

were ordered westward, they mutinied, and w^ould only sail for the 

Downs." ^ The rate of hire under James I. and his successor was 

two shillings per month per ton ; but this was often not paid for 

several years.* Up to 1624, and again from 1626 onwards, a bounty 

of five shiUings a ton was offered to induce the building of merchant 

vessels suitable for adaptation to the purposes of war. After 1642, 

the Parliament, instead of paying so much per ton per month, 

offered MS los. 6d. per man per month, the owner supplying his 

vessel completely armed, manned, and equipped for sea, and the 

State being responsible in case of her loss. 

The police of the home seas was disgracefully mismanaged under 
both James I. and Charles I. Dunquerque privateers infested the 
Channel, and rovers from the Mediterranean hovered about the 
coasts ; while the people of Ireland and the western counties were 
many of them either pirates themselves or in league with such 
freebooters.' It was sought to cope with the evil by granting 
waiTants to the merchants to cruise against the pirates, and to 
retain three-fourths of any goods seized from them.*^ In the middle 
of James's reign, a Sallee rover was taken in the Thames, and a fleet 
of thirty Mussulman corsairs cruised in the Atlantic. Between 
160'.) and 1616, no fewer than four hundred and sixty-six British 
vessels were captured by the Algerines, and their crews enslaved. 
Mansell's expedition of 1621 checked the evil only for the moment. 

' S. r. Pom. cc-lx.xi. 12.  Add. MSS. 9302, f. 24. 

■' Ih. xlii. loo. r. Q^^^^ j^jgg_ otho E, viii. f. 316. 

" '.\diiiiii. (.f I?nval Navy,' 22!i. « S. V. Dora. Ixxxvi. 101. 



1640.] 



FIB ACT. 



23 



The Newfoundland Compan}^ complained that since 1612 it had 
received damage from the pirates to the value of £40,000 ; Swanage 
was in terror of the Turks, and petitioned for a blockhouse ; and 
Trinity House objected to the Lizard Light on the ground that it 
would be of assistance to the marauders. Under Charles I., the 
nuisance grew even graver. Such men-of-war as cruised to protect 
trade in home waters were not good enough sailers to come up with 
the fast Dunquerquers and lateen-rigged Turks. Within only ten 
days in 1625, according to the Mayor of Plymouth, the pirates took 
twenty-seven vessels and two hundred men.-^ Nor was this all. 
On the night of June 30th, 1631, a body of Algerines landed at 
Baltimore in Munster, sacked the town, and carried off two hundred 
and thirty-seven British subjects into slavery. 

The Government was too much in fear of the adoption of 
retaliatory measures to be very severe upon such Algerines as were 
caught from time to time.^ They were not executed, because there 
were in Sallee two thousand English people in peril of their lives. 
These freebooters had much their own way on the west and south. 
On the east the Dunquerquers enforced something almost akin to 
a blockade ; so that at one time, at Ipswich alone, fifty-eight 
vessels were laid up, and, at another, Lynn was plundered and 
partially burnt. ^ Tunnage and poundage was supposed to provide 
for the protection of the coasts ; but in 1628, in addition, duties 
were levied on sea-borne coal from Sunderland and Newcastle to 
pay for it ; yet without any perceptible abatement of the scourge. 
Even when the ship-money fleets were at sea, coasters and Dover 
packets 'were overhauled and pillaged almost in sight of his Majesty's 
ships, and the Channel was full of Algerines."^ Eainborow's ex- 
pedition to Sallee, like Mansell's to Algier, gave but temporary 
relief ; for in 1640 there were sixty sail of Algerines off the south 
coast, and the unbelievers executed a successful raid near Penzance.^ 

The comparative impunity with which the Mediterranean corsairs 
carried out their operations was due perhaps almost as much to the 
disunion of the Christian Powers as to the weakness of Britain. 
Yet it is strange that while Britain in her own seas was at the 
mercy of these pirates, she still jealously maintained the right of her 
flag as against civilised states. Monson enforced it in the Downs in 



1 S. P. Dom. V. 6, 24, 36. 

2 lb. XXX. 17 ; xliii. 46. 
^ lb. xxxiv. 85 ; Ivi. 66. 



* ' Admin, of Eoyal Navy,' 276. 
5 S. P. Dom. cccclix. 8, 60. 



24 CIVIL BISTORT, 1603-1649. [1642. 

1604, when a Dutch squadron lay there ; Mansell enforced it in 1620 
against a French squadron on the coast of Spain ; Selden, in 1634, 
wrote his ' i\Iare Clausum ' in defence of it, Charles ordering a copy 
of the hook to be kept for ever as a piece of evidence in the Court of 
Admiralty. Lindsey was. sent to sea in 1635 especially to vindicate 
the honour claimed by Great Britain, and in 1636 Northumberland 
received the mark of deference both from the Dutch and from the 
Spaniards.^ 

The rations of the seamen were nominally, and when they were 
served out in full, the same as in the age of Elizabeth, viz., one 
pound of biscuit and one gallon of beer daily, with, on four days of 
the week, two pounds of salt beef (or alternatively on two of those 
days one pomid of bacon or pork, and one pint of peas), and on the 
other three days fish, dried or fresh, two ounces of butter, and a 
quarter of a pound of cheese. The allowance paid to the contractors 
for these victuals in 1622 was, per head, l^d. per day in harbour, 
and 8^. at sea ; but in Elizabeth's time the allowance had been but 
4i^£?. and bd. In 1635 the allowance rose further, the rates being 
l^d. and S^cZ., but owing to the advance in prices, the contractor, 
even on those terms, declared that he lost money, and in 1638 
he gave notice to terminate the arrangement. At that time beef 
was about 2jc7. and pork about l^d. a pound, stockfish about 
iJ4 5.9. a cwt., biscuit about 15s. a cwt., and beer about £1 16.s. 
a tun. 

Previous to the Civil "War, the crew of one of H.M. ships 
received no regular and fixed proportion of the proceeds of their 
captures, though, under an Order in Council of October, 1626, they 
were to be given "a competent reward." But in October, 1642, 
Parliament assigned to the officers and men of a ship, in addition to 
their pay, one-third of the value of the prizes taken by them. For 
many years, however, it was the practice to make unjustifiable 
deductions on various pretexts, and owing to this, and to delays 
in making payment, there was much naval discontent until the 
Commonwealth became firmly established. 

Soon after the union of England and Scotland in 1603, all 
British vessels for a time flew the Union Flag of the crosses 

^ These examples iiiif^lit be largely added to. lu Jvdy, 1626, for instance, the 
captain of Deal Castle fired at a Dutchruau which came into the roads -with her colours 
tlying, and made her master pay ten shillings, the cost of the shot. And in 1632 the 
captain of a man-of-war, sent to Calais to fetch the body of Sir Isaac Wake, forced the 
French to lower their flag to him. ' Admin, of Eoyal Navy,' 2!tl. 



1606.] 



THE UNION FLAG. 



25 



of St. George and St. Andrew/ but on May 5th, 1634, it was 
ordered by proclamation^ that men-of-war only were to fly it 
in future, and that merchantmen, according to their nationality, 
were to wear the St. George's or the St. Andrew's Flag merely. 
This rule endured until February, 1649, when Parliament directed 
men-of-war to wear as an ensign the St. George's Cross on a 
white field. 

Little progress was made in the art of signalling at sea. At 



F 


1 














T" 


















. 
























THE ENGLISH FLAG, BEFORE 1603, 



THE SCOTS FLAG, BEFORE 1603. 



night two lights from the flagship, to be answered by one light 
from each private ship, signified "shorten sail"; three lights 
arranged vertically astern signified "make sail"; waving a light 



f^ 




THE UNION FLAG, AS ORDERED IN 1606. 



from the poop signified "lie to," etc. Day signalling by means of 
flags was still in its infancy. In fleets the van flew the blue at the 

^ It was carried, under an order of April 13th, 1606, in the main-top, English and 
Scotch vessels also carrying their national colours in the fore-top. The first Union Flag 
is heraldically described as : " Azure a saltire Argent, surmounted of a cross Gules 
hmhriated of the second." The fimbriation was made one-third of the width of the red 
cross, and the red cross was made one-fifth of the width of the flag. Contemporary 
pictures seem to show that ensigns of red, white, or blue, bearing St. George's Cross 
on a white canton next the staft", were also commonlj^ carried vnitil the time of the 
Commonwealth. 

2 ' Foedera,' xix. 519. 



26 CIVIL EISTORY, 1603-1G49. [1635. 

main, and the Union at the fore ; the rear flew the white at the 
main, and the Union at the mizen ; and the centre flew the Union at 
the main, for distinction of squadrons. 

Eepeated mention has been made in these pages of the ancient 
practice of creating fleets by the process of summoning vessels from 
the port towns and coast counties. Part of the fleet for the Cadiz 
Expedition of 16-25 was collected in the old manner. But in 1634, 
the position of foreign affairs suggested to Charles I. the advisability 
of raising a fleet of better fighting value in order to maintain the 
sovereignty of the seas, prevent the French from taking Dunquerque, 
assert his right to the North Sea fisheries, and induce the co- 
operation of Spain in certain projects. Noy, the Attorney-General, 
suggested that the requisite money for equipment of vessels should 
be levied from the coast towns, a somewhat similar measure having 
been occasionally adopted in previous ages, though without parlia- 
mentary warrant.^ A ship-money writ was accordiiigly issued in 
October, 1634, and after some remonstrance was submitted to. 
In 1635 a second writ required the inland towns and counties to 
contribute also. There was much opposition, but in December the 
King obtained from ten judges an opinion that the levj^' of ship- 
money upon all was lawful. A third writ was issued in October, 
1636, and in spite of a further favourable opinion from the judges, 
provoked increasing hostility. A fourth writ was issued in the 
autumn of 1637, a fifth in January, 1639, and a sixth in 1640. 

By the writ of 1635, a ship of 450 tons, manned and equipped 
for six months, or in default a sum of ^64500, was demanded from 
the county of Buckingham. The constitutional struggle arose out 
of this fact, John Hampden, of Great Hampden, refusing to pay his 
share, and standing his trial in respect of 20.9. claimed from him for 
lands in the parish of Stoke Mandeville. Judgment was given in 
June, 1638, seven out of twelve judges deciding for the Crown, 

^ In lfil9, soon after Buckingham's appointment as Lord High Admiral, King 
James, apprehensive of a rupture with Spain, ordered that si.x. ships of the Koyal Navy- 
should be prepared for immediate service. Fourteen other ships were to be equipped by 
the merchants ; and directions were given to the City Companies to pay £40,000 which 
had been assessed upon tliem. It was also decided that the old tax of ship-money 
should be levied at the other ports ; and the magistrates were accordingly required to 
make up the sum of £8550 amongst them. The simis assessed were as follows:— 
Bristol, £2500; Exeter, £1000; Plymouth, £1000; Dartmouth, £1000; Barnstaple, 
£500; Hull, £500; Weymouth, £450; Southampton, £300; Newcastle, £300; the 
Cinque Ports, £200 ; Yarmouth, £200 ; Ipswich, £150 ; Colchester, £150 ; Poole, £100; 
Chester, £100; Lyme, £100. 



1638.] THE SHIP-MONEY QUESTION. 27 

three for Hampden on all grounds, and two for him on technical 
.grounds only. Charles I. was at one time willing to allow the 
judgment to go before the House of Lords upon a writ of error, and 
be reversed, but various considerations prevented the carrying out 
of that plan. When the Long Parliament met, the Commons on 
December 7th, 1640, and the Lords on January 20th, 1641, agreed 
to resolutions declaring the levying of ship-money to be illegal, and 
a bill to the same effect, being brought in by Selden, received the 
royal assent on August 7th, 1641.^ 

The fleets raised by ship-money were ill-found and ill-organised, 
but of imposing proportions, and Mr. Oppenheim, who nowhere 
conceals his contempt for the methods of those who raised them, 
and, indeed, for the Stuarts in general, is forced to admit that but 
for the forces which the writs enabled King Charles to send to sea, 
" the strife with France and Holland might have been precipitated 
by nearly half a century. That they had some such intimidating 
influence was shown by the care taken by the French fleets, also 
cruising, to avoid meeting them, and the efforts of the French Court 
to evade the question of the dominion of the Narrow Seas." ^ 

Just as the ship-money question had an important bearing upon 
the internal history of the country, so an episode of 1623 had an 
important bearing upon the history of the country's foreign relations. 
This episode was known as the Amboyna affair. Amboyna, one of 
the Moluccas, had been taken by the Dutch from the Portuguese 
in 1607. The English, after having been expelled from the place, 
obtained in 1619 the right to trade there ; but the treaty was ill- 
kept on both sides, and in February, 1623, the Dutch tortured to 
death several English factors, upon pretence that they had intrigued 
with the natives.^ This massacre was one of the main causes of the 
bad feeling between England and Holland in the middle of the 
seventeenth century, and although Holland, after the war of 1651-54, 
submitted to pay £300,000 to the descendants of the victims, the 
massacre was not forgotten in England, and its memory, for many 
years afterwards, often provoked ill-blood. 

The properties of the geometrical series which constitute the 
foundation of the doctrine of logarithms seem to have been known 

1 Hallam, ' Const. Hist.' ; Gardiner, ' Hist, of England ' ; Clarendon, ' Hist, of the 
Rebellion ' ; Xugeut, ' Memorials of Hampden.' Hampden was mortally wounded at 
Chalgrove Field on June 18th, 1643. 

2 ' Admin, of Royal Navy,' 218. 

^ For an account of the details of this affair, see Chap. XYIII. 



28 CIVIL HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1649. 

as long ago as the days of Archimedes ; they are also touched upon 
in the writings of sixteenth century German mathematicians. But 
these properties and their advantageous utilisation were not properly 
understood until the puhlication by John, Lord Napier of Merchis- 
toun, in 1(314, of his work, ' Mirifici Logarithmorum Canonis 
Descriptio.' The discovery was further improved by Henry Briggs, 
who at the time of Napier's publication was Professor of Geometry 
at Gresham College, and who later became Savilian Professor at 
Oxford. The work of Napier and Briggs, and of their con- 
temporaries Adrian Valcq of Gouda, and Henry Gellibrand of 
Gresham College, in connection wdth this subject, had a most 
valuable influence upon the development of the practice of naviga- 
tion, as well as of other branches of mathematics, and deserves 
commemoration here. 

While England Avas drifting towards the great constitutional 
struggle which more than any other laid the foundations of her 
freedom, her small transatlantic colonies, though still in their 
feeblest infancy, were also doing something towards the making of 
the prosperity and greatness to which, under independent govern- 
ment, they have since attained. A small ship was built at or near 
Boston, Massachusetts, as early as 1633, and in 1639 laws for the 
encouragement of the American fisheries were passed. These 
exempted fishermen during the season, and shipwrights at all 
seasons, from military duty, and no doubt had much effect in 
turning the attention of the colonists to the advantages of sea life. 
Two years later a ship of 300 tons was constructed at Salem, and 
in 1646 a vessel of 150 tons was built in Ehode Island.^ Such were 
the small beginnings of a mercantile marine which, two hundred 
years afterwards, seemed about to challenge, at least for a time, 
Great Britain's supremacy as the ocean carrier of the goods of 
the world. 

' J. F. Cooper, ' History of the Navy of the U.S.A. ' (1840), i. 18, 19. 




( 29 ) 



CHAPTEK XVIII. 

MILITARY HISTOEY OF THE EOYAL XAYY, 1603-1649. 

L. Care Laughton. 

James I. aud the succession — The Houour of the Flag — The East ludia Company — 
James Lancaster — Sir Henry Middleton — Thomas Best — Nicholas Downton — A 
great Portuguese carrack — Capture of Ormuz — Buckingham and the Company — 
The Dutch in the East Indies — Eelations with the Dutch — The Banda Islands — 
Nathaniel Courthope — Sir Thomas Dale — The Amboyna Massacre — Anglo-Dutch 
combination — Fight off Gombroon — Heavy Portuguese loss — Fight oft' Damaun — 
Loss of the Lion — Peace ■with Spain — Growth of piracy — Sir "William Monson — 
The Barbary pirates — Expedition to Algier — Piaiuborow at Sallee — Relations with 
Holland and Spain — Eich's piracy — Argall in Virginia — Dunquerquers in Scottish 
ports — Spanish vessels in the Downs — Penington's ships used against La Eochelle 
— The Cadiz Expedition — War with France — The St. Peter of Le Havre — Lord 
Willoughby's Expedition — Buckingham's fleet — The Expedition to Ehe — Its failure 
— Capture of the St. ii'.sp?'<Y— Denbigh's failure — Buckingham's unpopularity — 
His assassination — Lindsey sails to La Eochelle — Surrender of La Eochelle — 
Eecrudescence of piracy — The Dutch herring busses — The Ship-Monej^ fleets — 
Oquendo in the Downs — Attitude of the English — Scheme of the King — Tromp's 
victory — The Irish Eebellion — The Civil War — The allegiance of the Navy — The 
dual appointment — Eainboron' set ashore — The Eoyalist fleet. 

rpHE death of Elizabeth entirely changed 
the course of naval aifairs. James cared 
little for the old Elizabethan sentiment that 
looked on the Spaniard as a natural enemy ; 
nor was the fact that the war could be made 
to pay its own expenses inducement enough to 
make him forego the delights of peace. Eliza- 
beth had had in preparation two squadrons 
destined to cruise against Philip; "for the 
Queen held it both secure, and a profitable 
course, to keep a continual force upon the 
Spanish coacts." ^ Of these squadrons, the first, 
which should have sailed in February, was to 
have been commanded by Sir Eichard Leveson ; 
and the latter, intended to recruit the former in June, was to have 
^ Monson, ' Tracts,' p. 206, in Churchill's Voyages, vol. ill. 




30 MILITARY BISTORT, 1603-1649. [1605. 

gone out under Sir A\'illiam Monson. The first squadron was ready 
for sea, but in view of the Queen's ilhiess and the possibihty of a 
disputed succession, did not sail. As, in preparation for the peace 
signed in August, 1604, James began by forbidding the capture of 
Spanish prizes, these ships never proceeded to their destination. 
From them, however, was composed a fleet of eight sail which, 
under Leveson, with Monson as second-in-command, cruised on the 
coasts of France and Flanders, ready to take action should any 
attempt be made from abroad to interfere with the succession.^ But 
Henry IV., whether overawed or not by this fleet, which kept well 
in with the French coast, made no demonstration. At the end of 
the summer the ships were recalled to Chatham ; and, from that 
moment until the end of the reign, the Royal Navy had but scant 
opportunities of seeing active service. 

The Dutch had been in the habit of attacking Spanish vessels 
wherever they met them, and, so long as we were ourselves at war 
with Spain, no opposition had been offered to their so doing, even 
in English waters. Now, however, pending the signing of the 
peace, James determined to assert his rights : Monson was appointed 
Admiral of the Narrow Seas, and sailed early in 1605 to uphold the 
honour of the flag. Incidentally it is worth noticing how this zeal 
was made to forward the scheme which the King had most at heart. 
This action on the part of the English helped to augment the ill- 
feeling which was already growing up in Holland against us, and to 
pave the way for the many petty quarrels which resulted in the first 
Dutch War. On May 10th, 1605, Monson, coming into the Downs, 
found there six Dutch ships. Having learnt that their presence was 
due to a Dunquerquer which was then lying in Sandwich Harbour, 
he ordered them to stay two tides after she had sailed, and 
threatened to sink them if the Dunquerquer were molested.^ In the 
same year the Dutch drove under the guns of Dover a squadron of 
eight Spanish ships carrying one thousand soldiers to Flanders. 
Again the Dutch could not reach their enemy, but many months 
passed before the Spaniards could find a chance of eluding the 
blockade and putting over to Dunquerque. 

Yet notwithstanding the odium which we were incurring on their 

' Wlietlier by accident or design the flagship Repulse was less powerful than 
Monson's sliip the Mcrhonour. Monson himself said that the reason for tliis was that 
the Council was not sure of Leveson, but did not like to supersede him. ' Tr.' p. 510. 

■' ' Tracts,' p. 242. . 



1605.] THE EAST INDIA COMPANY. 31 

behalf, " notwithstanding the peace with Spain was concluded, 
the Spaniards continued their depredations on our merchants, and 
began to lead King James by the nose." ^ But James "shunned 
hostihties with a caution that was proof against the insults of his 
neighbours," ^ and, on one side only, the old maxim, that no peace 
held good " south of the line," was fully maintained. 

Yet though the King's ships lay idle for many years, the armed 
vessels of the newly-foUnded ^ East India Company were busy laying 
for us the foundations of an empire in the Far East. In them the 
Company's servants followed the Portuguese and the Dutch into 
eastern waters, much as the Jesiis and the Golden Hind had 
followed the Spaniards into the Far West ; and, though less is 
generally known of the exploits of Best and Downton than of 
those of John Hawkyns and Francis Drake, this would seem to be 
due, in great measure, to the want of romance in their setting out, 
as compared with the glamour of chivalry which surrounded the 
semi-religious * undertakings of the Elizabethan worthies. • 

First in the field in the East Indies were the Portuguese ; ^ after 
them came the Dutch, and last of all, three years after the Dutch, 
came the English. The East India Company was founded in 1600, 
while England was still at w^ar with Spain, and while Portugal was 
still a province of Spain. This alone was reason enough to account 
for the fighting that ensued. That hostilities did not cease in the 
Far East when peace was made in Europe was but in accordance 
with the spirit of the age ; a war of reprisals went on, and when 
to this was added trade jealousy, and the Portuguese belief in the 
Papal Bull," which conferred on them sole rights in those seas, it 
will be easily understood that the struggle became intensely bitter. 

The ships of the Company were built at least as much for w^ar 
as for trade ; ^ most of them were of 500 tons and upwards and 
carried from twenty to thirty guns of moderate calibre, w^ith crews 
of two hundred men. They were just such ships, in fact, as swelled 
the fleets that fought in European waters in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. 

1 Lediard, ' Xav. Hist.' p. -403. 

2 Macaulay, ' Kist.' i. 35. 

3 Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 1513-1616. .265, 281, 440, 1069. 
* Spanish Armada, N. E. S. vol. i. pp. xx, etc. 

 5 1513. Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 

« Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 1513-1616. .2. 

^ Cal. S. P. E. Ind. May 15th and 19th, Aug. 21st, 1607 ; July 5th, 1609, etc. 



32 • MILITARY HISTORY, 1G03-1649. [1610. 

The expedition of James Lancaster/ the first that was sent out 
by the new Company, gave a foretaste of what was to come. It has 
been described in Chap. XVI. 

Sir Henry Middleton was a worthy successor to Lancaster, and 
commanded in two of the Company's voyages. In the first, which 
sailed from Gravesend, March 25th, 1604, he was so much weakened 
by famine and fever at sea, and by the scattering of his squadron, 
that he was capable of little interference when he found that the 
Dutch had seized Amboyna, and were struggling with the Portuguese 
for the possession of Ternate and Tidore in the Moluccas.^ 

In 1610 Middleton sailed in command of the Company's sixth 
voyage ; his flagship being the Trade's Increase of 1000 ^ tons. With 
him were two men who, a few j^ears later, did notable service : 
these were Nicholas Downton, in command of the Peppercorn of 
250 tons, and Nathaniel Courthope, in the little Darling of 90 tons. 
Beaching Aden, Middleton left the Peppercorn there while he 
himself and the Darling went on to Mocha. There the Trade's 
Increase went aground, and it became necessary to lighten her in 
order to get her off. As the Aga was profuse in his protestations 
of friendship, Middleton set to work to land cargo and stores. The 
work w^as rudely interrupted by a treacherous attack made on a 
large landing party, of whom eight were killed, and fifty, including 
Middleton, were taken prisoners.* An attack made on the Darling 
was easily beaten off. Middleton was allowed to communicate with 
the ships, and was therefore able to restrain Downton, who arrived 
at this juncture from Aden, from making reprisals. Middleton did 
this, fearing lest hostile action on his part might involve the Com- 
pany in an unprofitable quarrel. Middleton was also allowed to send 
to the ships for provisions, and of this permission he availed himself 
to make his escape. He ordered a quantity of wine and spirits to 
be landed, and plied his keepers with them, " so that at noone they 
went home to rest their laden braines." '" He got on board the 
Darling, and, with the Peppercorn, blockaded Mocha until the 
prisoners, the stores that had been landed, and his ship were given 
up. He then went east and acted much as Lancaster had done. 

^ Cal. 8. P. E. Ind. 27 Uct. 1000. 

2 Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 244, 350. 

•'' Stow, ' Annals,' calls the Trades Increase a ship of 1200 tons. 

* Cal. S. P. 1513-101G..57O. 

'' Purchas, ' Pilgruns,' i. 583. 



1612.] BESTS ACTION. 33 

Off Surat ^ he skirmished with eighteen Portuguese " frigates," ^ and 
for a time was enabled to trade with the town, where as yet we 
had estabhshed no factory. When, in fear of the Portuguese, the 
governor closed the town to him, he returned to the Straits of 
Bab el Mandeb and tried to make his profit by seizing Indian 
ships and holding them to ransom. He did make money by these 
means, and he also obtained compensation from the Turks for the 
treatment he had experienced at Mocha ; but the method does not 
seem to have been so satisfactory as to encourage others to adopt 
it. In the Bed Sea he met John Saris, then on his way to open 
up our first trade with Japan," but a quarrel soon arose which 
separated the squadrons, Middleton then went on to Bantam, 
where the Trade s Increase was careened for repairs to her hull. By 
some accident the ship fell over on her side, and the Javanese 
burnt her as she lay, Middleton ^ and many of the crew perishing 
with her. 

The Portuguese now began to pay more heed to the equipment 
of such of their ships as were likely to meet the Company's 
squadrons. The English usually sailed with a force sufficient to 
save them from serious molestation ; and the Portuguese, dis- 
covering that their trading vessels were no match for these powerful 
armaments, came at last to fit out regularly-appointed war squadrons 
from their local factories. Surat was the first port of call for vessels 
from England, and there they could be found with their cargoes 
still on board, and with hulls and men still the worse for the long 
voyage out. 

The first of the actions which this pohcy entailed was fought in 
October, 1612.^ Hearing that Lancaster's old ship, the Dragon,^' 
Captain Thomas Best, had just arrived from England with but one 
small craft, the Osiander, Captain Christian, in company, the enemy 
hastened to send up from Goa a squadron of four galleons and 
a flotilla of the so-called "frigates." Surat lies on the left bank, 
and at the mouth, of the Tapti Eiver. Parallel with the coast and 

1 Cal. S. P. E. Ind. Oct. 12th, 1611. 

" These " frigates " were large open boats, crowded witli men, who were I'oi- the 
most part native sailors, but they mounted no guns. In light winds or calms they 
proved very dangerous neighbours. 

=* Lediard, p. 428. 

* Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 8th June, 1614. 

^ Cal. S. P. Ind. 1612.. 638. 

*^ Or Bed Dragon, formerly the Scourge of Malice. 

VOL. II. D 



34 MILITARY HIS TORY, 1603-1649. [1612. 

close in with it runs a shoal. Inside this is the anchorage in the 
Sutherland Channel, or, as it was then called, the Swally. There 
the English ships were lying on October 29th when the Portuguese 
hove in sight. Not to be taken by surprise, Best, in the Dragon, 
weighed and stood out to sea. The Osiander was unable to get 
out, but the Dragon, passing between the enemy's admiral and 
vice-admiral, gave each a broadside, and so handled them that 
they were glad to sheer off for that day. Next day, the Osiander 
made her way out of the channel, " and bravely redeemed the 
time she lost the day before. The fiery Dragon (bestirring herself) 
in about three hours' hot fight drove three of the galleons on 
the sands, and then the Osiander, drawing little water, danced 
the hay about them, and so paid them that they dare not show 
a man upon their decks, killing and spoiling their men and battering 
their ships exceedingly."^ On the third day little was done. The 
Portuguese, having the wind, contented themselves with sending 
down a "frigate" as an impromptu fireship, and this Best sank. 
When, shortly afterwards. Best resumed his voyage, the enemy 
declined to meddle further with him. On their own admission 
the Portuguese had lost one hundred and sixty men killed,^ while 
Best reported^ but one man killed in his ships. 

The immediate result of this action was an enormous increase 
of English prestige with the natives. The Great Mogul ceased to 
regard Englishmen as interlopers, and granted permission to estab- 
lish factories at Surat and elsewhere on the coast.* To protect 
these factories the Company provided itself with a few "grabs" or 
" galivats," native boats mounting no more than four or five guns, 
yet often wrongly spoken of as "galleys." These boats are in- 
teresting as marking the origin of what grew to be first the Bombay 
Marine, and then the Indian Navy.^ 

Best, following up this voyage, reached Acheen, where he was 
hospital)ly entertained '^ by the King. His trade was satisfactory, and 

^ Journal of Nicholas Witheringtoii, factor in the voyage. In Lediard, p. 433. 

- This gi'eat loss was probably sustained chiefly in the open boats. Lediard makes 
it oven heavier, suggesting that tliree hundred were killed. 

» Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 1612. .638. 

' Ih. 1614, June 22. 

^' Low, ' Hist. Ind. Xavy,' vol. i. ch. ii. 

" Among other entertainments the King gave a rivei " feast," a"; which the company 
sat in the water and were served by boys swimming. Five hundred dishes are 
mentioned as having been served, with corresponding hot drinks. Best was allowed to 



1614.] DOWNTON'S ACTION. 35 

for this he was thanked by the Company ; but dissatisfaction was 
expressed^ at his "great private trade," with the result that he did 
not go out again. 

In October, 1614, Nicholas Downton reached Surat with a 
squadron of four ships. These were,^ his own, the Neiv Years 
Gift, a new vessel of 550 tons ; the Hector, 500 tons, vice-admiral ; 
the Merchanfs Hope, of 800 tons ; and the Solomon of 200. The 
Portuguese viceroy at Goa, hearing of Downton's presence, saw an 
oj)portunity of avenging Best's victory. He collected a force of 
six large galleons and three smaller ships, two galleys — probably 
"grabs" — mounting in all 134 guns — and 60 "frigates." Some of 
the guns were 42-pounders, and the ships were manned by 8600 men, 
of whom 2600 were Europeans. Against this armada Downton could 
show but four ships, two of them small, and three or four grabs, 
mounting in all 80 guns of small calibre, and manned by 600 men, 
many of whom were sick. Seeing the great disparity of force, the 
Nawab of Surat was anxious to make his peace ; but the viceroy 
rejected his overtures, and the battle began. ^ 

The English were anchored in line ahead in the Swally and 
close to the shoal ; Downton's ship was the northernmost, and the 
Merchant' s Hope was the last ship in the line. We are not told 
how the wind was, but it seems that Downton had satisfied himself 
that the enemy would pass round by the north channel. This, 
however, they did not dare to do. The galleons anchored abreast of 
the English ships, but outside the shoal. From that position they 
maintained a comparatively harmless long-range fire, while the 
smaller vessels swarmed across the sands and tried to carry Down- 
ton's ships by boarding. The Merchanfs Hope was most easily 
approached, and she bore the brunt of the attack, repelling the 
boarders time after time. This was practically the whole of the 
battle, but the Hope was for some time in a critical position. The 
enemy, finding that their open boats gave them no protection 
alongside a high-charged ship, hastily set fire to many of their 
" frigates " and jumped overboard. The Hope with difficulty cleared 



rise an hour before the rest of the guests, Ijut " the Captayne of the Dutch house took 
his bane, either witli bote drinkes, or cold sitting so long in the water, and soon after 
dyed."— Purchas, ' Pilgrims,' i. 613. 

1 Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 26th July, 1614. 

2 Lediard, p. 436. 

^ Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 1513-1616. .1072, 1127. 

D 2 



;J6 MILITARY EISTOIiY, 1603-1649. [1615. 

herself from the hlazing boats ; but before she had done so her 
mainmast was on fire. AVhile the boats were burning out on the 
shoal, it went over the side. So ended the fight as far as that 
day, January 20th, ^ was concerned. The Portuguese lost many 
" frigates," and three small ships taken by the Hope, but afterwards, 
burnt ; and in men, burnt, killed, or drowned, about 500. The 
English loss was slight — only four killed and one wounded ; but as 
this last man had an arm shot off, it would appear that a w^ound 
was not counted as such unless it was very severe. The next- 
night, and for some nights afterwards, the Portuguese sent fire- 
ships across the sands, fortunately without doing any harm. On 
February 13th they withdrew. The English position had proved 
too strong for them. The Nawab came in state to congratulate 
Downton, and presented to him his sword " with hilt of massie 
gold"; and, says Downton, in a Homeric spirit, "in lieu thereof, I 
returned him my sute, being sword, dagger, girdle, and hangers . . . 
which made a great deal better show, though of less value.' ^ 

On March 3rd the English weighed to go to Bantam, but no 
sooner were they outside than they sighted the Portuguese. The 
two fleets stayed in presence of one another for some days, when, as 
the enemy showed no intention of attacking either him or Surat, 
Downton resumed his course. Two years previously he had 
visited Bantam, and on that occasion had written in his journal : 
" He that escapes without disease from that stinking stew of the 
Chinese part of Bantam must be of strong constitution." This 
visit proved the correctness of his opinion ; he died at Bantam on 
August 6th, 1615. 

A year after Downton's death there was fought an action highly 

creditable to the vanquished. A great Portuguese carrack was met 

near the Comoro Islands by four outward-bound ships under Captain 

Benjamin Joseph in the Charles.'^ This time the advantage lay 

clearly with us, for, though the carrack was of 1500 tons— a ship far 

greater than any we then had — yet the Charles was of 1000 tons, as 

was also the James. The attack began with a broadside from the 

big ship, and thereafter the fight was kept up with great spirit for 

half an hour, when darkness fell. Captain Joseph had been killed 

at the outset. The carrack made no attempt to escape, but held her 

course till midnight, with lights burning. Then she anchored, the 

' Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 1513-1616. .883. ^ j^^^.^^^^. ^^ ^ I. Co. March 7, 1615 

^ Low, 'Hist. Iiid. Navy,' vol. i. cli. i. 



1622.] CAPTURE OF OliMUZ. 37 

four ships anchoring near her. She did not weigh tiU the following 
night, when she was again pursued by the Company's ships. At 
daybreak the fight was renewed, the four ships keeping up a fire 
which entirely dismasted the carrack, and, according to Mr. Edward 
Terry, chaplain of the Charles,^ "had made such breaches in her 
thick sides, that her case seemed so desperate as that she must 
either yield or perish." But, rather than yield, her crew, after a 
most stubborn defence, ran her ashore and set fire to her. 

The next action of importance in Eastern waters took place in 
the beginning of 1622. In January Captains Ely the and John 
"Weddell appeared in the Persian Gulf with orders for reprisals 
against the Portuguese. They purposed to take Ormuz, a small 
island in the mouth of the gulf. Desert in itself, its importance lay 
in its having become a great trade centre. The Arabs had used it 
as an emporium from the beginning of the fourteenth century, and, 
early in the sixteenth, it was of such surprising opulence as to 
attract the attention of the Portuguese, who, under d'Albuquerque 
took possession of it. Its wealth may have waned somewhat 
under its new masters, but it still had the reputation of being 
enormously wealthy. The Persians were jealous of its prosperity, 
and readily agreed to act with the English. From the 20th to the 
30th of January the ships besieged the fort of Kishm, in which 
d'Andrade, the Portuguese admiral, commanded in person. On its 
fall an advance was made to Ormuz, which in turn surrendered on 
April 23rd. When it came to looting the town, the English stood 
little chance with the Persians either in point of numbers or in 
mere thieving power. They did, however, contrive to load one of 
the ships, the Whale, with booty to the value of £100,000. Unfor- 
tunately, the ship, with all the treasure, was lost on the bar outside 
Surat. So far as concerned the Company, the expedition resulted in 
a loss ; for on the return of the ships to England, Buckingham, then 
Lord High Admiral, preferred a claim to a tenth part of the booty. 
The argument that the whole of the 50100,000 had been lost was 
of no avail ; so the Company claimed that it had acted by right 
of its charter, and not in virtue of letters of marque from the 
Lord High Admiral. " Then," said Buckingham, " you have acted 
as pirates, and the whole is forfeit to the Crown." The matter 
ended in the Company's paying to Buckingham his tenth, and to the 
King £10,000 as a fine for having no letters of marque.^ 

^ Low, ' Hist. Ind. Navy,' vol. i. ch. i. ^ Frankland, ' Annals,' p. 155. 



38 MILITARY EISTOBT, 1603-1G49. [1618. 

But the Portuguese were by no means the only rivals we were 
called upon to face in the East Indies. Though we were at peace 
with the Dutch, they, like the Portuguese, persisted in regarding 
us as interlopers. Thus, although for a considerable time there was 
no serious rupture, there were heard in England continual com- 
plaints of unfriendly dealings en the part of the Dutch. This was 
notably the case on the return of William KeeHng's expedition of 
1G07, and of the expedition taken out by David Middleton, brother 
to Sir Henry, in 1009. 

The fault did not lie with the Dutch commanders, though no 
excess of peacefulness was to be looked for in men who commanded 
vessels equipped at least as much for war as for commerce. The 
real difficulty of the position "lay in the success of the English 
merchants in establishing a treaty right to share in the commerce 
of islands which were under the territorial sovereignty of another 
nation."-^ The Dutch, on their first coming into Eastern waters, 
had decided that their most profitable course would be to get the 
Moluccas" and the Banda Islands into their own possession, for 
from these islands alone in all the known world could spices be 
obtained. That they had found the Portuguese in possession 
and had driven them from Amboyna, Ternate, and Tidore, 
mattered little to the Company. AVhat concerned the Company 
more immediately was the resistance offered by the Dutch to all 
attempts made by the English to establish themselves in the Banda 
Islands. 

Arriving there in 1G13, Sir Henry Middleton found that the 
Dutch had four years before built a fort on the Great Banda, and 
that, in May, 1610, the English had been forced to transfer their 
factory to Bantam. From Banda the Dutch hoped to make sure of 
the rest of the group of islands. In 1016 they took Pulo Way.^ But 
late in that same year Nathaniel Courthope was sent from Bantam 
to hold the neighbouring island of Pulo lion. His difficulties were 
many. A meditated Dutch attack was only stayed by the erection 
of Ijatteries on shore. Of his two ships one was captured, the other 
was surrendered by her mutinous crew. 

But Courthope still held out. In March, 1618, two vessels 
sailing to his relief were taken by the Dutch after a seven-hours' 
light in sight of the island. The agreements arrived at by the 

' Gardiner, iii. IT'.i. - Burcliett, ' Tniiisactions,' ]'.k. iii. 202. 

^ Gardiner, iii. 109, sqq. 



1G23.] TEE AMBOYNA MASSACRE. 33 

Commissioners sitting in London were not known to him. Late 
in 1618, Sir Thomas Dale ^ was sent out in command of a force of 
six ships. With these he met and defeated a Dutch squadron off 
Jacatra ; ^ but when he might have used his victory to reheve 
Courthope and ensure our possession of Pulo Eon, he preferred to 
land a force to besiege the Dutch fort at Jacatra,^ and to disperse 
his ships for trade. Nor did the open war declared by Dale bring 
profit to England. The Dutch had a vast preponderance of force ; 
and during 1619 they used it in capturing many of the Company's 
ships. Courthope himself fell a victim. Met at Lantore by two 
Dutch ships, while he had but a native boat, he was slain by a 
iiitisket bullet. Directly afterwards the Dutch took both Lantore 
and Pulo Eon, and our hopes in the Banda Islands were gone.* The 
news of the signature of the treaty in England did not reach the 
East Indies till March, 1620. The greatest loss had been sustained 
iii' the year that passed between the date of the signature and the 
daty on which news of it reached Bantam. 

For a while after the receipt of this news relations became more 
friendly. But bit by bit the old jealousies re-arose, and in 1623 was 
perpetrated what has been considered in England as a very terrible 
crime. On pretence of having discovered a plot by which the 
English in Amboyna, with the help of the natives, intended to 
possess themselves of the island, the Dutch seized the English 
residents,^ 18 or 20 in number, including Gabriel Towerson the 
agent, as well as some Japanese suspects, and subjected them 
to torture. Judging the evidence thus obtained to be conclusive, 
they executed ten of the English, including Towerson, and drove 
the remainder away to other islands. They afterwards took 
Ceram. 

This was on February 27th, 1623. When the news became 
known in England a great outcry " was raised by the Company ; and 
the memory of Amboyna lived to become one of the many causes of 
the first Dutch War. We know now the value of evidence taken 
under torture ; but in estimating the Dutch position it must be 
remembered that such evidence was then generally held to be good, 

^ Formerly Governor of Virginia. ^ CoUiber, ' Col. Rostr.' 83. 

^ Dale died at Jacatra of swamp fever. * Purchas, i. 664-679. 

^ Lediard, p. 470. 

® The populace was then too busy with the Spanish marriage to be ready to pay 
much heed to the Dutch. Amboyna was more spoken of in England years after the 
receipt of the news than it was at the time. Gardiner, v. 242. 



40 MILITARY ff IS TOBY, 1603-1649. [1624. 

Yet Towerson and his men died protesting their innocence ; and in 
their innocence their countrymen firmly beheved.^ 

As a resiih of this " massacre " the Dutch were left in possession 
of the whole of the Banda group ; but elsewhere a semi-piratical 
war of reprisals continued to be waged. In face of the relations 
between the representatives of the two countries, it seems strange 
at first sight that we should find an Anglo-Dutch fleet combined 
against the Portuguese. The reason for the combination appears to 
have been merely the dislike, common to both English and Dutch, 
of being looked down upon with contempt as interlopers. Both 
Companies had shown themselves so little inclined to respect the 
treaty of 1619, that this joint action cannot be spoken of as the 
result of that treaty. It was enough for English and Dutch that 
their interests coincided for the time being. 

After having been in company with a Dutch squadron of four 
ships at the end of November, 1624, John Weddell parted from 
them on the 19th and 21st with the intention of going to Surat. 
As he had information of a large Portuguese force at Goa equipping 
against Ormuz, he gave the Dutch a rendezvous at Gombroon, 
where, after being joined by the Eagle at Surat, he joined them on 
17th December. The joint force then amounted to eight ships ; 
viz : the Boijal James, Weddell's ship, with the Jonas, Star and 
Eagle, belonging to the English Company, and the South Holland^ 
with Albert Becker in command, the Bantam, Maud of Dort and 
Weasope,"^ belonging to the Dutch. ^ On January 31st the Portu- 
guese were sighted, their force being made out to consist of eight 
galleons and sixteen "frigates."* That night it fell calm and the 
English, with an assurance from the Dutch that " they would stick 
to them like their shirts to their backs," waited for dawn to open 
the fight. The Dutch, weighing before daybreak, went first into 
action,^ being closely followed by the English. The dying away 
of the wind about noon gave the enemy an advantage, for they 

' After all the question was not really " Was Towerson guilty?" It was rather, 
'• SujipDsing tliat he was guilty, by what right did the Dutch act '? " The treaty of 161St 
oitlaincd tliat international disputes should be referred to a mixed council of the two 
nations. 

* The names of these Dutch vessels are given as they appear in the English 
records. I can find no trace of the action in De Jonge. — "\V. L. C. 

* Lediard, p. 477. 

* Cal. S. P. 1513-1G16..122. 

•* Accounts of the fight ; Weddell to E. I. Co. 25th April, 1625; and the narrative 
of one lircscnl, seemingly in the Janus, given in Lediard, 478. 



1625.] 



JOHN WEDDELrS ACTIONS. 



41 



could make use of their "frigates" to tow them into position, 
"which help we wanted." However, the James, with the help of 
her barge, got her broadside to bear and continued the fight. In 
the afternoon a breeze sprang up in favour of the Portuguese. 
The admiral and vice-admiral, being near the James, bore down on 
her, intending to board one on each side. When the James felt 
the wind she bore away with the wind on the quarter in order 
to separate the two ships somewhat. The Portuguese vice-admiral 
then altered course parallel with the James, but Weddell, as he 
drew up, hauled to the wind and weathered him. The admiral, 
seeing that the James would weather him too if he held his course, 




J. The liuiial Jamcx. 

A. The Portuguese admiral. 

T'. The Portuguese vice-admiral. 
A V J. Position when the wind sprang up. 
Ji VI. Roijal James tacking to weather the 
Portuguese vice-admiral. 



J3 A^. Portuguese admiral hove to. hoping 
that the Eoijal James would tall on board 
him. Boiial James, passing under his stern, 
rakes him, and then puts helm up, and follows 
him. 



PLAN OF WEDDELL AND BECKERS ACTION WITH THE PORTUGUESE, 

FEBRUARY IST, 1025. 



hove to in hopes that the James would run aboard him ; but 
Weddell, passing close under his stern, raked him fore and aft, and 
then stood after him.^ 

When the squadrons anchored, two leagues apart, the James had 
lost eight men killed, and in the South Holland Becker was dead. 
The 2nd was spent in refitting, and on the 3rd the English and 
Dutch, having the wind, ran dov/n in line, the Boyal James leading, 
with the South Holland next astern of her. As the James drew 
within range, the Portuguese opened fire, but she did not answer 

^ The account quoted by Lediard is not quite clear. The Portuguese admiral " put 
to stay " should mean that he went about ; but this does not agree with the rest of the 
manojuvring, so that it seems necessary to take it to mean that he " put his mainsail 
(or foresail) a backstays." 



42 MILITABY HISTORY, 1G03-1649. [1G25. 

till, passing between the leading ship and the admiral, she gave 
each a broadside and separated the leader from the rest of the 
fleet. The Eagle, Captain John Johnson, and the Weasope now 
came up and engaged this ship, thus preventing her from rejoining 
the squadron. The BoyalJames pressed on and engaged many ships 
in succession, but found that they would not stay by her. The 
other vessels, English and Dutch, made their way into the fight, and 
in the afternoon the Eagle, probably with the Weasope, returned 
from chasing the ship that had been separated from the enemy's 
squadron in the morning, and which, it is most likely, they had suc- 
ceeded in dismasting. Soon after this the James backed her foresail 
within biscuit-throw of an enemy. Weddell called upon Johnson, 
who was coming up astern, to board on the enemy side, and although 
the Eagle failed him, "Weddell remained alongside the Portuguese 
ship till she was a wreck. 

When night fell neither side had given way. The Dutch had 
lost their admiral and the Boyal James was much shattered, but the 
joint squadron had lost few spars and was quite ready to renew the 
engagement. In the enemy's fleet, on the contrary, but three ships 
had any topmasts left standing ; and both their admiral and their 
vice-admiral had fallen.^ 

Weddell had meant to send a fireship against the Portuguese 
admiral, but, when the time came, she was not in her place. She 
had been chased by the " frigates," which forced Darby, her master, 
to fire her at a distance from the fleets. That night, whether 
brought by the tide or towed by the enemy's boats, she came 
burning among the English and Dutch, who slipped their cables 
and escaped without damage. On the 4th the enemy was chased 
into shallow water. It was judged unwise, however, to pursue 
too far, both for fear of running aground, and because the enemy 
might have batteries on the island of Lowrack. And, as they were 
"implacable, malicious and politick," in fact very good enemies, it 
was feared that they might chain three or four fireships together 
and send them out on the ebb. 

Failing in their purpose, the allies resolved to look after their 
trade in Gombroon, and at the same time to refit. They did not 
sail again till the 13th, when the Portuguese, being once more in 
fighting trim, weighed to meet them, and by sunset were within 
saker shot.- That night it blew hard. A Portuguese ship carried 
' Juhnson to E. I. Co. 27tli Ainil, 1025. ^ j^^ about lialf a mile. 



1625.] 



JOHN WEDDELVS ACTIONS. 



43 



away her mainmast. Till noon of the 14th, the allies fomid them- 
selves encumbered with some merchantmen that had sailed from Gom- 
broon with them, but the battle was raging again by two o'clock. 

Weddell now altered his tactics. On the second day he had 
fought against a succession of antagonists ; but on this, the last day 
of the fight, he preferred to throw an accumulation of force upon one 
ship of the enemy. In pursuance of this plan, the James and the 
Jonas for a time poured a succession of broadsides into the Portu- 
guese admiral; but after a while the fight became a duel between 
the flagships, and this continued till another galleon came to the 
relief of the Portuguese ship, and, pushing between her and the 
James, took Weddell's fire. This ship seems to have been the San 
Sebastian, wearing the rear-admiral's flag. 

The action continued general till dusk. At nightfall the Portu- 
guese were edging in with the Arabian coast, and the joint fleets 
were chasing them. After dark the pursuit was abandoned, both 
because ammunition was running short, and because English as well 
as Dutch were anxious to land their cargoes at Surat and get off 
the Malabar coast before the south-west monsoon. 

Lediard^ gives the following hst of the Portuguese force and 
losses. It is said to have been drawn up by Peter Hilhon, a 
Frenchman present on board Batellia's flagship. 



Ship. 


Guns. 


Meu. 


Killed. 


Commander. 




1. S. Francisco, admiral . 


48 


350 


38 


Don Aliud Batellia. 




2. >S. Francisco, vice-admiral 


32 


250 


31 


Francisco Burge. 




;3. >S'. Sebastian, rear-admiral 


40 


400 


20 


Antonio Tela. 




4. S. Salvador 


24 


250 


41 


Francisco de Suar. 




5. S. Jago 


22 


200 


83 


Simon de Kintall. 




6. Trinidad 


22 


250 


243 


Alva Botelia. 




7. S. Antonio 


22 


200 


22 


Antonio Burallia. 




8. Miserere Cordium 


22 


200 


3 


Samuel Eodriguez Chava. 





1. Had the admiral and two other officers killed. 
2 and 4. Lost their captains. 

5 and 7. Were unseaworthy and were lost soon after. 
6. Was quite dismasted and was towed off by the rear-admiral. 
Besides all wdiich losses, every vessel is returned as having been more or less 
dismasted. 

The English losses, as given in an official report - to the Com- 
pany, were twenty-nine men killed, thirteen of whom were in the 
James, eleven in the Jonas, four in the Star and one in the Eagle. 

1 p. 482. ' Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 1513-1616. .122. 



44 MILITARY HISTORY, 1G03-1G40. [1625. 

The Dutch lost about the same number of men, but among them 
was Becker. The report also says that the James received 450 shot, 
some of them 27^ inches in circumference,^ and that the Portuguese 
lost 800 men, including, it was thought, their commander. AVeddell, 
in reporting to the Company,'-^ said that the enemy had sixteen ^ 
" frigates." It is not stated that these tried to board; it is indeed 
implied that they did not ; but while they were engaged in towing, 
on February 1st, heavy loss must have fallen on them. 

In this way it is just possible that the enemy lost 800 men. 
That this 800 includes wounded, or is a random guess, is far more 
likely. That the Trinidad was left with only seven men alive is 
absurd on the face of it. Yet, if she was the ship which the Eagle 
and Weasope engaged, and also if she was the ship mentioned as 
having been towed off, it is likely that she had suffered very heavily. 

Before the English were firmly established in India there were 
many further fights ; but of these the last one of any importance 
took place in this same year, 1625. 

Early in October, 1625, there were two Enghsh and three Dutch 
ships * lying in the Swally, when a Portuguese squadron appeared off 
Surat. These ships did not put to sea to meet the enemy. In a 
letter written shortly afterwards to one of the East India Company ^ 
it was said, " There were four great galleons came from Lisbon and 
chaUenged the Enghsh and Dutch ships in Swally Eoad, but they 
refused." But while the Portuguese were still off the port, in 
company with a detachment of "frigates " from Goa, the Palsgrave, 
Dolphin and Lion arrived from England. Seeing the galleons, and 
thinking the ships in the Swally to be also Portuguese, the fresh 
English stood out to sea with a northerly wind. Their commanders, 
Blyth and Eichard Swanley, decided on this course that the enemy 
might gain no addition of strength; that the "frigates" might be 
shaken off; and that, if the English ships sailed the better, they 
might go to Ormuz, which Eufrero's "frigate" squadron was 
blockading. But the English ships, foul from the long passage out 
and hampered by their cargo, were soon overtaken. At four o'clock 
the Portuguese admiral and vice-admiral came up with the Lion off' 
Damaun. The wind, however, fell light and the enemy could not 
reach the Palsgrave and Dolphin. Expecting help from his con- 

' I.e. GO-prs. Vide vol. I., 410, sujira. ^ Lediard says 32. 

2 April 27th, lG2r>. * Cal. S. V. E. lud. 1G25-1G20, p. xviii. 

'■ Thos. Friday tu Boll ; Cal. S. P. E. Iiid. 358. 



1625.] BLYTWS PROCEEDINGS. 45 

sorts, Swanley, in spite of his lower deck guns being in the hold, 
shortened sail and stayed within musket shot of the enemy. But 
the other two ships held on their course. The Lion had already 
suffered severely, and at nightfall found herself boarded on both 
sides as well by the ships as by some "frigates" which the calm 
had allowed to creep up. By eleven that night Eichard Swanley 
was dead and had been succeeded in the command by Henry 
Crosbey. 

As the Lion could not keep her decks clear nor free herself from 
the ships alongside, she dropped anchor and let the tide take the 
enemy away. The ship, however, was not abandoned by the Portu- 
guese, for fifty or sixty of them had been left on her poop and could 
not be dislodged. These had to be got rid of. Some barrels of 
gunpowder were placed in the round house and the enemy, together 
with the stern of the ship, were blown into the sea. Thinking that 
the Lion would be destroyed by fire, the Portuguese admiral passed 
on to engage the two other vessels. These had been already over- 
taken by the Portuguese ships which had not been delayed by the 
Lion. The fight lasted for more than twenty-four hours, and then 
at length the Palsgrave and Dolphin managed to disable and shake 
off their enemies.^ Meanwhile the Lion refitted to the best of her 
power, and, being unable to reach her consorts or to help them in 
any way, shaped her course for Ormuz in accordance with the plan 
proposed on October 7th by Captain Blyth. 

Arrived at Gombroon, she lay for some days landing cargo, re- 
fitting, watering, and mounting her heavy guns. On November 8th, 
Eufrero with eighteen or "twenty" frigates came down upon her 
from Ormuz. It was quite calm and the ship could not manoeuvre ; 
but, though the " frigates " avoided her broadside, she managed to 
sink four of them. So brisk a small-arm fire was kept up that she 
was forced to close her ports, upon which the enemy had no diffi- 
culty in setting fire to her. Her upper deck fell in and killed many 
of the crew. Of the rest twenty-seven, who had jumped overboard, 
were picked up, but the remnant, about forty in number, ended 
a most stubborn defence by blowing up the ship. Eufrero saved 
one of the men whom he had taken, and sent him to carry the 
news to the Company. The rest he beheaded. 

For some time anxiety prevailed regarding the Palsgrave and 
Dolphin ; but they returned to Surat ^ early in the following year. 
1 Cal. S. P. E. Ind. 328. - lb. 1G25-1629. .378. 



46 MILITARY niSTOUT, 1C03-1G49. [1603. 

In November the President at Surat spoke of the Palsgrave as 
hkely to postpone her trading if she saw a chance of annoying the 
Portuguese.^ There is no record that she did anything to atone for 
her bad conduct of October 7th, 1625. 

Such in brief were the services that gave us foothold in India 
proper, to the ruin of the hopes of Portugal ; such the Anglo-Dutch 
relations which sowed the seed of that ill-feeling that was destined 
to yield so bloody a harvest. 

Whether the conclusion of the treaty with Spain was bought 
by Spanish gold scattered freely in the English court, ^ or whether 
James would have braved the opposition of his advisers for the sake 
of his desire for peace are questions that have no place here. The 
effect of the peace is certain. It gave to Spain breathing space in 
which to recover her strength, and thus robbed the Navy of the well- 
deserved right of bringing the quarrel to an honourable close. It 
also opened the door to that gross mismanagement which allowed 
our seas to become infested with pirates of all nations. 

A great deal of trouble was given all round our coasts by purely 
native pirates ; from Scotland and from Ireland numerous com- 
plaints were made, but, of all towns, Bristol seems to have suffered 
the most severely.^ The reason of this is not far to seek. Not 
only was Bristol second to no city but London in wealth and 
trade, but also, lying far west, she was away from the protection, 
such as it was, afforded by the King's ships, and was nearer to the 
wilder parts of the kingdom where the pirates gathered. 

Between 1604 and 1616 Sir William Monson was constantly 
employed as Admiral of the Narrow Seas, and during that period 
not the least important of his duties was the restraint of privateering 
and piracy. 

In May, 1603, Captain George Baynard brought into Torbay a 
Portuguese prize, taken by him in virtue of his letters of marque, 
where he left her ; but no sooner was he at sea again than a 
Dunquerque squadron under Derickson carried her oft'. Strong 
representations were made'* for her restitution. 

The orders which Monson received show that the King was 
aware of the growing evil; that he under-estimated the danger 

^ Kerridge to the Comi)any, 29tla November, 162G. 

2 Osborne, 'Traditional Memoirs,' pp. 3, 4 ; Lcdiard, p. 400. 

2 Cal. S. P. D(jni. 1(;05, throughout. 

* Cal. S. P. Dom., James I. xvii. 100. 



1610.] 



Pill AC Y IN HOME WATEBS. 



47 



appears from the frequency of pardons granted to pirates taken in 
the Narrow Seas.^ As soon as they reahsed that the Navy was to 
be starved, many men who had so far cruised lawfully enough 
against the Spaniard seem to have decided that there was no need 
to let the peace drive them from their occupation. The King's 
clemency confirmed them in this opinion ; and so bold did they 
become that, in 1610, we find one of their number openly using 
Lundy as his headquarters, and styling himself king of that 
island.^ 

Monson appears to have done little to keep these men in check ; 




B n 




I S T O £ 

ylLxmdy I . .  

-<&^- 2£jrk/taru 




ANNE 






^ 




E !«■ 



.uJtfbrd'Po "^ f'BiirMT^ 



fi . OioJtonbury -tor 

L A :n^ 




T 



i> 



6 mile J 



'1 " 



THE BRISTOL CHAXNEI-. 

(From a chart puhlinhcd by Joyce Gold, 1816.) 

but when we consider that he was at sea for a comparatively short 
space each year, that much of his time was occupied in ferrying 
ambassadors -to and from the continent,^ and the rest of it in more 
or less fruitless attempts to convince the Dutch that James was 
sovereign of the seas ; when we consider, in addition, that the King's 



^ Cal. S. P. Dom. April 20th, November 13th, December 20th, 1604, February 9th, 
1605, etc. 

2 Cal. S. P. Dom. 17th April, 1610. 

^ Monson claimed that he was £1500 out of pocket, first and last, by this service 
and that he cou.ld never recover any part of that sum. ' Tracts,' p. 250. 



48 MILITARY inSTOnY, 1603-1649. [1614. 

ships sailed notoriously badly, it will no longer seem strange that 
of all trades piracy was the most prosperous. 

In 1614 however it was recognised that something must be 

done. Monson, in the Lion, with Sir Francis Howard in company^ 

sailed from Margate for Leith on May 14th. ^ At Leith they had 

news of pirates to the north, so northward they went, and put 

themselves in communication with the Earl of Caithness, who told 

them of tw^o pirates using those coasts. Of these, one gave himself 

up to Monson, saying that he wished to return to honest courses ; 

the other, Clarke, was not to be found at Orkney, at Shetland, 

nor among the Hebrides.^ Monson gave up the chase, and, using 

the knowledge of the pirate he had with him, steered for Broad 

Haven in Mayo. This place was the earthly paradise of the 

pirates. The whole population, men and women, found its profit 

in courting them, and it was but rarely that the law reached 

so far west. The English were advised to allow themselves to 

be mistaken for pirates, and to enjoy the hospitality of the local 

gentry. This they did, and after a few days spent in collecting 

evidence, declared themselves. Monson however was lenient ; he 

profited by the consternation of the people to bind them to 

his interests ; and with such good results that they helped him 

to ensnare a pirate ship which appeared on the coast a few days 

afterwards. 

After hanging the officers of this ship, and ascertaining that 
there were no more pirates then on the coast, Monson pursued 
his voyage, and on August 10th reached the Downs without 
further capture. He himself claimed that the result of this cruise 
was the termination of piracy in home waters. That the respite 
was more than momentary is doubtful, for, only eighteen months 
later, James was petitioned to send two small ships to protect the 
northern fisheries.^ The King's refusal was based on the ground! 
of expense. 

But, serious as were the ravages of these native pirates, the 
harm done to our trade by rovers from the Barbary ports was 
infinitely greater. While the Scots and Irishmen of the west coasts 
were for the most part " mean paltry rogues " that preyed on fishing 

^ ' Tracts,' p. 246. 2 lb. 247. 

^ Cal. S. P. Dom., James T. Ixxxvi. 58, 01. A little later still one of the charges in 
Buckinghaiii's impcaclnneut was that he had allowed the seas to he infested. Frank- 
land, p. 153. 



1617.] ' TEE BARBARY CORSAIRS. 49 

boats and small craft, the pirates from Tunis and Algier, from 
Tangier arud Sallee blockaded the trade routes in force and inflicted 
enormous damage within the Straits and without. In 1617 a 
Turkish pirate was taken in the Thames. For villages in England 
and "Wales, as well as on the Irish coast, to be raided, and their 
inhabitants carried away to slavery, was no uncommon thing. ^ 
In England all these rovers were called Turks ; that Sallee and 
Tangier were not even nominally under the sway of the Sultan 
was of no importance. 

The pirate vessels were specially adapted for the work. Prizes 
taken from European nations, they had their half -decks and all 
possible weight cut away. To give the ships elasticity, many of 
the knees were knocked out, and a high degree of speed was 
attained, "like a man that is tight trussed and hath his doublet 
buttoned, that by loos'ning it he is able to run the faster."^ The 
weakening of the ships did not matter to the pirates, for they never 
lacked prizes out of which to make more cruisers. As it was their 
practice to board, they did not carry many guns. When pursued by 
men-of-war they sought safety in flight. Neither was there any 
difficulty in raising a crew ; at Algier a ship could be manned in a 
few minutes. 

Ships thus equipped and manned sailed, with permission of 
their Bey or governor, either singly or in squadrons. In July, 1611, 
Sir Ferdinando Gorges wrote that a Barbary fleet of forty ships, 
manned by two thousand men, was at sea ; " and, in March, 1613, 
Nottingham granted to the mayor of Exeter a commission to 
cruise against them and keep what he could catch. Other similar 
commissions were granted.* 

The consequence was that vessels trading to any distance were 
heavily armed. In fact, they sailed practically in the condition in 
which they were hired out to the King when need arose. Such a ship, 
the Dolphin of London, Edward Nichols, master, mounting nineteen 
heavy guns besides smaller pieces, fell in with a Turkish squadron 
of five ships off Sardinia on 22nd January, 1617.^ The pirates 
were all big ships, and their admiral was an English adventurer 

^ When one of our cruisers, unless she chanced to be a King's ship, did capture a 
pirate, she too made her profit by selling her captives for slaves. 
2 Monson, ' Tracts,' p. 301. 
^ S. P. Dom., James I. Ixv. 16. 
* Jh.; Cal. Ixxii. 93, and Ixxxvi. 101. 
^ Lediard, p. 440, quoting an account published by Nichols. 

VOL. II. E 



50 MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1617. 

who sailed under the name of Walsyngham/ which presumably was 
not his own. Of the other captains also two were Enghshmen. 
The admiral's ship was the first into action, and boarded, after a 
heavy cannonade. Beaten off, she drew out of the fight to stop her 
leaks. Two more ships closed, exchanged broadsides and boarded. 
A pirate going aloft to strike the Dolphin's flag was shot by the 
steward, the decks were cleared and these ships also drew off. Of 
the two last ships, one could not get to close quarters before she 
was crippled hy the Dolphin's guns, but the other boarded. Again 
the English retired into their close fights ^ and cleared their decks 
A\'ith mui'derers;^ but the pirates fired the ship. No further attempt 
was made, and the Dolphin, after getting the fire under, put into 
the Sardinian shore to bury her dead and refit. Of a total crew of 
thirty-eight men and boys, she had seven killed and ten wounded, 
of whom four afterwards died. The ship herself was sound enough 
to ride out a heavy gale on the 25th, and it is satisfactory to know 
that she reached the Thames in safety. 

In October of the same year news reached England that the 
homeward bound Newfoundland fishing fleet had been met by thirty 
Turkish "frigates," and had lost seven of its number/ It was for a 
time supposed that Sir Eichard Hawkyns^ was among those lost, 
but this proved to be a false report. 

So serious was the evil that the king agreed that something must 
be done. An estimate of the cost of fitting out four ships, to be 
supplemented by eight more from the merchants, was formed.^ 
The expedition was to be aided by Holland, and would, it was 
thought, prove sufficient "if well commanded." But news reached 
England that Spain was fitting out a vast armament, and fresh 
considerations arose. 

It was believed in England that Philip might attack Ireland. 

^ There were many of these renegades, the most notorious being Ward, Sir Francis 
Verney, and the Dutchman Dansker, Gard. iii. 65. Though they were held in special 
detestation, this man Walsyugham seems to have returned to England and made his 
peace. He commanded a fireship in the Algier Expedition of 1620, and two years 
later was sent to the Tower for conspiring to seize the Dreadnought and return to 
piracy. S. P. Dom. 17th April, 1622. 

^ Barricaded and loupholcd strongholds under the poop and forecastle. — W. L. C. 

^ Light guns, often charged with langridge. — W. L. C. 

* Cal. S. P. Dom., James I. xc. October 17th. 

•' The son of John Hawkyns, and the same man who had commanded the Swalloiv 
against the Armada. 

® Cal. S. P. Dom., James I. civ. 145. 



1620.] 



TEE ALGIER EXPEDITION. 



51 



In Venice the folk made sure that the fleet, with its 40,000 troops, 
was to be used against them. But avowedly the destination of the 
force was Algier, and it is not impossible that it was so in reality.^ 
In 1617, Monson had written his view^s on the suppression of piracy, 
and had suggested the co-operation of England with Spain and 
Holland.^ It is possible that his opinions may have had some 
influence on the turn of affairs. 

James immediately offered to co-operate against the pirates, and 
hinted that the Dutch also would help. Meanwhile the estimate for 
the English expedition was largely increased and ship-money was 
levied on the principal ports to pay the cost.^ Thus James would 
be ready in any event ; either to deal with the Spaniards if their 
nominal object were a pretence, or to take in hand seriously the 
repression of piracy. For once his policy was successful. The 
Dutch refused to agree to his proposal, but the Spanish preparations 
were discontinued. And it was no small advantage to him that he 
had successfully revived an old method of levying money. 

Meanwhile the Duke of Buckingham became Lord High Admiral. 
Under his guidance no high-sounding project was likely to be 
abandoned. The fleet was to be strong enough to do the work 
without co-operation, and the objective was to be Algier. Monson 
had written that 9000 tons of shipping and three thousand six 
hundred seamen would be enough to destroy the whole of the 
pirate resources.* That with over 6000 tons and two thousand five 
hundred men he failed to destroy one town out of four is little to 
the credit of Sir Eobert Mansell. 

Mansell's commission was dated June 6th, 1620 ; ^ his Vice- 
Admiral was Sir Richard Hawkyns, the Vice-Admiral of Devon ; his 
Eear-Admiral, Sir Thomas Button. There was some friction about 
these appointments. Button had hoped to be second in command,*^ 
but Mansell pointed out that the post had been offered to Hawkyns 

1 ' Cabala,' i. 206, 207 ; Gardiner, iii. 287. 

2 ' Tracts,' p. 250. 

■^ Gardiner, iii. 288. The sums assessed in a total of £48,500 included — 



London 

Bristol 

Exeter 

Plymouth . 

Dartmouth 

Barnstaple 

' Tracts,' p. 250 



£40,000. 
2,500. 

I 1,000 each. 



Hull . . 
AVeymouth 
Southampton 
Newcastle 
Cinque Ports 



I 



500. 
^ ' Foedera,' vii. iii. 165. 



£500. 
450. 

300 each. 

200. 
and other small sums. 

« ' Cabala,' i. 140 (2) 
E 2 



52 



MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1649. 



[1620. 



in the belief that Button would not be able to leave the command on 
the west coast of Ireland to which he had succeeded on Monson's 
removal in January, 1616. The fleet was very late in starting. It 
was October 22nd before it left Plymouth.^ 

With Mansell in this expedition there were ^ — 



His Majesty's Ships (6). 



.Ships. 


Tons. 


Guns. 


Men. 


Commanders. 


1. Lion, Admiral .... 


600 ' 


40 


250 


Sir Robert Mansell. 


2. Vanguard, Yice-Admiral 




660 i 


40 


250 


Sir Richard Hawkyns. 


3. Rainbow, Eear- Admiral 


660 1 


40 


250 


Sir Thomas Button. 


4. Constant Reformation . 




660 


40 


250 


Arthur Mainwaring. 


5. Antelope 




400 


34 


160 


Sir Henry Palmer. 


6. Convertine 




500 


36 


220 


Thomas Love. 


Merchant 


Whips (12). 




7. Golden Phoenix .... 


300 


24 


120 


Samuel Argall. 


8. Samuel 








300 


22 


120 


Christopher Harris. 


9. Marygold . 








260 


21 


100 


Sir John Fearn. 


10. Zouche Phoenix 










280 


26 


120 


John Penington. 


11. Barhary . 










200 


18 


80 


Thomas Porter. 


12. Centurion. 










200 


22 


100 


Sir Francis Tanfield. 


13. Primrose . 










180 


18 


80 


Sir John Hamden. 


14. Hercules . 










300 


24 


120 


Eusaby Cave. 


15. Neptune . 










280 


21 


120 


Robert Haughton. 


16. Bonaventure . 










260 


23 


110 


John Chidlev. 


17. Restore 










130 


12 


50 


George Raymond. 


18. Marmaduke . 










100 


12 


50 


Thomas Harbert. 



Passing down the Spanish coast, the fleet saluted the various 
towns, for even then it was hoped that some help might be forth- 
coming from Spain ; ^ but they heard no news of any. The Admiral 
divided his fleet into its three squadrons ; he himself held on about 
six leagues from the shore, the Vice-Admiral was three leagues 
outside him on his bow, and the Eear-Admiral three leagues inside 
hini and on his quarter. They made no prize however, and on 
December 7th anchored at Algier. 

In view of the fact that Mansell subsequently accounted for his 
failure by pointing out that his commission made him uncertain 
whether to adopt loeaceful or warlike methods,* it is well to 

' A pam])hlet jniblished 1621 and ju-eserved, with MS. notes by Coke, in S. P. 
Dora., James I. cxxii. 106. 

2 S. P. Dum., James I. cxxii. 106. ^ ' Tracts,' p. 257. " Ih. 



1621.] THE ALGIER EXPEDITION. 53 

notice that he tried both and failed in both. He began by nego- 
tiating for the release of prisoners. The Dey was polite, offered 
refreshments, admitted that he had forty captives, whom he gave 
up, but could not be persuaded to treat seriously. In the 
meantime the pirates continued to bring in prizes before Mansell's 
very eyes. On 13th December six Spanish ships arrived in pursuit 
of some pirates, and exchanged a few shots with the town ; but 
they did not join the English, who sailed on the 17th. Until 
they went back to Algier the English passed most of their time 
in port, at Malaga, Majorca or Alicant. Occasionally Turkish 
vessels were pursued, more for the sake of appearance than with 
any hope of success. On the night of January 4th, eight or nine 
pirate ships fell amongst the English fleet ; but, even so, none 
were taken. On the 6th, the Bear-Admiral's squadron pursued two 
ships, but returned unsuccessful on the 8th to Alicant, where the 
fleet was lying. On February 7th, the fleet fell in with the Admiral 
of Zeeland with seven men-of-war. He told Mansell that his 
entire fleet was twenty-two strong, but he would not co-operate. 
Soon afterwards the English Admiral decided to fit out fireships 
in readiness and then go to Algier to burn the ships within the 
mole. Accordingly he returned to Alicant with his whole fleet, 
which had been augmented on February 26th by the Spy, 18, 
Captain Edward Giles, and the Mercury, 20, Captain Phineas Pett. 
There he bought three brigantines rowing nine oars a side, and hired 
a polacca of 120 tons. The former he converted into fireships ; and 
he did the same with some spare boats and two small Turkish 
vessels which he had managed to secure. 

On the last day of May the fleet was drawn up off Algier, closing 
the entrance.^ The Dey seems to have decided that his enemies 
would not attack the port. They had tried to negotiate on their 
former visit ; negotiation, he probably believed, was their aim now. 
Such being his attitude, a surprise seemed easy. Twice the attempt 
was foiled by a calm. The final attack was made on June 3rd. The 
boats had nearly reached the mole when the wind fell and the 
moon shone out brightly. It was too late to draw off. They were 
seen, but pulled in as fast as they could. Most of the pirate crews 
were on shore, so that the English were able to fire the ships in 
many places. A musketry fire was opened on them, but they got off 
with little loss. That the shipping was not destroyed was due, said 

1 Coke's note here is : " Why was not this done the tirst time ? " 



54 MILITABY HISTORY, 1G03-1649. [1621. 

Mansell, to the calm, to an unfortunate shower, and to a sally of 
"the cowardly Turks." ^ Probably an undue eagerness to be gone 
on the part of the boats had as much to do with it. A few" ships 
put out from the mole. One was forced ashore, and another was 
sunk by the Hercules and Bonaventure. The only prize was a " fly- 
boat " taken in the bay.^ 

A council of w^ar decided that nothing more could be done ; and 

the fleet sailed next day. A few days later a merchant vessel, with 

warlike stores for Algier, was taken. This was the only capture 

of any importance, though it was learnt afterwards that, by sailing 

when they did, the English missed a squadron of pirates and prizes 

that put in to Algier the night after they had left it. On the 9th 

the fleet returned to Algier ; but a boom had been made and boats 

were continually rowing guard. If they had failed when there were 

none of these obstacles, argued the council, they could not succeed 

in the face of them. Again the fleet left Algier. Four ships were 

detached to return home, and at the last minute four more were 

added as being unserviceable. There is no need to follow the fortunes 

of the remaining twelve ; they did nothing, and sailed for England 

soon after the others. 

The whole affair was carried out in a half-hearted manner. 
There was no striving to overcome difficulties ; there was not even 
any bombardment. What most struck Monson was that the ships 
" besides their coming and going, spent not forty days at sea, but 
retired into harbour, where the pirates could find them ; but not 
they the pirates." ^ As no English ship could catch a pirate at sea, 
it is not clear where the point of his argument lay. The lamentable 
fact was that nothing had been done to check the ravages on our 
trade. During the following year about thirty-five English and 
Scots ships were taken."* 

The only further action taken by James in the matter was to 
proclaim against the export of arms to Tunis and Algier.^ Charles 
consequently found matters as bad as ever, Sallee rovers being in 
the Channel in 1625.*^ He had work enough for his fleet, and could 
only send out Captain John Harrison in the Bainboir to negotiate 
an exchange of prisoners ^ with the Barbary States. Two years 

' 'Cabala,' i. 140 ; Mansell to the Duke. « Ruslnvorth, VII. iv. 59. 

- lb. « Gardiner, v. 364, 424. 

" 'Tracts,' p. 257. ' Tadera,' Till. ii. 123. 
* Burchett, 368 ; Lediard, 466. 



1611.] LADY ARABELLA STUART. 55 

later, a proclamation was issued to restrain loyal subjects from 
acting in any way against Algier, Tunis, Bailee, or Tetuan,^ but it 
was followed in the next year by a warrant of contrary effect.'-^ 
This put the matter on its old footing, and the cruising continued 
with as much, or as little, result as before. 

All of importance that was done was pacific. William Eain- 
borow, in 1637, was sent to Sallee with six ships. He blockaded 
the port and demanded that captives should be given up to hiin. 
The King of Marocco found it inconvenient to resist at that time, 
for he was engaged in a civil war. He therefore agreed to buy 
Bainborow's neutrality by the delivery of two hundred and seventy- 
one English captives.^ This successful mission was followed in 
December, 1638, by the appointment of William Woodhouse to be 
consul at Tunis.* 

In spite of our peculiar relations with the Dutch in the East 
Indies, there was no serious threat of a rupture in Europe. Eriction 
constantly arose in matters of piracy and Dunquerque privateering, 
but the defensive league of 1608 between England and the States,^ 
and the Truce of Antwerp, so far restrained the Dunquerquers, that 
for some years English ships in the Narrow Seas saw little service. 

In June, 1611, Lady Arabella Stuart tried to escape to France. 
She had left Dover twenty-four hours before Monson received orders 
to follow ; but, having met with baffling winds, she was overtaken 
within four miles of Calais. 

In 1612 there seemed to be for a time a threat of a war with 
Spain. We had driven the Spaniards from the whale fisheries 
and had claimed exclusive rights. The Spaniards made ready to 
attack Virginia, but, inspired by a due appreciation of their own 
weakness and a hope that the colony would die out, they abandoned 
the project.^ From that time friction increased with Spain in pro- 
portion as matters ran more smoothly with Holland. Such Dutch 
pirates as were brought in were given up to Holland,'' whereas 
in 1616 Bich accepted a commission from the Duke of Savoy 
to cruise against the Spaniards. Bich's proceedings, both in that 
year and in 1618, were in no whit better than those of the Eliza- 
bethan seamen whose methods had been so detestable to James ; * 

1 ' Foedera; VIII. iii. 4. •'' ' Foedera,' A^I. ii. 160. 

2 II. 64, 141, 144. « Gardiner, ii. 164. 

3 Gardiner, viii. 270. ^ Cal. S. P. Dom., James I. Ixxiv. 18. 
* Thurloe, S. P. I. 2. ** ' Fcedera,' VII. iii. 64. 



56 MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1622. 

and not the least disgraceful page in the King's history is that Eich 
passed unpunished while Ealegh, who, in spite of his desire to 
waylay the Mexico fleet/ was guilty of no aggression, was hurried 
to the block. 

In 1618 one of the Dutch ships which had acted against Court- 
hope in the Bandas was in the Channel. Application was made for 
leave to take her by way of reprisals, but before anything could be 
done she was safe in port. In that same year, Argall, Governor of 
Virginia, heard news of a French settlement to the north of New 
England. Arrived there, he found a ship lying in front of a fort, 
and took both.^ Possibly this breach of the peace was one of the 
reasons for his recall in 1619. 

In December, 1621, the commission on East India differences 
was at high words, and Oxford, then Admiral of the Narrow Seas,^ 
was ordered to chase homeward-bound East Indiamen. The Dutch 
were brought to their senses, but demanded Oxford's recall,* which 
James was weak enough to grant. 

Meanwhile the Truce of Antwerp ended and the Dutch began 
to suffer again from the Dunquerquers. In September, 1622, they 
blockaded two of these ships in Leith and Aberdeen, and in April, 
1623, two ships had to be sent to prevent a Dutch attack on the 
fugitives while lying in the King's waters. As Denbigh^ had gone 
with ten ships to bring home Prince Charles from Spain, the senior 
officer in the Downs, and the man on whom this duty fell, was 
Captain Best.*^ For a time it seemed that his mission would be 
successful. But the ship at Leith tried to escape at night and ran 
aground. The Dutch shot her to pieces w^here she lay, and, in spite 
of protests, burnt the wreck. 

Worse followed. The ship in Aberdeen was to be escorted back 
to Dunquerque by Best and the Dutch. An order from the States- 
General was to cause the blockading squadron off Dunquerque to let 
her pass unharmed. This plan miscarried through the folly of the 
Dunquerque captain, who crowded sail for a while as if to escape, 
and then hove to to wait for the convoy. The Dutch came up first 

^ Gardiner, iii. 48. Eohan had offered to help him with ships if he would guarant-e 
an attack on this fleet. Cal. S. P. Dom., James I. ciii. 16. 

2 Lediard, p. 455. s Toedera,' VII. iii. 221. 

* Gardiner, iv. 274. 

° William Fielding, first Earl of Denbigh. 

® Gardiner, v. 81. Best was the man who had defeated the Portuguese nff Stu-at in 
1612. In 1623 he was captain of the Garland. 



1624.] THE PENINGTON AFFAIE. 57 

and opened a heavy fire, and when Best in turn arrived he fired on 
the Dutch, who drew out of range. The Garland and her charge 
anchored in the Downs, the Dutch off the South Foreland. 
Choosing a dark night. Best dropped down among the latter and 
drove them out. For this work Best was treated as Oxford had 
been treated before him. He was superseded by Sir Eichard 
Bingley, who carried the ship in dispute to Flanders. 

But the Pacific reign of James was nearly at end, and the time 
was drawing on when Buckingham's adventurous projects would 
be allowed free scope. In March, 1624, Kensington wrote to the 
Duke that France was ready to enter into an alliance against 
Philip,^ and in the following month an attack on the Spaniards 
in the Gulf of Mexico was proposed to Buckingham.^ 

In May orders were given to equip twelve ships and thirty 
merchant vessels. Spain too was arming. In June a squadron of 
four Spanish ships, bound to Spain from Dunquerque, was blockaded 
in the Downs by a Dutch fleet, and James refused to interfere. He 
stood well with the Dutch at that time, and was hoping for help 
from them in the coming quarrel with Spain. The four Spaniards 
chose heavy weather for their escape ; but while three got clear, 
the fourth blew up together with her opponent.^ Before, however, 
the war with Spain broke out, there was interposed an incident 
which was in no small degree responsible for the disastrous war 
against France. 

Shortly before his death, James entered into an agreement * by 
which the Vanguard, Captain John Penington, of the Eoyal Navy, 
together with the Gi'eat Neptune, Captain Sir Ferdinando Gorges, 
and six other armed merchant ships were to be put at the disposal 
of the King of France, io use against any enemy, save only England 
and Scotland. The history of this agreement is somewhat obscure;^ 
but as in 1617 Kalegh had put forward a scheme for the joint 
action of an English fleet and a French army against Genoa, a 
state bound by the closest ties to Spain ; and, as a Franco- 
Savoyard army was now preparing to attack Genoa and needed 
the co-operation of ships, which both England and Holland had 
agreed to supply, there can be no doubt that the original intention 

1 ' Cabala,' i. 282. - Ih. 343. =* Gardiner, v. 245. 

* That the ships were specified appears from S. P. Doni., James, clxxxv. 99, a 
letter from Conway directing the Clerk of the Signet to draw up a warrant for the 
delivery to France of the ships named. 

^ Gardiner, v. 301. 



58 



MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1649. 



[1624. 



was to reduce Genoa. It was, doubtless, hoped that in the following 
year the French would help Buckingham in an attack on the 
Spanish coast ; that the Plate fleet would be captured, and that 
Spain would cease to be a power in Europe. 

But these fond hopes were shattered when Soubise sailed into 
the harbour of Blavet in December, 1624, and, by capturing six 
of Louis's ships, lighted once more the torch of civil war in 
France. 




ADillUAL Sill JOHN PENINGTON, KT. 

[From an anonymous print. The face bears a striking resemblance to that in a well 
authenticated contemporary portrait belonging to Mrs. W. Willes.] 



Louis had few ships, but James had been prepared to lend him 
eight. The bargain might still stand, and Louis, instead of em- 
ploying them against Genoa, might use the ships against his unruly 
subjects. Buckingham offered no objection to this. Shortly after- 
wards James died, though not before he had approved, verbally,^ 

' Gardiner, v. .",06. 



1625.J THE PEN IN a TON AFFAIR. 59 

the altered scheme. Charles, his successor, was forced to stay the 
preparations against Spain for want of money. 

With regard to Penington's ships, there was great difhculty in 
persuading their captains to admit the French.^ They were afraid 
that they should lose the ships, and pointed out that they had no 
guarantee for their value. ^ The duplicity was on the part of 
Buckingham. The French intended to put on board as many 
soldiers as the ships would carry, and to keep in the vessels only 
as many English as would serve to navigate them. All this the 
Duke could not allow to be known while the ships were still in 
England. Had the design leaked out, the captains would never 
have sailed. As it was, Penington did not reach Dieppe^ until 
June 13th, although the ships had been ready since April, the 
captains, notably Gorges, having hung back. Arrived at Dieppe, 
the English refused to admit the great numbers of soldiers the 
French proposed to embark. They must, said they, be masters in 
their own ships. Penington wrote to the Duke'' to represent this 
objection, and added that the English would not be content unless 
it was guaranteed that on service they should remain in one 
squadron under his — Penington's — command. Shortly afterwards, 
alleging that the weather was too stormy to allow him to lie longer 
in an open road, he put back to the English coast. Meanwhile 
Eichelieu assured Buckingham that a show of force at La Kochelle 
would be all that was needed ; and Buckingham, always ready to 
believe the truth of what he wished to be true, seems to have 
been convinced. Penington received orders to go to Dieppe and 
there surrender the ships. He asked to be superseded, but was 
privately informed that the government did not really wish the 
ships to be given up. Accordingly he proceeded to Dieppe, pre- 
pared to allow his crews to mutiny, if need be, to prevent the 
delivery of the ships. ^ Charles was, it was pretended, not eager 
for the delivery, and it was suggested that the device of a mutiny 
would serve, in case the French should fail to make such a mistake 
as would justify the King in breaking off the matter. The mutiny 
followed, and the sailors brought the ships home about July 28th. 
But Penington at length received a definite warrant for the delivery. 

' The delivery of the ships was made one of the charges against Buckingham, and 
on that charge being delivered the whole story appeared. Frankland, ' Annals,' 161- 
166 ; Granville Penn, i. 30, sqq. 

^ The French removed this difficulty by giving ample security. 

^ Gardiner, v. 380, sqq. * ' Cabala,' i. 150. ° Gardiner, v. 383. 



60 MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1625. 

The King was said to have satisfied himself that, after all, the 
ships would be used against the King of Spain or his allies,^ and 
Penington was to hand over the Vanguard, and to force the 
others to obey, " even unto sinking." He returned to Dieppe on 
August 3rd, and surrendered, but not until he had found it necessary 
to fire on the merchant ships, w^hose masters obeyed at last, all save 
Gorges, who carried his ship back to England. The conduct of 
Gorges was more to English taste than Penington's. Gorges was 
not punished for his disobedience, but Penington's obedience in- 
vested him with the character of being over deeply attached to the 
King's schemes ; and this was not to his advantage in after years. 
Of the English crews, but one man served with the French against 
La Kochelle ; the rest returned to England with Penington. The 
ships were used in the autumn against La Eochelle. On Septem- 
ber 5th, Soubise was defeated off the town and driven for refuge to 
an English port : "as for the Vanguard, she mowed them down 
like grass." The indignation in England was allayed by the return 
of the ships in the following summer. 

Meanwhile Buckingham's ambition drove him to advance ^930, 000 
to complete the equipment of the Spanish armament. The fleet 
seems to have been thus composed : — 

The Admiral's Squadron, 

1. Anne Royal . . Viscount Wimbledon Capt. Sir Thomas Love. 

2. St. Andrciv . . Lord Denbigh, Vice-Admiral ... „ Watts. 

3. Convert ine . . Sir AV. St. Leger, Eear-Admiral . . „ (Thomas) Porter. 

With four groups of transports mounting each ten or twelve guns, and carrying in 
all four regiments of one. thousand men. Also one victualler. In all, thirty ships. 

Thk Vice- Admiral's Squadron. 

1. Swiftsure . . . Earl of Essex, Admiral .... Capt. Sir S. Argall. 

2. St. Georrje . . Lord "N'alentia, Vice-Admiral ... „ Gilbert. 

3. Constant Refor-) t i i i i\r n i i • i n 

.■ •' > Ijonl de la Warr, i'ear-Adiinral . . „ Greeves. 

With four similar groups of transports, of which, however, one carried no troops. 
In all, twenty-nine ships. 

'I'm; Rear- Admiral's Squadron. 

1. Lion .... Sir Francis Steward, Admiral . . Capt. (Mitchell). 

2. Rainbow . . . Lord Cromwell, Vice-Admiral . . „ (John) Chidley. 

3. Bonaventure . . Sir Henry Palmer, Piear-Admiral . ,, (Collins). 

With four groups similar to those of the vice-admiral's squadron. In all, thirty 
ships. 

' S. P. Dom., Charles I. iv. 136, 137. 



1625.] THE CADIZ EXPEDITION. 61 

There went in addition to tliese the Assurance, Dreadnought, 
Mary Bose, and the "pinnace" Mercury. The Prince Boyal is 
entered at the end of the latest Hsts, but in none which are official. 
It may be concluded that it was intended that she should sail, but 
that she could not be made ready for sea in time/ 

The Dutch also agreed to send twenty ships, ^ so that the total 
of the fleet rose to well over a hundred sail. As a soldier, 
Wimbledon was a man of some note, but he had never held any 
high command, and was moreover quite ignorant of sea warfare. 
The appointment was made by Buckingham, who had received a 
commission^ empowering him to set forth the whole of the enterprise. 

By the terms of his commission Wimbledon's main object was 
to be the destruction of Spanish shipping. The taking of a town 
was not directly contemplated, save so far as it might conduce to the 
first-named purpose, or might serve to make the expedition pay for 
itself. AVhether the Plate fleet was to be dealt with or not was to 
be at Wimbledon's discretion. 

Mismanagement appeared from the first. The troops were raw 
levies, and of a nominal two thousand brought from the Low 
Countries, five hundred never appeared. The fleet was as bad. 
The bulk of it was composed of merchant ships of ten or twelve 
guns, commanded by their own captains,* men who made it their 
chief study how to avoid danger. In short, the force was worthy 
of no confidence, and its leader had none in it. 

A Dunquerque squadron was known to be on the Spanish coast. 
Buckingham gave orders for it to be sought and taken. ^ But when 
they fell in with an enemy, the English ships did not attack. 

After the fleet had sailed, it was found that it had not all its 
ammunition on board, ^ and that many of the Dutch ships had not 
joined. The blame was Buckingham's ; but not less fatal was the 
utter incapacity of Wimbledon. Though he sailed with no pro- 
claimed destination, Wimbledon called no council of war till Finis- 
terre had been rounded ; and thus such ships as parted company in 
the Bay knew not where to rejoin ; and four did not reach Cadiz 
until the expedition was leaving it. 

It had been half intended to go to San Lucar, but off the Spanish 

1 S. P. Dom., Charles I. vii. 47-53. 

^ Sixteen ships were actually sent, under Lieut.-Admiral Willem de Zoete, better 
known as Haultain, who was later joined by other craft. — W. L. C. 
=* ' Fa?dera,' VIII. i. 129. ^ Ih. vi. 17. 

* Cal. S. P. Dom., Charles I. ii. 106. ^ lb. vii. 10. 



(52 



MILITABT HISTORY, 1603-1649. 



[1625. 



coast the captains remembered, as they might have done in England, 
that the bar would be impassable. Gibraltar was suggested, but 
Wimbledon was afraid of being shut up in the Straits, and of not 
being able to get out in time to intercept the Plate fleet. Finally, 
Argall suggested St. Mary Port,^ where the landing was easy, and 
from which St. Lucar might be reached. The fleet accordingly 
entered Cadiz Bay, the Siuiftsure leading. Seeing a crowd of ships 




CHART OF CADIZ HARBOUR. 



and galleys under the walls of Cadiz, Essex pushed forward to the 
attack. Not reahsing that he was unsupported, the Spanish ships 
fled into the inner harbour, and Essex was recalled. 

The fleet anchored off St. Mary Port, and a few Dutch ships and 
merchantmen were told off to bombard Fort Puntal, which pro- 
tected the inner harbour. Wimbledon went to bed. In the morning 

' Gardiner, vi, 15. 



1625.] THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CADIZ. 63 

he found that the merchantmen had kept out of danger, and that 
the Dutch had lost two ships. When such conduct passed un- 
punished, it was easy to foresee what support could be counted on. 
Wimbledon gave further orders ; the troops landed ; Sir John Burgh 
summoned the fort, and, fortunately, it surrendered : — fortunately, 
because, as afterwards appeared, the troops had not even brought 
scaling-ladders ashore. 

No attempt had been made to pursue the ships up the harbour. 
Wimbledon had been told that there was not enough water, and 
had asked no further. He did not consider that Drake had sailed 
into the harbour before him, and that he might have passed up, as 
Drake had passed, with the lead going on both sides. Throughout 
he ignored his commission. Instead of burning the Spanish ships, 
fifty-nine sail in all,^ as he had been ordered, he landed troops and 
marched towards Zuazo bridge.^ Arrived there he found that his 
troops had no food — none had been landed — and he stupidly 
marched them into the village where was stored the wdne for the 
West India fleets. The whole army at once drank itself into a state 
of madness, and all that Wimbledon could do was to decide that the 
bridge was not worth holding, or even destroying, and to march his 
troops back again. Yet this bridge Essex, in 1596, had decided 
must be held by any one who would hold the town,^ for it was the 
only means of access from the mainland to Leon Island, on which 
Cadiz lies. All that Wimbledon did was, to take Fort Puntal and 
evacuate it, to take the bridge and abandon it, and to capture a few 
boats from St. Mary Port to replace the long boats which had been 
lost on the rough passage out. 

It was now decided to look for the Plate fleet, and, on 
November 4th, Wimbledon's squadrons took up their positions in a 
long line stretching south from Cape St. Vincent. They might 
have saved themselves the trouble had they known that the fleet 
had taken the southern route and, creeping up in shore, had reached 
Cadiz two days after the English had left it. 

Wimbledon had intended to cruise till the '20th, but on the 16th 
he was persuaded to bear up for England. His ships were foul and 
leaking, the crews were dying fast. Burchett* tells a story that, 

' ' Tracts,' p. 273. 

- Called the bridge of Suaco, in vol. I. 514, 515. 

3 ' Tracts,' p. 273. 

* Bk. III. Chap, xviii. 



64 MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1625. 

when he found a plague breaking out on board some of the ships, 
Wimbledon caused the sick to be scattered through the fleet, two to 
each ship, presumably to prevent any of the ships from being short- 
handed. It is almost incredible that this was done, nor is the tale 
corroborated. What is. certain is that the ships were too weak to 
make England. The Anne Boijal put into Kingsale, and landed one 
hundred and sixty sick. She had already buried one hundred and 
thirty men,^ and many other ships had suffered in a like proportion. 

Recriminations followed, of course.^ A series of charges against 
Wimbledon was laid upon the council table. But it was to Bucking- 
ham's interest that no serious investigation should take place, and 
so the matter was hushed up. 

On October 13th, while the fleet was still away, a gale had 
scattered the Dutch blockading squadron, and twenty-two Dun- 
querquers had slipped out. The blow fell on the Dutch fishing- 
fleets, and Buckingham hastened to improve the opportunity by 
suggesting an Anglo-Dutch attack on Dunquerque ; but he found 
the Prince of Orange less ready than himself to begin a siege in 
November . 

Many causes combined to bring on the war with France, but the 
two chief w^ere the affair of Penington's ships, and a cruise made by 
Argall in September, 1625. Argall had been sent out against the 
pirates, but had returned with a string of French prizes ^ which he 
charged with carrying contraband of w^ar to the Spanish Nether- 
lands. It so happened that the King needed money badly. These 
prizes were, therefore, sold before they had been legally condemned. 
Among them was the St. Peter, of Le Havre, a ship that was 
eventually added to the English Navy. There was an immediate 
outcry in France ; reprisals were made, and Charles was obliged to 
see the wisdom of restoring the St. Peter. But Soubise* was in 
an English port, and his presence reminded Charles of the help 
which he had given against La Eochelle. To repair the hurt, he 
determined to relieve the town, and to demand the immediate 
restoration of the ships. As a first step, the St. Peter ^ was re-seized 

^ Out of a crew of three hundred anc| fifty or four hundred. 

2 ' Cabala,' i. 135. 

^ Gardiner, vi. 40. 

* Soubise had lately been cruising against ' Spain with letters of inaique from 
Buckingham. 

** She, and another ]inze made in 1625, figure as the St. Clrmde and St. Denis in 
the list on p. 10. 



1626.] 



WAR WITH FRANCE. 



.65 



before she had left England. A quarrel would, no doubt, have 
followed, had not a pacification between Louis and La Kochelle 
been agreed upon. For long the negotiations went on, but it 
was Charles who stood in the way of peace. His nature would 
admit of no compromise ; concession must always come from his 
opponent. 

Meanwhile a fleet of thirty-nine sail was preparing for Lord 
Willoughby, who was to remedy the failure of the year before .on 
the Spanish coast. ^ It was with the utmost difficulty that money 
could be found to equip the fleet for sea. AVhen it did sail, in 
October, it was driven back by a storm and did not put to sea again. 
The only success won against Spain was when Warwick'^ with 
three ships scattered a fleet of transports bound for Dunquerque 
with troops. That year, too, Lord Denbigh brought in some valu- 
able French seizures, and so gave occasion for the arrest of the 
whole of the English wine fleet in France. 

Penington was at the time Admiral in the Narrow Seas ; and, 
the French king being said to have ships in Le Havre, Penington 
was ordered to destroy them. A cruise was undertaken with fifteen 
ships, assessed on the merchants of London. " Very mean things," 
Penington thought them ; but Le Havre proved to be empty. 
When ordered to sea again the crews grew mutinous,^ but a few 
fortunate prizes gave money to pay the men for a short time and the 
outlook improved. 

Charles had deliberately forced the war upon Louis ; and now 
another armament was made ready. It consisted of the following 
King's ships : — * 



Triumph . 
Repulse . 
Vanguard 
Victory . 
Rainbow . 
Warspite . 
Nonsuch . 
Esperance 
Lion . 

and six small craft 



Admiral the Duke of Buckingham . 
Vice- Admiral Lord Liudsey . 

 • « 

Eear-Admiral Lord Harvey . 



Capt. Sir John Watt^j. 
Thomas Best. 
Sir J<ihn Burgh." 
Thomas Kettleby. 
.John Weddell. 
Thomas Porter. 
Sir Allen Apsley. 
Shipworth. 
John Penington. 



1 ' Fcedera,' VIII. ii. 83. 

2 ' Col. Rostr.' p. 82. 

^ They had shipped for three months. This period, they claimed, had expired ; and 
they refused to sail save for the Downs. 

* S. P. Dom. Ivi. 87, 88. ^ Commanding the troops. 

VOL. II. F 



C)6 MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1649. [16 



The fifty msrchant ships that went as transports included the 
St. Peter, of Le Havre, and three other French prizes. In addition, 
a squadron of ten Dutch ships sailed with the fleet. 

Oil June 27th, 1627, the fleet left Stokes Bay with a fresh east 
wind. As it began by chasing Dunquerquers, it was carried far to 
leeward of the French coast, and, as a result, reached Khe in two 
detachments, the earlier of which was not strong enough to attack 
without the other, but served very well to put the French on their 
guard.' Moreover, there had sailed from Plymouth at the same 
time as the English fleet, a Dutchman. This ship reached Rhe 
some days in advance of Buckingham, and warned the French of the 
saiHng of the English fleet, and was able to give particulars. 

A consideration of the map will show the mistakes made in this 
miserable campaign. To begin with, Soubise had advised the 
English to land in Oleron, which, was unfortified.^ It would have 
served their purpose as well as Ehe, and by taking it they would 
have had a base to work from. But Buckingham's commission,^ of 
course, had made him absolute, and he seems to have understood 
that he was above the advice, as well as the orders, of his 
associates. Second under Buckingham was the commander of the 
troops, Sir John Burgh. 

Oil the night of the arrival,* the Convertine and the Abraliam, 
tln"ew a few shot into the small fort of La Free. On the next 
day the landing of the troops began at the easternmost end of 
the island. St. Martin's was not ready to resist an attack, but no 
attempt was made upon it till it had had time to get in such stores 
iiiid provisions as were to be had. 

Meanwhile it had been ascertained that the Rochellers would not 
co-operate with the English until the latter should have made 
themselves masters of the island. 

As our troops landed, a charge of French threw them into confu- 
sion, and many men were drowned. However, the troops rallied 
and drove oft" the enemy. The ships had been ordered to cover the 
landing with their guns, but it does not appear that their fire had 
any great effect. 

On the loth, the troops began their march along the island. 
Instead of attempting the little fort of La Free, they took a 

' "I'lact-s,' PI-. l-'Tti, L'77. - Burchett. ^ 'Pcedera,' YIII. ii. 175. 

* Account of the operations at Ehe in Lord Lansdowne's works, ii. 310, sqq., and 
Gardiner, vol. v. cli. l.\. 



1627.] 



THE EXPEDITION TO LA ROCHELLE. 



G7 



circuitous route inland. This blunder was most serious ; for the 
fort then could not have been held ; but the enemy immediatel_y 
strengthened it. It was left to them without dispute, and from it 
they commanded the road running east from St. Martin's to the 
place where the troops had landed. 

On the following day the English marched into St. Martin's. 
The town was taken possession of without difficulty ; but the citadel 




CHART OF LA ROCIIEIJ-E. 



on the east side of it remained in the hands of the French. Toiras, 
commanding the enemy, did what he could to gain time in which 
to provision the citadel. On the 18th, an exchange of fire was 
maintained between the fort and a few guns which Buckingham had 
landed. Little was done, but Sir John Burgh decided that the 
place was too strong to assault. He advised that the troops should 
lay waste the island and then go to Oleron. 

Already difficulties were growing, and Sir William Beecher was 

F 2 



G8 MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1627. 

sent home to hasten the Irish reghnents and the siippHes which had 
been promised. There was also a report abroad ^ that a fleet of 
forty Spanish warships and twenty Dnnquerquers would soon arrive 
to help the French in holding the island." 

For two days Buckingham busied himself in landing guns, but 
in his determination to reduce St. Martin's, he failed to see that 
trenches would be needed. It was not until August that these 
were made. In the interval, provisions began to reach the fort. 
The ships could not keep out the small boats used for this 
service. No small craft had been provided with the expedition, 
and even of the ships' boats many had been lost. An attack on 
some of the ships was beaten off on the 23rd, and was not 
repeated. The boats of the fleet rowed guard to keep provisions 
out of the fort, but with indifferent success. The siege began 
to seem tedious to Buckingham, and, against advice, an assault 
was delivered. 

When this was repulsed, he decided that the siege must be 
laid in form, and, on August 20th, he began a boom which 
should keep provisions from the citadel. A storm destroyed this 
before it was complete : it was therefore replaced by hawsers 
stretched from ship to ship. 

Meanwhile, on 2nd September, some reinforcements, two 
thousand five hundred strong, arrived under Sir Kalph Bingle}'. 
Holland was still expected with eight thousand. In his great 
need of men, Buckingham had landed five hundred sailors under 
Captain Weddell, but they proved of little use. Bingley's Irish 
troops were ordered to assault La Free. A few guns were landed 
at La Flotte, but, when the preparations were well advanced, the 
order w^as foolishly cancelled. 

Provisions were running short. They had been ordered in 

England,^ but bad weather had delayed their departure. When 

Sir John Burgh was killed, even Buckingham began to despair of 

success. Though the Eochellers had joined us there was little help 

to be had from them. Even such provisions as could be procured 

from them were only bought at an exorbitant rate.'* But at the end 

of September, Sir Henry Palmer arrived from England with the 

» ' Hail. Misc.' V. 111. 

- The treaty between France ami Spain had been signed on religious ground?. 
Politically, there could be nn uninn between the countries. 
« Cal. S. P. Dom. Ixx. 45, and rf. ' Fo'dera,' YITT. ii. 207. 
* ' Harl. :Misc.' v. 3. 



1627.] THE ENGLISH RETREAT. 69 

long-expected provisions, and Buckingham plucked up courage so 
much that, when the citadel demanded a parley, he refused to treat, 
save for its surrender. 

Though boats had continually run the blockade, the fort was 
in such straits that it was agreed to surrender on September 28th, 
if no relief should come meanwhile. But on the night of the 27th, 
the carelessness of the ships let a flotilla of small craft pass,, and 
provisions for two months were landed at St. Martin's in spite of 
Buckingham's efforts to destroy the boats as they lay under the 
castle. 

It was now Buckingham's turn to despond. On October 9th he 
shipped his sick, for the army was now rotten and the " men died 
apace." The guns had already been re-embarked, save only those in 
the one floating battery that commanded the face of the citadel. 
Holland had been detained by bad weather and was despaired of. 
The whole of the colonels advised a retreat, the more so as the 
French had brought down 4000 foot and 200 horse and were 
preparing to land them in the island. 

But Buckingham would not give up without one last effort. 
Against all hope, orders were given to storm the fort. Heavy rain 
postponed the attack for some days, during which the English left 
their trenches to face the landing of French troops near La Free, 
and had to recover them on their return. 

Though the walls of the citadel were intact, the attempt to storm 
it was persisted in. The attack was delivered on October 27th, and 
four hundred dead were left under the walls. On the following day 
the army was in full retreat. 

The French had thrown two thousand men into La Flotte 
during the month, and thus Buckingham's neglect was bitterly 
repaid. There was no hope of embarking save at the west end of 
the island. The direction of the retreat was left to the senior 
colonel. Sir William Courtney, whose share in the campaign was 
more disastrous even than the Duke's. The troops were marched 
towards Loix Island. There was no other place at which they 
could embark. The French, with two thousand foot and some 
horse, hung on the rear of the column, but could not be drawn to 
an attack. 

But when the English reached the causeway and bridge that led 
over the salt marshes to the island, the French cavalry swooped 
down. The English rear was soon a mob, and was cut to pieces. 



70 MILITABY HISTORY, 1603-1649. [1627. 

The only stand was made by Sir Pierce Crosby and Sir Thomas 
Fryer/ who with a few hmidred pikes held the causeway till the 
survivors had crossed. 

On November 11th, the remnant of the expedition reached 
England. By famine, pestilence and the sword Buckingham had 
lost 4000 men : but it may be remembered in his favour that he had 
not spared himself, and that he did not throw the blame on his 
subordinates. The reason of the failure, said the King, lay in the 
non-arrival of help from England ; and in this, if he set aside the 
Duke's incompetence, the King spoke the truth. 

While these events were in progress. Sir Sackville Trevor had 
been cruising w^ith the Assurance, Adventure, and five prizes or 
small craft on the Dutch coast." The French were building ships in 
Holland, and his mission was to add these to the English Navy. 
Charles was determined " to crush the crocodile in the shell." At 
the beginning of October, Trevor heard of a great ship completed 
for sea in the Texel, and lying there half manned. He bribed a. 
pilot to take him in at once, and in spite of the presence of eighteen 
Dutch men-of-war, poured in a broadside. Two or three of the 
other ships did the like, and she hauled down her flag. The prize, 
which proved to be the St. Esprit, of 800 tons, was brought to 
England without protest from the Dutch. 

Charles still intended to reheve La Eochelle. Denbigh was 
appointed to command the sixty-six vessels which were to carry the 
provisions to the starving town. But want of men and money as 
usual delayed the start. Although the date determined on for 
sailing w^as March 1st, 1628, it was just two months later when 
Denbigh appeared off La Eochelle. The French had not been idle ; 
the defence towards the harbour had been strengthened with moles 
and palisades so that not a boat could pass, and the blockade by sea 
was as close as by land. Denbigh saw nothing to do save to make 
an attempt with fireships, but as the wind came off the land before 
he was ready, he determined to return to England to avoid being 
himself set on fire. Charles was very angry at the return, and 
ordered Denbigh to go back to La Eochelle ; ^ but plague, discon- 
tent, leaky vessels and the raiding of Dunquerquers on the storeships 
so weakened the squadron that movement was impossible. 

^ Biickiiif!;liam was wounded wliile conversing with Fryer. 
^ 'Harl. Misc.' V. 108. 
=• Gardiner, vi. 291. 



1628.] ASSASSINATION OF BUCKINGHAM. 71 

Yet Buckingham had not done with the problem. Another great 
fleet was fitting out, and again the preparations were attended by 
the difficulties of want of money and want of men. As a desperate 
means of raising supplies, Charles suggested a general levy of ship- 
money ; but the time was not ripe, and he had to draw back. The 
men were pressed as usual, but were more than usually mutinous. 
A spirit of disaffection was abroad to which even Buckingham was 
disposed to make concessions. 

Nothing would, it was true, be gained by the relief of La Rochelle, 
for the French king was prepared to tolerate his Protestant subjects, 
though he insisted upon being absolute. But to Buckingham this 
went for nothing. He had pledged his word to help the town, and 
the fleet was preparing. 

So slowly, however, were things advanced at Portsmouth, that 
even Buckingham grew almost hopeless. On August 22nd, a mutiny 
broke out, and it was thought that the Duke's life was in danger. 
It was so, indeed, but from another direction. 

On August 23rd, 1628, as he left breakfast Buckinghain was 
stabbed to the heart. His assailant was John Felton, who had 
held a lieutenancy in the Bhe expedition,^ and who thought his 
action to be but one of public justice. 

At length, nevertheless, the fleet was nearly ready to sail. 
Lindsey was appointed to command it " on September 2nd, and on 
7th it left port. On the 18th it anchored off St. Martin's ; and 
though on the 23rd and 24th a show was made of attempting the 
relief, there was no real fighting. A fleet of French vessels was 
anchored in front of the moles, and with these a harmless long 
range fire was maintained. There was no attempt to board, though 
Lindsey held it to be quite feasible. While Charles at home was 
exhorting the force to persevere, the struggle was abruptly ended by 
the surrender of the town on 18th October. 

The most remarkable action at sea this year was the capture of 
the Silver Fleet by the Dutch admiral, Piet Hein, near Havana. In 
1627, Eich had cruised in hopes of waylaying it, but, happily 
perhaps, had met with no success. 

Sir Kenelm Digby, cruising in the Mediterranean with six small 
ships against the French, found a squadron lying near Scanderoon.^ 
Though four Venetian vessels elected to take the part of the French, 

1 S. P. Dom., Charles I. Ixviii. 77. ^ . Fcrdera,' VIII. ii. 275. 

^ Lediard, p. 514. 



72 MILITABY HISTOBY, 1G03-1G49. [1632. 

Dioby won a complete victory. He compelled the Venetians to 
draw off, and of the French took three ships and sank one. 

The next few years may he passed over rapidly. They do 
but illustrate the contempt into which Buckingham's failures had 
brought the English Navy. Disdaining their enemies, and aided by 
a proclamation of Charles restraining his subjects from attacking 
them,^ the Turkish pirates grew more troublesome than ever. In 
our own waters they kept Button, in command of the Irish 
squadron, busy, and occupied Penington who was Admiral of the 
Narrow Seas. 

Articles of peace w^ere agreed on between France and England,^ 
and the treaty was signed in April, 1630. It was not till December 
that Charles could proclaim the conclusion of a peace with Spain. ^ 

In 1632, Charles had in view a plan which was to give him 
Duliquerque if he would join Spain against France ; ^ but Philip 
could not be; brought to pay the price. Indeed, Charles's value as 
an all,y Vv^as considerably depreciated. As time went on and the 
course of the w^ar seemed likely to deprive Spain of all other ways 
into the Netherlands,^ the value of Dunquerque rose, and the town 
remained in Spanish hands till it w^as taken by the French in 
October, 1646. 

Ere that time, Charles began to contemplate an assertion of his 
sovereignty of the seas,*^ and certainly there was work to be done. 
The northern herring fisheries were almost exclusively in the hands 
of the Dutch, who kept nearly 3000 busses at sea,^ and whose 
trade in herrings, taken on our coasts without licence froin the 
King, amounted to about ^61,000,000 annually. Against these Dutch 
fishers, and against the pirates, strenuous action was very necessary; 
])ut the main interest of the fleets sent forth, for the purpose 
lay in the manner in which they were paid for. The difficulty of 
equipping a force " to protect commerce from the pirates," was 
solved l)y the levying of ship-money. 

 But before the ship-money fleet sailed, other fleets had put to 
sea. The French and Dutch were in alliance, and in 1635 the war 

' 'l-V(Icia,' Yin. iii. 4. 2 j^_52. 

■' Jh. l.'if), 141, 144. * Gardiner, vii. 214. ^ lb. p. 348. 

'' Sir John Borougli's book, ' Tlie Sovereignty of the Seas,' appeared at tlie end 
of 1G33 (old style) and had a great effect on Charles. 

" 'England's Way to Win Wealth,' by Tobias Gentleman, 1614, is a descrii:)tion of 
tin- Dutch fislieries, and a recommendation that England should cease to allow all this 
wealth to be drawn from her by foreigners. 



1G35.] LIND SET'S CBUISE. 73 

between France and Spain broke out anew. A strong Franco-Dutch 
fleet left port and was known to be off Portland in June. 

Lindsey had joined his command on May 26th, 1635 ; Monson 
was his Vice-Admiral ; Penington,^ his Kear-Admiral. The fleet was 
very strong ; it consisted of nineteen ships of the Eoyal Navy, and 
twenty-six merchant vessels.^ For fighting purposes it would have 
proved vastly superior to any armament previously sent out during 
this period. But it was not destined to meet with an enemy. 
Lindsey's instructions were to defend the King's honour, but to make 
no nation his foe. But as the King's honour was threatened by 
the strong Franco-Dutch fleet, it seemed as though the intention 
was not so pacific as was pretended. Charles, indeed, was dis- 
appointed that the fleet returned without fighting. The credit of 
avoiding hostilities belongs to Eichelieu, who kept the French flag- 
officers out of Lindsey's sight. ^ Towards the end of its com- 
mission the fleet seized a Dutch man-of-war which had attacked 
Dunquerquers in English waters. It was its only hostile act. 

Lindsey's instructions to his officers* included the following 
article : " If you find foreigners in His Majesty's ports under false 
colours, you are to arrest them ; their wearing the false colours is a 
decoy to help them in their piracy." He had also settled his plan of 
action in case of a hostile encounter. He himself would attack the 
Admiral : his Vice- and Eear-Admirals would similarly single out 
opponents of equivalent rank ; and the rest of the ships were to 
match themselves to the best of their power. 

For the equipment of the fleet of 1636,^ there was sent out on 
August 4tli the first general issue of ship-money writs.'' There was 
no great opposition to the levy. It is important to remember that 
ship-money in case of national danger might be levied without 
raising an outcry, and that the tax only became unpopular when 
Charles let it become a regular means of raising supplies.'^ 

The fleet was considerably stronger than that of 1635, and it 
would have been even stronger than it was, but for the lubberly 
conduct of the master of the Anne Boyal. In bringing the ship 

^ Knighted the year before on board the Unicorn. 

2 ' Tracts,' p. 290 ; and ' Fcodera,' IX. i. 27. 

^ Coke to Conway, S. P. Dom. ccxci. 5U. 

* ' Tracts,' 333, sgq. 

^ See note (^) on next page. 

" ' Foedera,' IX. ii. 41. See aho antea, pp. 2G, 27. 

"' lb. 113 ; and lb. iii. 26. 



74 



MILITABY niSTORY, 1603-1649. 



[1636. 



out of the Medway, this man, Peter White, quarrelled with the 
pilot. The pilot went ashore, leaving the ship at anchor, and as 
the tide fell the ship touched. Her crew then manned the capstan, 
thinking that she was touching a bank, but hove her on to her 
anchor. "When the ship was bilged and half full of water, AVhite 
made sail on her and overset her. Many were drowned. It was 
blowing hard at the time, and the ship was known to be tender- 
sided. Though raised afterwards, she was found to be useless and 
was broken up.^ 

The James, coming from Portsmouth to the Downs with two 
hundred and sixty luen on board, had not ten, besides officers, able 
to take a turn at the helm." 

^ The Ship-Moxky Fleet of 1636. 
(S. P. Dom., Charles I. cccxvi. 69, I.) 

(Adniiral tlie Earl of Xorthumber-\ 
land ' ]\ 
Wm. Kainborow, Captain . . j 



Mr. Noise, Lieut. 



8. 

9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 



Anne lioyuP . 
James . 
ItepuJse . 
Victory . 
Unicorn 
Defiance 
Charles 

Henrietta Maria 
No7isuch 
Convertine . 
Assurance . 
Garland 
Bonaventure . 
Happy Entrance 
Adventure . 
Mary Rose . 
Black George . 
Second Whe^p . 
Fourth Whelp . 
Fifth WheJp . 
Tenth Whelp . 
Great Finnace. 
Lesser Pinnace 
Jonas . 
Great Neptune. 
Third WheJp . 



Vice-Admiral Sir John Peningtou 
Hear- Admiral Sir Henry Mervyn 
Caj^tt. Montague . 

„ Stewart .... 

„ Sir Henry Mainwaring 

„ Murray .... 

„ Thiimas Kettlel)y . 

„ Porter .... 

„ Povey .... 

„ John Mennes . 

„ Lewis Kirke 

„ Fogge .... 

„ Henry Stradiing 

„ (ieorge Carteret 

„ Paramour. 

,, Jeremy Brett. 

„ William Smith. 

„ Price. 

., Penruddock. 

., Lindsey. 

„ .Johnson. 

„ Turner. 

„ Slingsby. 

,, Fielding 

,, Thomas Kirke . 

„ Fletcher. 



,, Foxe, Lieut. 

,, Andrew Mennes, Lieut. 

„ Francis Smith, Lieut. 
Capt. Bardsey, Lieut. 

„ Owen, Lieut. 
Mr. Philip Hills, Lieut. 

„ Wynd, Lieut. 

„ Edwd. Popham, Lieut. 

„ Lidcott, Lieut. 

„ Bargrave, Lieut. 
( 'apt. Love, Lieut. 
Mr. Moyle, Lieut. 

„ Button, Lieut.^ 
Capt. Browne, Lieut. 



!Mr. Aj^pleton, Lieut. 
„ Edwd. Powell, Lieut. 



1 
The 

2 



The Anne lioijal was wreckel iu Tilbury Hope wlii'.e sailing from Chatham tu juiu tlie fleet, 9-19 April. 
.St. Andreiv was substituteii fur her. 
I'ossibly a son tf Sir Tiioinas Bntton who had dieJ in 1634. 

' Cal, S. P. Dom. vol cccxviii. 61, 78, vol. cccxix. 4, 13-15, 2-1, '56, etc. 
- Mervyn, ' Jielation Concerning Prestmasters,' Dec. 1636. 



1636.] THE SHIP-MONEY FLEET. 75 

From the Downs the fleet sailed west. It was known that there 
was a large French fleet in La Eochelle, and Northumberland was to 
watch it, since its destination might be Dunquerque. But though 
England was at peace, no fleet would sight the English Admiral. 
Eight Dutch men-of-war fled from him off Portland ; the French 
he could not find. Off Ushant, in June, he discovered that they 
had left port. Believing the word of the first Irishman he sighted, 
he sailed east in pursuit of them. But, arrived in the Downs, he 
found that they had not been heard of in that direction. A south- 
westerly wind blew. While waiting in the Downs for it to 
change, Northumberland received orders to go north to the herring 
fisheries. He sailed, and tried to issue licences to the Dutch busses. 
Some accepted and paid for licences ^ which should carry a pro- 
tection from Dunquerquers. Others refused. Northumberland fired 
on the fleet, sunk several craft, and dispersed the rest.^ Actively 
this great fleet had done very little ; indirectly it had had the effect 
of keeping the French out of the Channel. 

In August, 1636, the Fourth Whelp was lost. Her pilot ran 
her on a rock off Jersey in daylight, when she was before the wind 
with a smooth sea. In 1637 the Fifth Whelp went down off the 
Dutch coast. She was rotten, and her bottom seems to have fallen 
out. It was blowing no more than a fresh breeze at the time, and 
Captain Edward Popham and most of the crew managed to save 
themselves in the boats ; but seventeen were drowned. The 
survivors joined an English ship in Hellevoetsluis. 

Northumberland, with his great fleet, was at sea again in 1637 ; 
but there was even less for him to do than before. Again he went 
north to offer licences to the busses ; but, hearing of the presence of 
twenty-three Dutch men-of-war, and not wishing to have trouble, he 
sent a merchant ship on ahead. This vessel was not allowed even 
to speak the busses, and the great fleet was reduced to pretending 
that the offer had been, not of licences to fish, but of protection for 
the homeward journey.^ 

In 1638 James, Duke of York, became Lord High Admiral. 
Northumberland acted as his deputy. Penington commanded in 
the Downs, as he did again in the year following. 

^ Frankland, ' Annals,' 477, says that after being fired on, the Dutch agreed to j)ay 
a yearly tribute of £30,000 for the right. It was paid that year and the busses finished 
the season ; next year it was refused. 

^ Lediard, p. 516. ^ Gardiner, viii. 220. 



76 MILITARY EISTOBY, 1603-1649. [1639. 

In 1639 Tromp ^ found some Spanish soldiers for Dunqiierque 
on board English ships, and seized the men ; but did not harm the 
English. To Northumberland and Penington his action seemed 
perfectly natural ; not so to Charles, whose animus against the 
Dutch was thereby greatly increased. 

During the summer, Tromp's vice-admiral fell in with a great 
Spanish fleet bound up Channel. "With this fleet were eight English 
transports which, at sight of the Dutch, took refuge in an English 
port. The Dutch were only seventeen strong, Oquendo's fleet about 
sixty ; but a running fight was maintained. When the fleets 
reached Dungeness, Tromp, who at Dunquerque had heard the 
firing, joined his vice-admiral. A battle was fought in the Strait, 
and the Spaniards were forced, with heavy loss, into the Downs. 
The Dutch followed and anchored to the south. That night 
Oquendo got twelve transports safely round the North Sand Head 
and into Dunquerque. 

Penington was in the Downs, ^ but his squadron, nineteen strong, 
was not enough to control the Dutch, who had added to their fleet 
and kept Oquendo fairly shut in. Penington gave out that he would 
attack the side that fired the first shot ; though the Dutch professed 
that they would be content if he remained neutral. Tromp tempted 
Oquendo to fire on him on October 18th, and at once joined battle.^ 
A Dutch squadron was told off to watch Penington. 

Penington did not move. On the one hand his crews would, in 
all probability, have refused to fight for Spain ; on the other the 
King was expecting 56150,000 from Spain as the price of his help 
against the Dutch.* So the battle took its course, and Penington 
merely protected such Spanish ships as had been run ashore. But 
if the money had arrived, Charles would have taken part with Spain. 
That such was his intention appeared from the fact that he had 
already placed an embargo on the shipping in the river. The King 
wished to have ships ready to his hand. 

Penington had desired to induce the Dutch to give the Spaniards 

two tides' law ; but, though the custom was common enough, 

Northumberland held that it did not apply to such large fleets, 

and therefore declined to back his subordinate. His interpretation 

' Marten Harpertszoon Tromp, then furty-two years did. 
2 Cal. S. P. Duiu., Charles I. ccccxxxi. 3, -l. 

^ Tromp knew that Oquendo had just received a supply of powder and had nut yet 
got it oji hoard. Ttardiner, ix. 6"). 
■• Gardiner, ix. 61. 



1642J THE NAVY IN THE CIVIL WAB. 11 

was due, doubtless, to the fact that he saw httle chance of bemg 
obeyed. 

In October, 1641, there broke out the Irish rebeUion. The 
King was satisfied that this was no " rash insurrection," but one 
that would have to be suppressed by a " sharp war." ^ The 
squadron in the Irish Sea was therefore strengthened and put under 
the command of Captain Bichard Swanley. 

In the following year, before the King raised his standard at 
Nottingham, there arose the question of the ownership of the fleet. 
In June, 1642, the Parliament had appointed the Earl of "Warwick 
to command in chief, Northumberland being too ill to serve. The 
King, on the other hand, nominated Penington. But Parliament 
thought Penington far too staunch a Eoyalist, and applied to 
Northumberland, in whose power the appointment lay, to nominate 
Warwick. This he did ; but his doing so angered the King 
who, while persisting in thrusting Penington forward, dismissed 
Northumberland from his office of Lord High Admiral.^ 

The attitude of the seamen was at first Eoyalist to all appearance. 
In January they swore " to acknowledge Charles king ; to stand for 
the privileges of Parliament." ^ But this should perhaps be taken 
as meaning that they were convinced that Charles ought to govern 
with a Parhament, and that they did not foresee the strife that 
was to follow. 

When, in view of the dual appointment, Warwick made the best 
of his way on board, he was welcomed readily enough. There was 
but a faint show from four or five captains in favour of Penington,* 
who was in Kent, wasting time in waiting for orders. Warwick, 
meanwhile, appointed Sir Wilham Batten to be his Vice-AdmiraL 
The fleet in home waters consisted of sixteen ships of the Navy 
and sixteen merchantmen. In Ireland there were ten ships, of 
which only two belonged to the Navy. 

In Prance, Eicheheu was dead, and Charles saw a hope of 
gaining naval support from that quarter.^ Mazarin allowed freer 
communication between Henrietta Maria and her brother than 
Eichelieu had permitted, but he was not in the least disposed to 
go to war for the sake of a renewal of Charles's misgovernment. 

At the beginning of the new year the King and Parliament 

1 G. Penii, i. 12. * Eushworth, iv. 752. 

2 II. 55. ^ Gardiner, ' Civ. War,' i. 42. 

3 Ih. 19. 



78 MILITARY HISTORY, 1G03-1G40. [1643. 

opened negotiations ; but as the very first of the King's " proposi- 
tions " inchided a demand for the fleet, there could be no hope of 

peace. 

In February the Queen sailed from Holland with four ships laden 
with treasure and stores for the King. A landing was made, after 
a long, rough passage, at Bridlington Quay. A little later Batten, 
with a squadron, came upon the scene, and immediately opened 
fire on the ships. Ignorant of where the Queen lay, he could 
not know that her house chanced to be right in the line of fire, and 
that many of his shot were striking it. But so it was ; and on the 
supposition that this conduct was intentional, Eoyalist writers have 
served out scant justice to Batten.^ The fall of the tide and possibly 
the presence of Tromp, who had escorted the Queen across, caused 
Batten to desist. 

Northumberland would not accept a renewal of his commission 
from Parliament, though he continued on good terms with that 
party. Warwick accordingly was named Lord High Admiral. 
The instructions issued to him bade him require foreigners to salute 
the flag,- as though the fleet still represented the King. This caused 
difficulties with the Dutch, w^ho, on occasion, insisted that the 
salute of former days was a mark of respect to the King's majesty, 
and therefore could not be claimed by Parliament.^ 

The fleet of 1643 was very strong. There were in the Narrow 
Seas twenty-eight vessels great and small, besides merchant ships, 
and the Irish squadron had been raised from two vessels of the 
Navy to eight.* Yet it was complained that there were not 
enough small craft for the work on the Irish coast. The larger 
ships, also, were constantly employed. In August, 1642, "Warwick 
had helped to take Portsmouth; in August following he failed to 
relieve Exeter. Three of his ships went aground with the ebb, and 
of them two were taken and the other burnt. ^ In May, 1644, he 
reheved Lyme ; ^ while another good, if unscrupulous, service, was 
done for the Parliamentary cause by Swanley, who sank off 
Pembrokeshire a vessel bringing Irish soldiers to Charles's help, 
and drowned all on board. 

^ With Clarendon, ii, 143,; cp. Rush worth, 'Plist.' vi. 150; both quoted at length 
in Granville Penn, i. 72, sqq. 

^ G. Penn, i. Go. 

* In May, 1G47, Batten brought into Portsmouth fifteen Swedish vessels that refused 
to salute his flag. G. Penn, i. 243. 

< G. Penn, i. 68. ^ Lediard, 530. " Rushwuith, v. 680. 



1G47.] COLONEL THOMAS ItAINBOItOW. 79 

Ere the civil contest had gone far, the King discovered that the 
Parhament v^as using against him letters of marque which had been 
granted by himself, and at the end of December he v^ithdrew, by 
proclamation, all which had been issued previous to July, 1642.^ 

In the spring of 1645, Penington died, and was succeeded in the 
style of king's Vice-Admiral by Sir John Mennes.^ In Ireland, 
Swanley was superseded by Sir Eobert Moulton as parliamentary 
Yice- Admiral. 

The war ended without any interference from foreigners. The 
Navy had done its work well. In addition to the power of gaining 
help from abroad, the King had lost much of the consideration of 
*' his allies, the neighbour princes, who saw the sovereignty of the 
seas now in other hands." ^ But it must be borne in mind that the 
Navy served the Parliament in an honest hope and belief that it was 
helping to effect a reconciliation which would secure the rights of 
all parties.* When such a reconciliation began to appear each day 
farther off, there arose doubts as to their loyalty in the minds of 
many of those who commanded on behalf of the Parliament. 

Foremost among these was Sir William Batten. The Committee 
was aware of a growing spirit of discontent, and in writing to 
Batten, in June, 1647,^ was at pains to point out how hard this 
seemed to the Parliament, which had maintained seamen's wages at 
a higher rate than ever before. What the Committee apparently 
did not realise, was that its party was daily becoming more divided, 
and that the pre-eminence was going to the Independents — the army 
faction. After commanding the fleet of 1647, with Rear-Admiral 
Pichard Owen as his second in command, Batten, actuated by some 
such thought as this, went before the Committee, in September, 
and resigned his command, not, he declared, from discontent. On 
the contrary, he would be ready to resume the command if called 
upon. 

But a week afterwards, on October 5th, Colonel Thomas Eain- 
borow was appointed to succeed Batten, and ordered to take 
command of the winter guard. ^ This appointment was, in itself, 
unpopular, as evidencing a triumph of the Independents. And 
Painborow was not a man to conciliate favour. Five months later, 
when he tried to go on board his flagship, the Constant Beforma- 

1 ' Foedera,' IX. iii. 107. * G. Penii, i. 9G. 

2 G-. Penn, i. 76. « //'. 247, 248. 

3 Clarendon, i. 679. "^ Ih. 251. 



801 MILITARY HISTORY, 1603-1G49. [1648. 

Hon, to take command of the fleet for 1648, his sailors refused to 
receive him. 

It has been alleged that Eainborow was unwelcome mainly as 
being no seaman. In this there may be some truth ; but as his 
father, AVilliam Eainborow, had served afloat all his life, and had 
been flag-captain to Northumberland, in the Triumj^h, in 1636, it 
seems likely that the son had been brought up to the sea. That he 
had deserted the sea for the land service was more probably the 
secret of his naval unpopularity.^ 

Parliament, on receiving the news, and a letter from Eainborow 
complaining of the attitude both of the fleet and of the county of 
Kent, reappointed Batten. 

Batten was welcomed on board, for he was popular with the 
fleet, and not the less so because he seemed to have been the martyr 
of the faction which the sailors disliked. While the fleet was in 
this temper, and petitioning for a personal treaty with the King, 
Batten withdrew from the river with eleven ships, ^ and joined the 
Eoyalists in Holland.^ The accessions of this time brought the 
Prince's squadron up to seventeen sail. But Batten, a Presbyterian, 
was not a welcome commander to the Eoyalists. The fleet 
clamoured that James, the Duke of York, should be its admiral. 
The Prince of Wales returned from France to Holland at this 
juncture, and he himself assumed the command. 

When the ships revolted from Parliament, the three castles in 
the Downs — Walmer, Deal, and Sandown — did likewise. There 
seemed some danger of the movement spreading, but the squadron of 
eight ships at Portsmouth remained staunch, and three vessels at the 
mouth of the Colne prevented any relief of Colchester from the sea. 

' G. Penn, i. 255, s(j[q. 

^ Ships carried off to the Prince of "Wales in June, 1648, by Sir "William Batten : — 
Swalloiu, Constant Reformation, Convertine, Antelope, Satisfaction, Constant War- 
wick, IJJackmoor Lady, Hind, Crescent, Roebuck, Pelican. The Satisfaction and 
Hind, "svith the Truelove, returned to their allegiance to the Parliament in Xovember. 
Tlie Truelove was then imder Captain John Sherwin. The Constant Warv:ick 
reverted to the Parliament at once. The Blackmoor Lady joined, or was taken hy, 
Charles in the Downs in July. 

^ S. P. Dom., Interregnum, 9 E., pp. 154, 155. This action brought the Parliament's 
fleet to Holland in the autumn and put the States in a false position. They could not 
allow the Prince to be attacked ; neither did they wish to offend the party which held 
power in England. Accordingly they massed as many of their ships as they could 
collect to keep the peace between the rival squadrons. This end was attained, yet 
there arose the further difficulty that Warwick refused to give Eupert two tides' law ; 
but, AVarwick sailing first, and Eupert slipping out of port without beiug met, this 
stumblingblock also was avoided. — Basnage, ' Annales,' i. 139. 



1648.] CHAELES AND RUFERT AT SEA. 81 

On 22nd July, the Prince of "Wales arrived off Yarmouth with 
his fleet. He decided not to attempt any operation at Colchester, 
but came into the mouth of, the Thames, calling on the ships there 
to join him. Meeting with no response, he went to the Downs. So 
distressed was he for money, that he was forced to hazard his cause 
by seizing English ships. His men refused to return to Holland, 
and insisted on sailing up the river. Near the Nore, Warwick's 
fleet was sighted. Neither commander was sure enough of his men 
to be willing to risk an engagement, but any chance of a meeting 
was removed by a calm, which kept the fleets apart, and which was 
followed by a breeze that blew the Boyalists over to Holland. 

Walmer and Deal had fallen to Nathaniel Eich ; Warwick joined 
with the Portsmouth squadron, and reduced Sandown — the King's 
last hope in Kent. Warwick then went over to Holland, and 
blockaded the Koyalist fleet in Hellevoetsluis. While there he 
found that the enthusiasm for the Prince was waning, and four of 
the ships rejoined him. The Prince himself had left the fleet, 
and the second in command, Willoughby, was superseded by Prince 
Eupert. 

Under the command of Eupert and his brother Maurice, the 
squadron sailed from Hellevoetsluis, with the expressed intention of 
upholding the Eoyalist cause in Ireland. The subsequent history 
of Eupert's squadron will appear when Blake's first command under 
the Commonwealth is described. 




VOL. II. G- 



( 82 ) 




CHAPTEK XIX. 

VOYAGES AND DISCOVEEIES, 1603-1649. 

Sir Clements Maekham, K.C.B., F.E.S. 

Prince Hfenry supports discovery — The early ventures of the East India Company — 
Saris to Japan — Attempts at the North-West Passage — George Waymouth — John 
Knight — The Muscovy Company and tlie North-East Passage — Henry Hudson's 
three voyages and death — Prince Henry and Pialegh — Thomas Button — The 
merchants discoverers of the North- West Passage — Death of Prince Henry — 
Captain Gibbons — Captain Bylot — William Baffin — Captain Hawkridge — Captain 
John Smith in Virginia — Annexation of Bermuda- — Ralegh's last voyage and 
execution — Death of Hakluyt — Captain Luke Fox — Captain James. 

npHE impetus given to maritiixie enterprise by 
the encouragement of the government of 
Queen Elizabeth did not lose its force at her 
death, but continued in full vigour for at least 
twenty years afterwards. This was due partly to 
that love of adventure which had been so thoroughly aroused, and 
to the patriotic zeal which had been instilled into the minds of 
the merchants and seamen of England, but also to the warm and 
active support which the great Queen's policy received from her 
young godson. Prince Henry. 

The first voyage despatched by the East India Company was 
followed by annual ventures. In 1604 Sir Henry Middleton led 
the second expedition, visiting Ternate and Tidore, and in the 
third voyage Captain William Hawkyns reached Surat and Agra, 
obtaining a footing for the Company on the mainland of India. 
But these East Indian ventures ^ now pass away from the province 
of discovery and exploration, with the exception, perhaps, of the 
voyage of Captain Saris, which brought the distant empire of 
Japan within the knowledge of EngHsh seamen. A letter from 
William Adams of Gillingham, who had been shipwrecked in a 
Dutch vessel on the coast of Japan, dated October, 1611, induced 

' Such of these voyages as involved serious fighting have been described in 
Chap. XVIII. 



1606.] SEABGH FOB A NORTH-WEST PASSAGE. 83 

the East India Company to send Captain John Saris in a ship 
called the Clove, accompanied by the Thomas and the Hector, 
to attempt to open commercial relations with the Japanese. In 
June, 1612, the Clove anchored in the haven of Firando, where the 
Dutch had already established a factory. Saris, with the help of 
William Adams, obtained ample privileges for trade. He sailed 
from Japan in December, 1613, leaving eight Englishmen to form 
a factory at Firando, but it was abandoned in 1624, and the 
establishment of friendly relations between England and Japan, so 
auspiciously commenced by Elizabethan seamen, was postponed for 
more than two centuries. 

The East India Company, constantly kept alive to the importance 
of geographical discovery by their first governor. Sir Thomas Smith, 
also made some efforts to discover a route by the north-west. In 
1602 an expedition consisting of two vessels of forty and fifty tons, 
named the Discovery and Godspeed, had been sent out under the 
command of an experienced seaman named George Waymouth. 
He sailed from the Thames in May, but was obliged to return, after 
reaching the Labrador coast, owing to a mutiny, fomented by the 
chaplain, one John Cartwright. It was intended to employ Way- 
mouth again, but the project fell through. The Company, however, 
did not abandon the attempt to discover a passage, for we find a 
captain named John Knight, who had previously served in a 
Danish expedition to Greenland, employed to discover the north- 
west passage in 1606. He sailed from Gravesend in April, on 
board the Hopeivell, of forty tons, and steered across the Atlantic 
until the coast of Labrador was sighted. But his journal ceases 
abruptly on the 26th of June. On that day he landed, leaving two 
men in the boat, and walked over a hill with three companions. 
They were never seen or heard of again. The ship returned to 
Dartmouth in September, and Sir Thomas Smith had much 
difiiculty in maintaining the zeal of his brother directors for dis- 
covery. When Captain Waymouth had returned unsuccessful, it 
had sunk very low, and some of them had proposed that the attempt 
" should be utterly left off." The disaj)pearance of Captain Knight 
still further disheartened them ; but fortunately Sir Thomas Smith 
had greater influence with the Muscovy Company. That body of 
merchant adventurers agreed to despatch an expedition to discover a 
route to Cathay by the north-east. 

Henry Hudson, whom we now hear of for the first time, was 

G 2 



84 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1603-1649. [1610. 

selected to lead this daring enterprise. He fitted out a little vessel 
of eighty tons, and weighed anchor at Greenwich on May 1st, 1607. 
He had with him only ten men, and his own little son John. 
Hudson first sighted the east coast of Greenland in 73^ N. on 
the '22nd of June, and then examined the edge of the ice until he 
sighted the N.W. cape of Spitzbergen, and named it Hakluyt 
Headland. He made a careful examination of the western coast 
of Spitzbergen, and on his way home discovered the island since 
called Jan Mayen, which he named " Hudson's Tutches." 

In 1608 Hudson fitted out a second expedition to explore the 
sea between Spitzbergen and Novaya Zemlya. He coasted along 
the edge of the ice, making more than one resolute effort to pene- 
trate into it, until he sighted Novaya Zemlya on the 25th of June. 
The practical consequence of these ably conducted exploring voyages 
was the establishment of a rich and prosperous Spitzbergen fishery, 
which continued to flourish for two centuries. In the four succeeding 
years, the Muscovy Company sent Captain Jonas Poole on voyages 
to kill morses and whales, and he was succeeded by Fotherby and 
Baffin, whose work in the Spitzbergen seas extended over the years 
from 1613-161.5. Subsequently Captain Edge was the leading spirit 
in these voyages, and between the j^ears 1607 and 1622 English 
seamen completed the delineation of the Spitzbergen group, while 
enriching their employers with full cargoes procured by facing 
dangers and hardships of a kind of which they had had no previous 
experience. The fleets in the northern seas and on the Newfound- 
land banks formed admirable nurseries for our Navy. 

Hudson's last voyage was undertaken to search for a passage 
by the north-west, by a strait which is marked on the globe of 
Molyneux as the " Furious Overfall," and of which Hudson had also 
heard from Captain "Waymouth. The funds were supplied by Sir 
Thomas Smith, Sir Dudley Digges, and Sir John Wolstenholme, 
merchant princes, whose patriotic munificence is deserving of all 
praise. The Discovery , of 55 tons, was equipped, and Henry 
Hudson sailed from the Thames on April 22nd, 1610, with his yomig 
son John and a crew of doubtful character, though including some 
good men and true. Passing the "Furious Overfall," as placed by 
Davis on the globe of Molyneux, and down the ice-encumbered 
strait, Hudson entered the great inland sea which was, from thence- 
forward, to bear his nume. He named the island on the south side 
of the entrance to Hudson's Bay, where he observed that myriads 



1611.] HUDSON'S LAST VOYAGE. 85 

of birds were breeding, Cape Digges, and here his own journal 
comes to an end, on the 3rd of August. The story is continued by 
one of the crew named Habakkuk Prickett, whose narrative is 
confused and unsatisfactory. Hudson examined the eastern shore 
of the great inland sea, and was eventually obliged to winter in 
a bay at its southern extremity. 

During the long winter nights a spirit of mutiny began to 
manifest itself, caused by the hardships and misery of the crew, 
and fostered by two or three designing villains. As soon as Hudson 
got his vessel out of winter quarters in the following spring, he 
shaped a course towards the strait on the 18th of June, 1611. 
The mutineers feared that the provisions would not last out, and 
they resolved to diminish the number of mouths by turning the 
sick and weak adrift. As they knew that their captain would 
never consent to this crime, he and his son were also to be aban- 
doned. After the ship had been three days at sea, the diabolical 
act was perpetrated. Four sick men, three who were loyal, Captain 
Hudson and his son Jack, who had accompanied him in all his 
voyages and who was then eighteen, were forced into the shallop, 
and she was cast adrift. They were given a fowling-piece, a little 
ammunition, an iron pot, and some meal. Hudson and his doomed 
companions were never heard of more. Eleven men remained on 
board. Only five survived to reach England, including old Bylot 
the mate, and Prickett, a servant of Sir Dudley Digges, who wrote 
the narrative. No one was punished, yet there was a feeling that 
search should be made for the great navigator. He had found a 
grave in the midst of his discoveries, and his name is immortalised 
by the strait and the inland sea which bear his name. 

At that period the natural leaders of maritime enterprise were 
more or less disabled. Sir Walter Ralegh, the accomplished 
navigator and fervent patriot, was in prison, having been con- 
demned on a false charge. Prince Henry, on whom the mantle 
of his godmother had fallen, was but a boy, full of zeal and 
ardour, but inexperienced. The friendship between the illustrious 
prisoner and the young Prince is a very touching episode in our 
history. Queen Anne first took her son to see Ralegh in 1606, when 
the boy was only twelve years old ; but their most intimate friend- 
ship was from 1610 to the Prince's untimely death in 1612. Prince 
Henry constantly consulted Ralegh, and was much guided by his 
advice. He learned the rudiments of shipbuilding from Phineas 



86 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1G03-1649. [1612. 

Pett, and of navigation from Edward Wright ; but it was Ealegh 
who gave hfe to his studies, who taught him the principles of 
seamanship, and filled his young mind with some of his own 
enthusiasm. The boy longed to sail in the Narrow Beas, and 
aspired to the command of a British fleet in the West Indies if 
there should again be war with Spain. 

The news of Hudson's abandonment aroused young Henry to 
action. Under his auspices an expedition was fitted out to follow 
up the discoveries of Hudson, and Thomas Button, an experienced 
officer, was entrusted with the command. His instructions were 
drawn up by Prince Henry, doubtless with the aid of Kalegh, 
whose guiding hand is visible throughout. They are dated 
April 5th, 1612. Button's orders were to make the best of his way 
to Bigges Island, and thence, without loitering, to steer direct for 
the opposite mainland, and to spend no time in the search for 
anything but the passage. Button was on board the Besolution. 
He was accompanied by two friends named Gibbons and Hawkridge, 
and by Prickett and Bylot, who had been with Hudson. The second 
vessel was Hudson's old ship, the Discovery, commanded by Captain 
Ingram. The expedition sailed in April, 1612, reached Bigges 
Island, and, in obedience to Prince Henry's instructions, shaped a 
course westward across Hudson's Bay. The western shore was 
sighted at a point named by Button " Hopes Checked," and Port 
Nelson was reached on August 15th. There the Besolution was 
lost, and the expedition wintered. In the spring Button, in the 
Discovenj, continued his search for a passage to the north-west, 
exploring the whole western shore of Hudson's Bay until he reached 
the strait in 65° N., known as " Sir Thomas Eoe's Welcome." 
Thence he proceeded homewards, arriving in the autumn of 1612. 

Soon after the departure of Button's expedition a charter was 
granted to a " Company of Merchants Discoverers of the North- 
West Passage," including Sir Thomas Smith, Sir Dudley Digges, 
Wolstenholme, Jones, Lancaster, Mansell, Freeman, Stone, Wyche, 
Bell — whose names all survive on bays and headlands of Spitz- 
bergen or round Baffin's Bay. Prince Henry was the official 
protector of the Company. The charter was dated July 26th, 1612, 
and the common seal had the Prince of Wales's feathers and his 
motto : " Juvat ire per altiun." 

But a terrible calamity followed soon after the return of Button's 
expedition. Queen Elizabeth's godson, the hope of England, was 



1615.] VOYAGES OF BYLOT AND BAFFIN. 87 

attacked by a fatal illness. His mother suspected poison. A cordial, 
prepared by Sir Walter Ealegh did him good and soothed his last 
hours ; but on November 6th, 1612, Prince Henry died in his 
nineteenth year. His father had promised the Prince to release Sir 
Walter Ealegh on the following Christmas. The son being dead, 
James broke his word. " No king but my father would keep such a 
bird in a cage," young Henry had indignantly exclaimed. 

The Company of Merchants Discoverers of the North-West 
Passage continued its efforts ; and in December, 1614, the Directors 
of the East India Company voted £300 a year, for three years, 
to further the same object. In 161'2 the Discovery was again 
despatched, under the command of Sir Thomas Button's companion. 
Captain Gibbons, with Bylot as his mate. Gibbons failed to enter 
Hudson's Strait, and was driven by the ice into a bay in 58° 30' N., 
where he was beset for ten weeks. It was called by the crew 
"Gibbons his Hole." When he was released he returned home. 
In 1615 an expedition was fitted out at the expense of Sir Thomas 
Smith, Sir Dudley Digges, and Alderman Jones. Again the old 
Discovery of 55 tons was used, and the command was given to 
Robert Bylot, who had served with Hudson, Button, and Gibbons. 
The pilot, who wrote the narrative of the voyage, was William 
Baffin, and the crew consisted of sixteen men and two boys. They 
had some difficulty with the ice at the entrance of Hudson's Strait, 
but eventually sailed along the northern shore, until the ships were 
beset off some land which Baffin named "Broken Point." There 
Baffin took a complete lunar observation, the second recorded to 
have been ever taken at sea, the first having been that observed by 
Pedro de Sarmiento on March 31st, 1580. Baffin's lunar was 
observed on June 21st, 1615. On the 27th the ice opened out, and 
,the Discovery proceeded on her voyage as far as the north-west 
coast of Southampton Island, where the closeness of the pack 
stopped further progress. Bylot returned in September, 1615. 

Another voyage was undertaken in the following year by the same 
merchant adventurers, and Bylot again took command of the 
Discovery, with Baffin as his pilot. This time they were to explore 
the sea to the northward of the farthest point of Davis, called 
" Sanderson's Hope." Sailing from Gravesend in March, 1616, 
they sighted the coast of Greenland, and passed Sanderson's Hope 
on the 30th of May. Baffin crossed Melville Bay with little or no 
obstruction from the ice, reaching the " north water " on the 1st of 



88 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1603-1649. [1616. 

July. He named a headland Cape Dudley Digges, and a deep bay, 
twelve leagues farther north, was called Wolstenholme Sound. To 
another bay he gave the name of Whale Sound, and an island was 
called after Eichard Hakluyt. In 78° N. an opening received the 
name of Smith Sound — "the greatest and largest in all this sea," 
says Bafhn. A group of islands was named after the ship's husband, 
Alwyn Gary. Standing to the westward in- an open sea, with a stiff 
gale, it suddenly fell calm, and Jones and Lancaster Sounds were 
discovered on the western coast. Baffin returned along the western 
side of Davis Strait, crossed to Cockin Sound, on the Greenland 
coast, where scurvy grass was collected for the sick, and arrived off 
Dover on the 30th of August, 1616. Baffin's conclusion was that 
there was no strait and no passage to the north of Davis Strait. He 
was wrong. His sounds named after Smith, Jones, and Lancaster 
were all straits. But he had discovered Baffin's Bay, and had thus 
crowned his Arctic career by an important achievement. He was a 
diligent observer and a scientific seaman. The death of this great 
navigator took place at Kishm Island, in the Persian Gulf, when he 
was in the service of the East India Company, on the 23rd of 
January, 1622. His was the last Arctic voyage deriving its impulse 
from Elizabethan days. 

The futile voyage, set forth in 1619, can scarcely be counted. 
Captain Hawkridge, who was a friend of Sir Thomas Button, and 
had sei-^'Cd in his expedition, received commaiid of a vessel in that 
5'ear to discover the passage. The chief promoter was Sir John 
Wolstenholme, and the East India Company subscribed £200. 
Hawkridge entered Hudson's Strait. He seems to have made 
regular observations, but he cruised about in an aimless manner, 
and the abstract of his journal, preserved by Luke Fox, proves him 
to have been an incapable commander. He appears to have been 
off Mansell Island in Hudson's Bay, and to have returned home in 
September. 

While Sir Walter Ralegh was in prison his great enterprise 
of establishing a permanent colony in Virginia was completed by 
others ; but, owing to the representations of himself and of his 
friend and admirer, Richard Hakluyt, a company of adventurers 
received a charter on April 10th, 1606, and three ships left England 
in Januaiy, 1607. The Susan Content, of 100 tons, was commanded 
by Captain Christopher Newport, the Godspeed, of 40 tons, was 
entrusted to Bartholomew Gosnold, who had already made a voyage 



1609.] JOHN SMITH IN VIRGINIA. 89 

to America, when he reached the New England coast and gave the 
name to Cape Cod. John Eatchffe had charge of the Discovery, of 
20 tons. The three vessels carried one hundred and five colonists ; 
and among them was Captain John Smith. 

This remarkable man was born at AVilloughby, in Lincolnshire, 
in 1579, and he had passed through many and most extraordinary 
adventures in the wars of the Low Countries and Hungary before 
he embarked in the Virginian expedition. On the 13th of May, 
1607, the colonists landed and formed their first settlement of 
Jamestown, on the northern shore of the James Biver in Virginia. 
At first they suffered from famine and disease, and before September 
fifty emigrants, including Captain Gosnold, were dead. Captain 
Smith's high character and great abilities pointed to him as the 
ruling spirit, and the chief management of affairs devolved upon 
him. But in one of his numerous exploring excursions up the 
Virginian rivers he was taken prisoner by the natives and placed 
in the power of King Powhatan, whose residence was on the 
north side of the York Eiver. It is stated, in his ' True Relation of 
Virginia,' that he was sentenced to death, but, when the weapon 
was raised to strike, the king's daughter Pocahontas, a child of 
twelve, rushed forward and clasped his head in her arms, determined 
to save his life or share his fate. Her conduct touched her father's 
heart and Smith's life was spared.^ He was allowed to return to 
Jamestown. In June, 1608, Captain Smith explored the Chesapeake 
and discovered the courses of the rivers Potomac and Rappahannock, 
returning to Jamestown in July. He was elected President of the 
colony, and on May 23rd, 1609, a new charter was granted to the 
Virginia Company. But this able administrator was to be super- 
seded. Lord De la Warr being appointed Captain-General of the 
colony, with Sir Thomas Gates as Lieutenant-General, and Sir 
George Somers as Admiral. Lord De la Warr was to be preceded 
by Gates and Somers. Sailing in May, 1609, they were ship- 
wrecked at Bermuda. The other ships, forming the squadron of Sir 
George Somers, arrived safely at Jamestown, and in the autumn 
of 1609 Captain John Smith returned home. He left behind him 
a colony consisting of four hundred and ninety souls, with pro- 
visions, arms and ammunition, stores of clothing, boots, and 
domestic animals. The English looked upon him as the saviour 

^ But Mr. Charles Deane gives reasons for discrediting this story, in a note at p. 28 
of his edition of the ' True Relation.' 



90 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1603-1649. [1615. 

of the colony ; the respect of the natives for him hardly stopped 
short of idolatry, and as an explorer he takes a high place among 
English geographers. He discovered Chesapeake Bay and the 
principal Virginian rivers. His ' True Relation,' published in 
1608, is a most interesting narrative of events from the first 
landing of the colonists, and in 1G12 his important map of Virginia 
was engraved at Oxford. 

Meanwhile the Sea Venture, with Sir George Somers, Sir 
Thomas Gates, and Captain Newport on board, had been cast 
ashore on the Bermudas. Out of the wreck, and with the cedars 
on the island, two vessels were built called the Patience and the 
Deliverance. By this means the company of one hundred and 
forty men and women was safely conveyed from Bermuda to 
Jamestown in May, 1609. Sir George Somers afterwards returned 
to Bermuda with the object of forming a plantation. He died 
there before his intentions could be fulfilled, but the colony at 
Bermuda was established and has since had a continuous history.^ 

John Smith did not remain idle after his return to England. 
In March, 1614, he sailed with two vessels belonging to some 
London merchants, which were commanded by himself and 
Captain Hunt. Reaching the coast of Maine they were occupied 
in fishing during the months of July and August ; while Captain 
John Smith himself, in a small boat, examined and surveyed the 
whole coast from Penobscot to Cape Cod. This enabled him after- 
wards to construct a map of the country, to which he gave the 
name of New England. The name of Cape Cod, as already noted, 
had been given by Captain Gosnold in 1602. On his return Captain 
Smith entered the service of a Plymouth company, and two vessels 
were again equipped. They sailed in March, 1615, but Smith 
was captured by a French squadron, in open defiance of the laws of 
nations, and taken to La Rochelle. He reached Plymouth towards 
the end of the year and wrote the narrative of his voyage to 
New England, which was published in 1616 with a map. 

Captain Smith was indefatigable in striving to awaken an 
interest in the subject of settling America, and personally distributed 
many copies of his work. He passed the remainder of his days 
in England, publishing his ' General History of Virginia, New 
England, and the Summer^ Isles' in 1626, the ' Sea Grammar and 

' The Benuudas are still nlternatively known as tliu Snincirs Islands. — W. L. C. 
^ Thus spelt in the title. 



1616 J RALEGH'S LAST VOYAGE. 91 

Accidence for Young Seamen ' in 1627, and the narrative of his 
extraordinary early adventures in 1630. With the exceptions of 
Ealegh and Hakkiyt, no one man did so much towards colonising 
the coast of North America as Captain John Smith ; and the 
stirring and romantic narrative of his life and adventures will ever 
secure a living interest in this noble Englishman, who, amidst many 
trials and temptations, maintained his honour spotless and his 
name untarnished. Two books which were used by Captain John 
Smith when he was yomig were Macchiavelli's ' Art of War ' and 
the ' Thoughts ' of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. These works 
supplied the education of a great man. John Smith " was great," 
says Mr. Long, " in his heroic mind and his deeds of arms, but 
greater still in the nobleness of his character." He died in London 
in 1631, in his fifty-second year. 

The sad story of the betrayal and death of Sir Walter Ealegh 
must needs have a place in the narrative of English exploration and 
discovery. He had strongly represented the existence of rich gold 
mines in Guiana, and declared himself ready to discover and work 
them for the enrichment of his country. He was not granted a full 
pardon, but he received a commission giving him the power of life 
and death, which was an equivalent. He was allowed to undertake 
this enterprise on the impossible condition that no complication with 
the Spanish Government should result. He was released from the 
Tower, after an unjust detention of fifteen years, in January, 1616. 

Robert Harcourt of Stanton Harcourt, in 1609, had sailed with 
his brother Michael to the Guiana coast, and, leaving a few colonists, 
had returned to England. He published a very interesting account 
of his voyage in 1613, but was unable, from want of funds, to 
continue his efforts for establishing a colony. Besides this 
Harcourt enterprise, nothing had been done by the English since 
the death of the Queen. 

Sir Walter Ealegh contributed the remains of his fortune, and 
received 5915,000 from his friends, with which he equipped a few 
vessels. But one was detained by creditors, another sank in a gale 
off Scilly, another was driven up the Bristol Channel, and a fourth 
deserted at Lanzarote. His own ship was the Destiny, with his 
young son Walter, aged twenty-four, as captain, and his life-long 
friend. Captain Keymis. Another vessel, the Thunder, was com- 
manded by William St. Leger. Sailing from Cork in August, 1617, 
the one bright spot in the melancholy story is the short stay at the 



92 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1G03-1649. [1(518. 

island of Gomera, the point of departure of Columbus, where Sir 
Walter Ealegh was most kindly received by the governor and his 
English wife. There was terrible mortality in crossing the Atlantic. 
Mr. Fowler, the chief gold refiner, and John Talbot, who had been 
Kalegh's secretary in the Tower for eleven years, died. Finally, Sir 
Walter himself was struck down with fever. He was prematurely 
old, and enfeebled hy long confinement. At length the Destiny 
anchored in the Cayenne River, and for a fortnight they found rest 
and refreshment during the last half of November. 

In December the ship was off the island of Trinidad, but Ealegh 
was too ill himself to undertake the boat voyage up the Orinoco in 
search of the gold mine. He sent the boats in command of Captain 
Keymis, accompanied by his own son Walter and his nephew, 
George Ealegh. They attacked and captured the Spanish settlement 
of San Tomas. Young Walter was killed in the assault. Keymis 
returned with the news of hopeless failure. The unfortunate 
leader saw that this fatal mistake would be used for his destruction. 
In the heat of the moment he upbraided Keymis. The faithful 
fellow said that there was but one thing left for him to do. He 
went into his cabin and shot himself. The crew became mutinous 
and insisted upon returning home. From St. Kitt's Sir Walter 
Ealegh wrote a full explanation to Sir Ealph Winwood, the 
Secretary of State, one of his few loyal friends. But, alas ! 
Winwood was already dead. The Destiny reached Plymouth on 
the 21st of June, 1618, and Ealegh was joined by his devoted 
wife. On November 29th the crime was perpetrated, and with 
that great Englishman's life ended the glorious roll of Elizabethan 
navigators. Queen Anne died in the same year. She was a steadfast 
friend, she had taught her son to admire and sympathise with true 
greatness, and, if Prince Henry had lived, England would have 
been saved from the infamy of Sir Walter Ealegh's execution. 
Eichard Hakluyt had died two years earlier, in November, 1616, 
when Ealegh was preparing for his last expedition. 

There was a long period which is almost blank as regards 
maritime enterprise. But in 1631 two voyages were planned for 
continuing discoveries in the direction of Hudson's Bay. One, the 
Maria, was fitted out at Bristol, and sailed on May 3rd, 1631, 
under the command of Captain James, who reached Cape Digges 
on the 15th of the following July. The other was equipped 
in the Thames by Captain Luke Fox, of Hull, a clear-headed. 



1631.] VOYAGES OF FOX AND JAMES. 93 

intelligent seaman, full of enthusiasm to advance the cause of 
Arctic discovery. 

It is to Fox that we owe all our knowledge of the expedition of 
Sir Thomas Button, and of other voyages which would otherwise 
have been lost to us. For besides being a thorough seaman, he was 
a quaint and very entertaining writer. He sailed in the Charles, 
of 80 tons, with a crew of tw^enty men and boys, his equipment 
having been superintended by those steady friends to Arctic 
discovery, Sir Thomas Eoe and Sir John Wolstenholme. Fox 
was perfectly satisfied with himself, his crew, his ship, and every- 
thing on board. On the 15th of July he entered Hudson's Bay, 
and gave names to several islands, proceeding to Port Nelson, where 
Button had wintered. Not finding any opening, he retraced his 
steps, meeting the Maria, in command of Captain James, on the 
1st of August. Fox then steered northwards, along the western side 
of the coastline which trends northwards from the western entrance 
to Hudson's Strait. All this was new discovery as far as a point 
in 66° 47' N., which he named "Fox his Furthest." In after 
years. Sir Edward Parry gave the name of Fox's Channel to the 
opening which leads to Fox's farthest point. There the bold 
Yorkshireman decided upon returning home, and he arrived at the 
Downs with all his crew sound and well. 

The cruise of the Maria was not so fortunate. Captain James 
determined to take shelter in a bay near the southern extremity of 
Hudson's inland sea. The crew wintered in a house on shore. 
Several men died of scurvy, but the vessel was got afloat in the 
spring, and arrived safely at Bristol in September, 1632. James 
was the last of the pioneers in Hudson's Bay. These gallant sea- 
men, commencing from Hudson, increased geographical knowledge, 
and prepared the way for more complete modern research ; and their 
discoveries led to the formation of a great company which carried 
on a lucrative trade, by way of Hudson's Strait and Bay, for two 
centuries. 



( 94 ) 



CHAPTEE XX. 

CIVIL HISTORY OF THE NAVY, 1649-1660. 

Parliamentary management of the Navy — Commissioners of tlie Navy and Customs — 
The Naval Committee of the Council of State — Commissioners of the Admiralty 
and Navy — The Navy Commissioners — Dockyard Commissioners — Admiralty 
buildings — The Treasurership — Eapacity of Hutchinson — The Admirals and 
Generals at Sea — The Commonwealth Caj^tains — The spirit of the Service — -Wages 
— Midshipmen — Treatment of seamen — Sick and woimded— Medical comforts — 
The Chatham Chest — Pay of officers — Pensions — Punishments — Prize-money — 
Medals — Naval law — Soldiers afloat — Slop clothes — Victuals — The grievances of 
the lower deck — The police of the seas — Privateering — Dockyards — Naval ex- 
penditure—Ships of the Commonwealth — Improvements in shipbuilding — Painting 
of ships^Boats — Private yards — Piating of ships — The Navigation Laws — Flags 



and ensigns- 



-The Right of the Flag. 



TT7HEN the Civil War had fairly begun, 
' ' and the control of the major part of 
the Navy had passed out of the hands of the 
King, the Parliament managed the service 
by means of committees, the members of 
which were constantly changed. There 
was a Parliamentary Naval Committee, 
with, subordinate to it, a body of Com- 
missioners of the Navy and Customs ; and 
the duties previously undertaken by the 
Principal Officers were, with the exception 
of those attached to the office of Treasurer, 

given over to a board of Commissioners of the Navy.^ 

A Lord High Admiral, in the person of Kobert, Earl of 

Warwick,- was appointed in July, 1642, in place of Algernon, Earl 

^ The members of this board were, at first, Captains Richard Cranley, John Norris, 
Roger Tweedy, William Batten, and Phiueas Pett. Batten went to sea in 1645, and, in 
1646, Peter Pett and Thomas Snath were added to the board. John HoUond also seems 
to have been a member of it in 1644, and until 1646. 

' Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick. Born, 1587. Appointed by Northumberland 
Vice- Admiral to command the fleet, 1642. Retained command in opposition to the 
will of Charles I., and established the ascendancy of the Parliament with the Navy. 
Died, 1658. 




1649.] THE NAVY COMMISSIONERS. 95 

of Northumberland ;^ but he resigned in April, 1645, being, however, 
re-appointed on May 29th, 1648. This second appointment was 
cancelled on February 23rd, 1649. 

The Commissioners of the Navy and Customs had very little to 
do with administrative matters, and the body was dissolved in 1654. 
The Parliamentary Naval Committee also by degrees lost its 
authority after the conclusion of the Civil War. After Warwick's 
final retirement, a Committee of the Council of State succeeded to 
his responsibilities, until, on December 3rd, 1653, Commissioners of 
the Admiralty and Navy were appointed by Act of Parliament.^ 
These met originally at Whitehall, but from January, 1655, occu- 
pied Derby House. With several changes the board existed until 
May 21st, 1659, when another body of commissioners, with little real 
power, was appointed, and Parliament itself assumed the chief 
responsibilities of Admiralty government. 

After the fall of Charles I. a new body of Navy Commissioners 
was appointed on February 16th, 1649. It consisted of John Hollond 
(with the duties of Surveyor), Thomas Smith, Peter Pett, Bobert 
Thompson, and Colonel William Willoughby. Willoughby died in 
1651, and his successor, Sir Eobert Moulton, in 1652. In 1653, 
Colonel Francis Willoughby, Edward Hopkins, and Major Nehemiah 
Bourne were added to the board. In 1654, George Payler super- 
seded Hollond, and in 1657 Nathan Wright superseded Hopkins.^ 
Hollond, as Surveyor, received i:!300, and the others each £250 a 
year, with, in 1653, an additional iB150, on account of the unusual 
stress of that year. Never, probably, did men do better work for 
such remuneration. They were laborious, prompt, and it would 
seem, conscientious and honest ; and they had enormous respon- 
sibilities, for, on and after May 22nd, 1649, admirals and captains 
addressed them direct on all administrative details ; and it is 
abundantly evident that in course of time the Navy Commissioners 
supplanted in importance the Admiralty Committee. 

^ Algernon Percy, Earl of Northumberland. Born, 1602. Admiral, Gustos Maris, 
Captain- General, and Governor of the Fleet (Lord High Admiral) 1638-1642. 
Died, 1668. 

^ The first Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy were Generals Robert Blake, 
George Monck, John Disbrowe, and William Penn ; Colonels Philip Jones, John 
Clerk, and Thomas Kilsey ; Major William Burton ; and Messrs. John Stone, Edward 
Horseman, and Vincent Gookin. They also controlled the Ordnance Department. 

^ Attached to the Commissioners, as Admiralty Agents, were Captain Henry 
Hatsell, at Plymouth; Thomas White, at Dover; Major Richard Elton, at Hull; and 
Major William Burton, at Great Yarmouth. 



96 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE NAVY, 1649-1660. [1651. 

From June 2nd, 1649, the Navy Commissioners occupied rooms 
in the Victualhng Office on Tower Hill. During the Dutch War, 
a Commissioner took charge at each of the dockyards, Willoughby 
going to Portsmouth, and Pett to Chatham. Bourne also went to 
Harwich, which owing to its position with regard to Holland, 
became of great temporary value. In 1654, Sir John AVolsten- 
holme's house in Seething Lane was purchased for the Com- 
missioners at a cost of £2400, and it remained the Navy Office 
until the establishment was transferred, in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, to Somerset House. The Treasurer's Office, 
however, was distinct, and occupied a house in Leadenhall Street. 
The Commissioners had no secretary, and, until the autumn of 1653, 
but one clerk apiece. Each w^as then allowed two clerks, and two 
purveyors were appointed, to assist in the purchase of stores. 

Sir Henry Yane, junior, was Treasurer of the Navy until the end 
of 1650, when he retired with a pension.^ He was succeeded on 
January 1st, 1651, by Eichard Hutchinson, who was given a salary 
of £'1000 in lieu of all former fees and perquisites attaching to the 
office. But Hutchinson, unlike the Navy Commissioners, was by 
no means a disinterested patriot. In 1653 he procured for himself 
an extra allowance of £1000 ; in 1654 he obtained £2500 besides 
£1000 on every £100,000 disbursed in excess of £1,300,000 ; and 
from January, 1655, he received £1500, with £100 on every £100,000 
disbursed in excess of £700,000.^ 

After the cancelling of Warwick's second appointment as Lord 
High Admiral, the duties of commander-in-chief afloat were put 
into commission, and entrusted to Edward Popham, Eichard Deane,^ 
and Eobert Blake * as joint Generals-at-Sea.^ To these were added, 
as Generals, George Monck, in 1652, and, after the death of Deane 

^ He was granted an estate worth £1200 a year. 

^ Oppenheim : * Admin, of Roy. XavjV 351, 352. 

^ Eichard Deane. Born, 1610. Served in the Parliamentary Army. Appointed 
one of the Generals-at-Sea, 1649. Commanded jointly with Blake and Monck against 
the Dutch, and fell in the action of June 3rd, 1653. 

* Robert Blake. Born, 1599, at Bridgewater. Educated at Wadham Coll., 
Oxford. Engaged in commercial pursuits. Served in the Parliamentary Army. 
Appointed one of the Generals-at-Sea, 1649. Burnt Prince Riipert's ships at Cartagena, 
1650. Reduced the Scilly Isles and Jcj-sey, 1651. Commanded against the Dutch, 
1652-54. Badly wounded in the action off Portland, 1653. Reduced the pirates of 
Tunis and Algier, 1655. Destroyed shipping at Santa Cruz, 1657. Died, August 7th, 
1657. Buried in Westminster Abbey. After the Restoration his body was dug up 
and thrown into a common grave in St. Margaret's churchyard. 

» Appointed February 27th, 1649.— Cal. of S. P. Dom., 1649-50, 23. 



1652.] SOLDIERS AS ADMIRALS. 97 

in the action of June 3rd, 1653, William Penn ^ and Edward 
Montagu,^ in 1654. Of these officers two only were seamen by 
bringing-up. Popham had been in command of the Fifth Whelp 
when, on June 28th, 1637, she foundered in the North Sea. Penn 
had commanded a ship when he was but ~ three-and-twenty ; 
but Deane, Blake, Monck, and Montagu were military men, who 
had little or no naval experience until they were suddenly thrust 
into positions of the highest responsibility. Deane and Montagu 
perished gloriously, while still in their prime. Monck became a 
distinguished admiral. Blake, although he was never at sea until 
he was fifty, developed into one of the two or three greatest sea- 
captains that Britain has ever known. It is a significant fact 
that when, under the Commonwealth, Great Britain entered upon a 
more ambitious and difficult naval policy than she had previously 
dared to essay, the chiefs who best served her at sea were, by 
training, land officers, and consequently men of wider attainments 
and more general education and experience than belonged to the 
regular sea officers of the time. 

And, indeed, it would appear that the Commonwealth possessed 
comparatively few captains who deserved elevation to more respon- 
sible positions. They were, for the most part, "tarpaulins," 
with little learning, no manners, and scant honesty. " Among 
officers," says Mr. Oppenheim,^ " captains were the class who gave 
mo§t trouble throughout these years, the number tried for or accused 
of various delinquencies yielding a much higher percentage of the 
total employed than that afforded by the men, or by officers of any 
other rank. This was perhaps largely due to the rapid promotion 
necessitated by the sudden increase of the Navy, commanders being 
chosen mainly for professional capacity ; and if they were considered 
politically safe, few questions were asked about their religious or 

^ William Penn. Born, 1621. Commanded the Fellowship, 1644. llear-Admiral 
of the Irish Squadron, 1648. Vice-Admiral, 1650. Served in the first Dutch 
war, and at the capture of Jamaica in 1655, when he was one of the Admirals 
and Generals-at-Sea. " Great Caj^tain Commander " under the Duke of Tork, 1665. 
Died, 1670. Disbrowe was nominated at about the same time as Penn; but he neve)- 
actually served as a General-at-Sea. 

^ Edward Montagu, or Mountagu, Earl of Sandwich. Born, 1625. Served in the 
army during the Civil War. A General-at-Sea, 1654. Served in conjunction with 
Blake, 1656-57. Commanded the fleet which brought back Charles II. Created Earl 
of Sandwich. Admiral (B.) in the action of June 3rd, 1665. Admiral (B.) at Solebay, 
and there jierished, May 28th, 1672. 

^ ' Admin, of Roy. Xavy,' 352. The naval captains of the time were often spoken 
of as " colonels."' 

VOL. II. H 



98 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE NAVY, 1G49-1660. [1653. 

moral qualifications. Many, again, had risen from the forecastle, 
and possibly brought with them reminiscences of the habits existing 
in the Caroline Navy ; others had been privateer captains, an 
occupation which did not tend to make their moral sense more 
delicate. Professional honour was not yet a living force, and in 
some orders issued by Monck to the captains of a detached squadron, 
the threat of loss of wages as a punishment for disobedience came 
after, and was obviously intended as a more impressive deterrent 
than, the disgrace of being cashiered." The chief offences were 
embezzlement, theft, drunkenness, and cruelty. Drunkenness was 
shamefully common throughout the service. The rule of the ex- 
military officers seems to have been instrumental in gradually 
ameliorating the tone of the Navy, and in creating a feeling of 
professional pride which, though only incipient in the seventeenth, 
grew rapidly in the eighteenth century, and produced its finest 
results early in the nineteenth. 

But there were other reasons for the improvement of the spirit 
of the service. The Navy was becoming a life's career instead of a 
mere episodal avocation, and the status both of men and of officers 
was being rapidly bettered. During the Civil War, the Parliament 
paid its seamen 19s. a month. While Prince Rupert was at sea, 
the men in the squadrons sent against him were paid 25s. From 
January 1st, 1653, the regular wages were : for able seamen, 24s. ; 
for ordinary seamen, 19s. ; for gromets, 14s. 3cZ. ; and for boys, 9s, 6^. 
It was ordered that every man's rating or ability should be marked 
upon his wages' ticket at his paying off, and thus he obtained a kind 
of certificate of efficiency, which, if satisfactory, was doubtless of 
great value to him. For the further encouragement of the men it 
was directed, on January 29th, 1653, that a certain proportion^ of 
them were to be rated midshipmen, with pay varying from £1 10s. 
to £2 5s. a month, according to the ship in which they served ; and 
it was stipulated that from December 14th, 1655, no one was to be 
so rated unless able in case of need to undertake officer's duties. 
This opened up a systematic way of promotion from the forecastle 
to the quarterdeck. There had been midshipmen during the time 
of Charles I., but it does not appear that anj^ special standard of 
competency had been exacted from them, or that the rating was 
regarded as one likely to lead to rank and professional honour. 

^ I.r., in first-rates, 20 ; in second-rates, 16 ; in third-rates, 12 ; in fourth-rates, 8 ; 
in fiftli-rates, 6 ; and in sixth-rates, 4. — ' Adiuin. of Roy. Navy,' 314. 



11)53.] THE SICK AND WOUNDED. 99 

Mr. Oppenheim notes that the earliest mention of midshipmen 
known to him occurs in the letter of a Mr. Cook, dated 
February 7th, 1643, in which the writer declares that he will not 
undervalue himself by allowing his son to accept a midshipman's 
place. But from 1655 the rating became one of the recognised 
introductions to officer's rank. 

It must not be supposed that the Commonwealth always paid 
its seamen regularly. The rule lay rather in the other direction, 
and at the Restoration, wages to the amount of above £'300,000 were 
owing, and some ships' companies had received nothing for four 
years. Yet the Commonwealth did make serious efforts to treat its 
men better than James and Charles had treated theirs. There was, 
for example, no deliberate neglect of the sick and wounded. During 
the Dutch "War the London hospitals were ordered to accommodate 
some, and various coast towns to provide for others. Ships, too, 
were regularly allowed "medical comforts" to the value of £5 per 
one hundred men per six months, and men invalided to the shore 
were retained in pay until their recovery or their death. It would 
seem, indeed, that, bearing in mind the then condition of the 
surgical, medical, and sanitary sciences, the sick and wounded fared 
remarkably well, and were in many respects better off than the 
able-bodied. For the better care of them, a board of four Com- 
missioners of Sick and AVounded was established on September 29th, 
1653, with offices in Little Britain. These Commissioners under- 
took the surgical and medical direction of the Navy, and were 
invested with power to grant gratuities up to £10, and pensions up 
to £6 IBs. 4f7. Incidentally, they had charge of prisoners of war. 
The Chatham Chest, on the other hand, was mismanaged and in 
debt. Pensions were paid from it to the w^idows of officers, but not 
to those of men, and many men's pensions were in arrears. An 
inquiry, instituted after the Restoration, into the conduct of the 
Chest, revealed the fact that extravagance and carelessness, if not 
actual corruption, hindered the efficiency of this admirable benevo- 
lent fund under the Commonwealth. 

The pay of officers was raised in 1649, and again in 1653, from 
which period it stood as follows (see next page). 

Pensions to the widows of officers seem to have been always 
small, but they were in some instances augmented by gifts or 
gratuities of considerable value. Thus, for instance, in 1653, seven 
captains' widows received gifts of from £400 to £1000. 

H 2 



100 



CIVIL HISTORY OF THE NAVY, 1649-1660. 
The Pay of Officers. 



[1655. 













Per 


LuxAR Month of 


TWEXTl 


-Eight Days. 








ist-rate. 


2nd-rate. 


3rd-rate. 


4th-rate. 


5th-rate. 


6 






th-rate. 




£ 


«. 


d. 


£ 


s. 


d. 


£ s. 


d. 


£ s. 


d. 


£ 


.V. d. 


£ 


i-. d. 


Captain .... 


21 








16 


16 





14 





10 





8 


8 


7 





Lieutenant . 


4 


4 





4 


4 





3 10 





3 10 













Master .... 


7 








6 


6 





4 13 


8 


4 6 


2 


3 


7 6 






Master's Mate . . \ 
Pilot J 


3 


6 





3 








2 16 


2 


2 7 


10 


2 


2 


2 


2 


Midshipman 


2 


5 





2 








1 17 


6 


1 13 


9 


1 


10 


1 


10 


Boatswain . 


4 








3 


10 





3 





2 10 





2 


5 


•> 





Boatswain's Mate . 


1 


15 





1 


15 





1 12 





1 10 





1 


8 


i 


6 


Quartermaster . 


1 


15 





1 


15 





1 12 





1 10 





1 


8 


1 


6 


Quartermaster's Mate 


1 


10 





1 


10 





1 8 





1 8 





1 


6 


1 


5 


Carpenter 


4 








O 


10 





3 





2 10 





2 


5 


-A 





Carpenter's Mate . 


2 








2 








1 16 





1 14 





1 


12 


1 


10 


Gunner .... 


4 








3 


10 





3 





2 10 





2 


5 


>> 





Gunner's Mate . 


1 


15 





1 


15 





1 12 





1 10 





1 


8 


1 


(5 


Surgeon. 


2 


10 





2 


10 





2 10 





2 10 





2 


10 


2 


10 


Corporal. 


1 


15 





1 


12 





1 10 





1 10 





1 


8 


1 


5 


Purser .... 


4 








3 


10 





3 





2 10 







5 


(-' 


01) 


Master Trumpeter . 


1 


10 





1 


8 





1 5 





1 5 





1 


5 


1 


4 


Cook .... 


1 


5 





1 


5 





1 5 





1 5 





1 


5 


1 


4 



1 The captain of a 6th-rate usually did purser's duties. 

From 1(349, the pay of officers having charge of stores was 
increased, and from 1652 such officers had to furnish sureties for 
the honest performance of their duties. These measures no doubt 
tended to check forgery, falsification of accounts, malversation, and 
peculation on the part of pursers, boatswains, gunners and others. 
Keform was also aided by the making of regulations that pursers 
should go to sea as clerks of the check, with limited powers, and 
that all their papers should be countersigned by their captains ; but 
it was not found necessary to prolong the arrangement as to pursers 
being clerks of the check after 1655 ; and these officers then resumed 
their old position. 

The system of punishments and rewards also had its effect in 
bettering the moral tone of the service, and especially of the officers. 
The death penalty, though prescribed for a great number of offences, 
was seldom enforced. Other punishments were, however, very 
severe. A cai-penter who had stolen stores, but returned them 
before his arrest, was taken from ship to ship in the Downs with a 
pax^er recording his offences pinned to his breast. This paper was 
read alongside each ship, and he was then thrice ducked from 
the yard-arm, and cashiered. William Haycock, carpenter's mate 
of the Hound, for drunkenness, swearing, and uncleanness, was 



1653.] PRIZE-MONEY AND MEDALS. 101 

sentenced to receive ten laslies alongside each flagship, a punishment 
which Mr. Oppenheim detects as the origin of the later practice of 
flogging round the fleet. ^ 

In the matter of rewards, the Commonwealth was much more 
liberal than preceding governments had been. An Act of 1649 gave 
the seamen, in addition to their wages, one-half of the value of 
men-of-war taken, the other half going to a fund for the relief of 
sick, wounded, widows and orphans.^ Men-of-war destroyed were 
paid for by the State at the rate of from £12 to £20 a gun. The 
proceeds of merchant prizes taken by men-of-war went, one-third 
to the officers and men, one-third to the sick and wounded fund, 
and one-third to the State ; and the proceeds of merchant prizes 
taken by hired vessels went, two-sixths to the officers and men, 
two-sixths to the sick and wounded fund, one-sixth to the owners, 
and one-sixth to the State. The "tenths," paid at an earlier date 
to the Lord Admiral, went towards the provision of special rewards 
and of medals. In 1653 a new scheme was introduced, and under 
it officers and men became entitled to 10s. per ton of every prize 
taken, besides £6 13.s. 4c?. for each gun carried by her, and to £10 
per gun for every man-of-war destroyed, while the old " tenths " 
were given to the sick, wounded, and widows' fund. It is true that 
the sums due were often not paid for years, but there is no reason 
to doubt the good intentions of the government. The immense 
difficulties under which it laboured may be pleaded in some extenua- 
tion of its shortcomings. 

The giving of medals, sometimes with chains attached, to 
distinguished officers was no new thing in England. Charles I., 
for example, had given a medal to Eainborow for his conduct of the 
Sallee Expedition in 1637. Parliament continued the practice, if 
practice it can be called, giving medals to both captains and flag- 
officers for the victory over the Dutch in 1653 ; but it also gave 
medals to seamen. Mr. Oppenheim cites as a somewhat doubtful 
reference an order of the House, of November 15th, 1649, for medals 
to be conferred on " several mariners " who had done good service 
in the previous year, but who may possibly have been officers. 
There is, however, no room for doubting that after Captain Eobert 
Wyard, of the Adventure, hired merchantman, fought his action off 
Harwich in 1650 with a greatly superior force, he and his officers 

1 ' Admin, of Roy. Xavy,' 357, 358. 

2 This Act amplified a somewhat less generous Parliamentary resolution of 1642. 



102 



CIVIL HISTORY OF THE NAVY, 1649-1660. 



[1653. 



and men were given medals of different values, ranging from £50 
down to bs., and that each medal had, as was directed, "the 
service against six ships engraved on one side and the arms of 
the Commonwealth on the other." ^ Nevertheless, the nmnber of 
medals given to seamen was certainly not large, for the entire 
munber of medals granted, to officers included, for the Dutch War 
was only one hundred and sixty-nine, the cost of them being £2069. 
This sum seems to have also covered the cost of the gold chains 
conferred on Blake, Monck, and Penn. Yet that medals were 
obtainable by them, even though rarely, cannot but have encouraged 
the seamen. 





GOLD 31EDAL FOR THE ACTION WITH THE DUTCH FLEET, 1653. 

{The orUjinal hy T. Simon, teas presented hy the English Government, with a large 
additional border, to the Flag Officers, and, as above, to the Captains engaged.) 



Naval law may be said to have received its first codification 
under the Commonwealth. More than once in these pages mention 
has been made of disciplinary instructions issued to their fleets by 
particular commanders upon particular occasions. These instruc- 
tions, however, lapsed with the various occasions which called them 
into being. Bules of the kind for the government of the Earl of 
Warwick's fleet were passed by the Commons in March, 1649 ; and 

' ' Admin, of Eoy. Navy,' 328, citing S. P. Dom., August IGth, 1650. Some of 
these medals were shown at the Eoyal Naval Exhibition of 1891, by Mr. J. G. JIurdoch, 
wlio hiliowed also the very rare medal " for eminent service in saving the 'Triumph," in 
Jvdy, 1653, together witli " Naval Kewards " of 1650 and 1653. 



1652.] NAVAL LAW. 103 

on December 25tli, 1652, a modification of these rules was enacted 
for the government of the whole Navy. These w^ere the first regular 
Articles of War ; ^ and to Mr. Oppenheim belongs the credit of being 
the first to point out that interesting fact. Until he did so it had 
been generally supposed that the consecutive history of the x\rticles 
of War began in 1661 ; but, as Mr. Oppenheim justly says, " these 
latter were only based upon those previously existing, which are the 
groundwork of all subsequent modifications and additions experience 
has shown to be necessary down to the present day." ^ There were 
thirty-nine of them, thirteen prescribing death, and twelve more 
prescribing either death or a lighter punishment alternatively, 
according to the view taken by the Court of War trying the 
offender. But though the code was then, on paper, extremely 
severe, it was enforced with mercy and discretion ; and up to the 
time of the Bestoration there is no known instance of a death 
sentence pronounced under it having been carried out. Even the 
fomenters of mutiny escaped. Three men of the Portland, con- 
victed of that most serious offence, or of having incited to it, in 
1653, w^hen the country was at war, were let off w^ith the com- 
paratively light though very cruel penalty of having to stand for 
one hour with their right hands nailed to the mainmast of the 
flagship and with halters about their necks. Three of their fellows 
received only thirty lashes apiece. 

No force akin to the modern Eoyal Marines was afloat in British 
ships until after the Restoration ; but the urgency of the situation 
during the Dutch AVar led to the embarkation of considerable bodies 
of soldiers, who assisted in the work of the vessels, and, in fact, did 
marines' duties. They behaved extremely well, although they w^ent 
on board under none of their own officers above the rank of sergeant ; 
and, no doubt, it was the recollection of their excellent service that 
suggested the formation, in the days of Charles II., of a regular 
force of sea soldiers. 

There was still no uniform for naval officers, and seamen dressed 
as they chose. The practice, prevalent in the early part of the reign 

^ The rules of 1652 and 1661, however, must not be regarded as the sole source 
from which the present Articles of War have been evolved. Additional sources 
continued to be supplied, by means of successive Admirals' instructions, until the 
commencement of the eighteenth century ; and only then did it cease to be the practice 
for Commanders-in-Chief to issue, as it were, special laws of their own. For a further 
discussion of this subject, see Chap. XXVI. 

^ ' Admin, of Eoy. Navy,' 311. — Thomasou Pamphlets ~. 



104 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE NAVY, 164P-1G60. [1654. 

of Henry VIII., of supplying the men with some sort of regulation 
coats or jackets had long since died out. But, as in the time of 
Charles I., slop-clothes were for sale on board every ship, and these, 
which were supplied at a specified price, seem also to have been of a 
prescribed pattern. Purchase of them was not, however, obligatory, 
and, if a seaman had enough clothes to give him a moderately decent 
appearance, no one cavilled at their cut or colour. In 1655 it was 
ordered that for the future no clothiers should send clothes for sale 
on board ship without the licence of the Kavy Commissioners ; 
and early in 1656 the prices of slops were thus fixed : ^ Canvas 
jackets, Is. lOcZ. ; canvas drawers. Is. Sr?. ; cotton waistcoats, 2s. '■Id. ; 
cotton drawers, 2s. ; shirts, 2s. 9(r?. ; shoes, per pair, 2s. "id. ; linen 
stockings, per pair, 10c7. ; cotton stockings, per pair, lOr/. The 
Commissioners declined responsibility for the quality of the clothes ; 
but, if a man lost his kit while on service, they usually granted him 
a small sum wherewith to buy another : so that it may be said that 
under the Commonwealth the seaman's dress became for the first 
time since the days of Henr}^ VIII. a question which seriously 
occupied the attention of the Government. 

At least equal attention was paid to the seaman's victuals. In 
1650 Colonel Pride and five others took a contract to supplj' the 
fleet at Sc?. per head at sea, and Id. per head in harbour. The 
contractors did not give complete satisfaction, and after 1652 a 
system of inspection of victuals was established. In that year also 
new buildings for the Victualling Department were erected or ac- 
quired at various ports. In 1653 the sea-rate for victualling was 
advanced from 8<:7. to 9c7. a head ; but in 1654 the victualHng con- 
tractors gave notice of their intention to terminate an arrangement 
which, even at that price, did not paj^ them : and the result was the 
formation of a Victualling Office, with Captain Thomas Alderne at 
its head. Alderne, until his death in 1657, was paid £500 a year, and 
did his work under the superintendence of the Navy Commissioners. 
He was succeeded by three of the Commissioners — Robert Thomp- 
son, Bourne, and Francis Willoughby, who were thenceforward 
called Commissioners of the Navy and Victualling, and who were 
paid i9250 a year each for the extra service." The Commissioners 
seem to have done their business as well as was possible in view of 
the straitened financial situation of the Government, which, towards 

' S. P. Dom. cxvii. 64; cxxxiv. 64. 
2 c A.imin. of Kuy. Navy,' 824-326. 



1655.] PBIVATEEEING DISCOURAOED. 105 

the end of the Commonwealth, was- in debt to every one in Enoland 
who had been wiUing to give it credit. But after the death of OHver 
Cromwell all the affairs of the Navy became involved in hopeless 
confusion. In the summer of 1659 a sum of £371,930^ was owing 
for w^ages alone. It is scarcely astonishing that the prospect of the 
return of Charles II. and of a change in the management of the 
Navy failed to arouse any noteworthy republican demonstrations in 
the fleet. 

One very remarkable feature of the period is the deference paid 
by the governing powers *o the common seamen. There were, of 
course, poHtical causes for this ; but the improved education of all 
classes, and their greater reasonableness, must also, to some extent, 
have been responsible. Thus, when in 1654 the seamen petitioned 
Cromwell for a redress of certain alleged grievances, the petition, 
instead of being shelved, was referred to a Council of "War composed 
of two flag and twenty-three other officers, who decided that the 
men had a legal right to petition, and that the alleged grievances, 
with a single exception, were real ones. 

In spite of the disadvantages under which they suffered, the men 
generally did their duty. The administration, too, though over- 
burdened and impoverished, never omitted to vindicate the honour 
of the country. Piracy, which had been so prevalent in the Narrow^ 
Seas under Charles I., became almost unheard of. The French, 
Dutch, and Spanish privateers still cruised, but, except for a short 
time after the Dutch War, they effected little, and numbers of 
them were taken. As soon, moreover, as the Ostenders and the 
Dunquerquers became really troublesome, Cromwell instituted a 
blockade of their ports. As for British subjects found serving in 
foreign privateers, they were summarily deported to the Plantations. 
The Commonwealth, indeed, did not look very kindly on priva- 
teering, even when it was practised in the interests of Great Britain. 
In 1652 all privateers were put under the direct control of the 
admirals afloat ; soon afterwards the issue of letters of marque was 
severely restricted, it being found that the lax discipline and freer 
life of the irregular cruisers had a prejudicial effect upon the regular 
naval service ; and, from. 1655 onwards, privateering was no longer 
allowed at all, apparently because it had too often tended to 
degenerate into piracy, or something very like it." 

Little progress was made in the development of the Government 

1 S. P. Dom. ccxii. 10!). 



106 CIVIL HISTORY OF TEE NAVY, 1649-1660. [1656. 

Dockyards. " In 1653," says Mr. Oppenheim/ " there was a double 
dry-dock at Chatham, Woolwich, and Deptford respectively, and 
one at Black wall, probably in the East India Company's yard : 
these were the only docks directly belonging to, or available by, the 
State. Ko addition appears to have been made to Chatham Yard, 
except the purchase of a wharf and storehouse adjoining the old 
dock in 1656. In October, 1653, a contractor from Chatham was 
either repairing an old, or constructing a new, dock at Deptford ; 
and in 1657 some wharves were built there alongside the waterside. 
A new dry-dock was ordered for Woolwich in 1653, and completed 
the next year : storehouses were built in 1656, and two years later a 
lease was taken from John Eymill, butcher, of London, of one acre 
of land, known as Chimney Marsh, on the east side of Ham Creek, 
'next to the State's Yard,' for ten years, at £4 a year. The sizes 
of the yards may, perhaps, be inferred from the number of watch- 
men attached to each : Chatham, thirty-two ; Deptford, eighteen ; 
Woolwich, sixteen; and Portsmouth, thirteen." A dry-dock at 
Portsmouth was built in 1656-57 at an estimated cost of £'2100. 
The yard there began to be again used for building purposes, and 
to acquire a reputation for economical construction. Dover and 
Harwich, as subsidiary naval stations and bases, were much used 
during the Dutch AVar. 

The naval expenditure, during almost the whole of the Common- 
wealth period, was, relatively speaking, enormous. In 1656-57, out 
to of a total revenue of £1,050,000, a sum of £809,000 was devoted 
the Navy ; in 1657-58, £624,000 out of £951,000 ; and in 1658-59, 
£848,000 out of £1,517,000. In 1652-53 the naval expenditure had 
been, in round figures, £1,400,000, out of a total expenditure of 
£2,600,000.^ In comparison with these disbursements the naval 
estimates of modern times are, indeed, ridiculously small in propor- 
tion. Under the Commonwealth Britain spent more than half her 
income upon the sea service : under Queen Victoria she has never 
spent one-fourth of it on the same object. Yet who can say that 
the necessity is less in the nineteenth century than it was in the 
seventeenth ? Cromwell and his advisers may not have understood 
as we understand it the influence of sea power upon history ; but 
they certainly did not underrate the importance to this country of 

^ ' Admin, of Koy. Navy,' 364, citing S. P. Dom., Iviii. 108 ; Ix. 12 ; Ixxxi. 194 ; 
cxxxv. 17 ; clxxx. 170 : and Add. MSS. 9305, f. 114 ; and 9306, ff. 175, 197. 

- Add. MSS. 32,471, IT. 2, 6, 15. Conims. Journs. May 20tli, 1659.— Pepys's ' Diary.' 



1660.J 



TEE NAVY LIST. 



]07 



the possession of a Navy fit to meet any combination that was hkely 
to be arrayed against it. I'heir forethought was justified. The 
Commonwealth found Great Britain weak at sea, but left it with a 
naval reputation second to that of no power in the world. 

The additions to the Navy during the eleven years are here given 
alphabetically, it being premised, however, that the list^ is very 
probably incomplete, especially as regards small craft and vessels 
taken for a short time only into the service : — 





* Bnilt. 
t Bought. 
J Taken. 


Length 
of Keel. 


Beam. 


Deith 
iu Hold. 


Drang 


ht. 


Nett 
Tons. 


Guns. 












Ft. 


in. 


Ft. 


in. 


Ft. 


in. 


Ft. 


in. 








Accadu 


tl656 


, , 








. 










10 




Adam and Eve 


1 1652 


















200 


20 


Sold, 1657. 


Advantage. 


1 1652 


, , 




. , 




, 




. . 




, , 


26 


Sold, 1655. 


Advice .... 


* 1650 


100 





31 


2 


12 


3 


15 


7 


516 


48 




Adviser 


* 1654 


















, , 


8 


Taken, 1655, 


Amity .... 


1 1650 


85* 





28* 





14 









354 


30 




Antelope . 


*1651 


120 





36 





16 











56 


/Wrecked off 
\ Jutland, 1652. 


Ar7ns of Eolland . 


tl652 










. 










32 


/Blown np in 
\W. Ind., 1656. 


Assistance . 


* 1650 


102 





31 





13 





15 





521 


48 




Augustine . 


tl653 


100 





26 





li 





14 





359 


26 


I'll e - n a m e d 


Basing. 


* 1654 


80 





24 


6 


10 





12 





255 


22 


< Guernsey, 
[ 1660. 


Bear .... 


tl653 


106 





26 


6 


14 


6 


14 


6 


395 


36 




Beaver .... 


1 1656 


. , 




, , 








, , 




, , 


6 




Blackamoor ' . 


*1656 


47 





19 





10 





, ^ 




90 


12 




Black Raven . 


1 165,3 






^ ^ 




. 




, , 




300 


38 


Sold, 1654. 


Bradford . 


*1658 


85 





25 


6 


10 


8 


12 





230 


28 


/R e - n a m e d 
\ Success, 1660. 


Bramble . 


tl656 






, , 




, 








112 


14 




Bridgewater . 


*1655 


116 


9 


34 


7 


14 


2 


17 





742 


52 


/Re-named 
1 Amie, 1660. 


Bristol. . . . 


* 165,3 


104 





31 


1 


13 





15 


8 


532 


48 




Bryar .... 


1 1651 


















108 


18 




Cagway 


1 1658 






, , 












60 


8 




Call, prize . 


1 1652 




















8 




Cardiff 


1 1653 




















18 


Sold, ca. 1658. 


Cat 


1 1654 


















, ^ 


8 


Taken, 1656. 


Centurion . 


*1650 


104 ' 





si" 





13 





16* 





531 


40 





1 Or Blackmoor. Built for service in Virginia. 



^ Compiled chiefly from two lists iu Charnock's ' Marine Architecture,' ii. 377, 382 ; 
the list in ' Archa3ologia,' xlviii. ; two partial lists in the Sergison Collection ; lists in 
the Pepysian Library ; and refei'ences in the State Papers. The measurements have, 
in many cases, been checked by those given by Mr. Oppenheim, p. 330, et seq. The 
armament of most of tlie ships varied from term to term. Numerous other vessels 
were levied for war purposes ; but those given in the table seem to have all been 
regularly added to the Navy. For much information as to changes in the names of 
ships, I ani personally indebted to Mr. Oppenheim and Professor Laughton, R.N. 



108 



CTVIL HISTORY OF THE NAVY, 1640-1660. 



[1660. 





* Built, 
t Bought. 
+ Taken. 


Length 
of Keel. 


Beam. 


Depth 
in Hold. 


Drang 


ht. 
in. 


Nett 
Tons. 


Guns. 








tt. in. 


Ft. in. 


Ft. in. 


Ft. 


























[K e - n a m e d 
< Speedwell, 


CheritoH . 


* 1656 


76 


24 


10 


11 





194 


20 




















[ 1660. 


Chestnut^ . 


* 1G56 


47 


19 


10 


, . 




90 


12 




Church 


1 1653 


, , 


, , 








300 


30 




Colchester . 


* 1654 


83 


25 6 


10' 


12 





287 


24 




Concord 


1 1650 


, , 


, , 


, , 


, . 




, , 


26 


Sold, 1659. 


Convert 


$1652 




, , 


, , 


, , 




, , 


26 


Sold, 1659. 


Convertine 


tl651 












500 


40 


/Taken by the 
I Dutch, 1666. 


Cornelian . 


tl655 


_ , 


, , 


, , 


, , 




100 


12 




Coventry . 


il658 


, . 


, . 




. . 




200 


20 




Crow .... 


tl652 




, , 


, . 


. , 




. , 


36 


Sold, 1656. 


Cygnet (I.) 


*1650 






, , 


. . 






22 




Cijgnet {11.) 


*1657 


. . 




. . 


- . ' 




60 


6 




Dartmouth 


*1655 


80 


25' 


10 


12 





230 


22 




Deptford, shallop . 


*1652 


, , 


, , 


. . 


, . 




. . 


4 


Sold, 1659. 


Diamond . 


* 1652 


105 6 


31 3 


13 


16 





547 


40 




Discovery . 


tl651 














20 


("Burnt at Ja- 
\ maica, 1655. 


Dolphin 


tl652 


. . 


- . 


. . 








30 


J Disposed of, ca. 
\ 1657. 


Dover .... 


*1650 


100 


31 8 


13 


16 





571 


40 




Drake . 


*1652 


85 


18 


7 


9 





113 


14 




Duchess 


tl6o2 


. . 












24 


Sold, 1654. 


Dunbar 


*1656 


123 


46 


17 2 


21 





1047 


64 


j E e - n a m e d 
\ Henry, 1660. 


Eagle .... 


1 1650 






, , 


, . 




. . 


12 




Eaglet .... 


*1655 


. , 


, , 


. , 


. . 




60 


8 




Ellas (I.) . . . 


1 1653 


101 


27 6 


11 


14 


6 


400 36 




Elias (ll.) . . 


1 1656 
















Elizabeth, prize 


tl650 


 . 


. . 


. . 










/Disposed of, ca. 
\ 1652. 


Endeavour 


tl652 














36 


Sold, 1656. 


Essex .... 


*1653 


115 


33 


13 8 


17 





742 


48 


/Taken by the 
\ Dutch, 1666. 
TRe -named 


Fagons- . 


* 1654 


82 


24 8 


10 


12 





262 


22 


< Milford, 
[ 1660. 


Fairfax (I.) . 


* 1641) 


116 


35 8 


14 6 


17 


6 


789 


64 


/Burnt at Chat- 
\ ham, 1653. 


Fairfax (II.) . . 


* 1653 


120 


35 2 


14 6 


16 


6 


745 


52 




Falcon, flyboat 


1 1653 




, , 


, , 


, , 




200 


24 


Sold, 1658. 


Fcdmouth ^ 


1 1652 


, , 


. 


, . 






. . 


20 


Sold, 1659. 


Fame .... 


il655 












90 


10 




Fbj .... 


? 






. . 








6 


/Disposed of, c«. 
\ 1652. 


Foresight . 


* 1650 


102 


31 


13 


14 


6 


524 


40 




Forester 


*1657 












2.30 


22 




Fortune (I.) . 


^1651 






. - 










/Taken by the 
1 Dutch, 1652. 


Fortune (II.) . . 


t 1653 












, 


26 


Sold, 1654. 


Fox (I.) . . . 


t 1651 


, , 


, , 


. . 






, . 


22 




Fox (II.) . . . 


1 1658 


72 


23 


8 6 


10' 





120 


14 




Francis 


tl658 












90 


10 





J Built for eervlce In Virginia. 



I.e., St. Fagans. 



3 Tjate Dutch Rotterdam. 



1660.] 



THE NAVY LIST. 



109 





* Built, 
t Bought. 
+ Taken. 


Length 
of Keel. 


Beam. 


Depth 
in Hold. 


Draught. 
Ft. in. 


Nett 
Tons. 


Guns. 












Ft. in. 


Ft. 


in. 


Ft. in. 


























[R e - n a m e d 


Gainsborough . 


*1654 


100 10 


31 


10 


13 


15 





543 


40 


\ Swallow, 
[ 1660. 


Gift Major . . 


X 1652 


90 8 


30 


.8 


11 6 


13 


6 


480 


26 




Gift Minor 


X 1658 


. , 






, J 


, 




120 


12 




GiUiflower^ . 


tl651 




. , 




, , 


, 




530 


32 


Sold, 1657. 


Gloucester . 


* 1654 


117' 


34 


10 


14 G 


18 





755 


50 




Golden Cock . 


$1653 










. 






24 


Sold, 1656. 


Golden Falcon 


$1652 










. 






28 


Sold, 1658. 


Golden Lion . 


$1652 










• 








Sold, 1653. 
TR e - n a m e d 


Grantham . 


*1654 


80 


25 





10 


11 


6 


265 


28 


< Garland, 
\ 1660. 


Great Charity 


$1650 


106 


28 


6 


11 10 


14 





400 


39 


/Lost in action, 
I 1665. 


Greyhound 


$ 1657 


60 


26 


6 


11 6 






150 


20 




Griffin. 


$1656 


, , 


, , 




, , 


, 




90 


12 




Guinea 


1 1649 


90 


28 





14 






375 


30 




Hare .... 


$ 1653 














, , 


12 


Wrecked, 1665. 


Earp .... 


* 1656 


, ^ 












, , 


8 




Hart .... 


*1657 


50 


14' 


6 


5 6 


5 





55 


6 




EnJf Moon 


$ 1653 


, ^ 








, 




300 


30 


Sold, 1659. 


Hampshire 


*1653 


101 9 


29 


9 


13 


14 


10 


481 


38 




Hawk .... 


*1655 


42 


16 





8 






60 


8 




Heartsease . 


$1652 


• • 








. 






36 


Sold, 1656. 


Hector .... 


$1653 


, , 












i50 


30 


Sold, 1657. 


Hind .... 


*1655 


42 


16 ' 





8 


. 




60 


8 




Hope .... 


$1652 




, , 




  


, 






26 


Sold, 1657. 


Edpewell . 


1 1652 
















20 


Sold, 1656. 


Horsleydoiun . 


* 1652 


, J 








, 




. , 


4 


Sold, 1655. 


Hound. 


$ 1652 










, 






36 




Hunter (/.) 


$1652 








. . 


. 




. . 


. . 


jLost in action, 
\ 1653. 


Hunter (II.) . . 


$ 1656 














50 


6 


Indian. 


$1654 










• 






44 


Sold, 1659. 
[Wrecked off 


Islip .... 


*1654 
















22 


1 Inverlocln% 
( 1655. 


Jermyn . . ' . 


$ 1649 










. 




 . 




/Disposedofjca. 
\ 1652. 


Jersey .... 


*1654 


102 10 


32 


2 


13 2 


15 


6 


560 


40 




Jesu Maria 


$ 1656 




















John .... 


tl650 










. 




. . 


30 


/Disposed of, ca. 
1 1652. 


Joh7i Baptist . 


$1653 
















12 


Sold, 1656. 


Katherine . 


$ 1653 


, ^ 














36 


Sold, ca. 1658. 


Kentish 


*1652 


107 


32" 


6 


13' 


15 





601 


40 




King David . 


$ 1653 










. 






12 


Sold, 1654. 


Kingscde . 


$ 1656 














'90 


10 


TR e - n a m e d 


Langport . 


*1654 


116 


35 


7 


14 4 


17 





781 


50 


• He n rietfa, 
. 1660. 


Lark .... 


$ 16.56 














80 


10 




Laurel .... 


*1651 


103' 


30' 


1 


15' 






489 


38 


Wrecked, 1657. 


Leopard 


* 1659 


109 


33 


9 


15 8 


17 





636 


44 





I Hx-Archanycl, taken by Prince Rupert, but recaptured and purchased. 



no 



CIVIL mSTORT OF THE NAVY, 1649-1660. 



[1660. 






* BnUt. 

1 t Bought. 

X Taken. 


1 Length 
of Keel. 


Beam. 


1 Depth 
in Hold. 


1 
1 

Draught. 


Nett 
Tons. 


Guns. 








Ft. 


iu. 


Ft. 


iu. 


Ft. 


in. 


Ft. 


in. 


1 




[R e -na m e d 


LichfiM 


$1658 


















200 


20 


< Happy En- 
[ trance, 1660. 


LUy{L) . . . 


•> 


• 


















8 


/Disposed of, ca. 
I 1652. 


Lily (II.) . . . 


* 1657 






^ 




. , 




5 





60 


6 




Little Charity. 


1 1653 


. . 




. . 












500 


30 


Sold, 1656. 


Little President . 


tl651 


. , 




, , 




, , 










12 


Sold, 1657. 


Lizard. 


tl653 


. - 












. . 




100 


16 




London 


*1656 


123 


6 


41 





16 


6 


18 





1050 


64 


("Blown up near 
\the]Srore,1665. 
TR e - n a m e d 


Lyme .... 


*1654 


117 





35 


2 


14 


4 


18 





769 


52 


< Montagu, 

{ 1660. 

r R e - n a m e d 


Maidstone . 


*1654 


102 





31 


8 


13 





16 





566 


40 


I Mary Pose 
{ 1660. 


Maria .... 


J 1658 






, , 




, , 




, 




120 


12 




Marigold . 


tl650 


, , 








, , 










30 


Sold, 1658. 


Marit/old, lioy . 


* 1653 


32 





14' 





7 





7 





42 






Marmaduke^ . 


tl652 


. . 












. . 




400 


32 




Marston Moor . 


*1654 


116 





34 


6 


14 


2 


17 





734 


52 


/Re-n am ed 
I York, 1660. 


Martin 


* 1652 


64 





19 


4 


7 









92 


14 




Martin, prize . 


$1651 






















(" Disposed of, crt. 
\ 1653. 


Mary, prize . 


X 1650 






. . 












500 


36 


Sold, 1657. 


Mathias 


X 165;; 


















500 


38 




Mayfloiver . 


tl651 




















20 


Sold, 1658. 
("Taken by the 


Merlin. 


*1652 


75 





18 





7 


8 


9 





105 


14 


Dutch, " Oct. 
i 1665. 


Mermaid . 


*1651 


86 





25 


2 


10 





12 





289 


22 




Middelhurg 


J 1652 




















32 


j Disposed of, ca. 
( 1657. 


Minion 


v- 




















6 


jDisjiOsedofjCa. 
\ 1652. 


Monck .... 


*1659 


108 





35 





13 


11 


16 





703 


52 




Nantwich . 


*1654 


86 


8 


26 


4 


10 


4 


12 


6 


319 


28 


fR e - n a m e d 
t Breda, 1660. 
f R e - n a m e d 


Naseby . 


*1655 


131 





42 





18 





11 





1229 


80 


< Royal Charles, 
I166O. 


Newbury . 


*1654 


117 





35 





14 


5 


17 


6 


765 


52 


■R e - n a m e d 
Revenge, 1660. 


Newcastle . 


* 1653 


108 


6 


33 


1 


13 


3 


16 





631 


44 




Nightingale 


* 1651 


86 





25 


2 


10 





12 





289 


22 


[Taken March, 
\ retaken Ajwil, 
( 1659. 


Nonsuch, ketch 


tl654 


27 





15 


6 


6 









60 


8 


























Norwich . 


*1655 


81 





25 





10 


6 


12 





246 


22' 




Oak ... . 


tl652 






















("Lost in action, 
\ July, 1653. 


Old President. 


X 1651 






















Sold, 1665. 


Old Success 


X 164!l 


















380 


34 




Orange-Tree 


X 1653 


v 








, • • 


1 






300 


26 


Sold, 1655. 



' Taken by Prince Rupert, but re-taken and bought into the service, 



1660.] 



THE NAVY LIST. 



Ill 









* Built, 
t Bought. 
J Taken. 


Length 
of Keel. 


Beam. 


Depth 


Tlroncp 


ht. 


Nett 


Guns. 






in Hold. ^ — ° 


Tons. 


1 








Ft. in. 


Ft. in. 


Ft. iu.' Ft. 


in. 


1 




Ostrich 


1 1653 


j 












Oxford 






*1656 


72 


24 


10 11 





240 


22 




Paradox 






1 1651 


, , 


, , 


. , 


. , 




120 


12 




Parrot . 




1 


*1657 




^ , 




5 





60 


6 




Paul . 




1 


tl652 


84' 


26 


9 6 


10 


6 


290 


22 




Peacock 






tl651 


, , 


. , 




, , 






. , 


Sold, ca. 1658. 


Pearl . 






*1651 


86 


25 


16' 


12 





285 


22 




Pelican 




1 


*1650 


100 


20 8 


15 4 








38 


j Burnt at Ports- 
1 mouth, 1656. 


Pelicari's Prize 




1 1653 






, , 


, , 




, , 


34 


Sold, 1655. 


Pemhrohe . 




*1655 


ni 


25 


11 6 


12 





269 


22 




Peter . 


1 


tl652 




. . 


. . 


, . 




, . 


32 


Sold, 1653. 


Plover (I.)^ . 




tl652 


. . 














jSunk in action, 
I Feb. 1653. 


Plover (II.) . 




1 1653 


, , 


. . 


. . 


. , 




. . 


26 


Sold, 1657. 


Plymouth . 




* 1653 


116 


34 8 


14 6 


17 





741 


54 




Portland . 




* 1653 


105 


32 11 


12 10 


16 





605 


44 




Portsmouth 




*1650 


99 


28 4 


14 2 


15 





422 


38 




Portsmouth, shallop 


tl655 














4 


(Taken, July, 
t 1655. 
("Re-named 


President ^ . 


*1649 


102 9 


29 6 


12 6 


15 


6 


445 


42 


1 Bonaventure, 
[ 1660. 


Preston 


*1654 


101 


30 


13 


16 





550 


40 


■Re-named An- 
\ telope, 1660. 
[Lost on the 


Primrose . 


*1651 


86 


25 2 


10 


12 





* • 


22 


 Sev^en Stones, 
^ 1656. 
[Wrecked on 


Princess Maria . 


tl652 




* • 


• • 


• * 




 ' 


36 


I the Goodwin, 
I 1658. 
[Taken by the 


Raven (I.) . 


$1652 














36 


\ Dutch, April, 
( 1654. 


Raven (II.) 


1 1656 


, , 


, , 


, , 


. , 




. , 


6 


Sold, ca. 1658. 


Recovery . 


1 1651 


.. 


.. 








, , 


26 


Sold, 1655. 


Redhart, pink. 


$1653 


, , 


, , 


, , 






55 


6 


Sold, 1654. 


Red Borse, pink . 


1 1655 






, , 


, , 






10 


Sold, 1658. 


Renoion 


1 1653 






.. 






.. 


20 


Sold, 1654. 


Reserve 


*1650 


loo' 


31" 1 


12 4 


15' 


6 


513 


40 


[R e - n a m e d 


Richard 


*1658 


124 


41 


18 


20 





1108 


70 


< Royal James, 
[ 1660. 


Roe .... 


*1655 


.. 


.. 




.. 




60 


8 




Rose .... 


*1657 


50 


14 


5' 6 


5 





55 


6 




Rosebush . 


$1653 


.. 


, , 


., 


.. 




300 


34 




Ridty .... 


*1651 


105 6 


31 6 


13 


16 





556 


40 




Samson 


$1652 






.. 


.. 






32 


Sold, 1658. 


Samuel 


? 


•• 


•• 


•• 


•• 




•■ 


6 


j Disposed of, ca. 

1 1652. 

[Run ashore hj 


Sapphire . 


*1651 


100 


28 10 


11 9 


13 


6 


442 


38 


\ her captain, 
[ 1671. 


Satisfaction . 


$1651 


, , 




, , 






220 


26 




Scout .... 


V 


• • 


•• 


•• 


• • 




• • 


6 


/Disposed of, c«. 
\ 1652. 



1 Late Dutch Mbrgenstar. 



2 Also called Great President. 



112 



CIVIL HISTORY OF TEE NAVY, 1649-1660. 



[1660. 





* Built. 


LeDgth 


Beam. 


Depth 
in Hold. 


Draught. 


Nett 
Tons. 


Gnns. 






+ Taken. ' "^ ^^^^■ 






Ft. in. Ft. in.; Ft. in. 


Ft. in. 








Seahorse . 


tl654 




. . 






26 


Sold, 1655. 


Sen7j .... 


*1654 


85 6 


25 8 


10 


12 


299 


22 


rE e - n a 111 e d 
\ Eagle, 1660. 


Sojihia. 


1 1652 


, , 


, , 






300 


26 




Sorlings ' . . . 


tl654 


, J 








250 


28 




Sj)arrow . 


tl6o3 


, , 


, , 




. . 


60 


12 


Sold, 1659. 


Speaker 


*1649 


116 


34 9 


14 6 


17 


778 


64 


R e,- n a m ed 
I Mary, 1660. 


Spice .... 


? 


• • 


.. 




.■ 


• • 


f, I Disposed of, ca. 

^ 1 1652. 
-.Q \ Disposed of, ca . 
^^ \ 1652. 


Star .... 


1 1650 




.. 


.. 


• • 


.• 


Stork .... 


tl652 


.. 




.. 


.. 


.. 






Sun .... 


tl652 


•• 


•• 


•• 


•• 


•■ 


12 


Sold, 1654. 
Blown up at 


Sussex .... 


*1652 


•• 


•• 


•• 


■• 


•• 


46 


Portsmouth, 
1653. 


Sxvallow . 


*1657 






.. 


5 


60 


6 




Swan .... 


J 1652 


.. 


.. 


., 


.. 


, , 


22 


Sold, 1654. 


Swiftswe . 


* 1653 


116 


37 4 


14 10 


18 


740 


60 


/Taken bv the 
\ Dutch, 1666. 


Taimton . 


*1654 


100 6 


31 8 


13 


16 


536 


40 


R e - n a ni e d 
t Crowz, 1660. 


Tifjer's Whelp. . 


tl649 


•• 


•• 


•• 


•• 


•• 


•• 


Sold, ca. 1658. 
fE e - n a m e d 


Torrincjton 


*1653 


116 8 


34 6 


14 2 


17 


738 


52 


 Dreadnought, 
1660. 


Towing Galley'^ . 


*1659 


•• 


•• 


•• 


•• 


•• 


1 


Ee- u a ni ed 


Tredagh^ . . . 


*1654 


117 3 


35 2 


14 5 


•• 


771 


50 


Eesolution. 
[ 1660. 


Tresco .... 


tl651 








17 


.. 




Wrecked, 1651. 


Tulip .... 


X 1653 


, , 


, , 


, , 


, , 


. , 


32 


Sold, 1657. 


Violet .... 


t 1652 


98 


28 


11 


12 6 


400 


44 




Vulture 


X 1656 


• • 


•• 


•• 


•• 


100 


12 


[E e - n a m e d 


Wakefield . 


* 1656 


74 


23 6 


9 9 


11 6 


235 


26 


\ Bichrnond, 
[ 1660. 


Waterhotmd . 


X 1652 










.. 


32 


Sold, 1656. 


Welcome . 


X 1652 


.. 


.. 


.. 


, , 


400 


36 




Westergate 


J 1653 


86 


24 6 


11 6 


13 


270 


34 


Sold, 1657. 
[E e - n a ni e d 


Wexford . 


tl655 


•• 


•• 




•• 


130 


14 


\ Doli'>hin , 
\ 1660. 


Weyiaout/i 


tl651 


.. 




.. 




120 


14 




Wildman . 


J1652 


•• 




•• 


•• 


•• 


16 


Sold, 1657. 
[E e - n a ni c d 


Winshy 


*1654 


104 


33 2 


13 


17 


607 


44 


< Happy l^e- 
( turn, 1660. 


Wolf .... 


X 1656 


•• 


-• 




•• 


120 


16 


TE e - n a ni e d 


Worcester . 


* 1651 


112 


32 6 


14 


16 


629 


48 


< D u ii k i r k. 
{ 1660. 


Wren .... 


tl653 










250 


12 


Sold, 1657. 


Yarmouth . 


* 1653 


105 " C 


33' r 


13 3 


17 


608 


44 





" Kx-fio>/iil Jama:, I!<iyalist i)rivatecr, (apt. Hidiard Beacli. Taken near Le.s Sorlinpies, or .'^cilly Isle?. 
2 For the defence of the Medway. ^ Ae., Droyheda. 



1649.] 



'' FEIQATESr 



113 



The Constant Warwick, built in 1646, and purchased by 
ParHanient in 1649/ is popularly supposed to have been the first 
frigate constructed in a British yard. She was not a frigate in the 
modern sense, and several vessels very similar to her were added to 
the Navy while she was still- a privateer, cruising for the profit of 
the Earl of Warwick, Peter Pett, and others. But she and other 
craft of 1646 marked the beginning of a progressive tendency in 
naval architecture. It lay in the direction of making ships of 
medium size less high out of water, of finer lines, and of longer 
proportionate keel than before, and of so obtaining faster vessels and 
steadier gun platforms. The developments in this direction con- 
tinued under the Commonwealth ; but they did not go very far, and 



^=w=-—  


M 


P4 


^ 


^A 




1 


'^. -iiif^ 




.^:><Li 




F 


™ '„it|i— — 1 




r 


'^■-Vf-i,, -,'.... 


m m m M 


i^H 










, 












W 





THK COMMONWEALTH SHIP " SPKAKKR," 64. BUILT 1049. RENAMED " MARY," 1660. 

(From Toiiikiiis's cngmi-iiig in Charnock.) 

nothing closely approximating to the Nelsonian idea of a frigate was 
produced until the eighteenth century. Another beneficial advance 
was a very considerable reduction in the amount of external decora- 
tion conferred upon men-of-war. Figure-heads and stern-carvings 
were still allowed, and there was carving round the ports ; but the 
expenditure on such luxuries was limited. The regulation dress of 
a Commonwealth man-of-war was black, with the carvings gilt. 
As yet, not more than two boats seem to have been carried by any 
ship. These were a pinnace, of a maximum length of 29 feet, and 
a skiff, of a maximum length of 20 feet. A. third boat, the long 

^ See list of shii^s added to the Navy under Charles I., pp. 10, 11. 
2 Add. MSS. 9306, f. 132. 

VOL. II. I 



114 CIVIL EISTORY OF THE NAVY, 1649-1660. [1651. 

boat, of a maximmn length of 35 feet, was never carried inboard, 
but was towed astern. The two smaller boats were hoisted in and 
out, not by means of davits, but by means of tackles on the main 
and fore-mast shrouds. 

The large and rapid increase of the ships of the Navy during the 
Commonwealth taxed the resources of the State dockyards to the 
utmost. Many vessels were consequently laid down and built at 
private yards at Blackwall, Eatcliff, Rotherhithe, Limehouse, Wood- 
bridge, Horsleydown, Wapping, Yarmouth, Wivenhoe, Lydney, 
Bristol, etc. 

Ships were rated as follows : first-rates, of 80 guns and upwards ; 
second-rates, of 52 and less than 80 guns ; third-rates, of 44 and less 
than 60 guns ; fourth-rates, of 32 to 50 guns ; fifth-rates, of 12 to 32 
guns ; and sixth-rates, smaller craft. The distinction between the 
rates was not as yet very closely drawn, and did not strictly and 
exclusively depend upon tonnage and number of guns carried ; but 
classification on the lines of common sense and obvious convenience 
became more and more usual as the j^ears went on. A regular 
establishment ^ of guns for each rate was prescribed in 1655, but was 
never fully enforced. 

The first Navigation Laws in England date from the Act of 

1381-82 (5 Eich. II. c. 3). The policy represented by this Act was 

not of English invention, but was suggested by the previous action 

of foreign nations. It was persisted in and developed under 

Henry VII. and Elizabeth. But not until the temporary fall of 

the monarchy did it become an important factor in determining the 

relations of the country with other powers. As soon as Parliament 

could find the necessary leisure, amid the pressure of domestic 

troubles, it enacted, in 1646, that no one in any of the ports of the 

plantations of Virginia, Bermuda, Barbados, etc., should suffer any 

goods or produce of the manufacture or growth of the plantations 

to be carried away to foreign ports except in English ships. In 1650 

it was further enacted that no foreign ships whatsoever should trade 

with the plantations in America except with a regular licence. 

And in 1651 the most famous measure of the series, " Cromwell's 

Navigation Act," was passed. By this Act the prosperit}' of 

Holland was dealt a very serious blow, for it was declared that no 

goods or commodities whatsoever of the growth, production, or 

manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America should be imported into 

1 S. P. Doin. ciii. 1)4. 



1649.] 



FLAGS. 



115 



either England or Ireland, or into any of the plantations of Great 
Britain, except in British-built ships, which were owned by British 
subjects, and of which the master and three-fourths of the crew 
belonged to Great Britain. It was additionally provided that no 
goods of the growth, production, or manufacture of any country 
in Europe should be imported into Great Britain except in British 
ships, owned and navigated by British subjects, or in such ships as 
were the real property of the people of the country or place in which 
the goods were produced, or from which alone they could be, or 
most usually were, exported.^ These enactments, levelled at the 
Dutch carrying trade, were the cause of the first Dutch War. 
Other enactments, following the same lines, had much to do with 
provoking the second and third Dutch Wars, under Charles II., and 
the wars of American 
Revolution and of 1812, 
under George III. 

It has been already 
noted that by an order 
of February 22nd, 1649,- 
the St. George's Flag, a 
flag exactly similar to 
the present admiral's 
flag, was made the 
national ensign. At 
the same time it was 
directed that every 
man-of-war should 

carry on her stern an escutcheon containing in one compartment a 
red cross, and in another a harp. This escutcheon seems to have 
suggested as a flag of command, instead of the Union, a flag bearing 
the arms of England and Ireland in two escutcheons on a red field 
within a compartment Or. In the case of a vice or rear-admiral, the 
compartment seems to have been unornamented. In that of an 
admiral, it was encircled by a laurel wreath. 

A variant of this flag is still preserved in an old chest in the 
house of the Admiral Superintendent at Chatham. Through the 
kindness of Staff-Commander J. E. Coghlan, E.N., I am enabled to 
illustrate and describe it. It measures 21 inches by 15 inches. 
The field of the flag is red ; the encircling wreath is green ; the 
^ Macpherson, ii. 430, 442-444. ^ §_ p_ p^j^^^ Interreg. i. 62. 

I 2 




COMMONWEALTH FLAG. 

{From the Original at Chatliain Dockyard.) 



116 CIVIL BISTORT OF THE NAVY, 1649-1660. [1657. 

English escutcheon bears the red St. George's Cross on a white 
ground, and the Irish escutcheon bears a yellow seven-stringed harp 
on a blue ground. I take this to have been an Admiral's boat flag. 
It may, however, have been a Jack. 

There is also evidence that during the Commonwealth, red, 
white, and blue ensigns with St. George's cantons, bore sometimes 
a harp on the fly. A Dutch medal commemorative of the death of 
Admiral M. H. Tromp shows such a flag. In 1653 the Generals-at- 
Sea, in addition to their flags of command, flew pennants at the 
main; and the Vice and Eear-Admirals flew their respective colours, 
red, white, or blue, at the fore and mizzen. From May 18th, 1658, 
says Mr. Oppenheim,^ " the standard of the General of the Fleet was 
to bear the arms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, ' with His 
Highnes' escutcheon of pretence, according to the Great Seal of 
England.' The Jack for admirals was to consist of the arms of 
England and Scotland united, 'according to the ancient form,' with 
the harp added, ' according to a model now shown.' " 

By the Treaty of April 5th, 1654, it was agreed " that the ships 
of the Dutch, as well ships of war as others, meeting any of the 
ships of war of the English Commonwealth in the British Seas, 
shall strike their flags and lower their topsails, in such manner as 
hath ever been at any time heretofore practised under any form of 
government." ^ The right of the flag, thus formally acknowledged, 
was afterwards generally conceded, though not always with grace. 
When Blake was at Cadiz a Dutch officer also lying there kept his 
flag struck so long as the great Englishman remained. On the 
other hand, Jacob van Wassenaer,^ in 1657, when going down 
Channel with thirty sail, refused to strike to the Dragon and 
Colchester, and only when these ships threatened to engage him 
until they should sink did he comply "in a great rage." 

^ ' Admin, of Roy. Navy,' 370. 
^ See Anderson : ' Orig. of Commerce,' ii. 420. 

^ Having been Lord of Obdam, he is usually known in England as Obdam van 
Wassenaer, or simply Obdam. 




( 117 ) 



CHAPTEE XXI. 

MILITAKY HISTORY OF THE NAVY, 1649-1660. 

L. Care Laughton. 

The Eoyalist fleet — Rupert's command — Piracy in the Channel — The Parliamentary 
Generals-at-Sea— Rupert at Kingsale — Relief of Dublin — Rupert's voyage south — 
Attitude of John IV. of Portugal — Position of the Parliament — Position of Charles 
— Blake follows Rupert — His fleet — Proceedings off Lisbon — Blake reinforced by 
Popham— Hostilities against Portugal — English victualling in Spanish ports — 
Blake's force weakened — Rupert's escape from the Tagus — Blake and Lalande — 
Penn to take the place of Blake — Destruction of the piratical squadron — The 
Marmaduke — Penn's instructions — A new era in the Mediterranean — Further 
movements of Rup.rt — Mutiny of the Revenge of Whitehall — Penn's cruise — 
Edward Hall— Precautions against the Royalists— The Royalist privateers — 
Reduction of Scilly — Ayscue's West India expedition — Reduction of the Isle of 
Man — Reduction of Jersey and Guernsey — Reprisals against France — Ill-feeling 
between Holland and England — Preparations for war — Causes of the First 
Dutch War — The Navigation Act — The Pawlett reprisals — Tromp and Blake off 
Dover — Explanations and recriminations — Maritime resources of the two countries 
— Withdrawal of the Dutch ambassadors — Return of Ayscue from the West 
, Indies — His meeting with the Dutch off the Lizard — Tromp's attempt on Ayscue 
in the Downs — Blake and the herring busses — Tromp superseded — Popularity of 
the war in England — De Ruijter as Tromp's successor — Battle off Plymouth — 
Subsequent movements of the fleets — Destruction of Vendome's squadron before 
Dunquerque — Defeat of Badiley off Elba — ^The balance of force in the Mediter- 
ranean — Cutting out the Phoenix — De With in command — Battle of the Kentish 
Knock — Factious in the Dutch fleet^Results of the English victory— Relations 
with Denmark and Sweden — ^Dispersal of the English fleet — Tromp at sea again — 
Battle ofl" DuDgeness — Dejection and demands of Blake — The position at Leghorn 
— Defeat of Appleton — The Mediterranean left to the Dutch — The command of 
the English Channel — Battle off Portland — The Protectorate, and the hopes of the 
Dutch — Movements of the fleets— Meeting oft" the Gabart Sand— Battle of June 
2nd and 3rd, 1653— Blockade of the Dutch ports— Battle of the Texel— Junction 
of Tromp and De With— Death of Tromi^— Retreat of De With— Losses and 
rewards — The fate of the blockade — The peace — Relations with Denmark, with 
Portugal, and with France — The French privateers — Capture of Beach — France 
and Spain bid for Cromwell's alliance— Hostilities against Spain — Penn and 
Venables to the West Indies — Penn's fleet— Failure at Hispaniola — Jamaica taken — 
Return of the Generals— Goodsonn in the West Indies— Blake to the Mediterranean 




118 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1649. 

— Blake at Tunis — Spain declares war — Blockade of the Spanish coast in 1656 — 
Staj'ner and the Plate fleet — Santa Cruz de Teuerife — Death of Blake — John 
Stoakes in coniuiand — " That famous rover, Papachim i " — Fall of Dunquerque — 
Troub'e in the Sound — Montagu sent to bring Charles 11. to England. 

■"- rpHE death of Charles I. put an end to any hopes 
-■- that may have been entertained by the Navy of 
a reconcihation between King and ParHament, and, by 
widening the breach, determined the ultimate fate of 
the Eoyalist fleet. 

While the ships which had revolted from Parliament 

L_ J still lay in Hellevoetsluis, Prince Rupert ^ was appointed 

to the command ; a reservation, however, of the rights of 
Lord High Admiral being made in favour of the Duke of York. 

Rupert's sea connnand was most eventful. By his commission 
he was absolute ; by the nature of the service before him he was 
fettered both in respect of his ill-paid mutinous crews, and in having 
to cater for the Eoyalist exiles in Holland. The squadron repre- 
sented the investment of such money as the exiles could scrape 
together. Charles himself wrote to Eupert at Kingsale : " Being 
totally destitute of means, we intend to provide for the satisfaction 
of our debts out of the proceeds of the goods in the ships lately 
taken." ^ 

In 1648, Warwick had blockaded the revolted ships in Hellevoet- 
sluis till November. On his withdrawal, it was decided that the 
Eoyalist fleet should go to Ireland to help Ormonde. On the way it 
was to plunder as much as possible, for such a course would harm 
the " rebels," and was, to the loyal party, an indispensable means of 
livelihood. 

But the fleet could not sail, the men deserting daily from 
a service where neither pay nor provisions seemed forthcoming. 
Eupert acted, however, with vigour ; he sold the brass guns of the 
Antelope, which, with the value of the Queen of Bohemia's jewels, 

' Prince Rupert, son uf the Elector Friedrich Y., sometime King of Bohemia, 
and of Elizabeth, eldest daughter of James I. Born, IGIO, at Prague. Served on 
shore during the Civil War. In 1649 commanded a semi-piratical squadron in tlie 
name of Charles I. Served as a llag-ofticer in the second Dutch war. Conjointly with 
Albemarle, commander-in-chief, 1666, and greatly distinguished himself. Vice- 
Admiral of England, 1672. Commander-in-chief in the third Dutch war. Governor 
of Windsor Castle. One of the first Fellows of the Eoyal Society. Of high scientific 
attainments. Died, 1682, in London. Buried in Henry the Seventh's Chapel at 
Westminster. 

2 Warburton, ' Hist, of the Cavaliers,' iii. 308. Cp. Cal. S. P. Clarendon, ii. 421. 



1649.] 



RUPERTS SQUADRON. 



119 



served to fit for sea two "frigates," the Boebuck, 14, CaiDtain 
Marshall, and the Guinea, 30, Captain Thomas AlKn/ These 
returned shortly with two prizes which enabled him to equip the 
whole squadron ; ^ and on January 21st, Kupert, in the Constant 
Reformation, weighed and steered for the Channel. With him at 
that time were the Convertine, Prince Maurice, Vice-Admiral ; the 




H.R.H. PRINCE KUPERT, DUKE OF CUMBERLAND, P.C, K.G., BARRISTER-AT-LAW, F.R.8., 

VICE-ADMIRAL OF ENGLAND. 

(Fruiii the portrait bij Sir P. Leltj.) 

Swallow, Sir John Mennes, Eear- Admiral ; the James, prize ; and 
the Charles, Boebuck, Pelican, and Guinea. His original fleet had, 
to a great extent, melted away. The Crescent had been retaken 

^ Thomas Allin. Born, 1G12. Commanded under Prince Rupert, 1649-50. 
Commanded in Mediterranean, 1664. Engaged the Dutch Smyrna Convoy and was 
knighted, 1665. Flag-officer during the second Dutch war. Reduced the Barbary 
States, 1669. Controller of the Navy, 1670. Commander-in-chief in the Channel, 
1678. Died, 1685. 

2 Warburton, iii. 275. 



120 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1649. 

almost at once, and other ships besides those that sailed with 
Warwick had deserted. The Antelope, it has been seen, was dis- 
mantled ; the BIacka?7ioor Lady could not sail for want of £100.^ 

The Antelope never did sail. In the spring a party of seamen 
from the Happy E)it ranee, the senior officer's ship in the Downs, 
made a raid over to the Dutch coast, and surprising her, still in 
Hellevoetsluis Init now ready for sea, immediately destroyed her. 
Such few men as were in her could offer no resistance.^ 

Bupert meanwhile, in company with three outward-bound Dutch 
East Indiamen, passed the Strait of Dover. Moulton was lying in 
the Downs with the Happy Entrance, Constant Warwick, Satis- 
faction, and a " frigate " or two besides. That he did not attack was 
due possibly to a misconception of the strength of Rupert.^ The 
Princes reached Kingsale and collected there all the buccaneers of 
Munster, together with such Dunquerquers as would join them for 
the time being. By liberal offers of pay and prize-money they 
contrived also to enlist a certain number of men. The result was 
felt immediately. Complaint was made from Bristol that no ship 
could pass into the Channel in daylight, and the Governor of 
Youghal wrote that Eupert's fleet was twenty-eight strong.* At 
the beginning of February, Penn fell in with two of these ships, 
the Mary Antrini and another. The fight that ensued was well 
maintained by the Irish cruisers. Penn's ship, the Lion, lost both 
mizzen and bowsprit, while the Mary Antrini continued the fight 
till she had eleven men killed.^ At that time a ship was sent from 
Ireland to bring the Prince of AVales, as Charles was still called by 
many men in England, out of Holland. This ship, the Santa 
Teresa, Captain Francis Darcy, failing in the object of her journey, 
and being unwilling to return empty handed, stayed out till July for 
a Channel cruise ; but in that too she w^as unlucky, for she fell a 
victim to the Garland and Nonsuch.^ 

As the piracy increased, so also did the Parliament's desire to 
make a speedy end of Bupert. At first the newly-appointed 
Generals-at-Sea, ]^opham, Blake, and Deane," thought that the case 

^ Hyde to Rupert iVom tlie Hague, 28th February. 

2 Cal. S. P. Dniii. 1649-1650, pp. 105, 200, and Whitelocke Memorials, 390. 
» AVarlnirt.m, iii. 281. 

* Hist. :MSS. Cum. 13 Hep. App. 1, pp. 509, 510. ° Ih. 

« Cal. S. P. Dum. 1649-1650, ITtli July. 

"^ This is the order of tluir ni>pointmeut. Blake had served on land under Popham 
and may even have been suggested by him fur this service. 




C^rom ij^. ,^ Tva fi(oi>/i o e/i(j/'ci<J-//i(^ a//er f/i^ ptrtirre f/i //if ■^o.04)eiJi 

o/ //ii' }}<i/-<'('/i i//i(' , ''('//)>iM,> (>/ }jcr<'//(7/// ( ('//t'lji', ( ir/r'/'c' 






', ^■'Mra/ia-tj^n^ a-fu^ Z5, _--> „ ..Z^n-aiiP-n, 



1649.] RUPERT ESCAPES FROM KINGSALE. 121 

would be met by adding somewhat to the fleet in Irish waters under 
Ayscue and Penn, while Popham himself commanded in the Downs. 
But though the Irish fleet did good service, and its captains, notably 
James Peacock, of the Tiger, sent in many prizes ; ^ yet, when 
Rupert was shut up in Kingsale, it appeared that the one fleet could 
not at once do the regular work of the station, involving at the time 
much hard service, and also maintain the blockade. Consequently, 
on May 22nd, Blake and Deane appeared off Kingsale in the Triumph, 
having with them the Leopard, Nonsuch, Constant Warwick, Happy 
Entrance, and others. Their well-appointed squadron was stronger 
than was needed, and they were presently able to send a ship or 
two back to the Downs to assist against the North Sea pirates. 

Royalist hopes were already on the wane in Ireland. Ormonde 
was indeed besieging Dublin, but in May, Ayscue ^ and Penn ^ 
brought relief to that town, and soon afterwards, Jones beat 
Ormonde under its walls.* This, coupled with Cromwell's bloody 
victories, made it very clear to the Princes that Kingsale would soon 
cease to shelter them ; but still, as often, sheer good luck helped 
Rupert. A heavy north-easterly gale drove the blockading fleet far 
to leeward, and gave him the long-desired chance of slipping out. 
He escaped with the loss of three of his squadron.^ 

The Parliament soon had news of him. He had gone to the 
south, plundering all he met. There was no Mediterranean 
squadron, and the Irish fleet could no longer reach him ; nor could 
any reliance be placed on the fact of his being a public enemy. 
The Moorish pirates throve in spite of their being hostes humani 
generis ; and, moreover, Europe had not as yet decided whether 
King or Parliament would be the winner. It happened, there- 
fore, that when the Royalist fleet with its prizes appeared off 
the mouth of the Tagus, and demanded admission to the river, 
John IV. of Portugal readily granted all that was asked. He, in 
his new-found independence, was so weak as to be in urgent need 

^ Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649-50, pp. 201, 235, and often. Among the prizes taken at 
this time were the Guinea and the Charles of Kupert's ships. 

^ George Ayscue. Born i^robably about 1615. Knighted by Charles I. Captain, 
1646. Made Admiral of the Fleet in the Irish Seas, 1649. Commanded in the West 
Indies. Engaged De Euijter off Plymouth, August 16th, 1652. Vice- Admiral (B.) in 
the action of June 3rd, 1665. Admiral (W.) and taken prisoner by the Dutch, 1666. 
Supposed to have died about 1674. 

3 Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. 13, App. 1, pp. 66, 67. 

* At Rathmines. 

^ Granville Penn, i. 292. 



122 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. 1649. 

of an ally. In Knpert, or rather in the sovereign whom Eupert 
represented, chance had sent one to his hand. 

With the Eoyalist fleet gone from Ireland, but with much still 
to be done there on land, Cromwell offered Blake a command 
on shore. But Blake, having the choice,^ preferred the sea, and 
remained on his station till the end of the year. For so long as 
Eupert's movements were unascertained, careful precautions were 
taken, a far greater force being kept up than had been previously 
maintained. Thinking that Eupert might make Scilly his head- 
quarters, Popham^ sent a small but strong squadron to cruise off 
the Lizard. It was under the command of Captain Edward Hall 
in the Leopard, and included the Happy Entrance, Captain 
Eichard Badiley, the Adventure, Captain Andrew Ball, and Captain 
Hackwell in the Bonaventure. But Hall, like Penn in 1651 in the 
Mediterranean, could get no sight of his enemy. 

When news came that Eupert was to the southward, all un- 
usual precautions were abandoned. Blake was recalled to Plymouth 
to superintend the fitting out of the fleet that it now became 
necessary to send to Lisbon. Vice-Admiral Penn was left to 
command on the Irish station, which still demanded a capable 
head ; and it was subsequently decided that Popham should take a 
reinforcing squadron to Blake in the course of the spring. 

At this period the infant Commonwealth was in no enviable 
position. So odious is the name of Eegicide, that in no case could 
the envoys of the ParHament have been welcome. But " the diffi- 
culties of the English agents abroad were the greater because agents 
for the late King, who had been sent with proper credentials, and 
who had transferred their allegiance to Charles 11. , were resident in 
several parts. "^ And, apart from such difficulties as these. Parlia- 
mentary agents had to face the very real danger of assassination at 
the hands of the embittered Eoyalists. 

With the Eoyalists still on their hands, and with Ireland in a 
state of tumult, the Parliamentarians had need of caution. Against 
the Dutch they had already many causes of complaint, and, in 
spite of the reluctance of the Prince of Orange to grant more than 
passive support to Charles, the unfortunate murder of Dorislaus 
brought the countries still nearer to an open rupture. Charles 

1 Cal. S. P. Dom. 2nd October, 1649. 

2 Ih. 14th November, 1649. 

■' Cal. S. P. Dom. 1649-1650, p. xxxv. 



1650.] REPRISALS AGAINST FRANCE. 123 

spoke of throwing in his lot with Ormonde and Inchiquin, and 
Wilham of Orange gladly helped on a course that would relieve 
him of so dangerous a presence. But the three ships that sailed 
from Holland got no farther than Jersey, where Sir George 
Carteret held Castle Elizabeth ; and there the Irish project was 
abandoned on receipt of the news of the revolt of Munster to 
the Parliament.'- 

In March, 1650, Charles returned to Breda, whence, in June, 
he went to Scotland. He had hoped for help from France, but 
Mazarin found one civil war at home enough and had no desire to 
meddle in another abroad. The French ambassador in England was 
told in plain words that the recognition of the Commonwealth was 
essential before business could be transacted" and when that recogni- 
tion did not appear to be forthcoming, and English trade was 
impeded. Parliament ordered reprisals which, in all but the name, 
resulted in war. Coupled with the help which Eupert had found at 
Lisbon, and the action of the Tsar of Moscovy in driving the English 
from his dominions, this action on the part of France showed that 
the Commonwealth had to face a hostile Europe. Her instinct of self- 
preservation was appealed to, and this " drove England to become a 
maritime power such as she had never before been.^ The Parlia- 
ment saw where its strength should lie, and fell to increasing the 
Navy, with such good results that its sea power speedily became an 
important factor in the policies of Europe. Basnage wrote*: "La 
republique d'Angleterre eut un sort assez singulier ; c'est qu'elle 
devint redoutable des sa naissance, et avant meme que son autorite 
fut affermie. Les princes se liguerent presque tous avec le Parle- 
ment, et abandonnerent Charles II. a sa mauvaise fortune." And 
though it is probable that Basnage regarded the Parliament as the 
representative of the army which had inade it supreme, yet the 
immense rise of England during this period was wholly due to her 
Navy. This is amply illustrated by the fact that, save to fight 
the Battle of the Dunes before Dunquerque, in 1658, no English 
troops served on the Continent so long as the Commonwealth 
lasted. 

The equipment of the fleet at Plymouth was forwarded with all 
speed, and on January 17th Blake received his instructions. He 
was to command in chief as general of the southern expedition,^ and 

1 Gardiner, i. 207. ^ August 23rd ; Gardiner, i. p. 200. ^ Gardiner, i. 331. 
* Basnage, ' Annales des Provinces Unies,' p. 193. ^ Tliurloe, i. 134. 



124 MILITARY BISTORT, 1649-1660. [1650. 

his main object was to be to seek out Rupert and destroy him. If 
any Power proved so ill-advised as to shelter his enemy, Blake was 
to point out that Eupert and his crew were mere pirates — " piratse 
et latrones, hostes humani generis " — that they had stolen the ships 
which composed their squadron ; and that, having no legal right in 
those ships, which were the property of the Parliament, they were 
not entitled to sell them. 

When Generals-at-Sea were first appointed, it was the custom to 
hold closely to the letter of the regulation that required the presence 
of two of their number,^ and it is not unlikely that Popham would 
have been sent out with Blake had his presence not been necessary 
before Dunquerque.^ It has already been seen that it was the Parlia- 
ment's intention that he should follow Blake to the south as soon as 
he was free. Parliament had received advice, in January, that the 
Dutch, in consequence of a territorial quarrel with the Portuguese in 
Brazil, intended to employ twenty ships off Lisbon during the year.^ 
This belief seems to have contributed to the strength of our 
squadrons, and certain it is that Blake, with no Dutch squadron to 
watch, found himself undisputed master at sea. Cromwell could ill 
afford the risk of any semblance of weakness. He therefore sent, 
and maintained, a force more than equal to all possible adverse 
chances. Danger from Rupert was provided against : so was the 
contingency of trouble with the Dutch. Blake was likewise in a 
position to teach international law to the King of Portugal, should 
need arise, as well as to create a favourable impression upon the 
French and Spanish courts. 

But there was no difficulty then with Holland. The Dutch were 
quite content, for the time being, that Portugal should embroil 
herself for the sake of Rupert, who merited scant affection on their 
part. In the following year the Prince recognised the growth of 
Republicanism consequent on the death of William of Orange, by 
including Dutch vessels in the objects of his piracy.^ 

On or about 14th February, 1650, Blake sailed. His fleet was 
composed as follows ^ :■ — 

1 Penn, i. 289. 

2 Cal. S. P. Dom. January 24th, 1650-1651. 

^ Ih. January 26th. The shij^s were not sent. 
* Warburton, iii. 275. 

6 S. P. Dom. Int. 1. 123, 316, 5th March, 1649-1650, and a list appended to the 
Declaration of Prince Piupert,' a 4to. pamphlet, 1650. 



1650.] 



BLAKE IN SEARCH OF RUPERT. 



125 



Ships. 



Comniauders. 



M(n. 



1. George . 

2. Leopard 

3. Bonaventure . 

4. Happy Entrance 

5. Adventiore . 

6. Assurance . 

7. Expedition. 

8. Providence. 

9. Tiger . . . 

10. John 

11. Constant Warwick 

12. Merchant, " frigate " 

13. Cygnet, fireship 

14. 10^^ Whelp, „ 

15. William, ketch 

16. Patrick, ,, 



I Robert Blake, General . 
I Captain Charles Thorowgood 
Eobert Moulton, senr., Vice- Ad 
Captain John Harris 

Eichaid Badiley, Rear-Ad 

Andrew Ball 

Benjamin Blake 

Abraham Wheeler . 

John Peirce 

James Peacock . 

John Saltunstall 

Robert Motrlton, juu. 

Xicholas Park . 

William Wheatley . 

Robert Banes . 

Bartholomew Yates 

William Kennedv . 



280 

180 
180 
180 
130 
150 
120 
120 
150 
130 
140 
109 
30 
30 



Guns. 



50 

48 
37 
40 
36 
33 
26 
27 
32 
32 
31 
28 
8 
8 

10 



He arrived off Lisbon on March 10th, and would have proceeded 
up the Tagus to seek Kupert, had not the forts opened fire on 
him.^ Unable to at once solve the difficulty, Blake anchored in 
the open roadstead of Cascaes Bay, and demanded that the 
Princes, who were ready to start on a cruise, should be forced 
to put to sea.^ His demand was refused, and for the next few 
months each side was busy trying to convince the king that its 
opponents were rebels. 

In view of the strength of Blake's fleet, the position of John IV. 
was the more difficult ; for Eupert, though he had with him a 
squadron which, in point of mere numbers, was almost equal to 
Blake's, was, in all other respects, severely handicapped. To begin 
with, his men were mutinous, and desertions were so frequent,^ that, 
shortly before, he had thought fit to hang ten at the yard-arm in 
order to terrorize the rest. He was also so terribly short-handed, 
that, at one time, report went abroad that he had but forty men in 
his flagship,* a vessel whose complement should have been about 
three hundred. Such men as he had were a motley band of 
adventurers, drawn together more by the hope of prize-money ^ 

1 Gardiner, i. 331. 

- AVarburton, iii. 300. 

3 Whitelocke, 28th February, 1649-1650. 

* lb. April 10th, 1650. 

^ For the table by which j^rize money was to be distributed, vide Warburton, iii. 
288, 289. Prize-money before being divided into three parts for owners, for victuallers, 
and for officers and crew, was subjected to a deduction of -^-^ for Charles, and another 
of -^Q for the Admiral. 



126 MILITABY HISTORT, 1649-1660. [1650. 

than by the offer of high monthly pay,^ the receipt of which was 
by no means to be counted on. 

A hst of Bupert's squadron, drawn up by some one in Blake's 
fleet off Lisbon,^ can be proved to be fairly accurate. According to 
this authority it consisted of thirteen vessels, mounting about four 
hundred guns ; but only five of the ships had been at Hellevoetsluis, 
and, of these, the Blackamoor Lady, 18, was sold at Lisbon. The 
other four, the Constant Heforination, Convertine, Swalloic and 
Boebuck, were the only ships of Bupert that had been built as 
men-of-war. The remaining ones were prizes. 

The first demands of Blake met wdth no acquiescence from the 
king. It was, therefore, decided at a council of war, held on board 
the George, on March 23rd, to send Moulton as ambassador to the 
Portuguese court. ^ His demands were for restitution of, or leave to 
seize, all vessels under Eupert's command, or, failing that, for an 
engagement, on the part of the king, to force the Princes to put to 
sea ; and, failing that again, for leave to come into the river on 
giving an engagement not to attack. 

Although the demands against Bupert were refused, Blake gained 
leave to shelter from a heavy gale in Oeiras Bay, but was called 
upon to leave the river when the weather moderated. This was 
scant concession, and was made not with any intention of deserting 
Rupert, but with the natural desire of avoiding an open breach with 
the English until they should have allowed the Brazil ships to pass.* 
But Bupert was not satisfied of his ally's intentions. He knew that 
factions ran high at the Portuguese court, and, wishing to be on the 
safe side in case the king should give way, he made ready to try to 
force a passage out.^ 

The fleets were still in the Tagus when, at the beginning of 
April, two French ships-of-war appeared off the port. They knew 
Bupert was there, but of Blake they knew nothing. With the 
intention of saluting his Boyal Highness, the captains went aboard 
the flagship at the mouth of the river. This was, of course, Blake's 
ship, the George; and Blake, perfectly well aware that they had 
meant to join with Bupert, ordered their detention, pending instruc- 

. 1 Touching the scale of pay, it is worth recalling that when Eupert offered twenty- 
four shillings a month, the Parliament raised the pay of men sent against him to 
twenty-five shillings. Sec p. 98. 

'^ Appended to Eupert's declaration to the King of Portugal, 

3 Hist. MSB. Com. Eep. 13, App. 1, pp. 520, 521. 

* Warburton, iii. 302. " lb. 303. 



1650.] ATTEMPT TO BLOW UP THE " LEOPAPB." 127 

tions from home.^ But the time to quarrel with France had not, at 
that date, arrived, and the Frenchmen were eventually released. 

Although the squadrons did not meet, watering parties from the 
ships did. ScufHes on shore were constantly taking place, each side 
claiming to be the aggrieved party. Eupert accused the Parlia- 
mentarians of laying a plot to kidnap himself and his brother, and 
retaliated for the imagined ill-faith by an undoubted attempt to 
blow up the Leopard.- It is sufficiently well known that Rupert's 
complex nature had always a leaning towards scientific and chemical 
studies, and that he subsequently devoted years of enforced leisure 
to their pursuit. On this occasion he sent a couple of negroes and 
one of his seamen, in Portuguese dress, alongside the English vice- 
admiral in a shore boat. They carried with them what purported to 
be a barrel of oil ; but the barrel really held an infernal machine, to 
be fired by a pistol attachment, the trigger of which could be 
pulled by a string passing through the bung. The travestied 
seaman, however, coming alongside, and finding the lower deck 
ports closed, "uttered an exclamation" in English. It at once 
appeared that there was some deceit. He was seized, and the barrel 
was given a respectful investigation. Yet harshness to Rupert's 
followers was no part of Blake's policy, and the man was not 
punished. 

Meanwhile, in England, the summer guard had been made ready, 
and the ships had been appointed to the various home stations ; ^ but 
the determination to send Popham south to join Blake necessitated 
the detachment of the following squadron : — ^ 

Andrew Edward Popham, Admiral and General. 

Resolution Captain William Wildey. 

Phoenix „ William Brandley. 

Satisfactio)! „ John Lambert. 

America , 

Great Leivis ( 

Merchant j ^I^rchant ships. 

Hercules . . . . . . -' 

On the 13th or 14th May,^ 1650, Popham sailed. His instructions 
from the Council of State *^ supplemented those which had been 

1 Nicholls, S. P. p. 7. 2 Warburton, iii. 305. 

2 Whitelocke, 428, and list in S. P. Dom. Int. I. vol. 123, p. 315. The. numbers 
were forty-seven men-of-war, and twenty armed merchant ships. 

* Thurloe, S. P. i. 144, 145 ; S. P. Dom. Int. I. 123, p. 297. 
^ Cal. S. P. Dom. 1650, p. 161. « Ih. p. 122. 



128 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1650. 

already given to Blake, and were binding on both Generals. They 
differed from the earlier instructions in giving distinct orders for 
the arrest of French ships, and in granting power to attack the 
King of Portugal if he still persisted in supporting the revolted fleet. 

A curious point to notice with regard to the first outbreak of 
hostilities against Portugal, is that it occurred before Blake received 
the authority which Popham was bringing out. On May 21st ^ the 
fleet for Brazil sailed out of the river, and was promptly stopped 
by Blake. It was found that with it were nine English ships laden 
with Portuguese goods. These were detained, and the rest were 
allowed to proceed. According to statements subsequently made by 
Popham, Blake acted thus because he believed that the French 
intended to send a force to Lisbon to help Eupert, and because he 
expected Popham to bring him authority to seize Portuguese goods 
and ships. ^ It has been seen that he was not mistaken. 

Popham joined Blake on May 26th, yet found nothing more to 
do than to join in a dreary blockade. For two months nothing was 
done, but, on July 25th, Eupert, with a considerable fleet, consisting 
largely of Portuguese and French vessels, sailed out to avenge the 
detention of the Brazil ships. The wind was fresh from the E.S.E., 
and Eupert was almost up to the blockading fleet before the Portu- 
guese admiral weighed. As Eupert complained afterwards, " his 
anchor fluke had too good a hold."^ Then the wind shifted, and 
Eupert, by the Eoyalist account, could not come up.* He anchored 
off the Cachopo shoals, and did not move thence till Blake had been 
reinforced. 

Blake and Popham's report to the Council of State was to a 
somew^hat different effect.^ 

" We stood with them, they keeping the wind of us. Our fleet was of ten sail, 
together with the nine Brazil ships. Having got a reasonable berth from the shore, 
we haled our foresails to the mast. The enemy still kept the wind of vis, the French 
admiral with four fireships leading, the Reformation being a mile astern. Then the 
wind shifted to the south, whereon we tacked and gained the wind. We bore away 
large on the Frenchmen and exchanged some shot with him, as did also the Phoenix. 



1 Gardiner, i. 334, and Cal. S. P. Dom. p. 428. The Admiralty judges subsequently 
upheld Blake's action, vide S. P. Dom. Int. vol. xvi. 78. 

2 lb. p. 438. 

^ This admiral, and his successor, were nominees of Conde del Miro, of whom 
Rupert was proftiundly jealous. Miro represented the party which saw that a policy 
of peace with the Parliament was the better one to follow. 

* Warburton, iii. 310. 

^ Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. 13, App. 1, pp. 521-523. 



1G50.] RUPERT BLOCKADED. 129 

But as fast as we Lore upon liim, lie bore away large in toward tlie liarbour ; and 
Kupert likewise, his mizzen always haled up. We followed, but having a lee shore, a 
lee tide and night coming on, drew off in 10 fathoms at the South Hetchoopes." ^ 

Next day Rupert was under Fort St. Julian, and refused to 
move; at niglit, the Assurance was sent in "to alarume them," and 
was fired on by the forts. On the 28th, Eupert, though he had the 
wind of Blake, still refused to engage, and in the evening went into 
the river at the sight of eight ships which had joined his enemy. 
These were a squadron which had been detached to Cadiz for 
water. They were under the command of Badiley, and on their 
return from Cadiz had fallen in with, and fought, a French 
squadron of king's ships, whereof they had sunk one. 

Blake and Popham determined, with their increased fleet,^ to 
attack Rupert in Oeiras Bay; "but next day they had all gone up 
the river, and our plan to fall on them came to nought." 

The Constant Warwick was at that time on her way from 
England with instructions, dated July 13th, for a strict blockade 
to be maintained till Rupert should be driven out. At the same 
time it was suggested that as the Brazil Fleet had sailed, the 
generals, by sending some ships to the Azores, might doubtless 
intercept it. But the generals regretted that the scheme was 
impracticable. By August 15th the nine Brazil prizes were judged 
unseaworthy and were sent to England.^ In spite of the inevitable 
anger of Parliament at the prospect of a rich prize being missed,* 
Blake decided that the best which he and his colleague could do 
would be to see that the Brazil Fleet did not get in ; and, with that 
object, as autumn came on, the blockaders drew farther off from 
the land. 

During July, Blake had insisted on the need of fresh ships. ^ It 
was very difhcult to keep the vessels in repair when the nearest 
ports at which they could careen were San Lucar and Cadiz on 
the south, and Vigo to the north. But he received no further 
reinforcement. The squadron under Penn, which was ordered for 
the autumn, did not sail till the work on the coast had been done. 

^ The name Cachopo became with the English Hetchoopes, Catchups, Heckups, etc. 
Oeiras Bay was written either Wyers or Weyres. 

2 Blake had then eighteen ships and. the nine Brazilmen. With Eupert were 
twenty-six ships and eighteen small craft. 

^ Petition of the masters of these ships for pay while in the service of the State, 
Cal. S. P. Dom. November 13th, 1650. 

* Thurloe, S. P. i. 156. ' lb. 611 and 620. 

VOL. II. K 



130 MILI-TABY HISTORY, 1649-16G0. [1650. 

On September 7th, Enpert again came out, " to cut capers," as 
Nelson might have put it. He plied oif the harbour mouth with 
thirty-six ships, while there were actually with the Generals only 
ten.^ A thick fog prevented much from being done, but Hupert, in 
the Beformation, happening to stumble upon the George, the 
Phoenix, and the Expedition, had his foretopmast shot away before 
the mist hid him from sight. ^ 

A week later, on September 14th, the long-expected Brazil Fleet 
hove in sight and was at once attacked by Blake. Blake reported 
the matter thus : ^ " I made towards the Admirall, whoe being to 
nimble, I fell on the rereadmirall, being a ship of noe less force, 
and had above 3 howres dispute with him, it blowing very much 
wind, so that wee could not use our loure tire." At length the 
rear-admiral struck, having sustained heavy loss. Then the " Vize- 
admirall w^as burnt, being first boarded by the Assurance who saved 
most of the remainder of his men." 

Seven ships were either taken or destroyed, and then Blake, 
with his whole fleet, bore up for Cadiz. He was a welcome guest 
there in view of his late achievement, for the enmity between Spain 
and Portugal was very bitter. It was indeed owing to this that 
Blake had been allowed to victual in Spanish ports ; * and the feud, 
combined with an appreciation of England's strength, kept the 
two great countries at peace. Looking to the diametrically opposite, 
but equally bigoted, religious sentiments of England and Spain, it 
was clear that there could be no thorough and permanent alliance. 

Popham returned to England and resumed command in the 
Downs ; and on October 14th, Blake formed a squadron of four 
of his least seaworthy ships and sent it home under Badiley in 
charge of the four prizes taken in September. Badiley picked up 
twelve sail of merchantmen for England from Leghorn, and reached 
the Downs with his convoy on November 9th. ^ 

Blake was left with seven ships ; he himself w^as in the Bonaven- 
ture, the others being the Leopard, Phoenix, Expedition, Elizabeth, 
Constant WarwicJc, and John.^ 

There was now nothing to keep Eupert in Lisbon. The coast 

' Hist. MSS. Com. Eep.lS, App. 1, p. 536. Blake to C. o. B. 

^ The Portuguese never came near the enemy, Rupert asserted that their admiral 
towed a sheet anchor overboard to stop his way. 

3 Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. 13, App. 1, 536, 537. * Gardiner, i. 341. 

^ Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. 13, April 1st, p. 541. « Ih. pp. 537, 639. 



1650.] BLAKE IN CHASE OF EUFERT. 131 

was clear, and since September l^tli, the king's estimate of the 
value of Eupert's presence had fallen rapidly. The Eoyalist view 
w^as that if the Portuguese had victualled Eupert's ships earlier, 
the seizure of the Brazil Fleet would not have taken place. "When, 
however, because the squadron had become worse than useless, 
the victualling was pushed on, Eupert sailed with six ships, 
apparently all that he could man, on October 12th. In the words 
of the Eoyalists,^ " being destitute of a port, we take the Mediter- 
ranean sea for our harbour, poverty and despair being companions 
and revenge our guide." 

 Eupert's ships w^ere not destined to be left to their piracies for 
long. After passing down the coast and making a few captures, they 
passed the Straits. Blake had news of them and weighed from 
Cadiz at about the time when they must have passed him. On his 
way to Gibraltar he fell in with a French ship. 

As Whitelocke^ tells a pretty story about this capture, a story 
wildly improbable but currently accepted, it is well to see what 
Blake said of the affair. The accepted version is to the effect that 
Blake summoned the French captain on board and asked him : 
" Would he surrender his sword? " On being answered " No ! " he 
bade him return on board his ship and make the best fight he could. 
But after two hours the captain came in to him and, kissing his 
sword, delivered it up. Blake's letter to the Council says: "On 
October 20th, being four or five days off the Straits' mouth, we met 
a French man-of-war who, after some dispute, yielded on quarter. 
There was in her thirty-six brass guns and one hundred and eighty ' 
men, and the captain was Chevalier de Lalande, chef d'escadre, 
brother to him that was sunk by the Adventure frigate." ^ 

On November 2nd the Council of State wrote ^ that, hearing that 
" Eupert with his piratical crew," was got abroad, and that the 
Brazil Fleet was returning homewards,^ they were sending out 
Penn with four ships, all that could at that time be got ready. 
With Penn, who was to command in chief, Blake was to leave his 
best sailing light vessels and then to hasten home. 

1 Warburton, iii. 313. ^ Ih. p. 462. 

3 Hist. MSS. Com. Eep. 13, App. 1, pp. 538, 539. The letter is far more detailed 
in its statements than most of Blake's, and is directly corroborated by a letter of 
Saltonstall to Coytmore {Ih. p. 543), which mentions the capture, but records no heroic 
details. ^ Thurloe, S. P. i. 166. 

^ Homewards, i.e. to England. It was known in England October 15th, 'that the 
sugar ships had-been captured. Nicholls, S. P. p. 27. 

K 2 



132 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1650. 

Penn was a capable seaman, and Blake possibly was not. But it 
is not an occasion for regret that the Eoyalist squadron was dealt 
with by Blake before Penn's arrival. 

Blake, passing along the coast, had news of Eupert at Malaga, 
and there heard that he was at Velez Malaga. But Eupert and 
Maurice had parted company from the rest of their force off Cape 
de Gata, and had chased a large shi^?, the MarmaduJce, of London, 
towards the Barbary shore. On the morning of November 6th they 
were up with her and opened fire. She did not strike till disabled 
by the loss of her mainmast.^ 

At Velez Malaga, Blake found that the Eoyalists had destroyed 
two English ships, the master of one of which, Morley, was an 
object of Eupert's particular detestation as being a regicide.^ On 
the next day, November 3rd, the Boehuck was taken off Cape Palos ; 
on the 4th, the Black Prince, " the John being ready to board 
him," ^ ran ashore, took fire, and blew up three leagues east of 
Cartagena. Counting prizes, there were four * Eoyalist vessels left 
in Cartagena Bay. The accounts of what happened are very 
conflicting ; but this much is certain, that Blake followed them into 
Cartagena Bay, and that not one of them ever came out. 

Blake said they had been driven ashore by a storm and lost.^ 
Saltonstall said that they had run themselves ashore for fear of the 
Parliament's ships ; and this, in the main, is corroborated by 
Cadenas, who told Parliament that Blake had agreed not to harm 
them till he should receive formal permission, but that the ships 
tried to escape and were driven ashore. By Warburton's account,'^ 
one, the Henry, was taken ; but it is possible that the Henry was 
the Boehuck renamed. 

In any case it must have been a disappointment to Blake to 
have been so near Eupert himself and yet to have missed him. 
By strange irony, on the very day when the squadron was destroyed, 
the Council wrote to Blake complaining of the cost of the fleet. 



^ Warburton, iii. 317. 

2 Hist. MSS. Com. Eep. 13, App. 1, p. 547. Account of the proceedings of 
Xovember 2nd-5th, given to Parliament by Cadenas, the Spanish ambassador. 

^ Ih. p. 543; Saltonstall, of the John, to Coytmore, and cp. Heath, Chron. 275, 276. 

* The Convertine was not one of these ; she seems to have been left unmanned at 
Lisbon, whence she was afterwards restored to the Parliament. As the Roebuck was 
taken, it will be seen that not one ship of those then destroyed had ever belonged to 
the Navy of England. 

^ lb. 540, Blake to King of Spain. « lb. iii. p. 322. 



1650.] PENN IN SEABCH OF RUPERT. 133 

recalling Blake, and bidding him try to make a profit on the 
expedition by keeping a sharp look out for prizes on the journey 
home.^ When the news of his success reached them, they hastened 
to change their minds and wrote an appreciative letter, bidding him 
stay where he was and finish what he had so well begun. ^ That 
letter, dated December 24th, can never have reached Blake. He 
was back in England by the middle of February. On the 13th, he 
was thanked by Parliament for his " great and faithful service," 
being voted also the more substantial gratification of dGlOOO.^ 

Even before the news from Cartagena reached England, it had 
become evident that the Parliamentary star was in the ascendant. 
Vane, writing to Cromwell* at the end of December, said: "The 
seven ships left with Colonel Blake . . . are very likely to be the 
total ruin of Eupert's fleet, and a great terror to the French. This 
hath made the Spaniard solemnly to acknowledge us. Portugal 
likewise stands knocking at the door, but we pause upon it a little. 
The French and Dutch, as conceived, will not sit out long, unless 
they are resolved to sit out for altogether ; which we hope they will 
think on twice before they resolve on it." In other words, Blake's 
fleet had raised the Commonwealth to a recognised position in 
Europe. 

Blake's entry into the Mediterranean marks the beginning of a 
new era, that of English influence in those waters.^ The Council 
adhered to the new policy, and the Mediterranean station, though 
for a time neglected, was never afterwards for long abandoned. 

Partly as a substitute for Blake's force against Kupert,*^ partly, 
too, for the continuation of Blake's policy, a squadron was collected 
for Vice- Admiral Wilham Penn. The winter guard had been 
already formed.^ It was now called upon to supply ships for Penn, 
who, after waiting some time for the completion of the Fairfax, 52, 
which was to have been his flagship, sailed without her from 
Spithead on November 80th. Though his squadron was nominally 
eight strong,^ he sailed with only five, the Centurion, Siviftsicre, 
Foresight, Pelican, and Guinea.^ He was, however, joined by the 

1 Thurloe, S. P. i. 1G7. 2 j^^ p_ ^gg. 

3 In the C. 0. S. minutes for 15th March following occurs the entry " The Admiralty 
Committee to consider where the £1000 ordered for General Blake may be had." 
* Nicholls, S. P. pp. 10, 41. ' Gardiner, i. 341. 

« G. Penn, i. 324, 327. ^ Granville Penn, i. 302-304. 

^ Cal. S. P. Dom. 25th October, 1650. 
3 Hist. MSS. Com. Eep. 13, App. 2, p. 69. 



134 MILITARY HISTOST, 1649-16G0. [1651. 

Fairfax and others in January, 1651 ; and these, with such, 
"frigates" as Blake had left to him, brought his fleet above its 
originally intended proportions. 

His instructions were to go at once to the Azores on the chance 
of finding homew^ard-bound Portuguese treasure-ships there. Not 
finding them, he was to follow Eupert, and to act against the 
French in the Mediterranean. He went to the Azores, but found 
nothing. Blake, as has been seen, had already picked up the Brazil 
trade. Accordingly, he steered for the Mediterranean, and passed 
the Straits on March 29th, 1651. 

Eupert and Maurice, meanwhile, had been lying in Toulon 
doing their best to collect a squadron. They bought one ship, 
another joined them, and the Marmadu'ke prize was fitted as a 
man-of-war and renamed tKe Bevenge of JVhitehalL Their squadron 
then included the Constant Beformation, Swalloiv, Bevenge of White- 
hall, Loyal Subject, and Honest Seaman} Penn did his best to get 
information, but from first to last was never near the Princes. 

There is little need to follow the course of events in the 
Mediterranean. Eupert, when he was ready to sail, gave out 
that his intentions were for the Archipelago ; so eastward Penn 
promptly went. Having thus easily disposed of his opponent, the 
Prince left Toulon on May 7th, passed Gibraltar, and steered to the 
south. His real desire was to go to Virginia and the West Indies, 
where tbe Eoyalist interest was still strong; but the mutinous 
attitude with which his crews greeted the news forced him to go 
instead to the Azores. The rovers gained little there. Few prizes 
were made, and there sprang up a heavy gale in which the flagship 
sank. Eupert himself was saved, and a mere handful with him, but 
three hundred and thirty-three are said to have gone down in the 
Constant Beformation.'^ The Loyal Subject was also lost. 

Owing to the peace with Parliament, the Portuguese in the 
Azores would have nothing to do with the Eoyalists ; yet the dis- 
contented crews refused to face the Atlantic voyage, and Eupert had 
to resolve to look for the homeward-bound East Indiamen. But 
luck now was against him. He did not make the Canaries in time, 

1 Warburton, iii. 325. 

2 ■\Varburtoii, iii. p. 333, says that the crew perished heroicalh*. The ship spranc; 
a leak and foundered slowly, and, as all the long boats towing astern had been lost, no 
help could be given. Rupert was however saved by a small boat from the Honest 
Seaman. At 9 p.m. the ship with her steffdfast crew, " burning two firepikes to give 
us notice of their departure, took their leave of the world."' 



1652.] THE "BEVENGE OF WHITEffALL." 1S5 

and when at last, after refitting at Cape .Blanco, he persuaded his 
men to follow him to the west, he had w"ith him but two ships and 
a few unarmed prizes. Of the three ships which had escaped from 
the Azores, the Bevenge of Whitehall was carried to England by a 
portion of her crew. 

The story of her transfer to the Parliament shows daring of no 
common order. ^ When the ship came into Plymouth Sound on the 
last day of May 1652, Coxon, who had brought her home, was 
ordered to draw up a narrative of the affair. He showed how, when 
the ship had been beating up to the northward on the African coast, 
seven officers of merchant ships, pressed from prizes to serve in her, 
had decided on revolt. The project was one of extreme difficulty, 
and was possible only because the squadron was scattered in order to 
let nothing pass it. By degrees they sounded the crew, and having 
increased their number to twenty-five Englishmen out of a total of 
one hundred - and fifteen, the rest being chiefly Frenchmen and 
negroes, they watched for their chance. When it came — and it was 
slow in coming, for the officers of the ship suspected something — 
the captain, Marshall, was attacked and overpowered. Then ensued 
a stiff fight with hatchets. No firearms could be used for fear of 
bringing Eupert down on the ship, but the conspirators had taken 
precautions accordingly. Many of the Boyalists were wounded, 
and the French, who cried for quarter, w^ere put ashore. But 
even then there remained against the mutineers a majority of 
more than two to one. Constant watch had to be kept, and 
during the five weeks for which the passage lasted Coxon's anxiety 
never slept, 

Eupert meanwhile made the West Indian Islands and found that 
he had come too late. Ayscue had been there before him, and the 
Parliament's authority was assured. 

Again he met with a terrible storm. He himself had a narrow 
escape of being dashed ashore by night on one of the Virgin Islands. 
When morning dawned it was found that Prince Maurice, in a 
prize named the Defiance, had disappeared. Nothing was ever 
known of his fate, but there is little doubt that he perished close 
under the southern shore of Anagada. Nor did Maurice die alone. 
Of the great ships, the Swalloiv, in which was Eupert, alone was 
left; and with her, leaking and foul, accompanied by only two 

1 S. r. Dom. lut. vol. xxiv. CO. 



136 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1651. 

prizes, the royal corsair ended his long cruise at Nantes in the 
spring of 1654,^ 

While these varied and evil chances were befalling Bupert, quest 
was still being made for him in European waters. Penn, as has 
been seen, had started eastward on a wild goose chase. It was not 
till he reached Malta on the 25th July,^ 1651, that he learnt how he 
had been tricked. Rupert was then reported to be off Cadiz,^ and 
this necessitated a return to the neighbourhood of Gibraltar. 
Nothing of importance was done on the way to Malta and back. 
The Tunisians and Algerines treated Penn with incivility, refusing 
even to sell him provisions, but he did not dream of exceeding 
his instructions on their account. On August 6th " the Foresight's 
foretopmast was split from head to heel with a clap of thunder." * 
Three weeks later Penn met a Dutch admiral, who gave him false 
news of Rupert. 

On September 25th, Penn heard that Rupert was at the Azores. 
He did not, however, make any attempt to follow him, but contented 
himself with keeping his ships at the Straits' mouth to intercept him 
on his return. An appreciation of Rupert's boldness does not seem 
to have entered into Penn's composition. Like others, he had not 
the least suspicion of Rupert's West Indian voyage ; and there can 
be little doubt that, had the Royalist fleet gone thither at once, 
instead of wasting time, the Parliamentary cause in the New World 
would have suffered heavily. 

•Cornehs Tromp was in Malaga in October, 1651, while Penn 
lay near Gibraltar; and the English admiral seems to have been 
exercised in his mind as to how to behave to Tromp. Enghsh and 
Dutch were, as yet, no more than mutually suspicious. But both 
had realised the value of their interests in the Mediterranean and 
had determined to protect their trade; and both were acting, or 
were intending to act, against the African pirates.^ The difficulty 
arose out of the English war of reprisals with the French. This 
obliged Penn to seize everything French that he could lay his hands 
on, whereas the Dutch were at peace with France and their men-of- 

• ^ The Swallow was the last of the revolted ships. She was laid up at Nantes, and 
it was intended to refit her. But she was too far spent and never put to sea again, 

- G. Penn, i. 31.3, remarks that Penn's was the first man-of-war squadron to 
penetrate so far. 

=« G. Penn, i. 353. * Ih. 356. 

° Basnage, 214, and ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' p. 9. The Dutch had concluded a 
peace with Sallee at the end of January, 1G51. 



1652.] CONVOYS IN TEE MEDITERRANEAN. 137 

war were as ready to convoy French-owned goods as any others. 
But the rest of Penn's commission, until he reached Fahnouth on 
March 18th, 1652, passed off uneventfully enough. He did indeed 
believe that Tromp was collecting men-of-war to take a convoy to 
France, yet there was no collision ; and when Dutch ships met the 
English squadron, they were so much inferior in force that they did 
not dare to refuse to salute the flag.^ 

The English Mediterranean trade was well protected at that 
time. Sailing shortly after Penn, Captain Edward Hall passed the 
Straits with a convoy a few days before Penn had come thither from 
the Azores.^ His work was chiefly of a nature to leave little trace, 
but one legacy left behind by him was pregnant enough of results. 
By seizing a French ship in a Tuscan port he angered the Grand 
Duke, who complained to Parliament. No satisfaction was given. 
Parliament wrote that as accounts differed widely, and as their real 
wish was for peace, they thought that the end would be best 
attained by letting the matter sleep. ^ 

Appleton* in the Leopard went up the Straits on similar duty 
soon after Hall, and like his predecessor annoyed the Duke of 
Tuscany. He, with Richard Badiley, who went out in December, 
1651, was left in the Mediterranean to represent English rights 
during the Dutch War, while Hall, with his far more adequate 
squadron, was withdrawn. 

During 1650 there was still the possibility of help reaching the 
Koyalists from abroad. An English squadron was constantly em- 
ployed on the east coast of Scotland, and, though it failed to inter- 
cept either Montrose or Charles, it at least caused the lengthening 
of the Prince's passage to three weeks, and, by co-operating with 
the Parliamentary army that started north in June,^ had consider- 
able influence on the Scots War. Dunquerque too was busy,*' and 
gave ample employment to ships in the Narrow Seas. So dangerous 
indeed did the Dunquerquers threaten to become, that a blockade of 
the port was instituted, and it was from this service that Popham 

1 G. Penn, i. 365, 386. 2 Lediard, p. 535. 

3 Hist. MSS. Com. Kep. 13, App. 1, p. 622. 

* Save for his service from this time until the beginning of 1653, all in the 
MediteiTanean, Henry Aj^pleton is utterly unknown. It is probable that he was a 
merchant skipper ; it may also be possible to identify him with a Mr. Appleton who 
had served as lieutenant of the Jonas, hired merchantman, in the Ehe expedition 
of 1627. 

5 Gardiner, i. 288. ' G. Penn, i. 294 ; Cal. S. P. Dom. 23rd August, 1649. 



]38 MILITAEY HISTORY, 1G49-1660. [1651, 

was withdrawn to join the fleet off Lisbon. It w^as truly a time of 
difficulty for peaceful traders,^:ior, besides the accepted dangers from 
Dunquerquers, from French cruisers/ and, in the East Indies, from 
the Dutch, the home seas were full of Eoyalist privateers from the 
islands. 

With regard to the Dutch, the period was one of embassies and 
negotiations ; but Parliament was loth to take the high hand. The 
East India Company was warned "that as soon as any ship's 
company brings the tidiiigs of injury offered, they," must "put the 
thing into way of proof in the Admiralty, that complaint may be 
made thereof to the States."^ For the moment, diplomatic action 
was preferred. But against the Royalists another method was 
adopted. In the Isle of Man, the Earl and Countess of Derby ; in 
Scilly, Sir John Grenvile; and in the Channel Islands, Sir George 
Carteret, still held out for the king. And in addition, Parliament 
had to deal with Boyalist influence in the Colonies. 

On the establishment of the Commonwealth, one of the first 
pieces of work which the Council of State purposed to take in hand, 
was the reduction of the islands.^ Scilly was the most important 
of these stations, for cruisers from the islands could ply on the 
Soundings and levy toll on all homeward-bound trade, English and 
Dutch alike. The Council realised as early as April, 1649, that " it 
would be a great service to take Scilly,"^ and the Generals-at-Sea 
were informed of the decision. But the Generals-at-Sea were. too 
busy then with Eupert, who, before the blockade of Kingsale, seems 
to have made some attempt at concerted action with Grenvile.^ So 
the matter dragged on until the spring of 1651, when suddenly 
Marten Tromp appeared off Scilly with a squadron.'' On April 1st 
the Council wrote to Blake and Ayscue to hurry to Scilly and watch 
Tromp's movements. Tromp had demanded reparation and, getting 
none, proceeded to declare war "^ against Grenvile, as his instructions 
permitted. But Parliament could allow no such thing. Scilly in 
Dutch hands would be far more dangerous than it was in Eoyalist 
possession. Blake and Ayscue sailed at once in a squadron which 

^ Gardiner, i. 339. At the eiul of October 1650, it was estimated that the French 
privateers had taken 5000 tons of English sliipping, and goods to the vakie of half a 
million sterling. 

2 G. Penn, i. 301. •'' Cal. S. P. Dom. Int. 16-49, p. 6. 

* C. 0. S. Minutes, 24, April 16th, 49, in S. P. Dom. Int. 

^ Warburton, iii. 289. " Basnage, 215 ; Thurloe, S. P. i. 177, 

' Whitelocke, 17th April, 1651. 



1651.] ATSCUE IN TBI: WEST INDIES. 139 

had been prepared for Ayscue to take to the West Indies. Tresco 
and Bryer were seized, and the walls of the main stronghold where 
Grenvile held out in St. Mary's were breached.^ This, combined 
with a rigorous blockade,^ forced the governor to come to terms, 
and the islands were surrendered on 2nd June, while he retained his 
liberty. 

Even before this service, short as it was, had been completed, 
Ayscue for some reason left his command. He was at once ordered 
to return,^ and did so ; and, as soon as the work was finished, he 
received instructions to refit his squadron and carry out his original 
orders.'* 

The Caribbee Islands belonged to the Earl of Carlisle, who in 
1647 had leased his rights to Lord Willoughby of Parham.^ Prince 
Charles at the Hague gave Willoughby a commission to govern in 
his name, and with this Willoughby had sailed in February, 1650, 
taking out a similar commission to Sir William Berkeley, the 
Boy alls t Governor of Virginia. 

On reaching Barbados, Willoughby found that party spirit ran 
high, and that the Cavalier faction was in the ascendant and had 
cleared the island of Koundheads.'^ Some of these Roundheads 
reached England, and, no doubt, their representations helped to fix 
the determination of Parliament. Ayscue left England 8th August, 
and arrived at Barbados with seven ships. He at once attacked, 
and Willoughby, after a stubborn defence, capitulated upon favour- 
able terms. Ayscue granted Lord Willoughby his freedom, an 
act of leniency which seems to have been remembered against the 
admiral in the following year. 

When Barbados had fallen, no further resistance was made. 
Nevis, St. Kitt's, and Virginia, submitted to the Parliament, and 
Ayscue was at liberty to return to England, which he reached in 
May, 1652. 

In his absence, Jersey and the Isle of Man had been reduced. 
In the case of the latter, after an expedition had been organised and 
troops landed, no resistance was offered. Captain Anthoriy Young, 
in the President, challenged Man, and met with defiance.^ The Earl 
of Derby was not in the island at the time, but his countess retired 

1 Cal. S. P. Dom. Int. 23rd May, 6tli June, 1651 ; Whitelocke, 464-467. 

^ 'Eleuchus Motuum,' p. 77. ^ Gardiner, i. 350. 

=' Cal. S. P. Dom. 10th May, 1651. « /&. 352. 

•* Ih. lOtli June, 1651, and 8th July, 1651. ' Whitelocke, 486. 



140 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1651. 

to Peel Castle, and was preparing to hold out when she was forced 
by her own men to capitulate. 

The Isle of Man was reduced in October, and only Jersey and 
Guernsey were left. But Jersey had become more formidable in 
proportion as other refuges had been withdrawn from the Eoyalists. 
Innumerable piracies are recorded of the Jersey men,^ and as early 
as April of the year 1651, the Lord General had been requested to 
consider how and when the reduction was to be.^ Troops were 
held in readiness, but on 1st August were countermanded. Next 
day they were ordered to proceed. Jersey, it was thought, " will 
feel security, and the expedition will advance easier." During 
September, Blake at sea and Colonel Heane on land reduced the 
islands, and penned Carteret in Elizabeth Castle. The surrender 
could not be long delayed, for the castle was quite cut off, and 
Carteret's garrison was large. ^ A bombardment was opened and was 
replied to. The castle was well stocked with munitions of war ; and 
that the capitulation occurred so early as December 12th was due 
in great part to the mutinous disposition of the rabble which the 
Governor had within the walls. It was said at the time that he 
had with him Frenchmen, Danes, Germans, Swiss, Scots, Hollanders 
and Irishmen. With the fall of Castle Elizabeth, resistance ended. 
Five days later. Castle Cornet in Guernsey surrendered, and Charles 
had no longer a foot of land to receive him throughout the whole of 
what he claimed as his dominions. 

Relations between England and France, it has been seen, were 
by no means satisfactory. The war of reprisals was carried on with 
vigour, and many of the ships of the Navy saw service therein. The 
Fairfax, for instance, a new ship of fifty-two guns, fought two or 
three severe actions in the Channel with French cruisers,* and Penn 
brought home thirty-six French prizes from the Mediterranean. 
In addition to this, in December, 1650, Ormonde, Inchiquin and 
many other refugees from Ireland went over to the Duke of York, 
and thus largely increased the Eoyalist strength in France,^ to which 
country the Stuarts then, as afterwards, looked for their chief 
support. 

Much has been written on the one side and the other to prove 

1 Whitelocke, pp. 464-494. " C. o. S. Minutes, 24tli April, 1651. 

^ Whitelocke, 485, saj's that he had four thousand men. 

* Cal. S. r. Dom. 1650, pp. 312, 313; Whitelocke, 26th July, 28th August, 
9th September, 1650. 
s G. Penn, i. 309. 



1651.] PBEPABATIONS FOR A DUTCH WAR. 141 

each of the combatants responsible for the first Dutch war. It 
is impossible to adopt conclusions without a consideration of the 
facts on which they rest. In considering these, it will be best to 
follow the chronological sequence of these events. 

One of the most important features of the history of James I. 
and Charles I. was the growth of enmity between England and 
Holland. The Dutch held in their hands a great majority of the 
carrying trade of the world. They were, therefore, the rivals in 
commercial enterprise of England, seeing that she was likely to 
prove the most formidable competitor. And in this connection it 
must not be forgotten that England's rivalry was doubly dangerous, 
for not only was she able to compete in the markets, but she could 
at will all but close the trade routes of Dutch shipping. This was a 
cause of ill-feeling. Another cause was the disputed question of the 
herring fisheries, which had never been settled. During the Civil 
"War in England it had, indeed, been allowed to drop out of sight ; 
but it was not dead, and it began to reassert itself in proportion as 
the power of the Commonwealth became established.'^ 

In the spring of 1651, it became obvious that both countries 
were preparing for a struggle. Orders were given in England to 
hasten forth the summer guard, but the order was the less to be 
remarked because there was no lack of ordinary work for the fleet to 
do. The action of Holland was more suspicious. To allay the 
feeling aroused in England by the intelligence of great preparations 
in the Netherlands, the three Dutch ambassadors signed a memorial 
for presentation to Parliament. In this they admitted that a fleet 
of one hundred and fifty ships, over and above those already at sea, 
was being made ready, but they maintained that there was no hostile 
intent against the Commonwealth. The force, they explained, was 
needed for the police of the seas and the protection of trade. ^ The 
most lucid exposition of English scepticism that occurs bears a date 
subsequent to the war, and takes the form of a charge brought 
against the States.^ *' It is showed how you made a league defen- 
sive and offensive with France, a league cle non offendendo with 
Spain, a league defensive with Sweden and Denmark, and a defensive 
league with Denmark against Sweden and all other nations ; and 
therefore it did appear that you had in the preparation of that 
navy no real intention of peace with us, but the contrary." 

' Whitelocke, 487. = jjist. MSS. Com. Eep. 13, App. 1, p. 636. 

3 Thuiioe, S. P. i. 291. 



142 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-16G0. [1G51. 

Consequent on the death of the Prince of Orange, Parhament 
proposed a closer alHance of the two repnbhcan governments, but 
the scheme was such as would have given to England a preponder- 
ance. The Dutch were not prepared for this, nor would they accept 
a clause by which they should make England's enemies their own/ 

Mutual suspicion continued to grow, and was by no means 
allayed by Tromp's appearance off Scilly. On June 20th, 1651, the 
negotiations w^ere broken off and the English ambassadors recalled. 
The chief determining cause came from England. On October 9th, 
very shortly after the final ruin of the Koyalist hopes by the "crown- 
ing mercy " of Worcester, was passed the famous Navigation Act. 

The Dutch, of course, assumed that the blow was struck 
primarily at them ; and doubtless it fell far more heavily on 
them than on others. But the gain to England was so evident 
that the passing of . this Act could not be attributed only to a spirit 
of vindictiveness against the States. Hollanders in London tried 
to negotiate, but were met with a statement of grievances, beginning 
with the death of Courthope and the massacre of Amboyna, and the 
losses of the Muscovy and Greenland companies, and continued 
down to the support given to Charles at the Hague, the murder of 
Dorislaus, and the insults that had been heaped upon the Parlia- 
ment's ambassador St. John. 

No settlement was arrived at. None, perhaps, was expected. 
Letters of marque had already been granted, and in November, 1651, 
the Pawlett Reprisals began. The heirs of Robert and William 
Pawdett obtained leave to make reprisals on the Dutch for damage 
done to the extent of ^£29,170 ; and two vessels put to sea under 
Captains Smith and Stanton.^ Complaint was immediately made 
at the Hague, and one more point was added to those already in 
dispute. On the other hand, England demanded the repayment of 
money advanced by Elizabeth for the fortresses of Flushing and 
Briel,^ which had weakly been restored by James I. 

While arming their great fleet the Dutch issued an edict that 
none of their seamen should serve abroad."^ All was then ready for 
war, which began without formal declaration, on the old and most 
convenient claim of the honour of the flag. The Dutch were at 
least as desirous for war as were the English, and probably more so, 
for they had more to gain. The request for a closer alliance had 

. ^ Basnage, 215. ^ Ih. 2-i8, and Monsoii, ' Tracts,' p.' 554, 

2 II, 220. - ^ Ih. 253. 



1652.] CAPTAIN YOUNG'S ACTION. 143 

been shelved, and the ParHamentary demands, though heavy and 
distasteful, did not go beyond what was legally due. Holland could 
not go to war because her old debts were called in. She could, 
however, find a pretext for a war, and in the event of a happy issue 
thereof, escape for ever from making restitution. 

The Navigation Act was rigidly enforced, and many Dutch 
vessels were confiscated, not without loud protests from their owners. 
A large fleet of Dutch men-of-war was reported ^ to have appeared on 
the eastern coast in February, to have used rough treatment towards 
the English, and to have demanded the restoration of confiscated 
vessels. News, too, was received that Ayscue had found many 
Dutch ships openly engaged in an illegal trade with the Eoyalist 
colonies ; and had seized eleven at Barbados ; ^ and that Penn in the 
Mediterranean and on the Portuguese coast had made various 
captures of a like natT;ire.^ 

On May 12th, 1652, Captain Anthony Young, in the President, 
accompanied by two other "frigates," fell in off the Start with a 
small squadron of a dozen ships. "^ Taking them to be Ayscue's 
vessels, he stood towards them, but, on coming up, discovered that 
they were homeward-bound Dutch merchant ships, convoyed by 
three men-of-war wearing flags as admiral, vice-admiral, and rear- 
admiral. The Dutch admiral, on being summoned, struck his flag 
and held his course, but the vice-admiral who followed him refused 
point-blank, bidding Young come aboard and strike it himself. 
Young naively sent his master aboard, only to meet with a further 
refusal. On this the President ranged up on the Dutchman's weather 
quarter and again called on him to strike. The vice-admiral refused, 
and Young at once gave him a broadside, which was as promptly 
returned. The Dutch admiral hauled his wind — the wind seems to 
have been north-west — and tried to weather Young, who found 
himself obliged to put his helm down to prevent the admiral from 
getting out to windward of him and boarding. Meanwhile, Captains 
Chapman and Eeynolds had fired on the rear-admiral astern. They 
now came up with the vice-admiral, but, as they overhauled him, 
the Dutchman struck his flag, and the rear-admiral did the like. 

1 Whitelocke, p. 498. ^ jj^ 3 q.^ ^enn, i. 391, 392. 

* The main authority for the engagements off the Start and off Dover is the 
collection of evidence and declarations published as a pamphlet- in June, 1652, under 
the title of " The Answer of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England to three 
papers delivered by the Lords Ambassadors Extraordinary ... of the United Pro- 
vinces." C]). Basnage, 253. 



144 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1652. 

Young demanded that the vice-admiral should be sent into port 
with him to make good the loss to the "frigates." To that the 
admiral said that so long as the dispute concerned the tlag alone 
he did not interfere, but that he would resist to the uttermost any 
interference with the possession of the ship. 

Nothing further w^as done. Young, who had lost one man killed 
and four wounded, wrote, " I do believe I gave him his bellyful of 
it ; for he sent me word he had orders from the States, that if he 
struck he should lose his head ; but at length he did strike, which 
makes me conceive he had enough of it." Whitelocke,^ who repeats 
many hearsay reports, records that the Dutch admiral offered in 
explanation the suggestion that his vice-admiral was drunk. When 
he goes on to say that after the fight the Hollanders gave Young 
" such loving salutes, confessing their faults, and so they parted 
good friends," he rather discredits his story. 

This action, unimportant in itself, very soon had a most import- 
ant result. On May 18th, Bourne was lying in the Downs in the 
AndreiVy 42 guns, with the Triumph, 42; the Fairfax, 52; Haiypy 
Eiitrance, S2 ; Centurion, 4S) ; A dv enhir e, S8; Assurance, 32; Grey- 
hound, pinnace, and Seven Brothers, hired merchantman ; nine ships 
in all. Suddenly the Dutch fleet, forty-two strong, appeared on the 
back of the Goodwins. "When it reached the South Sand Head, 
Marten Harpertszoon Tromp,^ who was in command, sent two ships 
into the Downs to Bourne. Bourne, by special leave from Blake, 
was then, as commander-in-chief, w^earing a flag at the main. 
From this Tromp at first supposed that Blake himself was present. 
These two ships came into the Downs and saluted the flag. The 
captains went on board the flagship, and explained that Tromp 's 
presence was involuntary ; that it was due to foul weather, which 
made it impossible for him to lie longer before Dunquerque, where 
he had lost many anchors and cables ; and that all he desired w^as 
shelter. Bourne answered that Tromp would best show his 
sincerity by getting away from the coast as soon as possible. 

Meanwhile Tromp dropped anchor in Dover road. He had not 
gone into the Downs because he did not wish "to breed dispute 
about the flag, inasmuch as he had no order to take it down." It 

^ Whitelocke, 508. 

^ Marten Harpertszoon Tromp. Born, 1570, at Briel. Admiral of Holland, 1639. 
Is said to have been victorious in thirty-three actions. Killed in the battle of 
July 31st, 1653. 



1652.] 



BLAKE JOINS BOURNE. 



145 



was not, therefore, to be expected that he would strike it to the 
Castle. He did not. The Castle fired a shot or two to call his 
attention to the fact, but all the heed he paid was to exercise his 
small-arm men in volley firing continually throughout the day. 

Blake, meanwhile, was in Eye Bay with the main part of the 
fleet, consisting of his own ship, the James, 48 ; Victory, 42 ; 
Garland, 34; Speaker, 64; Star, 12; Martin, 36; Buhy, 40; 




MARTEN HARPERTSZOON TROMP, LIEUTENANT-ADMIRAL OF HOLLAND. 
(From Balcn's engraving, after the portrait hij J. Jcciens.) 



Sapphire, 38; Portsmouth, 38; Mermaid, 22; one other, and a 
hired merchantman. At the first sight of Tromp, Bourne had 
made up his mind that there was danger of an attack, and 
besides clearing his ships for action, had sent an express to Blake 
asking him to come at once to his support. The wind on the 18th 
was at north-east, and Blake soon received the message. He 
weighed at once, and wrote to Bourne to join him. This message 
VOL. II. L 



-146 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1600. [1652. 

eached tlie Downs by 10 a.m. on the 19th, by which time the 
Dutch, at the sight of Blake beating up towards them against an 
easterly -vNand, weighed together and stood closehauled towards 
Calais. 

Bourne, who had been lying all night with two " frigates " posted 
between himself and Tromp, weighed about mid-day when the tide 
served. When he was off the South Foreland, the Dutch suddenly 
went about and bore down on Blake, who was then near Folkestone, 
Tromp, in the Brederode, leading. 

As Tromp drew near, Blake, already cleared for action, fired a 
gun for him to strike his flag. As this had no effect, it was followed 
by another, and by a third, to the last of which Tromp made answer 
with a broadside.^ This was promptly returned, and, Tromp " having 
put abroad the bloody flag under his Holland's colours," other ships 
engaged as they came up. 

Tromp, according to his captains, when he altered course, " came 
through the whole body of his fleet," and bore directly down on 
Blake. To the impulsive nature of this attack was due the 
straggling line which the Dutch fleet presented at the moment of 
impact. The fight at once grew hot in the van ; Blake was 
supported by several of his heaviest ships, although a few were so 
far to leeward that some time passed before they could come up. 
The Dutch, on their part, being greatly superior in numbers, would 
have surrounded the English van had not Bourne come up almost 
simultaneously with his nine ships and fallen impetuously on the 
enemy's straggling rear. 

The battle thus joined raged till dark. In the van the heavier 
English ships held their own, sustaining considerable damage, but 
inflicting heavy loss. From time to time boatloads of the Kentish 
fishermen joined the fleet with admirable spirit, and helped to fight 
the guns.^ For the time it was not seen who held the advantage, 
but in the morning it appeared that Bourne had taken two ships 
from among those cut off by him, viz., the St. Laure?is and the 
St. Maria. The latter was abandoned by her captors as being in a 
sinking condition ; she drifted to seaward, and on the morning of 
the 20th was discovered dismasted by the Dutch, who carried her 

^ Though Dutch writers, as Basnage, 253 (' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 17), show 
Tromp to have claimed that Blake fired the first broadside, there is little doubt about 
the matter. In the examinations before Cromwell the Dutch captains taken in the 
engagement corroborated the version given by every Englishman concerned. 

- Whitelocke, 509. 



.1652.] 



BATTLE OFF DOVER. 



147 



into port. Her crew, however, had been put on board Lawson's 
ship, the Fairfax. 

The advantage, then, was distinctly with the EngHsh, who had 
lost no ship. Of the English vessels, the flagship James had suffered 
the most heavily, both as being first into action and as being the 
chief object of the Dutch attack. In her there were six men killed, 
nine or ten desperately wounded, and twenty-five wounded " not 
without danger." She had received seventy great shot in the hull 




THE BATTLE OFF DOVER, MAY 19tH, 1652. 

A 1. Tromp in Dover Eoad. 

A 2. Point at which Van Sanen fell in with Tromp. 

A 3. Tromp attacking, at 4 P.M. 

C. Blake attacked, at 4 p.m. 

B. Bourne falling on the Dutch rear, at 4.30 P.M. 

Note.— Groups, and not single ships, are represented in the above plan. 



and masts, her mizzen mast had been knocked overboard, and her 
sails and rigging were cut to pieces. 

Such was the fight. As it had been preceded by no declaration 
of war, it was necessary for each commander to explain the part 
which he had taken. 

The narrative which has been given shows what was Blake's 
share, while Tromp's conduct was explained by evidence which was 



Q 



148 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. {1652. 

taken at the official inquiry Held at Dover. From this it appeared 
that Tromp had originally no intention of attacking. In ai^pointing 
him to command the fleet, the States General had examined him on 
the question of the salute to the Enghsh flag. It was customary, 
had been the reply of Tromp, to make the salute, especially when 
the Dutch force chanced to be the weaker ; and, upon this, Tromp 
had been dismissed with instructions to protect trade, to keep off the 
English coast, and to do nothing discreditable to his country. 
Whether to strike his flag or not, he himself was to decide when 
occasion should arise. 

This explains every incident up to the moment when Tromp 
changed course. "What occasioned this was the sudden arrival of a 
vessel from the westward, which joined the Dutch fleet, and sent a 
boat aboard Tromp. In her w^as Captain Joris van Sanen, who had 
been present off the Start a week before, and who added the 
information that, near the Parliament's ships, to leeward, lay a 
squadron of rich trading vessels, which were homeward bound to 
Holland, and in imminent danger of being searched. From English 
sources we hear very little of these few ships, save the mere 
statement that they proceeded on their course that same morning. 
It is, however, certain that they were not molested 

It may, then, be accepted without hesitation that Tromp had at 
first intended to avoid any dispute by keeping clear of the English 
flag ; that to gain this end he had weighed from Dover on Blake's 
approach, but that he altered his course and bore down to engage on 
receiving the news of Captain Young's action. To claim, as Tromp 
himself did in his letter to the States,^ that he weighed, stood over 
towards Calais, received news of the search of merchant vessels 
when he was in mid-channel, and that, as he steered towards them, 
he " fell in with " the Enghsh fleet under Blake, is to outrage beHef. 
On the face of it, it is absurd to think that Tromp — the foremost 
naval commander of his age and a thorough seaman — could "fall 
ill " by accident with a fleet of the presence of which he had learnt 
the day before, and which he had seen beating up towards him 
before he weighed from Dover that morning. 

Another argument often repeated on Tromp's behalf ^ is that, 

had his intentions been hostile, he would have crushed Bourne in 

the Downs on the 18th before Blake could support his subordinate. 

This, too, is a fallacy. Bourne had " the later tide of ebb in hand," 

' ' Vie de Corneille Trump,' p. 17. ^ Basuage, 253. 



1652.]: THE ENOLISH AND DUTCH NAVIES. 149 

and a fresh north-easterly breeze was blowing. To beat into the 
Downs was not impossible, for Captains Thijssen and Allers^ 
actually did so ; but for the Dutch fleet to do so against the lee tide, 
and under fire from Bourne's heavily-armed squadron, would have 
exposed it to a certainty of heavy loss before any effective answer 
could be made. 

On the night of the 19th the Dutch lay with lights burning, 
whilst Blake was repairing damages off Hythe. On the 20th the 
enemy was standing over towards the French coast, and Blake 
went on to Dover, whence he passed into the Downs. 

Here it is necessary to insert a few words concerning the 
maritime resources of the two countries. The first point that will 
draw attention is that in the subsequent battles, with scant ex- 
ception in home waters, enormous fleets were employed. But when 
we hear that Tromp, or Monck, or another commander, took the sea 
with a fleet of one hundred or one hundred and twenty sail, we must 
bear in mind how such fleets were formed. In England, of course, 
there was, at the opening of the war, a Navy large and rapidly 
increasing. But, in May, 1652, the number of first, second and third 
rates did not rise in all above twenty ships, though there were many 
ships of less force. Owing to the system of buying into the service 
prizes and suitable merchantmen, it is extremely difficult to be sure 
what was the regular establishment at any given time. The fore- 
going number, however, is approximately accurate. But this was 
only a small part of the available force. In days when a merchant 
ship was beset with dangers from legitimate foe and illegitimate 
pirate at every turn, she was built far more stoutly than mere 
seaworthiness demanded. She carried guns, and could be pierced to 
carry more. Thus the State could form a large fleet by the 
speedy but effective process of laying an embargo on the country's 
outward-bound trade, and refusing to allow it to proceed till from 
it there had been chosen all such craft as promised to prove 
effective against the enemy. This, then, is what was done. The 
impress of ships was as regular and as indispensable as the impress 
of seamen. 

But when these ships had been impressed it is not to be sup- 
posed that they were usually to be compared with vessels of the 
first, of the second, or even of the third rate. They were, for the 
most part, of inferior size, of from three hundred to five hundred 

1 ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 16. 



150 



MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. 



[1652. 



tons' burthen ; and rarely did they mount more than about 
thirty guns. 

With the Dutch the case was exactly similar, save, perhaps, that 
our primary resources were greater. In mere number of merchant 
ships that could, on occasion, be taken into the country's pay, the 
Dutch had an advantage. But with number the advantage ended. 
Their vessels were even smaller than the English merchantmen, 
with the exception of a few East Indiamen, which seem to have 
carried about fifty guns ; and, from their tendency to sink upon 
receiving a comparatively small amount of ill-treatment, these would 
seem to have been of slighter scantling and inferior workmanship. 

Till the last few" months of the war there was in the Dutch fleet 
no vessel superior to Tromp's ship, the Brederode, of fifty-six guns, 
and about eight hundred tons. This state of things does not com- 
pare at all favourably with that existing in the English Navy. The 
Dutch admirals, after each engagement, made regular complaint to 
the States General that it was useless to send them out so long as 
there were in the English fleet twenty vessels better than their best. 
And in this they seem to have been guilty of very little overstate- 
ment, as will be seen from the subjoined table of their ships which 
were ready to join the fleet at sea in March, 1654, and which would, 
it was claimed,^ with a very few more, place the Navy on a better 
footing by half than it had ever before been on. 

Dutch Navy List, 10th March, 1654.^ 





Belonging to ok Built in 




Ships Mouxtikg 


Zeeland.i 


Rotterdam.2 Amsterdam.s 


Hoorn.'' 
Eukhuizen. 
JMedemblik. 


Total 
Number. 


From 24 to 28 guns . . . 

„ <jO „ 3b „ ... 

» 40 „ 48 „ ... 
50 guns and upwards . 


3 
16 

8 
2 


none 
7 
6 
4 


1 

26 

18 

3 


none 
20 
7 
none 


4 
69 
39 

9 



1 Of these, four, includiug two 48-gun ship-, were new. 

2 The eight greatest were new. These included oue 60-guii ship. No other in the list mounted more than 
fifty-four guns. 

3 Fourteen of the greatest were new. 

* Nine new, including all of more than forty guns. 



The Dutch Navy then, in 1652, was comparatively small, the 
more so because many ships had been sold after the Peace of 



1 rii 



Thurloe, S. P. ii. 319. 



lb. ii. pp. 78, 79. 



1052.]' TACTICS IN lQ~o2. \bl 

Mlinster ; and few of them mounted as many as forty guns. 
Merchantmen were armed, but they were in every way inferior. 
They were small ; they carried few guns — from twenty-tw^o to 
twenty-eight — and those of small calibre ; and the numbers of their 
crews were scanty. 

Naval tactics at that period were in their infancy. The line of 
battle proper was not yet invented, though, in the course of the war, 
some sort of line formation was developed ; and the distinction of 
the "ship of the line" was unthought of. So far as a commander 
had any theory as to the fighting of a fleet action, it was founded on 
the subdivision of the fleet into squadrons, each with its own flag- 
ship. Bound the flagship the ships of the squadron rallied, keeping 
clear of one another by sheer exercise of seamanship. When, as in 
time of i)anic, that failed, the confusion and disaster were appalling. 
During the whole of the First Dutch War this system held its 
ground. It was, indeed, found to answer well enough, for the 
flagship was generally the most powerful vessel in her part of the 
field, and, as such, could give help to the smaller fry that clustered 
round her. The glaring defects of the system did not appear till, 
after the great battle of June 1-4, 1666. 

The details of the rise of squadronal subdivision cannot be 
investigated here. Briefly, the system had been adopted from the 
Mediterranean as eminently satisfactory in the organisation of large 
fleets. It is first met with in the Cadiz Expedition of 1625,^ and in 
some degree in the expedition to Ehe in 1627. The Blue, at that 
time, had preceded the White. With the advent of the Common- 
wealth it fell into the third place. 

In London the news of the battle created an uproar, and had not 
a guard been placed over the house of the Dutch ambassadors in 
Chelsea, there is little doubt that they would have fallen victims to 
the fury of the mob. 

With the Parliament it had been no unlooked-for thing that a 
battle should be fought ; but that the collision should have come 
so soon, and at a time w^hen the chances of peace seemed to be 
improving, was of the nature of a surprise. In the crisis, however, 
the Government behaved with dignity. To its former demands it 
added a claim for the reparation of all damage done by hostilities,^ 
for which it held the States wholly responsible. When reparation 

1 S. P. Dom. Charles T. vii. 50. 

^ ' Vie tie Corneille Tronip,' pp. 51, 52. 



152 MILITAEY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1652. 

had been made, hostilities should cease and negotiations for an 
alliance might be reopened. But Pauw^ shirked the ultimatum, and, 
when the Council of State insisted on an answer, the ambassadors 
withdrew. 

Parliament at once proceeded to prepare still further for the 
struggle. Merchant ships were called in for the service of the State. 
It will have been noticed that on 19th May only two were serving 
with the Downs fleet. And a proclamation was issued for the im- 
pressment of all seamen between the ages of fifteen and fifty years 
in the south-eastern counties.- At the opportune moment Ayscue 
reached England from Barbados, dropping anchor in Plymouth 
Sound on May 26th. He did not return empty-handed. With 
him were thirty-six prizes,^ taken in virtue of the Navigation Act, 
chiefly from the Dutch. 

Blake now received instructions to attack the Dutch East India 
fleet and to disturb the enemy's herring fishery and Eastland trade.* 
His fleet was largely increased, and a careful survey was made of it 
as it lay in the Downs. While this was taking place, the Channel 
and North Sea cruisers were busy. Blake himself seems to have 
found time to intercept a Dutch convoy ; but the only incident of 
much note was an engagement in June between the Tiger, Captain 
James Peacock, and another "frigate," with two Dutch men-of-war 
on the coast of Holland. Of the two Hollanders, one was carried by 
boarding, but afterwards sank, and the other was run ashore.^ 

Seeing that Blake's absence to the northw^ard w^ould leave the 
mouth of the river wholly unprotected, it was decided that Ayscue 
should be called from Plymouth to take up his station in the Downs. ^ 
But Ayscue, while still in the west, received news of the approach 
of the Dutch outward-bound Portuguese trade, consisting of about 
forty merchantmen, convoyed by a few men-of-war. His own 
squadron seems at that time to have consisted of eleven ships, the 
Marmaduke, which joined him at Plymouth from Eupert's flotilla, 
being not yet added to the Navy. Ayscue himself was in the 
BainhoiD,'' and with him were the Amity, Captain Pack, second in 
command, the Happy Entrance, and the Tiger.^ The rest of his 

^ Adriaan Pauw, Heer van Heemsted, Pensionary of Holland and Ambassador 
Extraordinary to the Parliament. 

2 Cal. S. P. Dom. 24vli May, 1652. ^ Wlutelocke, 509. 

* Clarendon S. P. Cal. ii. 743; C. o. S. to Blake, 10th Jane, 1G52. 

« ' Col. Eostr.' 98 ; Wlutelocke, 510. « C. o. S. Minutes, 15th June, 1652. 

^ Cal. S. P. Dom. 1650, p. 455. « lb. 417, 500. 



1652.] WEAKNESS OF AYSCUWS FOBCE. 153 

siiips were eittiex prizes tongiit into tbe service, or Mred merctiamt- 
men/ go thiat tbe total strength of the squadron was mot great. 

Citasing io the westward, Ajserae came up with the Dhateh off 
the TAz&Tci on Jmnie 12th, and, after a sharp fight, to'-'''^: }\ -^.If-a-dozen 
of them,^ and sent them into port. 

Immediately afterwards he went to the Dowtqis and dropp :^..^ 

near Blake on the 20th, War was in the air, and forthex . : tiefa 

were expected at any moment, so that the mere n^^'-<^ of :.-.■. ...:er- 

change of salmtes was enough to send ahroad the .o^w.t of a further 
engagement.^ Bmch vessels as had been miade ready for sea since 
the battle off Dover had been sent to the fleet, the resnT^" l^'^ing that 
Blake had thirty-nine men-of-war, two fireships, two o^. -"^ ^.nd 
eighteen merchantmen,* while Ayscue^s squadron was s~ . : 

condition in which it had returned from Barbados. The :.. . ....:-. 

remained quite distinct, for Ayscue, though subordinate to Bla •-:- 
continued to exercise the duties of an independent cornrris-nd. 

When Blake sailed north on June 27th it was ai ,. ---^^n hov/ 
dangerously weak Ayscue was. Efforts were made to ^ ...^ -hips to 
him,^ but three only — the Vanguard, Succem, and Fef^^-n » "^ — were 
able to join him before the news of the presence of Tr ,..,^. .„;. ie it 
impossible for others to venture to quit the river. 

On the breaking off of n^otiations, Pauw, retnr^ing to H^...-...i 
and fully posted in the positions and strength ..: t?:^ English 
squadrons, feU in with Tromp r\^-'->.r Schouwen on Juij ...j..' He 
gave Mm all the information j -» and pointed out the wef*l<:n^-« 

of Ayscue, urging that he shou. .. ..o attacked in the Downs ... ..i 
Blake's return, Tromp, not sorry to see an opportunity of atoning 
for his defeat, fell in with the scheme the more readily as the wind 
which promised it success made it a matter of great difficulty for 
Mm to follow Blake. Ayscue's sMps were only sixteen, possibly 
only fourteen, in number, whereas there were with the enemy 
ninety-two,* Of these latter, six were firesMps, two were galliots, 
and ten were small " frigates " mounting eight or ten guns. Of the 
rest, twenty were "good and firm sMps" of from tMrty to forty 
guns, and the rest "of the middle size," meaning, in all likelihood, 

1 CaL 8, P. Dom. 1651, p, 261. ^ ' Col. Bostr.' 98. 

3 WMtelocke, 512. * Hiat. 3ISS. Com. Eep. 13, App. 2, p. 69. 

® C. o. S, ilinutes, July 4tb, 1652, « Ih. June 28th, 1852, 
^ * Vie de Coraieille Tromp,' 60. 

" Whitelocke, 514. The list is possibly mot accurate, \mt at least it is typic4 «f a 
Ihitcli fleet of the time. 



154. MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1652. 

hired merchantinen. A partial attack was made, the Dutch being 
to the north of Ayscue and having the wind fair to come into the 
Downs. The attempt failed, however, partly because the English 
had drawn close in shore and were protected by gun platforms run 
out towards the sea from Deal Castle,^ but chiefly because of a 
fortunate shift in the wind. 

Tromp, Evertsen, and Floriszoon, in command of the Dutch 
fleet, had now nothing left to do but to seek Blake. But in this 
too they were unfortunate. At the very time when they were 
threatening Ayscue in the Downs, Blake was making short work of 
the herring fleet. Of the thirteen small " frigates " that served it 
for a guard he took or sank twelve, while of the busses themselves 
about a hundred were taken, the rest being scattered.^ The busses, 
with 1500 men on board, were set free : the other prizes returned to 
England with Blake. No explanation has been offered for Blake's 
action, but it would seem likely that, as his intention w^as to keep 
the sea for some time, this leniency was due to his reluctance to 
weaken the fleet. That so many prisoners had been set free was 
not acceptable news in England. 

But in spite of the simultaneous presence of the two fleets on the 
fishing grounds, no action resulted. On 26th July, when the fleets 
were in sight of one another,^ a heavy gale sprang up from the 
north-west and blew all that night. Blake, who was inshore, 
managed to find shelter with but little damage, but Tromp's fleet 
felt the full force of the storm. It was scattered over the North 
Sea, and when morning dawned Tromp could collect no more than 
thirty-nine ships, with which, and with two or three East Indiamen 
which he had met, he returned home. Of the ships that parted 
company most were disabled, many were lost. This was the 
crow^ning misfortune of Tromp's commission. He had failed to 
protect trade ; he had brought about an open rupture, for which 
it suited his country to hold him to blame ; his attempt on Ayscue 
in the Downs had been unsuccessful, and he brought home but a 
bare half of his fleet. 

A town mob is never reasonable, and in Tromp and Pauw the 
mob at the Hague saw the men who were responsible both for the 
war and for its ill success. The States General too turned upon 
Tromp, who was suffered to lay down his command.* 

' Cal. S. P. Dom. 11th July sfjq. ; ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 61. 

^ ' Columna Kostrata,' 99. ^ Basnage, 258. * lb. 



1652.] DE RUIJTER'S APPOINTMENT. ]55 

England had fared proi^ortionately well and the war was popular. 
The English cruisers brought in a great number of prizes ; indeed, it 
is said that in the course of the war no less than 1700 were taken. 
But, save in fleet actions, the capture of men-of-war was of rare 
occurrence. A "frigate" of twenty-six guns, the Botterdam, was 
taken in the Channel at this time and was sent into Falmouth. 
There was urgent need of ships, and, renamed the Falmouth, she 
was at once added to the Navy.^ It is probable that this ship was 
one of a small Dutch squadron stationed near the Soundings to 
warn homeward-bound merchantmen of the war, and to send them 
to Holland north about. 

That the Council of State was jealous of English prestige is 
shown by a decree that letters of marque should be granted to no 
ship of less than twenty guns and two hundred tons ; but this it was 
found necessary to withdraw.^ With Blake's return, Ayscue was 
appointed to conmiand "the guard for the Channel and those seas."^ 
Captain William Haddock, in the Vanguard, was his vice-admiral, 
and Pack his rear-admiral. His fleet had been increased to nearly 
forty sail, but even that did not seem strong enough, and on 
August 15th Blake was advised* to support the Western Guard. 

Meanwhile De E.uijter^ had been appointed in Holland to super- 
sede Tromp. Tromp's politics were not likely to bind his arm, 
but he was known to be an Orangeman, and that fact, while the 
Loewenstoin faction was in power, made his retirement desirable. 
De Euijter himself was a man of moderate politics, though an 
adherent of the party in power ; but he had seen too much service 
to be ignorant of the bitterness of the party spirit afloat. Thus, 
when the command was offered to him, it was with great difficulty 
that he could be induced to accept it, and he did so at length 

1 Cal. S. P. Dom. 19th July, 1652. 

^ lb. 1652, July 10th and August 23rd. Possibly as a result of this edict, we^find 
the Levant Comjjauy petitioniug on August 2nd for state protection, and professing 
inability to fit out privateers. 

3 lb. pp. 335, 339 sqq. 

* lb. August 15tb. It so happened that on that day there was not a quorum of 
members present. The result Avas that the Council could not command Blake, but 
could only advise him to go. 

® Michiel Adrieuszoon De Piuijter, the greatest naval leader of his century. Born, 
1607, at Flushing. Served at sea in all ranks from seaman to Liutenant-Admiraal- 
Generaal. Commanded in 164:1 against Spain. Served in all three of the wars with 
England. Died, April 29th, 1676, in consequence of a wound received in action with 
the French off Messina. As great in private as in public life. Biography by Klopp 
(1852). 



156 MILITARY HISTOBY, 1649-1660. [1652. 

protesting against the insufficiency of the fleet/ He left port with 
no more than seventeen ships in all, his own ship, the Neptune, 
mounting only twenty-six guns. This made reinforcements im- 
perative, for he would attempt nothing before his number had 
reached twenty-nine, including six fireships. He had instructions 
to wait for and convoy some fifty merchantmen, and, expecting 
them, he reached Calais about August 3rd, only to receive news of 
Ayscue's presence, and, with it, a grossly exaggerated statement of 
his force. How many and what ships Ayscue had with him cannot 
be determined ; but this much is certain, that he had not, as 
De Euijter had been led to suppose, twelve of the first rate and 
eight of the second, for of the two rates together there were then 
but six representatives in our Navy. 

De Ruijter was joined on August 11th by eight men-of-war 
bringing to him the merchantmen from the Texel : and it is well to 
point out in this place that of these merchantmen, of which many 
were East Indiamen, there were few that were not heavily armed. 
Thus reinforced he proceeded down Channel, and five days later met 
Ayscue off Plymouth. 

In point of strength the fleets seem to have been well matched. 
It is impossible to speak exactly as to the numbers, inasmuch as no 
two accounts agree ; but approximately Ayscue had thirty-eight 
ships and eight small craft, ^ while De Euijter, it is known, had 
thirty men-of-war besides small craft. The difficulty is to decide 
how many of the Dutch merchantmen took part in the engage- 
ment. A moderate estimate makes this number about twenty, and 
in Dutch writers evidence abounds that divers of these acquitted 
themselves extremely well.^ 

Of the action, as an engagement between fleets, nothing can be 
said. The chronicles are full of isolated heroic actions of single 
captains, but the only detail of any value that is preserved is that 
the wind was at north-east ; * and even this is discounted by our 
ignorance of the course which Ayscue was steering and of how he 
bore when sighted by the Dutch. All that can be said with 
certainty is that the fight began at about one o'clock and continued 
tiU dusk ; that the contest was stubborn ; that no formation was 
attempted on either side, and that both countries claimed a victory. 
As between fleets of men-of-war the advantage lay with neither ; 

1  Vie de De Ruijter,' 17, 18, =* ' Vie de De Euijter,' 20 ; Basuage, 259. 

2 'Col. Host r.,' 100. " Ih. 18. 



1652.] AYSCUE'S ACTION WITH BE EUJJTER. 157 

but inasmuch as De Euijter was able to continue his course 
without the loss of his convoy, while the English were too much 
shattered to pursue, it must be allowed that the great Dutchman 
had effected his purpose. 

De Euijter did not accompany his convoy beyond the Soundings, 
but returned eastward from the neighbourhood of Scilly on Septem- 
ber 12th. ^ Blake meanwhile had been sent westward to support 
Ayscue and to secure the Channel during the time when the Western 
Guard lay in Plymouth Sound refitting. In the late engagement 
both fleets had suffered heavily, though neither had lost a ship. 
The Dutch vessels, it was claimed, had been for the most part badly 
damaged in the hulls, while Ayscue's ships had lost spars and 
rigging. Both seem to have lost many men. On the English side 
the most serious loss was that of Pack, the rear-admiral, who had a 
leg carried away by a round shot and soon afterwards died. His 
successor in the post was Joseph Jordan.^ 

This battle was almost the last piece of active service that 
Ayscue saw under the Commonwealth. He continued afloat for a 
month or two during the reorganisation of the fleet, but we find him 
constantly summoned to attend meetings in October of the com- 
mittee for trade and foreign affairs,^ and after that time he was 
relieved of his command. The reason for this is shrouded in 
obscurity, but it has been generally supposed that the Council of 
State took the step owing to his success having fallen short of their 
expectations. It is not impossible that such was the case, but 
Ayscue was, even during his retirement, held by the bulk of his 
countrymen to be a most capable commander. He had, moreover, 
" extraordinary power w^ith the seamen," and seems to have been 
popularly spoken of as likely to succeed Blake in the chief command 
when the General was subsequently lying ill and wounded ashore.* 

1 'Viede De lluijter,' 20. 

^ Cal. S. P. Dom, 23rd August, 1652. Joseph Jordan. Born, 1603. Captain of 
the Cfesar, 16-12. Rear- Admiral of the Irish squadron, 1643-14. Eear- Admiral with 
Penn in the Mediterranean, 1651-52. Vice-Admiral (B.) in the first Dutch war. 
Rear-Admiral in Blake's expedition against the Barbary States, 1654. Served, chiefly 
as a flag-oi!icer, throughout the second Dutch war. After Lawson's disablement Vice- 
Admiral (E.), 1665. Commanded an attack on the Dutch in the Thames, 1667. 
Vice-Admiral (B.) at Solebay, 1672. Died, 1685. Buried at Hatfield. 

3 Cal. S. P. Dom. 1G52, pp. 441, 458, 462. 

* Clarendon S. P. Cal. ii. 1307, July 29th, 1653. This letter adds, " Cromwell 
cannot trust Ayscue," as being the chief reason why Ayscue did not command at sea 
that summer. This might be passed over as the vapouring of an enthusiastic Eoyalist, 
were it not that other information seems to confirm it. 



158 MILITARY mSTOBY, 1649-1660. [1652. 

When Blake readied the west in the Besolutlon, he joined to 
himself such of Ayscne's squadron as were ready for sea. On 
September 14th, taking with him the main part of the fleet, he 
parted company, leaving Penn on the Devon coast with about fifteen 
sail. Next day, with the wind at W. by N., Penn's scouts sighted 
two Dutch flyboats ; ^ and immediately afterwards the whole Dutch 
fleet, numbering from thirty-five to forty sail, was seen to windward. 
Blake, it was supposed, and as was afterwards proved to be the case, 
was in Torbay, yet Penn was ready to fight as soon as he could 
reach the enemy. But the Dutch, having the weather gauge, 
availed themselves of it to shun an engagement, their reason 
(besides the knowledge that the main body of the English fleet 
was not far off) being that they had suffered considerably in the 
fight with Ayscue, and had but recently been still further damaged 
by a severe westerly gale which had caught them near Scilly.^ 

All that day the Dutch kept the wind, and Penn held his 
squadron well together, confidently expecting an attack. It was a 
thick dirty night that followed, with the wind blowing hard from 
the west, and about midnight some firing was seen on the weather 
quarter of the James. Penn at once tried to come up, thinking the 
Dutch had fallen upon his stragglers, but he lost sight of the ships 
engaged, and till morning did not know what had happened. At 
eight A.M. he was joined by seven ships from Blake in Torbay, and 
at about the same time Captain Sanders, of the Assurance, came 
aboard and told him the meaning of the guns which had been fired 
in the night. At about midnight, he said, he saw to the north of 
him a great ship bearing away to the eastward. As she would not 
stay, he made a running fight of it with her till his course brought 
him down on the whole Dutch fleet, when he hauled his wind. 
The Dutch fleet had passed in the night and was steering east.^ 
For a while Penn could not believe that " they would have been so 
poor and low-spirited ; " but, when conviction came, there was 
nothing left to do but to join Blake and follow them. 

Anxiety in the west, whether for the safety of the Isle of Wight,* 

1 G. Penn, i. 440 sqq. '^ ' Vie de De Euijter,' 21. 

^ Dutch writers, as in 'Vie de De Euijter,' 21, have claimed that, so far from 
seeking to slip past, De Euijter was actually in pursuit of the English squadron. A 
Dutch captain who had been made prisoner on September 28tli had been jiresent on 
that occasion, and gave Penn an account of it which agrees with that in the text. 
Penn, i. 439. 

* Thurloe, S. P. i. 214 ; C. o.. S. to Governor of the Island. 



1652.] BLAKE'S ACTION WITH VENDOME. 159 

or for the welfare of British commerce, was for the time being at 
an end. 

Blake meanwhile had not been idle. Besides fighting the Dutch, 
it fell to his lot to ensure the freedom of the Channel from the 
depredations of French privateers ; and on September 5th he was 
offered a chance of striking heavily against French resources.^ The 
Spaniards had lost Dunquerqne six years earlier, and were now 
making strenuous efforts to regain it. If no relief came, it was 
believed that the French could not hold out ; but Vendome appeared 
with a strong squadron of men-of-war convoying troops and muni- 
tions for the town. It made little difference to England who held 
-Dunquerque, but, considering the state of affairs in the Mediter- 
ranean, it was essential to stand well with Spain, the more so as 
such an end could be gained at the expense of France. At the right 
moment, then, Blake, with his vastly superior force, swept down on 
Vendome's relieving squadron, and in a running fight so handled it 
that a few days later the town fell. Of the men-of-war engaged 
Blake took seven, besides two small craft. What became of the 
transports is not stated, but the intention was to keep them out of 
Dunquerque, and that end was most certainly gained. 

This affair made a good deal of noise at the time, the King of 
Spain expressing to Parliament his gratitude for an attack which 
had laid Dunquerque at his mercy, and Louis XIV., on the other 
hand, adding to his former complaints against the letters of reprisal, 
which were then in force, a very definite statement of his grievance.^ 
It was, urged his ambassador, an unheard-of thing that a nation 
should extend letters of marque so as to cover the property of an 
allied prince. Such an action was tantamount to a declaration of 
war. When he went on to say that England might at least show 
gratitude to France, which had not interfered in the Civil War 
though in a position to do so, it is impossible to believe that his 
words carried conviction to any man who knew that the policy of 
the English Navy had been " to keep foreigners from fooling us." 

During the summer of 1652 there were many minor actions in 
which the balance inclined distinctly in England's favour. In August 
Blake and Penn both made valuable captures of laden merchantmen 
from the West Indies and the Straits,^ but against this the Dutch 

^ Cal. S. P. Dom. 1652-1653, p. 504; Whitelocke, 518 ; ' Columna Eostrata,' 105 ; 
Basnage, 264. 

2 Hist. MSS. Com. Eep. 13, App. 1, pp. 661, 663, 666. ^ . Coi_ Rostr.,' 105. 



160 MILITARY HISTOBF, 1649-1660. [1652. 

could claim the capture of two small men-of-war, the Fortune and 
the Hart. Of these two the former seemed to the Council to have 
been too easily surrendered, and an order was therefore made ^ that 
the wages of her crew should not he paid until it was found out who 
had cried for quarter, and till the offender was punished. The Hart, 
on the other hand, had been gallantly fought, and had yielded at 
length only to the greatly superior force which three Dutch ships 
brought against her.^ The Hart was a marked ship. There had 
been a heavy blot against her name on the Navy List, in the shape 
of the record of her mutiny ; and doubtless her stubborn defence was 
an effort to w^ipe this out. Francis Darcy, the Royalist, who had 
been captured in the previous year, had headed the rising,^ and, with 
a few men, had surprised such of the crew as were averse to his pro- 
ject of carrying her over to the Duke of York at Dunquerque. The 
resistance had been overcome, and sail had been made on the ship, 
but, before they were many leagues on their journey, the seamen 
had thought better of the bargain and had insisted on returning to 
Harwich. The ringleaders had been " made an example of," and 
the wages of the other guilty persons had found their way into the 
Chest at Chatham. 

Everywhere the course of the war was favourable to England, 
save only in the Mediterranean, where her interests were being 
distinctly neglected. When Penn returned with his squadron, the 
total force left on that station was represented by the few ships 
with Appleton and Badiley. The ships being so few in number, in 
view of the local strength of the Dutch, could in no case have taken 
the initiative ; but, being divided into two commands, they were 
doubly feeble. 

As early as June, before the rupture, and therefore long before the 
news of the breach had reached the Mediterranean, Longland wrote 
from Leghorn * showing his anxiety. The Dutch were supporting 
the French, and they were in such force that nothing could be 
undertaken against them. They had, in point of fact, a squadron 
of eighteen men-of-war lying before Toulon, while the total English 
force consisted of eight ships, the Leopard, Constant Wariuick, 
Phcenix, Paragon, Elizabeth, Adventure, and two armed mer- 
chantmen. Individually, however, as the result proved, the English 

1 Cal. S. P. Dom. 1652 ; C. o. S. to Navy Commissioners, 23rd August. 

2 lb. and AVhitelocke, 516. ^ lb. 1650, March 2nd, 4tli, 9tL, etc. 
* Cal. S. P. Doui. 1G52, p. 293. 



1652.] BADILEY'S ACTION OFF ELBA. 161 

vessels were superior to the Dutch, many of which were merchant- 
men, unsatisfactorily armed, and undermanned. 

On July 8th the war was formally proclaimed in Holland, and a few 
days later, before the EngHsh in the Mediterranean had news of the 
breach, Joris Catz, in command of the Dutch squadron off Toulon, 
moved with fourteen ships to Leghorn, where Appleton was lying, 
and closed the port.^ He injured his chance, however, by trying to 
prevent the unloading of the merchantmen which Appleton had 
convoyed thither, for this action ensured the opposition of the Grand 
Duke, who, by a complaint to the States General, brought about 
Catz's dismissal.^ Van Galen, who went out overland, at once set 
to work in earnest. Appleton, save for the despatch of the Constant 
Warwick to apprise Badiley of the turn of events and to reinforce 
him somewhat, was content to accept the blockade passively. Van 
Galen left only four ships to watch him, while with the rest he 
cruised to intercept Badiley. Had it been possible for the Council 
of State to respond immediately to Longland's appeal of July 12th 
and to send the twelve " frigates " which had been asked for, there 
is little doubt that the situation would have been saved. The 
Grand Duke of Tuscany, indeed, was friendly, and made a direct 
offer of help, but it was not to be supposed that he could do more 
than guarantee the safety of his ports against attack.^ 

Badiley, on being joined by the Constant Warwick at Cephalonia, 
made the best of his way towards Leghorn. He hoped that, by 
touching at no port on the way, he might arrive before the Dutch 
expected him, and that he might thus avoid the blockading ships 
and join with Appleton. This was not the case. When he passed 
Monte Cristo, on August 27th, he found the Dutch squadron, ten 
strong,'* lying between that island and Elba. 

Badiley had with him, besides his own ship the Paragon, 42, 
the Constant Warivick, 30, Captain Owen Cox, the Elizabeth, 38, 
and the Phoenix, 38, with which he was convoying four Levant 
merchantmen. On the 27th the wind was light, and the squadrons 
could not come to close action.^ The merchantmen made no 

1 Basnage, 263 ; Cal. S. P. Dom. 1652, p. 330. ^ ' yie de Corneille Tromp,' 73. 

3 Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. 13, App. 1, p. 656. 

^ Cal. S. P. Dom. 13tli September, 1G52 ; Basnage, 263. Whether this squadron 
nmnbered ten or eleven ships is a small point, but the weight of evidence is in favour 
of ten. There is no proof that Van Galen was reinforced before the fight, and it is 
kno-\vn that of an original force of fourteen ships he left four to watch Leghorn. 

s S. P. Dom. Int. vol. xxiv. 120, 125, 125 (i.) ; which are Badilcy's and Appleton's 
official reports. 

VOL. II. M 



1G2 MILITABY HISTORY, 1G49-1GC.0. [1652. 

attempt to offer help, considering that their own safety was the 
XDoint under discussion ; and they made the best of their way into 
Porto Longone, Badiley hoped for some help from Appleton, but 
Appleton declared that he was too ill to leave port — an excuse which 
Badiley refused to accept, alleging that, even if such were the case, 
he might at least have sent his vessels. The four ships were thus 
'•jft to fight it out by themselves ; and, as all accounts agree, the}' 
made a right gallant defence. 

The calm gave the English some little help, by keeping three of 
the enemy out of action ; and, although the odds were still two to 
one, Badiley did not despair. He decided that, as his ship was the 
heaviest, it w^ould be best that she should meet the brunt of the 
attack, and accordingly he bade his consorts take up their stations 
under his stern. This, he says, the Constant Warwiclx, and 
apparently the Elizabeth, did with satisfactory results, but the 
Phoenix remained too far off to allow of any support being given to 
her by the others. The manoeuvre may be looked upon as one of 
the earliest attempts at the formation of a line ; but as the ships were 
so few in number, it is at least likely that Badiley merely intended 
to collect his squadron into a compact group for mutual support, 
with a reservation to himself of the post of honour in the van. 

The Paragon drew the fire of the three Dutch flagships,^ which 
engaged her within pistol-shot; and she continued throughout in the 
heat of the fight, being always well supported by the Constant 
WarwicJi, whose captain, Owen Cox, was, by his record, a man of 
more than ordinary valour. Little mention is made of the Elizabeth, 
but she seems to have been somewhat to leeward of, and screened by, 
the two first-named ships. That she was closely engaged may be 
taken for granted, in view of the balance of force in favour of the 
enemj^, but though she did not come off by any means free, her loss 
was shght compared with that sustained by the Paragon. 

The Phoenix, wrote Badiley, was taken in a strange and sudden 
manner, and M^ould not have been thus lost had she fallen astern of 
the Paragon as ordered. A heavy ship of the enemy's ran her 
aboard, and, owing to her want of a forecastle, captured her. 
Badiley, however, declared that he had four ships close aboard him 
at the time, so that it may reasonably be doubted w^hether he was 

^ Auy Dutch squadron, however small, bore in separate ships flags as of admiral, 
vice-admiral and rear-admiral. Such was the case even in Young's action of 
May 12th, although there were but the three Dutch ships present. 



1052.] 



BABILETS ACTION OFF ELBA. 



163 



in a position to say what happened. The accepted account of the 
ioss^ has nothing unhkely in it. It shows that a Dutch ship 
which was closely engaged with Badiley, lost her mainmast, and 
hauled out of the fight. The Phoenix, seeing this, ran alongside of 
her, and boarded, but, while she was thus left empty and defenceless, 
a second Dutch ship in turn boarded the Phoenix, and took her 
without resistance. The boarding-party from the Phoenix had no 
means of retreat, and, being overpowered, was killed or taken. 

With evening the fight came to an end ; and the remaining 
EngHsh ships, torn and shattered, and with all, or nearly all, their 



'\\Conafant Warmck 




TlIK ACTIUX OFF KLBA, AUGUST HHtH, 1052. 

Note.— No aeeotmts of the fight contain details that make the preparation of an exact plan 
possible ; hut the conjectviral plan given above will explain how the Phoenix was taken, and how 
the Elizabeth escaped the brunt of the attack. 

ammunition expended, w^ere towed into Porto Longone.^ The 
Paragons loss was twenty-six men killed, including her principal 
officers, and fifty-seven wounded. She had received fifty great shot 
in her hull, many between wind and water; and hardly a spar was 
sound. ^ The other ships had suffered only less heavily. The Dutch 
loss was represented by three captains killed,'* besides very many of 
their men. Two ships also had lost their mainmasts, and the whole 
squadron was hardly in a position to keep the sea. 

The enemy managed, however, to follow Badiley to Porto 
Longone, where they would have made an attack on him at once 



1 ' Columna Eostrata,' 103 ; AVhitelocke, 520. 
^ ' Yie de Corneille Tromp,' 76. 



■'' Badiley to Navy Committee. 
* ' Yie de Corneille Tromp,' 77, 

M 2 



161 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1652. 

had they not met with opposition from the governor/ The next 
expedient tried was to attempt to bribe the governor, but he not 
only proved incorruptible, but also allowed the English to land guns 
and make batteries on shore for their protection,^ whereupon the 
Dutch withdrew. 

This left Badiley free to quit the port : and he availed himself of 
the opportunity to go over and concert matters with Appleton at 
Leghorn. There he found that Appleton and Longland had been 
doing their best to persuade merchant ships to volunteer for the 
service, but with singularly little success.^ Everywhere they met 
with the answer, that the merchant captains had no orders froin 
their owners, and could not act without them — all of which was 
doubtless true to a certain extent, as was the further objection that, 
even if taken up, the ships, owing to the small numbers of their 
crews, would not be efficient for war. And Appleton was not the 
sort of commander to attract men to the service, especially when the 
prospect was one of hard blows and deferred pay. lie was a man 
absolutely without tact, and unpopular alike with officers and men. 
Badiley found him engaged in a quarrel with one of his captains, but 
contrived to smooth over the difficulty to such good effect that some 
progress at last began to be made. 

Two merchant ships were taken up and equipped in Leghorn ; 
and then a much-cherished project was carried into execution. This 
was no other than the recapture of the Phoenix— a,n affair which 
was much spoken of, both at the time and afterwards, and which 
was destined to have important results. 

The Dutch had at once careened and refitted their prize; and she 
now lay in the outer road at Leghorn ready for sea, and under the 
command of Cornehs, son of Marten Tromp. To the English in the 
port, she, with the Enghsh ensign traihng in the water astern, was a 
continual eyesore ; and it is hardly to be w^ondered at that an effort 
should have been made for her recovery. To surprise her did not 
promise to be difficult, and Badiley, Longland and Appleton had 
the less hesitation about doing so, in violation of a neutral port, 
seeing that the Government at home was aware of the scheme.* 
After all, they argued, the affair could be carried through without 

' ' Tie de Corneille Tromp,' 76. 

^ Longland to Navy Committee, October 11th. 

3 S. P. Dom. Int. xxv. 44, 46, 56, 60. 

* Blackborne to Longland, October 22ud. 



1652.] EECAPTUBE OF THE " PIKENIXr 165 

the use of firearms, and, so long as there was no noise, there would 
be no insult to the Grand Duke. Such was a theory which had 
been laid down by the elder Tromp, and which it was now con- 
venient for the English to adopt. 

Accordingly they chose their occasion — the night of the '20th of 
November — which was, in the calendar style, St. Andrew's Day. 
By good luck the night was extremely dark, so that there was 
little fear of the attackers being seen by the other Dutch ships. In 
command of the expedition went Captain Owen Cox.^ He took with 
him eighty men in three boats, fourteen with himself, the rest with 
lieutenants Young and Lynn ; and all were armed with hatchets and 
cutlasses, besides which they carried bags of flour for the purpose of 
blinding the Dutch. Twice the boats were separated in the dark, 
but at the third attempt they reached the Phoenix, and boarded. It 
was then almost daybreak, and, as the Dutch had been keeping high 
festival the night before in honour of the saint, the watch was not 
too well kept. 

There was practically no resistance. Tromp himself, who was 
entertaining a brother officer in his cabin, saw that there w^as 
nothing to be done, and firing a pistol at the boarders as they broke 
in, rushed to the cabin window and jumped out. It is possible that 
he dropped into the longboat, which would be towing astern : in any 
case he was picked up. The English at once made sail, and the 
ship, thanks to her recent careening, was soon beyond pursuit." She 
rejoined her squadron at Elba, and was there blockaded by the 
enemy. 

The Dutch were more formidable than ever in those waters, for 
they had withdrawn from the neighbourhood of Messina a squadron 
which had been stationed there to intercept Badiley, and had joined 
it to the ships already cruising between Leghorn and Elba, thus 
bringing the total numbers of the blockading force up to twenty- 
seven sail. 

The recapture, in spite of the precautions taken, gave serious 
offence to the Grand Duke, who refused to be convinced by the 
English arguments that there had been no violation of his port. 
Neither had Appleton improved matters by violence which his men 
had offered to a sentry on the Mole.^ The affair was looked upon 

1 S. P. Dom. lut. XXV. Go ; Appleton to Navy Committee, 22nd Xovember 
' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 82. 

^ lb. ^ Grand Duke of Tuscany to Badiley, 25th XoveniLer. 



166 MILITARY IIISTOEY, 1649-lGOO. [1652. 

as a most serious insult, and for that reason it became necessary to 
remove Appleton from his command, leaving him, however, his 
captaincy of the Leopard} Badiley was appointed Commodore of 
the two squadrons. 

It is now necessary to revert to affairs in the Narrow Seas, as 
well to avoid anticipating events as to explain the further action 
taken by the Grand Duke. 

De With,- meanwhile, had put to sea wdth the main fleet of the 
Dutch. He was intensely unpopular with the men, but his ability 
and courage were undoubted, and his politics were those of the party 
then in power.^ His orders were to take De Euijter under his 
command, for which reason he proceeded at once to the Narrows, 
knowing that the western fleet would be due there in a few days. 

On September 11th he showed himself at the South Sand Head, 
this being the first intimation the Council had of his being at sea. 
The Council at once wrote to warn Blake and Ayscue** of his 
presence, but it has been already seen that the English Western 
Guard had failed to intercept De Euijter. The junction took place 
in due course off Calais on September 22nd, the number of ships 
brought out by De With being forty-four. The first duty that was 
incumbent on the Dutch admirals was to hold a survey of their 
fleet,^ which was in many ways ineffective ; and when this had been 
done it was discovered that ten men-of-war and five fireships were 
quite unfit for service. After these had been sent home, with 
instructions to the captains to refit with the utmost speed and to 
come out again, the total of the united fleet was sixty-four sail,^ 

1 Hist. MSS. Com. Eep. lo, App. 1, 662 ; ditto to Parliament, Appleton was arrested, 
and by order of the Grand Duke was confined for a few days until set at liberty 
owing to Badiley's representation that he would be punished by his own comitry. 

- Witte Corneliszoon de With, after servino; the Dutch West India Company, 
fought under Piet Hein and Tromp. He fell in action in 1658. 

^ I.e. Strongly republican. 

* C. 0. S. Minutes, September 12th. The exact date of Ayscue's retirement is 
unknown, but it is usually placed directly after the battle off Plymouth, which, as this 
order shows, was not the case. f\u-ther, there is no proof of the supposition that his 
retirement was due to ill-success. This is indeed contradicted by the fact of his having 
received a pension. It is far more natural to suppose that the committee for foreign 
affairs had presented an adverse re]iort on the Poyalist tendency exhibited by him at 
Barbados. G. Penn, i. 457 ; Cal. S. P. Dom. 1652, pp. 441, 458, 462. See also p. 157. 

'^ lb. The Enghsh report of it was fifty-nine sail, and a few small craft. Blake's fleet 
was slightly superior in numbers, but very greatly so in the force of individual ships. 
There were no vessels in the Dutch fleet to compare with the Sovereign or liesohifion, 
and but few that were a match for the Fuir/cu; James, Ainlrew, and other secoud- 
rates present. 



1652.] 



BLAKE AND DE WITH. 



167 



with which, inferior though he knew them to be, De "With felt that 
he was bound to seek out the enemy and give battle at once. He 
had come out to better the work done by Tromp, and it was clearly 
his duty as well as his inclination to endeavour, by success in a 
general engagement, to clear the sea of the many cruisers that 
pressed so heavily on Dutch commerce. 

The English fleet that had collected from the westward, with the 
exception of some of Ayscue's ships which were refitting, joined 
the force in the Downs, and weighed to seek the Dutch early on the 
morning of September 28th, 1652.^ The force passed the North 






\:-0 

■' ({/ 9 

i / 













•.T<i«.'. , ; Q 






9 



9 « 



'*><>. 



-^e 




TWO PHASES OF THE BATTLE OF THE KENTISH KNOCK, SEPTEMBER 28tH, 1652. 
English, white. Dutcli, black. 

Eoreland with a fresh westerly breeze ; and at about noon the Dutch 
hove in sight. The wind shifted to the south-west and fell light, 
and the greater part of Blake's fleet was left some distance astern, 
" by reason of their late weighing from the Downs." Blake, in 
the Besoliition, and Penn, the vice-admiral, were well up with the 
enemy, who were standing west close-hauled on the port tack ; but 
as some little time would elapse before Bourne, the rear-admiral, 
could come up with the rest of the fleet, Blake refrained from 
attacking. 

The enemy, meanwhile, was hove-to close under the lee of the 
^ Penn to Bishop. Blake to C. o. S. in G. Penn, i. 446-453. 



168 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1652. 

Kentish Knock, which Hes at the north-east end of the Long Sand, 
about fifteen miles north-east from the North Foreland. The 
English came upon them somewhat as a surprise, and De With, 
having no time to hold a council of war, had to rest content with 
sending advice vessels round the fleet. Nevertheless, his position 
was one of strength, the ships being drawn up so close to the shoal 
that there was little chance of the English weathering them without 
grounding. Just before the action De AVith was seen to leave his 
own ship, a forty, and go on board the largest of the East India- 
men, which mounted fifty-six guns. The Bredcrodc, Tromp's old 
ship, was in the fleet, but her crew refused to receive the new 
admiral on board, ^ and showed a spirit which boded ill for any 
chance of Dutch success. The Dutch fleet was organised in four 
squadrons : De Euijter had the van, W. C. de With the centre, 
G. de Wildt the rear ; and J. Evertsen,'-^ with the fourth, formed'a 
reserve.'^ De With held the chief command, but De Euijter also 
wore his flag at the main, in virtue of the independent command 
which he had exercised before the junction.* 

As the vessels from astern drew up, Blake and Penn with the 
leading ships ran down to attack the Dutch van; "but," wrote 
Penn, " it pleased God to disappoint us, being aground upon a sand 
supposed the Kentish Knock. It was reasonable smooth, and for 
my part, I did not feel her strike. . . . The Sovereign was near 
musket-shot without us, and struck several times." Others of the 
heaviest ships also grounded, while yet others held on with Blake. 
The fight in the van was hot. Two Dutch ships were dismasted at 
the outset. De With, whether to come to a general engagement the 
sooner or to avoid for a time the two or three heavy ships with 
Blake, whose course was taking him somewhat to leeward, tacked 
all together and stood south. As the Dutch came up with the 
English rear, Peim and the ships with him contrived to cast free 
from the shoal and fell in amongst them, thus turning to advantage 
what had threatened to be a grave mishap. To quote Penn again :^ 
" We were forced to tack our ship to clear ourselves of the sand ; 
and, indeed, it fell out better for doing execution upon the enemy, 
than wc could have cast it ourselves ; for, as the Dutch fleet cleared 

^ reiui, i. 417. 

^ Jan Evertsen, Itmtlicr ut" Cuniclis Evertscu " tlie Old," wlio was also in the fleet. 
Served as flag-oflicer under M. H. Troinji, De liuijter, and Wassenaer van Obdani. 
As Lieut.-Adniiral, fell in the battle of July 25th, 1666. 

•' '^'ie de Corneille Trump,' 7H. " •« Penn, i. 453. ^ Ik 447. 



1G52.] BATTLE OF THE KENTISH KNOCK. 1G9 

themselves of our General, he standing to the northward and they to 
the southward, we fell patt to receive them, and so stayed by them 
till the night caused our separation." 

Penn, together with Bourne, completed what Blake had begun. 
By night the Dutch were beaten and discouraged, yet De With 
had no thought of retiring. He could not return beaten to 
Holland without forfeiting his command, and he was, in addition, a 
man of that stubborn type which is very slow to recognise defeat. 
Unhappily, his captains were not all of the same way of thinking, 
and many of them chose the occasion to exhibit their political 
prejudice. In the morning it was found that some twenty of them 
were at a distance to eastward of the fleet ; and though further 
action was contemplated, these men refused to come within range. 
A council of war was held, and De With was eager to re-engage, 
although De Kuijter and Evertsen, men of known valour and 
reputation, did their best to prevent his risking the safety of the 
vessels that remained with him. They pointed out that many of 
the ships were crippled, and that so many men had been lost as 
seriously to impair their efficiency ; and they spoke also, doubtless, 
of the disaffection existing in the fleet. ^ 

Early in the day the wind was light and treacherous, so that the 
English were unable to bring on more than a partial engagement ; 
but when, at about noon, a northerly breeze sprang up in favour of 
the Dutch, they were able easily to avoid coming to close quarters, 
and though for a while " they seemed to stay," at about three 
they set their mainsails, and what else they could carry, and 
made for their own shores. The English followed, but drew off 
at nightfall lest they should get among the shoals of the Dutch 
coast. In the morning the Dutch were hull down, and as it seemed 
impossible to come up with them, it was determined by a council 
of war ^ to return to the Downs for victuals, of which there was 
great need. 

The actual duration of the engagement can have been little more 
than three hours, and it is not to be expected that very many ships 
were captured. The English loss was singularly shght, both in men 
and in ships, but the Dutch had, not unnaturally, been far more 
roughly treated. Two vessels at least were taken, of which one, the 
Mary, ol 30 guns, served through the rest of the war in the English 
Navy. The second, also a 80-gun ship, was found to be so riddled 
1 Basuage, 2G0, 2G1. 2 p^ii^^ ;_ 449^ 



170 MILITARY HISTORY, 1619-1660. [1652. 

with shot that she could not be kept afloat, and was consequently 
abandoned and allowed to sink. 

De "With, on his return, inveighed bitterly, and not without 
justice, against his captains ; but he could effect nothing. Their 
very number, if not their political friends, shielded them from 
punishment. 

With the Enghsh, after this, all was for a time prosperous in 
the Narrow Seas. The Dutch dared not appear outside their ports, 
and the small cruisers reaped a golden harvest. On October 18th, 
the Tiger, Captain James Peacock, a man well used to North Sea 
cruising, and his small squadron, put into Yarmouth ^\'ith twenty 
prizes.-^ Of these, one, the Morgenstar,- was a man-of-war which 
had been taken after stiff fighting. The Tiger had not lost a man, 
while the Dutchman had suffered heavily. 

Another result of the victory was that the batteries overlooking 
the Downs, that had been run up in July for the protection of the 
anchorage, were now looked upon as useless and were dismantled. 
This was a mistake for which England was destined to pay a price, 
and that soon ; for in Holland there was little thought of peace. 
The successes of the English were either not recognised or were 
regarded as merely local and temporary. Nor is this to be wondered 
at when we consider how little the burden of the war pressed upon 
the people. Johan de Witt ^ was at the helm of the state, and so 
excellently did he manage the country's finances that no loan was 
called for in consequence of the war till June, 1654. 

In the behef that the States must soon submit, or that in no 
case would anything further be attempted that year, the Council of 
State proceeded to disperse the fleet. Captain Andrew Ball, in the 
new second-rate, Antelope, was sent with a squadron of eighteen 
ships to the Sound, where there was urgent need for the presence 
of a force, owing to an embargo having been laid by the Danes 
on about twenty English merchantmen, and to the capture by the 
Dutch of two or three ships in the Eastland trade.'* The actual 
loss of these Baltic ships was less important at that time than it 

^ S. P. Dom. iDt. XXV. 18. 

2 Added to the Navy as the Plover, Oct. 30th, 1652. 

^ Johan de AVitt. Bom at Dordrecht, 1625. Opponent of the House of Orange. 
Leader of the burgher republican aristocracy. Grand-Penfiionary, 1653-1672. "With 
his brother, Cornehus, murdered by a mob, Aug. 20th, 1672. Life by Simons, 
1832-1836. 

* Cab S. P. Dom. 29 Sept. 1652 ; Wliitelocke, 522. 



1652.] CAPTAIN BALL TO TEE SOUND. 171 

would have been a few years earlier/ for the extension of England's 
colonies allowed her to buy timber and pitch in other markets ; yet 
the position in the Sound was serious. 

The arrest of four Swedish ships from the west coast, in the beUef 
that they were Dutchmen disguised, challenged danger from Sweden. 
Their release, however, coupled with the Swedish jealousy of the 
Danes, joined Sweden for a while to English interests." The 
Danes were useful alHes to Holland. Xot only did they supply xery 
many men to the Dutch navy, but also they were bound, by the 
receipt of a subsidy, to maintain a squadron of twenty men-of-war 
for the Dutch service.^ 

And here it will not be amiss to say that Charles imagined that 
he discovered in the war another means of regaining his kingdom. 
Eepresenting that Eupert was in the Mediterranean with a strong 
squadron,^ he offered his alliance to the Dutch. But the Dutch 
would have none of it. Setting aside the question of what value 
they may have attached to the Eoyalist declarations, they knew 
full well that such an alhance would make a reconcihation "^"ith 
Cromwell impossible. 

Ball was unfortunate. On September 30th, before anything 
could be done, a severe stoiTu struck the squadron, and the Antelope 
was driven ashore and lost, though the commodore and most of the 
crew were saved. The rest of the squadron weathered the danger, 
and returned to England, picking up a number of prizes on its way.^ 

Such was the history of the Sound squadron. Of the other 
squadrons detached, one. of twenty sail, was sent north under Penn 
for the convoy of coUiers ; another, of twelve sail, was sent to 
PhTUOuth for the guard of the western Channel ; a further division 
was busy refitting in the river ; and, vrith. yet another, the Council 
decided to comply with Longland's repeated requests for an acces- 
sion of force. ^ A squadron of twelve frigates was ordered for this 
purpose, and Captain James Peacock, who, with the Tiger, had for 
some years done excellent service in the Xarrow Seas, was appointed 
to command it. The re-appearance of the Dutch fleet, however, 
and the reverse sustained by the Enghsh arms, compelled the 

^ 'ElencLus Motuum," ii. 174. ^ Basnage, 2S7; Wiikeiocke, o:iC'. 

■^ Basnage, 2S»3-205 ; Colliber, p. lOS, a^lds that the Daiiisli king made the restoration 
of Tronip one of his conditions. 

* lb. 298. ^ 'Col. Rostr.' lOS. 

* Cal. S. P. Dora. 1652, p. 498 : 0. o. S. Minutes, November 18th. 



172 MILITARY HISTORY, 1G49-1660. [1652. 

Council to rescind the order for Peacock's sailing, and to employ 
both the ships and their commander nearer home. 

Meanwhile, in Holland, it was recognised that, if surrender was 
not to be thought of, some great effort must be made to relieve the 
harassed commerce of the country. Since the fight off the Kentish 
Knock, matters had been many times worse than before it, and 
what this must have meant will appear when it is recalled that on 
September 2'2nd, before the defeat, it had been necessary formally to 
restrict all sailings of merchantmen to those of organised fleets 
under the convoy of men-of-war.^ 

A huge Dutch fleet of three hundred merchantmen was lying 
ready to sail. Great efforts were made to ensure its safet}', and a 
fleet was equipped and sent to sea under Tromp and Jan Evertsen, 
with De Euijter as vice-admiral, and Pieter Floriszoon as rear- 
admiral. De With was to have held a vice-admiral's command, 
but had to be left sick ashore.' The fleet, by Dutch accounts,^ 
consisted of seventy-three men-of-war and a few fireships and small 
craft, while with Blake at the time in the Downs there were, 
from causes already explained, no more than thirty-seven, with 
two or three small tenders.* 

Tromp left his merchantmen on the Plamand coast, and 
appeared with all his fighting ships at the back of the Goodwin 
on November 29th. Blake, after holding a hasty council of war, 
weighed and stood with him to the southward. 

It is impossible now to say exactly why Blake took this step, so 
contrary to his usually well-considered methods. Many reasons have 
been suggested, and of these the oldest, that Blake had to defend 
the river at any cost, is obviously the most fallacious, for Blake's 
course took him to leeward of the river's mouth. It is possible that 
Blake recalled how this same Tromp had, in the case of Oquendo, 
turned the Downs into a rat-trap, and that, in view of the demolition 
of the batteries that had protected Ayscue, the anchorage was held to 
be unsafe. It is also possible that the thickness of a November day 
led him to misjudge the quantity or quality of the enemy's fleet. ^ 
The action certainly was not due to a mere chivalrous spirit that 
held itself in honour bound to accept every proferred challenge. 

1 'ViedeDclfuijter,' 24. ^ jj^ 

•■' Ih. aud Basiiagc, 2(J1. * 'Col. llostr." 101>. 

** Cal. S. P. Dom. 1G52, 541, shows that hu had Litely heard of a large Dutch 
merchant fleet at sea. 




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1652.] BATTLE OFF DUNGENESS. 173 

Not until he was under way does Blake seem to have realised 
what force he had to meet. The wind, too, which, at the time of 
weighing had been at S.W., veered and made return to the Downs 
impossible. For awhile it was variable, but soon it settled in the 
north-west and blew too strongly to admit of fighting,^ so that with 
evening Blake anchored in Dover Eoads, Tromp lying some two 
leagues to leeward, i.e., close off the South Sand Head. With 
the morning of the 30th both weighed, and, as Blake still kept 
the wind, both steered parallel courses along the shore. There 
was no engagement till the fleets came off Dungeness, when the 
trend of the coast brought the English van down upon the Dutch. 

There resulted a partial engagement, in which the leading English 
ships were terribly outnumbered. It is probable that many Dutch 
vessels were too far to leeward to help, while it is but too certain that 
English captains in the rear availed themselves of the wind to keep 
out of action.^ The reason for their doing so is hard to discover. 
Had they been mere merchant captains the case would be easily 
understood ; but the evil system of employing merchant captains to 
fight battles had been remedied somewhat, and the offenders in this 
case commanded ships of the regular Navy and were, in some cases 
at least, men of known courage.^ The only reason that can be 
suggested is that they had received Eoyalist bribes ; but as the 
evidence taken on their examinations is not forthcoming, this must 
remain a theme for speculation. 

Such ships as were engaged fought desperately, foremost among 
them being the Truwi/ph, with Blake on deck. She was resolutely 
seconded by Lionel Lane in the Victory and John Mildmay in the 
Vanguard, and against Evertsen and De Euijter these ships fought 
from about one o'clock till dark. As Tromp came into action a most 
gallant attack was made on him by Captains Robert Batten in the 
Garland, a third rate, and Hoxton,* in the hired merchantman 
Bonaventure. The Brederode was laid aboard on both sides and was 
extremely hard pressed, but Evertsen, drawing up, took the pressure 
off her and captured the Bonaventure, with the loss in killed and 
wounded of the major part of her crew, among whom fell the 
captain. Tromp himself proved far more than a match for the 

^ G. Penn, i. 458 ; Blake to C. o. S. December 1st. - lb. 

^ E.g. Young and Taylor. 

* This is the spelling of Blake's official report. Cp. Cal. S. P. Dom. 1G52..451. 
The name is often misspelt, Hoxon, Axon, Ackson, Achson, Hookson, etc. 



174 MILITARY IIISTOEY, 1C.40-16GO. [1652. 

Garland, which before being taken had lost her captain and sixty 
men killed/ out of a company of one hundred and fifty. 

Blake did his best to relieve these two ships, but, owing to the 
loss of his foretopmast and mainstay, found himself unable to get 
near them till too late.- In the attempt the Triumph was herself 
placed in danger, being boarded on both sides at once ; but she 
managed to shake off her assailants and to rejoin the rest of the 
fleet. Besides the Garland and Bonaventure, the English loss 
amounted to three ships sunk, while the Dutch lost only one, 
which was accidentally blown up. 

Blake went to Dover Eoads and thence into the Downs. Tromp, 
for his part, lay for two or three days off Dungeness refitting, and 
was thus in a position to intercept vessels coming round from the 
western ports. On the night of December 1st, one of these, the 
Hercules, hired merchantman, fell into the Dutch fleet and was at 
once taken. Tromp next picked up his convoy and took it as far as 
Rhe, where he lay to wait until the homeward-bound trade was 
ready for his escort back.^ 

Blake was extremely dejected by his defeat. In reporting the 
result of the battle to the Council of State, he wrote : — * 

" I am bound to let your Honours know that there was much baseness of spirit, not 
among the merchantmen only, but many of tlie State's ships ; and, therefore, I make it 
my earnest request, that your Honours would be pleased to send down some gentlemen 
to take an imjiartial and strict examination of the deportment of several commanders. 
. . . And I hope it will not be unreasonable for me, in Ijelialf of myself, to desire yom- 
Honours, that you would think of giving me, your unworthy servant, a discharge from 
this employment, so far too great for me . . . that so I may be freed from that trouble 
of spirit wliich lies upon me, arising from the sense of my own insufficiency." 

But Blake was far too valuable a servant to lose, and the Council 
refused to receive his commission back again. It thanked him 
for his efforts, and it at once acceded to his demand for a com- 
mission of inquiry.^ The results of this inquiry were threefold : a 
considerable increase in the material force of the fleet, including the 
building of thirty new frigates ; the removal from their commands, 

' Basnage, 2G1. 

2 Blake to C. o. S. December 1st in G. Penn, i. 458-460. 

^ It is to this time that tradition assigns the fabulous broom at Tromp's masthead. 
There is no mention of it in any writer, Dutch or English, Eoyalist or Eoundliead, 
mitil it appears as a vague report in the Daily Intelligencer {or the 0th March following 
(No. 113). A broom at the masthead being a sign that the sliip wearing it is for sale, 
it is possible that the story was started as a joke by some one who had seen Tromp 
refitting and selling his jirizes at St. Martin's. 

* Blake to C. o. S. 1st December. " G. Tcnn, i. 461, sqq. 



1G53.] THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITEBBANEAN. 175 

and the committal to the Tower, of various captains/ inckiding 
Saltonstall, Taylor, Young, Brown, and Chapman ; and the giving 
of orders that, to avoid desertion and delay, seamen should be kept 
in their ships while the ships lay in port, and that merchant 
skippers should no longer be allowed in action to command their 
own vessels." 

AVhat could be done was done to make the fleet ready to meet 
Tromp on his return. But the sum total of preparations in England 
did nothing to help the cause in the Mediterranean ; and, unfortun- 
ately, it was imperative to turn over again to the main fleet the 
squadron which had recently been appointed to go thither with 
Peacock. 

At Leghorn and Elba the position remained practically un- 
changed. In the one port the Dutch held Appleton, and in the 
other was Badiley. At neither place had the English succeeded in 
taking up for the service more than a very few ships. The force at 
the beginning of the new year ^ was thus distributed : with Appleton, 
in the Leopard, 50, at Leghorn, were the hired merchantmen Bona- 
venture, Samson, Mary, Peregrine, and Levant Merchant ; with 
Badiley in Porto Longone were his old four ships, Paragon, Phoenix, 
Elizahetli, and Constant Warioick, together with two merchantmen 
which had been recently added. 

Life in the Mediterranean convoy service, the Straits fleet as it 
was called, cannot have been pleasant during the Dutch "War. Not 
only was the enemy present in vastly superior force, but since the 
re-taking of the Phcenix it was becoming more and more doubtful 
whether the squadrons would be allowed to go on sheltering them- 
selves in port until the relief force should arrive. The fact is that 
the Grand Duke was bitterly affronted by the capture, and that no 
amount of polite negotiation could appease him unless restitution 
were made. When the news of Dungeness came and he began to 
think that the Dutch would prove victorious everywhere, he saw fit 
to conciliate them. Refusing all apologies, he insisted that the 
English must either accept his terms or leave his port, and to this 
ultimatum he attached a time limit. Apparently in expectation of 
the sailing of Appleton's squadron, the Dutch massed their whole 

' G. Penn, i. 469, 471. 

- Op. Penirs letter to Cromwell, June 2ik1, 1052, advisiug this step aiul other 
imiirovements. — G. Penn, i. 466. 

^ Dates are given in the old style, but the year is reckoned from January 1. 



176 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1653. 

force off Leghorn, leaving Badiley free to come out. This Badiley, 
who, in preparation for the worst, had concerted a scheme with 
Appleton, immediately did ; and he proceeded to Leghorn to effect, 
if possible, a junction of the squadrons. Divided, the two English 
forces were despicable ; united, they might be able to offer a good 
resistance ; for the Commonwealth ships were superior to nearly 
all that the Dutch had on the station. 

The plan agreed upon was, that as soon as Badiley should appear 
off Leghorn, Appleton should weigh to meet him. If the wind 
should be on shore, and in Badiley's favour, the Elba squadron was 
to keep to windward till the very moment when Appleton should 
reach the Dutch fleet ; and it should then try to break through and 
join him. But if the wind should be off shore the ships in Leghorn 
w^ere to avoid getting into action till the Dutch should have attacked 
or should be on the point of falling on Badiley. 

On the 4th March, 1653, when Badiley presented himself, the 
wind was off shore. Van Galen made a feint of attacking him, and 
possibly by this move induced Appleton to weigh too soon. The 
Dutch indeed claim so much in his honour. But as we know 
Appleton to have been, though personally brave, but an addleheaded 
commander, it is far more likely that he mistook the purport of his 
instructions and hastened to attack with no clear conception of how 
long he would have to fight unsupported. As soon as they saw his. 
sails let fall, the Dutch recalled the ships, and pushed forward 
towards Badiley ; and if Appleton then saw his mistake it was too 
late to remedy it. The wind was fresh. The harbour faces some- 
what northerly, and to the north of it there projects the Mallora 
shoal for some five miles from the coast. 

Appleton's only possible j)lan, then, was to run down before the 
wind. This brought him into action while Badiley was still some 
miles to leeward. The action began with a great disaster. At the 
very outset the Bonaventure received a shot in her magazine and 
blew up, and at the same time a round shot it is said from the 
Bonaventure, shattered Van Galen's leg. The remaining English 
ships w^ere surrounded, and one only, the Mary, succeeded in 
fighting her way through and joining Badiley. The other four were 
taken after a stubborn defence. In Appleton's own ship, out of two 
hundred men, there were one hundred and fifty killed and wounded, 
yet Appleton declared that, even so, he was forced into a surrender 
by his men when his own wish was to blow up the ship. 



1653.] THE MEDITEBBANEAN ABANDONED. 177 

There was nothing left for Badiley to do. As he came up he 
saw the last of the four ships taken, and therefore laid his course 
back to Elba. The Dutch made no serious effort at pursuit. They 
were, in fact, too much cut up to be able to do so. Badiley went 
from Porto Longone to Messina, and thence home, rightly judging 
that his small remaining force was useless in the Mediterranean. 
"When he reached the Downs in May, he found that he had but 
anticipated an order for his recall. 

For a few weeks after November 30th the Channel swarmed 
with Dutch cruisers, but by the end of the year the English Navj' 
was able to resume the control pending the return of Tromp. It 






\0 



/ 






'^acfcley 



Vi 



.». 






k  



Galen 







K'"^' 



THE ACTIOX IN LEGHORN ROAD, MARCH 4tH, 1653. 

A. Point reaehecl by three of Van Galen's ships -when feinting against Badiley. From it they 
rejoined the squadron. 

B. Point at which the Manj joined Badiley. 

was seen to be essential to meet him on his homeward journey, and 
by a victory to gain back that supremacy which Dungeness had 
shaken. 

How far the supremacy had been re-established even before the 
main fleet put to sea is curiously attested by a letter addressed 
to the Parliament in January, 1653.^ The Genoese had ordered 
two ships to be built in Holland for the protection of their com- 
merce against pirates. These were now ready to sail, but, as there 
was the danger of their falling a prey to the English in the Channel, 
the Genoese petitioned for a free pass out to be granted to them ; 
1 Hist. MSS. Com. Eep. 13, App. 1, p. 669. 
VOL. II, N 



178 



MILITABT EISTOBY, 1649-1660. 



[1653. 



which alone is strong evidence that the Dutch superiority in the 
Narrow Seas was already a thing of the past. 

On Fehruary 10th, Penn was appointed to command/ as vice- 
admiral of the fleet,- twenty-two men-of-war and nine merchant- 
men, constituting the White squadron. But Monck and Deane 
were associated with Blake in the command, and Monck elected to 
go to sea as Admiral of the White. Penn therefore became Admiral 
of the Blue, while John Lawson,^ to whom the post of rear-admiral 
of the fleet * really belonged, was made Vice-Admiral of the Bed. 

The flagships then wore the distinctive flags of the following 
commanders : — 



Eed 



White 



Blue. 



Triumpli, 62 
Fairfax, 64 
Laurel, 38 
Vanguard, 56 
Bainboiv, 58 
Diamond, 40 
Speaker, 64 
Victory, 60 
Assistance, 48 



The Generals, Blake and Deane. 
Juhu Lawson, Vice-Admiral. 
Samuel Howett, Eear-Admiral. 
General Monck. 
James Peacock, Vice- Admiral. 
Roger Martin, Rear- Admiral. 
Wm. Penn, Admiral. 
Lionel Lane, Vice-Admiral. 
John Bourne, Rear- Admiral. 



As is suggested by this list, some of the most powerful vessels 
afloat, notably the Sovereign and Besolution, first rates, and the 
James, second rate, were absent from the fleet as the result of 
injuries sustained at the Kentish Knock. 

Tromp, having some two hundred merchantmen to convoy home, 
would have been glad to get this charge off his hands before falling 
in with the enemy. Accordingly when he received new^s from the 
States General that the English fleet was ready for sea, he made 
haste to pass the Channel. But on February 18th, in the morning, 
"to his amazement," as we are told, he discovered the English 
fleet to the number of eighty sail, standing south on the starboard 
tack. The wind was fresh at AV.N.W., and, his fleet being about 
equal to the English, he at once decided to engage. He had indeed 

1 Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. 13, App. 2, p. 85. 

^ 111 other words, as Admiral of the AVhite squadron. 

^ John Lawson. Born about 1616. Originally the Anabaptist master of a collier. 
Served ashore and afloat during the Civil War. Commanded the Centurion in North 
Sea, 1650. Commanded Fairfax, 1652. Rear- Admiral of England. A^'ice- Admiral (R.) 
in the action off Portland, 1653. Admiral (B.) in the actions of June and July, 1653. 
Vice- Admiral of England, 1653. Knighted, 1660. Reduced the Barbary States, 1661. 
Vice-Admiral (R.) 1665. Mortally wounded in the action of June 3rd, 1665, and died 
on June 25th. Buried at St. Dunstan's-in-the-East. 

* In other words. Admiral of the Blue. 



1653.] 



THE BATTLE OFF PORTLAND. 



179 



every advantage, and an inspection of the relative positions of the 
fleets will show that the arrangement of the English was such as to 
invite attack. 

Here we may pause for a moment to congratulate the English 
Navy on the happy chance that had decided Deane to remain with 
Blake in the Triumph, when he might have elected to command the 
Blue squadron as Monck did the White. Monck had allowed 
himself to fall four or five miles to leeward with his whole squadron. 
But Penn remained to windward with the Blue squadron ahead of 
the Generals, and actually with Blake were not more than ten or a 



Dttrch 
Con i^o V 

A A A 



t^v. 







at'" y' ; 







W/iite / 
Squae/ron / 



THK BATTLE OFF TORTLAXD, TEBRUARY 18tH, IGoo. 

The Fleets at the moment of Impact. 
Note.— Grouiis, and not single ships, are represented in the above plan. 

dozen ships. Lawson was a short distance astern of the Triumph, 
and about a mile to leeward. 

It was of course open to Blake to run to leeward and form his 
line on the lee squadron, but rather than risk any semblance 
of giving way, he elected to fight where he was, thus making it 
necessary for a part of the fleet to sustain the action for a consider- 
able time before the leewardmost ships could support it. The attack 
was bound to fall upon Blake and Penn, and it was possible for 
Tromp to throw the bulk of his force on either. 

Tromp was not slow to seize the opportunity. With his fleet 
in three divisions, or possibly four, he ran down to engage, leaving 
his convoy some four miles to windward. Of the engagement that 
followed details are sadly lacking, but as far as can be ascertained, 

N 2 



180 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-lGGO. [1653. 

Tromp commanded in the centre, De Ruijter on the left and Jan 
Evertsen on the right. The Dutch centre attacked Blake directty, 
and immediately pressed him very hard. De Euijter passed on and 
bore in among Blake's ships from the north, while Evertsen was to 
the southward and threatened entirely to surround him. It was at 
this point, when the danger was already most serious, that the 
great advantage of having trained seamen in command at least of 
part of the fleet appeared. 

Penn, like Blake, hauled to the wind to meet the attack, and 
opened fire on Evertsen, who was then on his starboard bow. 
Evertsen held his course, and Penn, to avoid being cut off from 
the Red squadron, tacked at once, passed through the opposing 
Dutch squadron and joined the few ships which were, with the 
Generals, engaged against Tromp. Lawson, meanwhile, had also 
shown his ability. If he should haul on a wind as Penn had done, 
he saw that De Ruijter could interpose between him and the 
Generals, while still keeping up the severity of the attack. He 
therefore bore aw^ay, with the wind abeam, till he had made enough 
southing to be able, by tacking, to fetch the main body of the 
enemy. And this he did, following the Blue squadron very closel}^ 
when it crashed into Tromp's rear. 

Meanwhile, part at least of Evertsen's squadron ran down to 
leeward, and engaged Monck and the White squadron within a 
couple of hours from the beginning of the battle. Some of the ships 
of the lee line, not improbably the stragglers of the Red and Blue 
squadrons, by dint of sailing close-hauled on the starboard tack, 
were by four o'clock in a position to weather the Dutch main body. 
But in the van, where the ships were massed most thickly and 
where both Tromp and Blake were, the fighting had been of a very 
stubborn order, and the Dutch were left in no position to withstand 
the attack of comparatively fresh ships. Accordingly, both for this 
reason and to avoid the possibility of the English stretching to 
windward enough to fall upon his convoy,^ Tromp drew out of action 
and rejoined the merchantmen. In the van the battle was over for 
the day, but to leeward the fighting continued till dark. 

Details of Monck's share in the action are almost entirely 
wanting, but as Mildmay, the captain of his ship the Vanguard, 
was killed, we can at least be certain of the truth of the statement 
that he was engaged towards evening. 

1 ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 94. 



1G53.] 



THE BATTLE OFF POBTLAND. 



181 



In the Eed and Blue squadrons the loss was heavy ; and as the 
Triumph was first into action against overwhelming numbers, and 
was for a while unsupported, she suffered extremely. Her captain, 
Andrew Ball, was killed ; so, too, was the Generals' secretary. 
Sparrow ; Blake himself was badly wounded in the thigh by a 
splinter ; and of men put ashore dangerously wounded, fifty-five were 
from her and the Worcester alone. ^ The Triumph, too, was much 
damaged, and lay till the morning refitting. Other vessels were so 
much shattered that they had to be sent into Portsmouth, after 
contributing men to make up the complements of some that had lost 
most heavily. 

Among these ships were the Assistance, 48, Rear- Admiral John 





;' f '^^ 
■■•■ A -"^M-' 1^: 

■^-^^ 0rU 

- Cot/^S£ o^ Di/rcH 

Coi/^ sz or ^Ta'c i 1^1* 




THE BATTLE OFF PORTLAND, FEBRUARY 18tH, 1653. 

The Fleets engaged. 
Note. — Groups, and not single ships, are represented in the above plan. 

Bourne; the Ocik, 32, Captain Edwin, and \hQ. Advice, 48, Captain 
Day. Bourne himself was wounded in the head, and the three 
ships lost so many men in the action, besides contributing to Blake 
at its close, that they must have reached port all but unmanned. 
They were all, as was officially reported, " so disabled as to be unfit 
for service till repaired." ^ 

Both the Oak and the Assistance were taken by the Dutch but 
afterwards re-won ; so, too, was the Prosperous, 40. Boarded by 
De Euijter, the last named, cleared her deck, her men then 



Cal. S. P. Dom. 23 February, 1653. 



Cal. S. r. Dom. 1652-1653, p. 174. 



182 MILITARY HISTOBY, 1C49-1660. [1653. 

following the Dutch on hoard their own ship. A second attempt 
was made and she was carried, hut, the Martin coming up, she was 
re-taken.^ Her loss, of course, was great, and among the dead was 
John Barker, her captain. 

The English lost but one ship, the Samson, which they found 
to be in a sinking condition. Button, her captain, and most of 
the crew were dead, but the survivors were taken out before the 
ship was allowed to founder. It is claimed by the Dutch that the 
Speaker put into port much damaged,^ a thing most probable in 
itself, but quite unsupported by official record. 

Of the Dutch, ^ one was taken and sent dismasted into port. 
This was the Struisvogel,^ Captain Adriaen Cruick ; ^ but others 
were destroyed. The Dutch confessed to three ships sunk and one 
blown up,*^ and it is fairly certain that some others were burnt." 

Where Tromp himself had been the English had suffered so 
heavily that he may have naturally exaggerated the damage done to 
the entire fleet. When morning dawned, it was found that he had 
passed to leeward and was running up Channel before the wind with 
his fleet in crescent formation between the English and his convoy. 
Towards two o'clock the greater part of the English fleet came up 
wdth the Dutch off the Isle of Wight, the wind having fallen light, 
and " had warm work, till night parted " them. 

The event proved the necessity for Tromp 's manoeuvre, though 
his action certainly gave the Generals the impression that they were 
pursuing a beaten fleet. But Tromp's first duty was to bring his 
convoy safely home, and not to risk such loss as would leave it 
unprotected. 

Ammunition ran very short in the Dutch fleet, and only the 
fitful lightness of the wind on the 19th prevented the Enghsh from 
reaping their harvest. The fighting was partial, but heavy. De 
Kuijter withstood the attack time after time, and, towards night, 
entirely dismasted and riddled with shot, had to be taken in tow.** 
What the day's loss was is uncertain, but Lawson, with a few 
of the quicker-sailing " frigates," contrived to cut off from the right 
wing two or three men-of-war and a handful of merchantmen. It 

^ Willoughby to C. o. S. February 20 ; S. P. Dom. xxxiii. 72. 
2 * Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 91 ; 0. Pemi. i. 478. 

' The prisoners sent into rortsniouth were su numerous that it was hard to know 
how to dispose of tliem. S. P. Doni. xxxiii. 72. * J.e. Ostrich. 

" ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 91. « Ih. 94. 

' Cal. S. P. l)om. 1G52-1653, pp. 174, 175. » ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 85. 



1653.] END OF THE THREE DAYS' FIGHT. 183 

is probable that the Dutch estimate, viz., two men-of-war, wdth 
ten or twelve merchantmen taken, is right. ^ Disorder crept in 
as the convoy lost faith in the men-of-war. Many vessels turned 
their heads towards the French coast, some few escaping into 
Le Havre. 

At night the Generals steered their course by the Dutch lights 
with a steady breeze at W.N.W. The next day's action is well 
described in the official report. 

" On the 20th, about nine in the morning, we fell close in with 
them with some five great ships and all the frigates of strength, 
though very many could not come up that day ; and seeing their 
men-of-war somewhat weakened, we sent ships of less force that 
could get up amongst the merchantmen." The Dutch, who were 
now past Beachy Head, standing towards Boulogne, turned some 
merchantmen out of the fleet for a bait. The scheme failed to draw 
off the English who, hauling to w^indward, fought on till dusk. 
They were then ten miles from Gris Nez, "so that, had it been 
three hours longer to-night, we had probably made an interposition 
between them and home, whereby they might have been obliged to 
have made their way through with their men-of-war, which at this 
time were not above thirty-five." ^ That they were so few was due 
in great measure to the flight of some twenty who had fired away 
all their powder.^ 

At night the English anchored three leagues from Gris Nez, 
which bore N.E. by E. ; and the enemy lay in-shore to leeward. 
This step was taken by the advice of the pilots, who pointed out 
that, with a lee tide, the Dutch would be unable to weather the 
point.^ But, in the morning, not one Dutch ship remained in sight. 
After refitting, the English weighed on the night of the 21st, and on 
the 27th made Stokes Bay. 

Monck and Deane's estimate that the enemy had lost seventeen 
or eighteen men-of-war, is certainly an exaggeration. Only four 
were admitted by the Dutch to have been taken,^ and only four were 
brought in.^ This agreement disposes us to accept the Dutch 
statement that only five were sunk,^ though two or three more at 
least seem to have been burnt. The number of merchantmen taken 



1 ' Vie de De Kiiijter,' 30; cp. S. P. Dom. Int. xxxiii. 88, 89. 

2 Cp. Basnage, 300. ^ ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 97. 
■* The Genepals to the Speaker, 27th February. G. Penn, i. 476. 

= ' A^ie de De Euijter,' 31. "^ S. P. Dom. Int. xxxiii. 72, 89. 



184 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1653. 

is stated variousl}- at from thirty to fift}', but no official list was 
ever niade.^. 

Of English ships, only the Samson miscarried, though three 
more were quite disabled. To these three the Dutch added a fourth, 
the Fairfax, which they asserted was purposely burnt as unfit for 
service. This was not so, however ; the burning was due to 
criminal negligence, but was accidental.^ 

There was much to be done before the fleet could be again 
ready, but a commission was appointed^ and the work was 
energetically taken in hand. There had been good ships absent 
from Portland, but of them the Besolution and the James, as well as 
others, were now made ready. Yet the old difficulty of raising 
mariners continued, and again recourse had to be had to drafting- 
large bodies of soldiers to the fleet.* That men were so hard to 
obtain was due partly to the smallness of their pay, but chiefly to 
the difficulty which they experienced in getting any pay at all. 
This led not only to mutiny and riot at home, but also to the 
presence in the Dutch fleet of many Englishmen who, doubtless, 
like the Scots and Irishmen in the same service, salved their 
consciences with the reflection that they were fighting for their 
lawful king against a pack of rebels. Many such were taken in the 
battle off Portland ; and the extreme need of men is typified by the 
reluctance of the Council of State to hang those whom it was 
possible to press for service against their former friends.^ 

Blake's wound proved severe. A month after he had been put 
ashore, his doctor wrote from Portsmouth : " General Blake, I hope, 
mends, but . . . de senibus non temere sperandum," a sentiment 
which shows how altered is the conception of old age, for Blake was 
but fifty-three. His general health, too, was bad, so bad that the 
Royalists hoped that he would never go to sea again. ^ 

On April 20th, 1653, Cromwell dissolved the Emnp and usurped 
the supreme authority, a change to which the Generals-at-Sea 
and the captains adhered,^ though the Royalists tried to persuade 
themselves that it was otherwise.'^ The Dutch, who were thinking 

1 ' A'ie de De Euijter,' 31 ; ' Col. Eostr.' 115 ; Basnage, 300; G. Peiiu, i. 479, 480 ; 
Clar. S. P. Cal. ii. 997, 1002. 

2 Cal. S. P. Dom. 1652-1653, 231, 255-257. 
^ C. o. S. Minutes, February 26th. 

* lb. March 16tl), April 8th; Penu to Admlty. Com. April 9th, etc. 
5 lb. March 4th. " Clar. S. P. Cal. ii. 1083. 

7 G. Penn, i. 489-191. » Clar. S. P. Cal. ii. 1121. 



1653.] THE DUTCH IN THE STRAIT OF DOVER. 185 

of peace, hoped mucli from the change/ but the Pensionary 
de Witt soon found how Httle it affected the war. Negotiations, 
indeed, were opened with Cromwell, but so little did they advance, 
the basis still being the Hague articles of 1651, that the Dutch 
ambassadors were advised to conclude, if possible, a secret treaty 
with France.^ Denmark was apprised of this, for just then it was 
essential for Holland to maintain cordial relations with a country 
which had twenty-two men-of-w^ar ready for sea.^ Of these ships 
as well as of a further squadron of equal force, the Dutch hoped 
to derive the benefit. They had, it is true, themselves already 
ordered heavier ships to the number of thirty, but none of them 
were ready. 

In Holland, the questions of rewards and punishments, of re- 
fitting, of finding men and making provision for the wounded, gave 
at least as much trouble as in England.* Partly owing to increases 
of pay, partly to individual enterprise, the fleet was manned. It put 
to sea under Tromp, who sailed north about with a large outward- 
bound convoy and returned at once by the same way and on the 
same duty. 

Monck and Deane were on the Zeeland coast to intercept him, 
but, though the fleets came very near one another, they failed to 
meet ; and the English contented themselves with ravages on the 
fishing and coasting trade. ^ They also made, in May, an abortive 
attempt on the shipping in the Vlie;'' and the Dutch on the 14th 
tried to come into the Downs. 

The whole Dutch fleet was there under Tromp, De Kuijter, 
De With, Jan Evertsen, and Floriszoon ; and it was decided at a 
council of war that, when both entrances should have been closed, 
the whole of the five squadrons would attack together.^ This was, 
in fact, a suggested repetition of the treatment meted out to Oquendo 
fourteen years before. 

But both the Downs and Dover Eoads were empty. Even 
Badiley and the Straits fleet, which had but recently returned to 
England, were not to be found; and Tromp withdrew under a heavy 
fire from Dover Castle. On the coast of Flanders he heard from the 
fishermen that the Enghsh fleet had been seen off Nieuwpoort, and 

1 Whitelocke, 531 ; ' Col. Eostr.' 116, 118. ^ Basnage, 307 ; ' Vie de De Euijter,' 34. 

2 Basnage, 303, 306. " ' Col. Rostr.' 121. 

3 Thurloe, S. P. i. 241, 248. '' Basnage, 307 ; ' Vie de De Ruijtcr,' 34. 
* Basnage, 301 ; ' Col. Rostr.' 123. 



186 



MILITARY HISTORY, 1G49-1660. 



[1653. 



he at once went in search of them. On June 1st the EngHsh lay in 
Yarmouth Eoads, where they received advice that the Dutch fleet 
was near the coast ; but the thickness of the weather prevented any 
meeting that day. They weighed, and anchored next tide two miles 
outside the Gabart ^ Sand, Orfordness bearing N.W. about five 
leagues. On the following morning at daybreak, the Dutch fleet 
was sighted two leagues to leeward,^ bearing S.S.W., the wind 
being in the north-east.^ Tromp had come down a S.W. wind on 
May 31st with the intention of interposing between the English and 



^S?T 




i A TV' TV E 



THE STRAIT OF DOVER, AXD PART OF THE ^'ORTH SEA. 
From a chart in the London Magazine. 



the river, and on June 1st had been anchored four leagues N.E. 
of the North Foreland. The battle, therefore, that followed,'^ was 
sought for by both nations. On its result depended in no small 

^ In old accounts the spelling of this name is Gaber, Goher or Gable. 

^ Monck to Admlty. Comrs. in G. Peuu, i. 491. 
.3 'Vie de De Kuijter,' 34 ; Basnage, 307. 

* This battle has suffered from a multiplicity of names, due chiefly to the neglect 
of historians to follow the movements of the fleets, but in no small degree to the 
great expanse over which the action was fought. However, Lowestoft is certainly a 
misnomer ; so too are Nieuwpoort and Dunquerque when stated as being the scene of 
the opening fight. If the name is to be other than purely chronological — and perhaps 
June 2nd is too near June 1st to allow of that — it must be called after either the 
Gabart, from the point of sighting, or the North Foreland, wliich is not far from where 
the first day's battle began. 



1653.] 



FIB ST BATTLE OF THE NORTH FOEELAND. 



187 



degree the result of the war. Then, for the first time, did the full 
strength of each country take the field ; and then, for the first time, 
were disadvantages, whether of convoy or of a hated commander, 
absent from the Dutch. 

The Dutch fleet, according to Tromp's report, was of ninety- 
eight sail of men-of-war together with six fireships,^ while the 
English, as appears from the subjoined contemporary list, consisted 
of one hundred men-of-war and five fireships.^ 

The English Fleet of the 2nd and 3kd June, 1653. 

(The ships appear to have been even more than usually overgunned. 
Compare the Table, pp. 107-112.) 

The Red Squadron. 



Ships. 


Commanders. 


Hesolution . . 


The Generals .... 


Worcester . . 


George Dakins, Captain 


Advice . 


Jeremv Smvth, ,, 


Diamond . . 


William Hill, 


Sapphire . . 


Nicholas Heaton, ,, 


Marmaduke . 


Edward Blagg, ,, 


Pelican . . 


Peter Mootham, ,, 


Mermaid . 


John King, ,, 


j Golden Fleece . 


Nicholas Forster, „ 


^Loyalty . . 


John Limbry, „ 


^Society . - . . 


Nicholas Lucas, ,, 


^Malaga Mer- 
chant . . 


Henry Collins, „ 


Martin . . . 


John Vessy „ 






Triumph . . 


.Tames Peacock, V.-Adm. 


Laurel . . . 


John Stoakes, Captain 


Adventure . 


Ptobert Nixon, ., 


Providence 


.lohn Peirce, ,, 


Sear . . . 


Francis Kirby, ,, 





o5 

a 


Ships. 


Commanders 




s 


CD 
8S 








550 


Heartsease . . 


Thomas Wright, 


Captain 


220 


50 


Sound . . . 


Jonah Hide, 




180 


42 


^Anne and Joyce 


"William Pile. 




180 


42 


London . . . 


Arthur Browne, 




140 


38 


\Hannibal . . 


William Haddock, 




160 


42 


Mary . . . 


Henry Maddison, 




180 
100 


40 
26 


\Thomas arul\ 
William. .] 


John Jefferson 




180 


44 








150 


34 


Speaker . . 


Samuel Howett, R 


-Adm. 


140 


44 


Sussex . . . 


Roger Cuttance, 


Captain 


140 


36 


Guinea . . . 


Edmund Curtis, 




Tiger . . . 


Gabriel Sanders, 




90 


14 


Violet . . . 


Henrv Southwood, 




90 


30 


Sophia . . 
Falmouth . . 


Robert Kirby, 
John Jeffreys, 




350 


62 


fFour Sisters . 


Robert Becke 




200 
160 


48 
40 


\Hamhurg Mer-^ 
chant . . i 


William Jessel 




140 


33 


Phoenix . . 


Henry Eaden 




200 


46 

1 









1.50 
120 
119 
200 
180 
120 

140 



300 
180 
150 

iro 

ISO 
160 
100 
120 

110 

120 



36 
36 
34 

40 
44 
3T 

36 



56 
46 
34 
40 
40 
38 
26 
30 

34 

34 



The White Squadron. 



James . . . 


AVilliam Pcnn, , 


tdm. . 


Lion . . . 


John Lambert, 


Captain 


Jtuby . . . 


Robert Sandei s. 


)» 


Assistance . . 


William Crispin 




Foresight . 


Richard Stayner 




Portsmouth . 


Robert Danford, 


,, 


jAnne Piercy . 


Thomas AVare, 




Peter . . . 
^Exchange . . 


John Littleton, 
Henry Tedman, 


J* 


Merlin . 


George Crapnell, 


,, 


^Richard and\ 
Martha. . .1 


Eustace Smith, 


„ 


^ Sarah . . . 


Francis Steward, 


*f 


\Lissa Merchant 


Simon Bady 


»» 








Victor u.   


Lionel Lane, V.- 


Adm. . 


Centurion . 


AV alter Wood, 


Captain 


Expeditiun 


Thomas Foules, 


>) 



361) 


66 


220 


50 


180 


42 


180 


40 


180 


42 


170 


38 


120 


33 


100 


32 


100 


30 


90 


12 


180 


46 


140 


34 


160 


38 


30 


10 


300 


60 


200 


42 


140 


32 



Gillyflower 

Middelburg 

Kaven . 
^Exchange . 

Globe . . 
iPrudent Mary 
fThomas and 
Lucy . . .. 

Andrew 
Assurance . 
Grown . 
Duchess 
Princess Ma r ia 
Walerhound 
Pearl . 
Reformation 
i Industry . 



John Hayward, 
Thomas ^V^ithiug, 
Robert Taylor, 
Jeffery Dare, 
Robert Coleman, 
John Taylor, 

Andrew Rand, 



— Thompson, 
Richard Seafield, 
Seth Hawly, 
Giles Shelly, 
.lames Cadman, 
Anthony Earning, 
Ben Salmon 



Captain 


120 


ij 


120 


,, 


140 




120 


»» 


110 




100 


»» 


125 


.-Adm. 


360 


Captain 


160 


,, 


140 




90 




170 


J » 


120 




100 


J J 


160 


»» 


100 



32 
32 
33 
32 
30 
28 

34 



56 
36 
36 
24 
38 
30 
2G 
40 
30 



t These ships were hired armed merchantmen. 
^ ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 126. ^ q pen^^ i_ 49^ (corrected by W. L. C). 



188 



MILITABY HIS TOUT, 1G49-1660. 



[1653. 



The English Fleet of the 2xd and 3rd June, 1653 — continued. 

The Blue Squadron. 



Ships. 


Commanders. 


a 
o 


3 


Ships. 


Commanders. 


s 










s 


58 






% 


O 


George . . . 


Jolm Lawson, Adm. . 


350 


Crescent . . 


Thomas Thorowgood. . 


115 


30 


Jientish . . 


Jacob Reynolds, 


Captain 


ISO 


50 


iSamvel Taboat 


.Joseph Ames .... 


110 


30 


Great Presi-\ 
dent . . ./ 
. yonsuch . . 


Vrancis Park. 




ISO 


40 


iBi-njamin . . 


Robert Sparks, Captain 


120 


32 


Thomas Penrose, 




170 


40 


fKing Ferdi-\ 
nando . . 1 


Richard Paine, ,, 


140 


36 


.•Success . . . 


AVilliam Kendall, 


,, 


150 


38 


Jioebuck . . 


Henry Fenn, ,, 


100 


30 


Welcome 


John Harman, 


,, 


200 


40 










Oak. . . . 


John Edwin, 


s» 


120 


32 


Hainbom . . 


Will. Goodsonn, R.-Adm. 


300 


58 


^Brazil . . . 


Thomas Heath 


», 


120 


30 


Convertine. 


Anthony Joyn, Captain . 


210 


44 


jEastland J\rei-\ 
chant . .1 


.John AValters 


„ 


110 


32 


Amity . 
Dolphin 


Henry Pack ,, 
Robert Davis ,, 


150 
120 


36 
30 


iAdventiire . . 
j.^'amaritan 


Edward Greene 
Shadrach Blake 


>. 


lOO 
120 


3? 
30 


Arms of Hul-\ 
land . . .1 


Francis Mardrig ,, 


120 


34 


1 fireship . 




• • 


30 


10 


Tulip . . . 
^Jonathan . . 


Joseph Cubitt , , 
Robert Graves ,, 


120 
110 


32 
30 


Vayjgiiarl . 


.Joseph Jordan, Y 


-Adm. 


390 


56 


\Dragoneare . 


Edward Smith ,, 


110 


32 


JIappy Entrance 
Dragon. . . 


Pvichard Kewbery, 
John 8eaman, 


CciptaiQ 


200 
260 


43 
38 


\William and) 
John . . .1 


Xathan'el Jesson ,, 


120 


36 


Convert . . 


Philip Gethiugs 




120 


32 


yicodemus . . 


AVilUam I^edgait ,, 


40 


12 


J'aul . . . 


Anthony Spatchni 


t, ,',' 


120 


38 


^Blossom . . 


Nathaniel Cock „ 


110 


30 


Gift. . . . 


Thomas Salmon , 


" 


130 


3t 











t These ships were hired armed merchantmen. 

The battle that ensued not only went far to decide the result of 
the war, but, owing to the tactical principle involved, was one of 
extreme interest. For both of these reasons it is much to be 
regretted that the evidence is incomplete, and is involved in a 
mass of unintelligible contradiction. 

On sighting the enemy at dawn of June 2nd, the Generals 
weighed with their fleet in the recognised three squadrons,^ and 
stood towards him. The chief interest of the battle attaches to the 
first meeting of the fleets, for it is certain that there was some 
attempt at line formation. Where exactly the meeting took place 
cannot be told with certainty, for it is not known what course the 
Dutch held. It seems probable, however, that while the English 
bore down, the Dutch stood close hauled to the eastward with the 
wind at N.E., in the hope of presently gaining the weather-gauge. 

It has been claimed for AVilliam Penn that he had learnt the 
lesson of the line of battle froin Tromp, and had introduced it into 
the English Navy,^ a thing which may be possible enough, for 
Penn was probably consulted freely by the Generals on matters 
of seamanship and tactics. But Penn's biographer, enthusiastic, 
but ignorant of naval warfare, grossly overstates his case. He 
misreads "fought " for the second " fight " in the following quota- 
tion : ^ " We must fight in a line, whereas we fight promiscuously, to 



' Cal. S. r. Dom. 1652-1653, p. lOi. - d. Penn, i. 399, sqq. 

3 Pepys's ' Piary," 4th July, 1666. 



1653.] NAVAL TACTICS. 189 

our utter and demonstrable ruine : the Dutch fighting otherwise ; 
and we, whenever we beat them." And, referring it to the Four 
Days' Battle of June, 1666, he preaches a homily on his text. The 
result he arrives at is that the battles of the first Dutch wars were 
fought in line ahead, and that the credit was due to William Penn. 
The assertion ^ that the tactics of the day consisted in letting ships 
of a squadron group themselves round their flagship, he scouts as 
ridiculous. The truth would seem to be that both assertions are 
wrong and both partly right. 

The squadronal subdivision was essential. It was, in fact, the 
unit of the fleet. But there was already an appreciation of the line. 
There exists distinct evidence in support of the statement that the 
ideal formation of the time was, with men of wide seamanship, a 
line ahead of small squadrons with the wind abeam. Such progress 
as was made in this direction lay, not in regarding the single ship as 
the unit. With fleets one hundred strong, that was impossible. It 
lay rather in a minuter subdivision. That Marten Tromp was a 
man of masterly ability is a commonplace, but explanations of the 
operation of his genius are far to seek. It would seem, however, 
that the line is due to him ; that the English adopted it from the 
Dutch ; and that Tromp in and after 1639 extended the principle by 
dividing the fleet into as many as fifteen small subdivisions.^ 

At Portland it is possible to see, in the position of Penn's 
squadron, and in his ready movement to support Blake, some 
confirmation of this theory. With regard to the battle of June 2nd, 
direct evidence is to be had. At the Hague, the estimate of the 
English formation was that, " having the wind they stayed on a 
tack at half cannon shot for half an hour, until they put themselves 
into the order in which they meant to fight, which was in file at 
half cannon shot " : ^ and this method of attack w^as observed on 
both days, the English not bearing down to board save when the 
enemy fell into great confusion. The only English account which 
hints at such formation is that of the chaplain of the Besohition, in 
which occur the words : "Our fleet did work together in better order 
than heretofore, and seconded one another " * ; but such silence 
seems to prove merely that the formula, "in line ahead," was not as 
j^et a popular catch-word. 

^ MacphersoD, ' Hist, of Britain,' i. 74, and G. Penn, i. 400. 

2 'Tie de Corneille Tromp,' 118. 

2 Thurloe, S. P. i. 277 ; ' Vie de De Euijter,' 34. * G. Penn, i. 493. 



190 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1653. 

Just before the action began, it was noticed by the Dutch that 
the divisions of the EngHsh fleet were strongly marked, and then 
De Enijter, possibly with a lucky slant of wind, weathered Lawson 
on the Enghsh left. Monck and Deane supported Lawson, the 
latter being killed by a round shot as the Besolution got into action ; 
and Tromp, possibly owing to the English falling somewhat to lee- 
ward in consequence of the lightness of the wind,^ also became 
engaged on the English left.^ But though the fighting was of a 
severe nature, a considerable part of each fleet was not able to come 
into action. 

Before three o'clock the Dutch lost a forty-two-gun ship, of De 
Euijter's squadron, which was sunk by Lawson,^ but then the wind, 
veering, seemed to give them an advantage. The weather-gauge, 
however, was soon lost owing to confusion in the Dutch fleet. 
What the confusion was Dutch writers do not say, but as the 
English were proficient in gunnery, and as the calm day was 
all in favour of the over-gunned English ships, it is not hard to 
understand. 

Having the wind again the English bore down to attack, and the 
fight became general all along the line. We have seen how Tromp 
had been busy on one English wing. That he now fought on the 
other appears from his falling in with Penn in the James. Tromp 
boarded and was beaten off ; Penn in turn boarded, and was only 
dislodged by blowing up the decks of the Brederode. Again he 
returned to the attack, but help came to the Dutchman.'^ At six 
the Dutch bore away before the wind ; and the " frigates " followed 
till dark, the Dutch losing another ship, that of Cornelis van Velsen, 
which blew up.^ 

At night Blake joined the fleet with eighteen fresh ships. 
Tromp had by that time found ammunition running so short, 
especially with De With and De Ruijter, that he determined to draw 
back towards the AVielings on the following morning. To do so he 
steered south with the wind at S.W., the English bearing down to 
intercept him. At eleven o'clock he was on the point of success 
when the wind veered to W.S.W., and fell so hght that he lay 

^ Vanguard^s log, G. Penn, i. 530. 

2 Basnage, 307, 308; G. Penn, i. 496. 

3 'Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 124; 'Col. Eostr.' 125; Tromp to B. G., June 4th in 
Tliurloe, 8. P. i. 270. 

* ' Col. Rostr.' 125, 126. 
^ Thurloe, S. P. i. 270. 



1653.] DEFEAT OF THE DUTCH. 191 

helpless under the lee of the enemy, who at once attacked.^ All 
that he could do was to gather his scattered ships into some sort of 
order. ^ 

For a while the fight was renewed with vigour, but soon dire 
confusion fell on the Dutch fleet. Fireship captains scuttled or 
burnt their vessels and escaped in the boats ; vessels ran foul of one 
another, and either sank or lay at the mercy of the English boarders. 
Some fled. Tromp fired on the fugitives, but with little or no effect. 
The Dutch fleet was, in fact, very badly beaten. 

The end of the day's work, as stated by the Generals, was as 
follows : " After four hours' dispute with them they endeavoured 
what they could to get away from us; but having then a pretty fresh 
gale of wind, we pressed so hard upon them that we sank and took 
many, and do suppose that we should have destroyed most of them, 
but that it grew dark, and being off Ostend, among the sands, we 
durst not be too bold, especially with the great ships." The English 
therefore anchored, and saw Tromp go into the Wielings next 
m.orning. De "With went to the Hague, and openly admitted that 
the English were masters of the sea ; and De Kuijter refused to 
serve again unless the fleet were improved.^ 

Among eleven prizes brought in,* besides small craft, was one 
towed by the Happy Entrance, "a rear-admiral, being far bigger 
than herself," of twelve hundred tons, and fourteen guns on a tier.^ 
About six ships were sunk, two more being burnt or blown up. 
The prisoners numbered one thousand three hundred and fifty, 
including six captains, but of the killed and wounded there is no 
record. 

In the English fleet no ship was lost, nor even seriously 
damaged, though a few vessels were without a bowsprit, and one or 
two without a head. In men the loss was heavy, one hundred and 
twenty-six being killed, including Deane and two captains, and two 
hundred and thirty-six wounded. The Generals' flagship had 
eighteen killed and eight wounded. 

The result of the victory was the closing of the Dutch ports, and 

^ Vanguard's Log, G. Penn, i. 531. 

2 Generals to Cromwell, G. Penn, i. 493 ; Tromp to S. G., June 4, Tliurloe, i. 270. 

3 ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 132. 

* The official list, in Penn, i. 494, is so far borne out by Dutch and other statements 
of losses, that it may be accepted as substantially correct. Cj). Cal. S. P. Dom. 1653, 
pp. 597, 599, etc. ; Log of the Vanguard, G. Penn, i. 422-540. 

s Whitelocke, 532. 



192 MILITABY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1653. 

the maintenance of a rigid commercial blockade.-^ It was Cromwell's 
intention to keep the whole fleet on the enemy's coast, '-^ for, though 
negotiations were resmiied, it was confidently expected that the 
Dutch fleet would again come out to do battle. Such, indeed, was 
the Dutch intention. Tromp refitted in the Maas ; De With 
collected a squadron in the Texel. Their design was to do their 
best to effect a junction and to raise the blockade as soon as they 
were both ready 

Blake did not share in the great fight that ensued. He was 
put ashore seriously ill, at Solebay, after the former victory, and 
there was no hope of his serving again for a considerable period. 
Monck was, therefore, ordered to command in chief for the time 
alone, ^ he being the only man left afloat of the triumvirate of 
December, 1652. The Council, hoping for Blake's recovery, delayed 
the appointment of Penn, who had been suggested by Monck* as a 
colleague, until December 2nd, when Disbrowe was nominated to 
make up the three. Disbrowe never served afloat. Lawson became 
admiral of the White in Penn's place, and was succeeded by 
Badiley,^ in command of the Blue squadron.*^ 

Before the last great battle of the war was fought, there was a 
resumption of peace negotiations, and it was then that the scheme 
for a union between the two republics, which had long been in the 
air, took definite shape. When first advanced by St. John, in 1651, 
the proposal had been merely for " a more intimate alliance," and on 
that basis the Dutch had been ready to treat. But St. John's 
instructions demanded that the Dutch should accept the principle 
blindly, while they, on their part, refused to consider the scheme in 
the abstract. Till after the battle of June 2nd and 3rd, 1653, the 
points of this treaty were never formulated, but, as the result of 

^ The history of this blockade is in the Vanguard's Log, G. Penn, i. 522-540. It 
is as colourless as the records of such service are wont to be. The only important 
capture made was that of two sliips from the Sound laden with three hundred and 
sixty guns for ships then on the stocks. 

2 Hist. MSS. Com. Kep. 13, App. 2, p. 86. 

3 C. 0. S. to Monck, 9tli July, 1653. 
* Monck to C. 0. S. 2nd June, 16o3. 

^ Badiley, on his return from the Mediterranean, had had to meet an attack made 
on him by Appleton, ' A Remonstrance of the Fight in Leghorn Eoad,' etc. : London, 
1653, fol. He replied in pamphlet form, ' Captain Badiley's Reply to Certain Declara- 
tions,' etc. 4to. The best commentary on the matter is this appointment and tlie 
shelving of Appleton. 

•^ G. Penn, i. 578, 579. 



1653.] ACTION OFF KATWIJK. 193 

that battle, Cromwell felt that it was possible to make an advance 
on all former demands. 

Privately at first, publicly afterwards, through the Council of 
State, Cromwell put forward his project for a complete coalition.^ 
By this, with the two countries Under one government, but with a 
great preponderance of material force assured to England, Holland 
as an independent state would have ceased to exist. No wonder, 
therefore, that the ambassadors drew back in the utmost alarm, 
and refused to proceed without consulting the States General. Two 
of their number were sent to Holland for that purpose. While 
they were at sea there was fought the Battle of Scheveningen.^ 

On July 24th, 1653, Tromp sailed out of the Maas with eighty 
men-of-war and five tireships,^ and, for a few days, plied to and fro 
before the mouth of the river. On the '26th, the English off the 
Texel noticed that the ships under De AVith " turned down to the 
outer part of the channel, as we conceive, to have got out and away 
(in the fog) to join with Admiral Tromp." "^ Accordingly a council 
of war was held on the following day, and it was decided that the 
whole fleet should weigh " to meet with Admiral Tromp, having an 
eye to prevent his conjunction with those in Texel." ^ 

The English fleet weighed on the 28th at 8 p.m., and stood north 
with the wind at W.S.W. On the following day Tromp was sighted 
before noon.*^ The wind was westerly, and, had Tromp held on his 
course to the north, he could have weathered the English." But his 
immediate business was to draw the enemy from before the Texel, 
that De "With might come out to join him ; and for that day he 
would have preferred to decline the engagement. He therefore 
tacked, and steered S.S.E., with the English fleet in hot pursuit. 

At about five o'clock the sternmost Dutch ships were brought 
to action off Katwijk ; and, as other English ships came up, the 
fight became pretty general. By about seven o'clock, Monck, who 

1 Basnage, 312. ^ c^ned by the Dutcli the Battle of " ter Heijde." 

^ Thuiioe, S. P. i. 392 ; De With to S. G., 1st August, 1053. The English official 
report stated the numbers as ninety-seven sail, whereof ninety were men-of-war. 
Penn said they Avere eighty-three men-of-war four fireships strong. G. Penn, i. 506. 

* Vanguard's Log, July 26th. = Ih. July 27th. 

^ Monck to President of C. o. S. 31st July. G. Penn, i. 501, says that Monck's 
scouts discovered a fleet about nine, that he stood towards it, and that two hours later 
he made it out to be the Dutch fleet. 

■^ Van guard's Log, July 29th. The wind was light and fickle. Tromp seems to 
have had a breeze at S.W. and to have tacked when it veered to AV.N.W. ' Vie de 
Corneille Tromj-),' 138 ; Basnage, 313. 

VOL. II. O 



194 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1653. 

in the Besolution, had fallen somewhat to leeward, supported by 
Jordan, in the Vanguard, came into action, and it was estimated 
that the English ships engaged that night amomited to thirty sail.^ 
The Dutch rear w^as supported by the whole fleet,- and the fighting, 
though without order, was very severe. Darkness put an end to the 
combat, and left the fleets to prepare for the further struggle that 
was expected on the morrow. In the Dutch fleet De Euijter and 
Cornelis Evertsen, "the Old," suffered most, both having lost 
topmasts;^ and two ships were sunk.* The loss in men must 
have been heavy, if we may judge from the sixteen or seventeen 
killed and twenty-five dangerously or severely wounded on board the 
Resolution alone. ^ 

Tromp had not succeeded in avoiding an engagement and in 
keeping his fleet intact ; but he had avoided a decisive battle, and he 
had drawn the English from before Texel, thus leaving free exit for 
De With. 

At night the English held on their course towards the south, 
thinking that they had the Dutch under their lee ; but with daybreak 
of the 30th it was found that the enemy was to windward.*^ All 
that day it blew hard between AV. and N.W., and both fleets had 
enough to do to haul off the lee shore. Very little was done in 
consequence. Early in the morning, Troinp, in the Brederode, with 
a few ships of his squadron, stood south till he was within range, and 
then fired a few guns ; ' but when Monck and Jordan tacked towards 
him he went about and rejoined his fleet. ^ The English followed, 
making as much northing as the wind would allow. They seem, how- 
ever, to have made little progress, for when the Texel ships joined 
the enemy that afternoon, both fleets were off Scheveningen. De 
AVith brought twenty-seven men-of-war and four fireships, and the 
numbers of the united fleet rose to about one hundred and twenty.® 
The English fleet was roughly the same as that which had fought 
the battle of the 2nd and 3rd of June ; but a few ships had been 
withdrawn for refit, and, although as many as could be made ready, 
and others besides, had been sent out, the fleet was not quite at its 

' Monck to the President of tlie C. o. S. 31st July. 

2 Tromp to States General, 29th July ; ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 138, 139. 

^ Basnage, 313. * G. Penn, i. 506. 

"• Monck to President of C. o. S. July 31st. •= Ih. 

^ Vamiuard's Log, July 30th. « ' Vie de Corneille Trump,' 140. 

' De With to States General, 1st August; Thurloe, S. P. i. 392. 

'" Vanguard's Log, e.g. July Ttli and 23rd. 



1653.] BATTLE OFF SGHEVENINGEN. 195 

former force." De With reported that it numbered ninety sail of 
men-of-war, with twenty-six victuallers and small craft. 

The fleets were within about half a mile of one another in the 
evening, the English being to w^estward of the Dutch ; but the 
weather continued too heavy for an attack to be made, and at night 
it blew harder than ever from the N.N.W. 

By the morning, the wind, which had fallen considerably, was 
blowing from the south. ^ The English, who were a mile and a half 
to windward, off Scheveningen, bore down to attack, and at seven 
o'clock began the last and bloodiest fleet engagement of the war.^ 

The Dutch fleet was again in its usual formation of five 
squadrons, Tromp being on the right wing, and Jan Evertsen in 
the centre.^ As the English bore down, the enemy stood up to 
windward to meet them, and within a few minutes from the firing 
of the first shot, shortly before 7 a.m., the battle grew general. 

Again we have no record of the disposition of the ships or 
squadrons, but again, on good evidence,* we can affirm that the 
English fleet was drawn up in a line of squadrons. Jordan wrote : 
" About seven in the morn, my General tacking to meet them, each 
division followed. Most of the enemy weathered us, but the rest 
were scattered." And this is all that can be told of the opening of 
the fight. It appears, however, that the Dutch broke through the 
English line, instead of weathering the whole fleet, and that fore- 
most among them was the Breclerode. She was engaged with the 
Blue squadron, and, for a time, received so little support,^ that, by a 
concentrated fire, she suffered heavily. There was little wind, and 
the furious cannonade kept up by Tromp shrouded his ship from 
sight in a dense veil of smoke. When this cleared away, the signal 
for a council of war was flying. Such flag-officers as could go on 
board hastened to do so, and there they found the lifeless body of 
their great commander — the only admiral under whom all others 
had been content to serve — the adored of the seamen, the bravest 
and most skilful enemy then known to the EngHsh Navy. From a 

^ VanguanTs Log, e.g. July 31st. 

2 Basnage, 314 ; De With to States General ; ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 140. 

3 Hoste, p. 78, claims that the fleets fought in parallel lines.— " The English when 
first discovered," he says, " were drawn up in a hne four leagues long, and stretching 
N.N.E. and S.S.W." The Vanguard's Log shows us that the English fleet was, at the 
time named, anchored before the Texel, while Hoste infers that it was under way. Of 
the many inaccurate accounts of this battle, there is none more grossly incorrect than 
his, which is demonstrably wrong in every particular. 

* Va7igHard's Log, July 31st. ^ ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 141. 

o 2 



196 



MILITARY HISTORY, 164'J-1G60. 



[i653. 



ship of Goodsonn's division of the Blue squadron a musket-bnllet 
pierced his heart. ^ 

It was decided to keep Tromp's flag flying, and not to let the 
knowledge of his death become general. This was done both to pre- 
vent the dismay which such news would spread in the Dutch fleet, 
and to avoid giving the English any encouragement ; and so well 
was the secret kept that Monck was not aware of the enemy's great 
loss until the battle was over.'- It was agreed that Jan Evertsen 
should assume the command, and with this resolution the Dutch 
admirals returned to their ships and continued the fight with un- 
abated vigour. With the main part of the Dutch fleet to windward, 
the battle raged until one o'clock. De Euijter's ship, the Lam, 40, 




DUTCH MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF M. II. TROMP, lG5o. 
{From an Original kindhj lent by Cajjt. H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenhenj. G.C.B., li.X.) 



was riddled with shot, had only her niizzen left standing, and of a 
crew of one hundred and fifty, lost forty-three killed and thirty-five 
wounded. In this condition she was towed into the Maas, as also 
was Jan Evertsen.^ Many other Dutch ships were in nearly as bad 
a state, and not a few sank amongst the enemy ; but no vessels were 
taken on either side. It has been said that Monck x^urposely re- 
frained from taking prizes and prisoners, because he did not wish the 
movements of his fleet hampered or its strength diminished. There 
is no evidence that he forbade the giving of quarter,* and it is most 

• It was said that the captain of the ship wheuce the shot was fired was instantly 
slain. ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 142. Such was not the case. Ko captain of 
Goodsonn's was killed, though one, Cubitt, was wounded. 

" Monck to the President of the C. o. S. August 1st. 

3 ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 153. "' Buichett, 384 ; ' Col. llostr.' 133. 



1653.] SAVING THE ''TRIUMPHS 197 

improbable that he did so ; but judging from the result, he may 
have advised his captains that the destruction of the enemy's fleet, 
not prize money, should be the object of their endeavours. In 
point of fact, not only was quarter given, but very many men 
were taken up from sinking ships by the English, and were brought 
back as prisoners. 

The English meanwhile had not escaped without heavy loss. 
As has been seen, for a long time the enemy had the wind ; and well 
did they use it. The Oak was burned ; the Worcester, grappling the 
Garland, formerly taken from the English, burnt to the water's edge 
together with her enemy. Fireships were sent down on the English 
flagships. Two grappled the Triumph, bearing the flag of Peacock, 
Vice-Admiral of the Bed, and placed her in a position of extreme 
danger. The fire gained a good hold, and panic seemed to be setting 
in. The Dutch maintained a heavy fire on the burning ship, and a 
third fireship was sent against her.^ But Peacock remained cool in 
the midst of the danger, and his men stood to their guns. The third 
fireship was beaten ofi' ; the grappling irons of the others were cast 
loose ; and, with great difliculty and danger, the flames were got 
under ; but not before the brave Peacock had been most severely 
burned.^ In the same way the Andrew was attacked and half 
burned, Eear-Admiral Graves and many men perishing by fire before 
help was received and the fire quenched. 

The enemy was in no danger in this fight of running short of 
ammunition, for a supply of many thousands of rounds had been 
brought out to them by the fishermen. 

At about one o'clock the English, apparently taking advantage of 
a shift of wind, weathered the enemy. Those of the Dutch fleet 
that had stayed to leeward in the morning were now some way off 
and refused to come into action ; but the Dutch hoped again to 
weather the English and the main body did not yet give way. The 
attempt, however, failed. As De With, who, with Floriszoon, had 
taken up the command, wrote : ^ "We could not get the wind 
of the enemy and divers of our ships are far off", so I have thought 

1 ' Vie de Corneille Tiomp,' 143. 

^ A medal, now rare, was given for tliis service. It is oval, and bears on the obverse 
the picture of a sea fight and the words, " Fok eminent service in saving y.^ 
Triumph tiered in fight w" y" Duch in July 1653." On the reverse side are 
the arms of the three kingdoms suspended from an anchor. Peacock unhappily died 
as the result of his burns. 

^ De With to States General, August 1st. 



198 



MILITABY HISTORY, 1649-1660. 



[1653. 



good to temporize and retire. Afterwards we showed our sides again 
to the enemy towards the south-west," but an hour later De With, 
with thirty ships, w^as covering the flight of many recreant captains. 
Yevy unwillingly did he retire, still fighting bravely and firing on 
the fugitives: "Had they been hanged for doing the like before," 
said he, " they had not now again done this." The English, 
despite their losses, were now in overwhelming force : a vice- 
admiral's ship was sunk alongside the Brederode,^ which, in her 
turn, was with great difficulty kept out of the hands of the English. 
The battle lasted till eight at night, when the retreat became a 
flight, the ships setting their mainsails and what they could carry. ^ 
The Enghsh pursued till midnight, when they hauled off the 
shore. On August 1st, Monck's advice-vessels watched the Dutch 
run into the Texel, whereon the English fleet bore up for home, 
made Yarmouth on the 4th and went into Solebay on the 5th. 

In ships the English had lost the Oak, the Worcester, and a fire- 
ship : ^ in officers and men the loss was heavy, though it cannot be 
stated accurately. Penn put it at two hundred and fifty killed, and 
seven hundred wounded ; * but many unofficial estimates exceeded 
his. The following captains were killed : — ^ 



Andreiv 


. Thos. 


Graves (E.-Adm. of White). 


Golden Cock 


Captain Edward Chapmau. 


William 


9J 


John Taylor. 


Mayflower, merchant 


)> 


William Newman. 


Prosperous . 


9> 


Crisp. 


Phoenix 


?) 


Owen Cox. 


and the wounded included — 






Triuraph 


J James Peacock (Vice-Adm. of lied), 
' \ mortally. 


Laurel 


Captaiu John Stoakes. 


Dragon 


)» 


John Seaman. 


Portland 


?? 


William Eous. 


Assurance . 


?» 


Philip Holland. 


Tulip .... 


)) 


Joseph Cubitt. 



How many ships the Dutch had lost it is impossible to say. De 
With ^ put the loss at fourteen, but Dutch writers assert that five 
of these, including the Garland, got into port very much damaged. 
The English, on the other hand, insisted that they had destroyed 

' Monck to President of C. o. S. July 31st. The sunken ship was (". Evertsen's, 
" the Old." 

^ VarKjuard's Log, July 31st ; 'Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 145. 

^ Monck to President of C. o. S. July 31st. 

•• G. Penn, i. 504. "> Heath, 348. " De With to S. Gen., August 1st. 



1653.] REWARDS FOR THE VICTORS. 199 

twenty or thirty/ Heath putting it at twenty-six. Of the enemy's 
loss in men it is equally difficult to speak, but it included eight 
captains killed, and five, including Cornelis Evertsen, Vice-Admiral 
of Zeeland in his brother's squadron,^ taken, besides some 1300 men, 
who were brought to England. In Holland, August 17th was 
observed as " a day of fasting and prayers." 

After all, the details of the losses^ are unimportant. What is 
important is that though the English were too much shattered 
to keep the sea in August, the Dutch were in no state to offer any 
further resistance on a large scale ; and that though the war dragged 
on till the following year, the decisive blow had been struck and had 
miade the enemy anxious for peace on any terms. 

On August 6th, Parliament voted to Blake and Monck chains of 
gold to the value of £300 each, and to Penn and Lawson others 
worth iGlOO. That the award was made to Blake, who had been 
absent from the last great battle, shows that these chains were given 
for services in the whole war rather than in one particular action. 

The teiuporary raising of the blockade was a great relief to the 
Dutch, though bought at so high a price ; and the outgoing trade 
at N^ce sailed north convoyed by De With with forty ships of war, 
which by degrees were increased to seventy-six.'* But by the middle 
of August, the English North Sea fleet of about forty-five sail 
resumed, under Lawson, its duties on the Dutch coast, ^ and kept a 
sharp look out for De With's return from the Sound. The fleets did 
not come into contact. De With received the Eastland trade from 
its convoy of fourteen Danish men-of-war, and, having added to it 
merchantmen that had gathered from all parts to the northern 
waters, he avoided Lawson, and brought the whole of that enormous 
fleet, some four hundred sail,^ safely into the Zuider Zee. 

This piece of Dutch good fortune was followed, however, by a 
severe mishap to De With's fleet, which, riding off the Texel, was 
struck at the end of October by a heavy three days' gale from the 
N.W. which destroyed or dismasted half of it.'^ 

1 Penn's report in G. Penn, i. 504. 

2 ' Tie de Corneille Tromp,' 118. This was Cornelis Evertsen, " the Old," brother 
of Liut.-Admiraal Jan Evertsen. Served later under De Ptuijter. Fell on the first 
day of the Four Days' Fight, 16G6, having the rank of Lieut. -Admiral. 

^ For various estimates, see G. Penn, i. 504, sqq. ; also Thurloe, i. 4:12, 415, 440. 

* ' Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 159. 

fi Thurloe, S. P. i. 440 ; Whitelocke, 545. 

« ' Vie de De Kuijter,' 43. 

^ 'Vie de Corneille Tromp,' 160; Whitelocke, 549. 



200 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1653. 

The blockade was not formally renewed, both belligerents^ 
confining themselves to the interception of isolated ships and small 
squadrons of merchant vessels. In December, Monck took the 
fleet, refitted, from the river to the Downs, but did nothing beyond 
sending out cruisers.- There is no need to follow in detail the 
many recorded captures of that autumn and winter, for the fate of 
the war was decided ; but a few single ship actions call for passing 
mention. 

On November 15th, the Nonsuch, 88, came much damaged into 
Plymouth, ^vith her boatswain and trumpeter dead, and her 
lieutenant, master, chaplain, and many others wounded.^ Cruising 
near the Soundings she had fallen in with, and brought to action off 
the Lizard, a Dutch man-of-war. She reported other Dutchmen on 
the station; and the Assistance with a consort put to sea to meet 
them. 

At sea the English Navy lost no ship to the enemy. Two 
vessels, however, came to grief, the Lily being wrecked near 
Weymouth in September, and the Sussex being blown up by her 
own powder at Plymouth in December. The latter loss was by far 
the more serious, especially seeing that fifty men perished with 
the ship. 

In December, the Phoenix carried Whitelocke, as ambassador, to 
Sweden, and no sooner had she put him ashore and got well into 
the North Sea than she fell in on the '21st with the Dutch Baltic 
trade, seventy-two sail, going home. Foster at once attacked, but 
without success. He had four men killed and eleven wounded ; was 
utterly dismasted ; and had to get to England as best he could,* a 
task which seems to have employed him for nearly a fortnight. 

In January, 1654, the Sapphire, Captain Nicholas Heaton, 
brought in the Walcheren, man-of-war, and in February a Dutch 
twenty-gun ship was captured by the Amity. Other small fights in 
home waters, were reported from time to time, till the conclusion 
of peace on 5th April. 

It is enough to say that all Cromwell's terms, including the 
Navigation Act, the right of the flag, the claims for damages,^ 
compensation for Amboyna, and the exclusion of the Prince of 

» Whitelocke, 545-549. "- Ih. 557, 562. ^ S. P. L)uui. Int. xli. 150. 

* Foster to Adinlty. Ctee. Cal. S. P. Dom. 3rd January, 1654. 

^ Pulo Eon was restored and £900,000 damages ]iaid. The Amboyna chiim was 
settled for a trifling sum. Basnage, 349. 



1654.] PEACE WITH HOLLAND, DENMARK, PORTUGAL. 201 

Orange were accepted.^ The peace was a very hard one ; but the 
Dutch were fortunate in that one point, the demand for a union of 
the two countries, had been abandoned. Holland was allowed to 
continue to exist as a separate nation. 

Vastly though the peace improved the Protectorate's " position, 
France was still glad to see it concluded, knowing that, if the 
war continued, England's power at sea would become so great 
that there would be no resisting it. Speaking for the Boyalists, 
Hyde wrote to Nicholas, " the news of the treaty has struck us 
all dead."^ 

It was a time for the settling or readjustment of quarrels. The 
war had been against Denmark as an ally of Holland, and Denmark 
was of course included in the peace. The ships which had been 
detained in the Sound were restored, and Holland was made re- 
sponsible for the damage, to the extent of £140,000, which had been 
done to English trade by the Danes. "^ 

The dispute with Portugal was also brought to a close, the 
terms being those which had been proposed in April, 1651.^ The 
main demands had been : (1) the restoration of goods and prisoners ; 
('2) punishment for all who had aided Rupert in his outrages ; 

(3) the payment of the cost of the Lisbon expedition of 1650, 
subject to the deduction of the value of the sugar ships seized ; 

(4) the making good of all damages done by Eupert from Lisbon, 
and the restoration of all prizes of his made in Portuguese harbours. 
The proclamation of peace was delayed ; and the money was not 
actually paid till June, 1656. "^ 

The quarrel with France remained on much the same footing 
as during the war. Reprisals were made far more vigorously by the 
English than by the French, for to the latter a reconciliation was 
the more essential. To avoid an open breach with Cromwell, 
Charles was requested to leave Paris. This he did, going to 
Cologne, and intriguing thence.'^ 

The position of Cromwell thus assured, the suppression of 
privateering was the only essential naval work to be taken in hand. 
With the French the scuffles continued, and, though it would seem 

1 Basnage, 338, 339. 

^ ' Instrument of Government ' and the Induction of Cromwell as Protector ; 
December 16th, 1653. 

^ Clarendon, S. P. Cal. ii. 1693. ■* Whitelocke, 573 ; Basnage, 3-19. 

« S. P. Dom. Int. I. 89, pp. 24-29. "" Whitelocke, 638. 

^ Basnage, 352, 358, 399. 



202 MILITARY EISTOEY, 1649-16G0. [1654. 

that the English were in most cases the aggressors/ the French 
corsairs were reaUy troublesome. 

Blake and Penn were ordered to consider how best to deal 
with the corsairs of Brest ; and a squadron of six ships was made 
ready for the service, other vessels being ordered to watch the 
mouth of the Channel." But the report of the pilots was to the 
effect that a rigid blockade of Brest was, from the prevalence of 
westerly winds, impossible," so that the ships were sent to the 
neighbourhood of Ushant, there to do as best they could. The 
" admiral " of the Brest privateers bore the name of Beach,* a 
name which suggests that he was English ; and his capture was the 
main object. It was not long delayed. At the end of February he 
was brought to action by the Falmouth, Captain Mill, but for the 
time escaped. In the early days of March he fell in with the 
Portsmouth and Constant Warwick. The two ships chased, but 
the Portsmouth soon dropped astern. The Constant Warwick, 
however, came up with him before dark and kept company with him 
all night. In the morning at six o'clock Beach opened fire ; but 
by 2 P.M., with twenty men out of a crew^ of two hundred, killed, 
and with five feet of water in the hold, he cried for quarter. He 
was taken into Plymouth with his ship, the Boijal James, a vessel 
pierced for forty-two guns, but then mounting only thirty.^ The 
prize was added to the Navy as the Sorlings, in memory of her 
cax^ture near Les Sorlingues, or the Scilly Islands.*^ 

The blow went a long way to finish the matter, for on board 
Beach's ship there happened to be at the time of capture a number 
of captains of privateers belonging to Brest. It would seem, how- 
ever, that Beach was presently set free, for in August, 1657, he had 
returned to his old trade. ^ 

Little more trouble came from Brest, though the course of 
French reprisals was not completely stopped until after the con- 
clusion of a peace and the signature of a commercial treaty with 
France on 3rd November, 1655. When Penn sailed on the West 
Indian expedition, which forms one of the main features of the year 

1 ' Col. Kostr.' 139, 140 ; Cal. S. P. Dom., 1st February, 1654. 

•' Cal. S. P. Dom. 1653, 1654, p. 568. ^ lb. 4tli February, 1654. 

* He was apparently the Royalist Piichard Beach who in 1661 was appointed to the 
Crown, and, after having served as a flag-officer and been knighted, died Controller of 
the Victualling Accounts in 1692. — W. L. C. 

° Whitelocke, 507 ; Cal. S. P. Dom. 1654, p. 38. 

« Ih. p. 337. '^ S. P. Dom. Int. clvi. 1. 



1654.] THE QUARREL WITH SFAIN. 203 

1654, he took with him very definite instructions from Cromwell to 
act against the French/ and the peace was not concluded till after 
his return. 

Before proceeding to relate the great undertakings which were 
set on foot in 1654, it remains only to notice the appointment of 
John Bourne to sail in the Essex in command of a squadron of six 
ships destined for the protection of the Newfoundland fisheries.^ 

France and Spain had at length begun to bid for Cromwell's 
favour ; and France, with an offer of Dunquerque, when it should 
once more be taken from Spain, carried the day.^ Cromwell could, 
however, have easily kept peace with both as he had done for so 
long. No one in Europe wished to quarrel with him ; and there 
were more ambassadors at that time at the English Court than had 
been seen there for many a long year. 

To account for Cromwell's determination to make war on Spain, 
it is necessary to consider the state of affairs at home.'* The rule of 
Cromwell was the rule of a conqueror. The success of the Dutch 
War was largely responsible for his installation, and, when the 
excitement of that had subsided, it became evident that to many 
the Instrument of Government was bitterly distasteful. Foremost 
among them were the sterner Eepublicans, and, of course, the 
Eoyalists. These were but two of many factions from which 
trouble might be anticipated ; and it was imperative to divert public 
attention from home poHtics. And by far the best, most natural, 
and most popular way in which Cromwell could do this would be 
by waging a lucrative and successful foreign war. 

As has been seen, Cromwell had to choose an adversary. That 
he chose Spain was due partly no doubt to the ostensible reason, 
of her religious oppression and cruelty ; ^ but chiefly to the wealth 
to be obtained from her. But in estimating the motives for the 
step it must not be forgotten that our West Indian colonial ex- 
pansion had brought us more and more into contact with Spain, 
and that a settlement of all questions thus arising with her had to 
be attempted sooner or later. And, taking advantage of the old 
doctrine of " no peace south of the Hne," the war might be waged 
elsewhere than in Europe until a formal declaration should become 
convenient. 

1 G. Peun, ii. 25. ' Cal. S. P. Dom. 1654, p. 241, 3rd July. 

3 Basnage, 400. •* Ih. 

^ G. Penu, ii. 21. Cromwell to Penn. 



204 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1654. 

The armament of two fleets was openly pushed forward dming 
the summer, one destined for Blake, who was at length restored to 
health, the other for Penn/ But the objective of each was kept in 
profound secrecy, and both France and Spain were painfully anxious 
to see where the blow would fall.^ 

In the course of that summer, Penn, always a Eoyalist at heart, 
but loyal to the national interest so long as the war lasted, wrote to 
Charles at Cologne that he was prepared to place at his Majesty's 
disposal the fleet which he was about to command, if a secure port 
could be named in which to deliver it.^ But Charles, though, 
according to Clarendon, he received a very similar offer from 
Venables, who was to command the soldiers during the expedition, 
could not name a port.'* He desired the officers to continue their 
enterprise, and to wait a favourable opportunity. It will be not 
amiss to say that Penn and Venables were not in one another's 
confidence. This is enough to show w^hat need Cromwell had to 
think of diverting men's minds. 

Penn's commission was dated October 9th. After enumerating 
Spanish outrages in America, assaults on planters, and the like, it 
went on to suggest that the King of Spain's object then was " the 
ruin and destruction of all the English plantations, people, and 
interest in those parts." ^ Penn and Venables were therefore ap- 
pointed for the express purpose of attacking that monarch in the 
West Indies. Besides dealing with his shipping, they were 
authorised to land men upon any of the dominions and posses- 
sions of the King of Spain in America." The continuance of 
reprisals against France was also part of their care, as well as 
the maintenance of the provisions of the Navigation Act. 

In view" of the experience of this expedition, it is important to 
remember that neither Penn nor Venables ' was chained to a hard 
and fast plan. 

An advance squadron was despatched as soon as it was ready ; ^ 
and, a little later, on Christmas Day, 1654, Penn weighed from 
Spithcad. The force was composed of thirty-eight ships and four 

^ The comprehensive account of lliis expedition is in Granville Penn, ii. 1-142. 
Tliis is the first history of the business written from original documents. 

2 Hci)\vorth Dixon, ' Blake,' 271. ^ q.^ pg„y^ jj^ ^4^ 

* Clarendon, iii. 576. ^ G. Penn, ii. 21, aqq. 

'^ J Ik 24. -' lb. 28. 

^ Hist. MSS. Com. Pc]). 1."., Ajip. 2, p. 88 ; and Swi/tsure's Log, Dec. 20tb, in 
G. Penn, ii. 50, fi'j'j. 



1655.] 



THE EXPEDITION OF PENN AND VENABLES. 



205 



small craft, with three thousand soldiers. A further regiment was 
to be enrolled at Barbados, and arms were to be there embarked. 

Penn's Fleet for the West Iniuks.' 



Kates. 


Ships. 


Seamen. 


Soldiers. 


Guns. 


Captains. 


2 


Swiftsuri- 


350 


30 


60 


(William Perm, General. 
\Jonas Poole, Captain. 


2 


Paragon 


300 


30 


54 


W. Goodsonn, Vice-Admiral. 


8 


Torringtoii ..... 


280 


30 


54 


George Dakins, Rear- Admiral. 




Marston Moor .... 


280 


30 


54 


Edward Blagg. 


3 


Gloucester 


280 


30 


54 


Benjamin Blake. 


3 


Lion 


230 


30 


44 


John Lambert. 


3 


Mathias 


200 


30 


44 


John White. 


3 


Inxlian 


220 


30 


44 


— Terrv. 


4 


Bear 


150 


30 


36 


Francis Kirby. 


4 


Laurel 


160 


30 


40 


William Crispin. 


4 


Portland 


160 


30 


40 


TRichard) Newbery. 


4 


Dover 


160 


30 


40 


Robert Sanders. 


4 


Great Charity .... 


150 




36 


Leonard Harris. 


4 


Heartsease 


70 


160 


30 


Thomas AVri^ht. 


4 


Discovery 


70 


160 


30 


Thomas AVills. 


4 


Convertinc 


75 


200 


30 


John Hayward. 


4 


Katherine 


70 
( 


200 
1830) 


30 


Willoughby Hannam. 


5 


20 ships for transports . 


1145 


38 
horses] 


352 




6 


Martin, galley .... 
4 small cralt. 


60 




12 


William Vesey. 



The outward passage was good, and Barbados was reached on 
January 29th. It was found that the Dutch were engaged in an 
illicit trade with that colony, and eight Dutch ships were seized ; ^ 
but it was found to be impossible to raise the expected reinforce- 
ments there, or to find the desired arms.'' By one method or 
another, however, the land force was at last nearly doubled,* and 
while the force still lay at Barbados, a regiment of one thousand 
two hundred seamen was formed, and Goodsonn, the vice-admiral, 
was appointed by Penn to command it ashore as colonel.^ 

The fleet sailed from Barbados on March 31st, 1655 ; and, after 
touching at and raising troops in Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis and 
8t. Kitts,*^ reached Hispaniola, the primary object of attack. On 
April 13th the fleet made San Domingo, and the greater part of the 

' Granville Penn, ii. pp. 17, 18. (Cori'ected by W. L. C.) 

^ Commissioner Butler to Cromwell, February 7th. 

" Winslow to Thurloe, March 16th. 

* Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. 13, App. 2, p. 21. 

" G. Penn, 73, 74. 

'^ Butler to Cromwell, Jime, 1655. 



206 MILITABY IIISTORT, 1649-1660. [1655. 

army, four thousand strong, landed with Venables ten leagues to 
leeward of the town, the fleet, with the remainder of the force, 
keeping under way to the eastward.^ The men who went ashore 
carried three days' provisions, but no entrenching tools ; and as 
Venables presently discovered this want, and many other deficiencies, 
much time was wasted. On the 14th the remaining troops were 
landed, also to leeward of San Domingo, inasmuch as no landing 
could be found to windward ; and meanwhile some of the lee 
division of the fleet exchanged frequent shots with the town.^ 

The success of the affair depended entirely on Venables and the 
army. Penn had brought him to the chosen landing-place, and 
supplied him with everything he demanded from the ships. All 
that Venables had to do was to march forward with seven thousand 
men and capture the town. Penn lay with eleven ships, including 
both the second-rates, within shot, ready to stand closer in and 
batter the forts when the army should approach the town ; ^ but on 
the 25th the troops were disgracefully beaten and Venables refused 
to make any further attempt. 

It is needless here to enter into a defeat which concerns only the 
land service ; but in extenuation of Venables's failure on the occa- 
sion, it is fair to point out that he was seriously unwell, and that his 
troops were an undisciplined rabble.* What little credit can be 
assigned to any one is due to the regiment of seamen, who, when 
the army was in full flight under the walls of San Domingo from a 
small party of Spaniards and negroes that had burst upon them from 
an ambush, stood its ground and beat the enemy off.^ 

Penn offered to support the army with the fleet if another attack 
should be made, but he found in the land officers a disinclination to 
trust themselves to their men, "for they would never be brought 
to stand."® Yet, as the fleet and army could not go home empty- 
handed, an attempt upon Jamaica was decided upon. 

Penn himself was eager that Hispaniola should be again at- 
tempted, and offered to stand off to sea for a few days with the 
army on board, to allow the enemy to disperse, and, then returning, 
to try to surprise the town. But again he was refused. 

' Swiftsure's Log, April 13tli. 

^ Butler to Cromwell, June, 1655. 

^ Butler to Cromwell ; and Swiftsurts Log, April 18th, sqq. 

"* He bad also embarrassed himself by allowing his wife to accomiiany him. 

^ Swiftsure's Log, April 28th ; Venables to Montagu, May 26th. 

« n. 30th. 



1655.] CAPTURE OF JAMAICA. 207 

On May 4th the fleet left Hispaniola, and reached Jamaica on 
the 10th. Penn went on board the Martin, a galley drawing little 
water, and led the way in, saying that " he would not trust the 
army if he could come near with his ships." -^ Other small vessels 
followed the Martin under the walls of the fort, while the larger 
ships anchored in the harbour. A brisk cannonade was maintained 
between the Martin and the fort, until the boats had set the troops 
ashore ; when the Spaniards ran without waiting for an attack. 
Venables did not land till he saw that no resistance had been 
offered, and, though the boats came cheering close past the Martin, 
on board which he was, " he continued walking about, wrapped up 
in his cloak, with his hat over his eyes, looking as if he had been 
studying of physic more than like the general of an army." ^ The 
town surrendered next day, and the whole island by the 17th. 

Penn and Venables stayed for a month, seeing to the pacification 
of the island, and sending cruisers along the Spanish main.^ They 
then resolved to return home with the chief part of the fleet.* 
There was good reason for this step, for provisions were hard to 
come by at Jamaica ; the fleet might be useful nearer home ; the 
army needed the fleet no longer ; and, lastly, the enemy had no 
great naval strength in those waters. Accordingly Goodsonn was 
appointed to command-in-chief,^ while Dakins went home with 
Penn. The ships left on the station were the'' Torrington, Martin, 
Gloucester, Marston Moor, Laurel, Dover, Portland, Grantham, 
Selhij, Hound, Fahnouth, and Arms of Holland, with three brigs 
and a dogger. 

On May 25th, a disaster befel the fleet." The Discovery took 
fire in the steward's room, and burned till the fire reached her 
powder, when, having one hundred and twenty barrels on board, 
she blew up "with a very terrible blow," putting the Swiftsure, 
which rode next her, in great danger.^ The loss was the greater 
because many provisions, as well as the Swiftsure' s lower deck 
guns, had only that day been transferred to her. Most of the 
guns, however, were soon recovered. 

On June 25th, Penn left Jamaica and sailed for England, hoping 

^ Butler to Cromwell, June, 1655. ^ G. Penn, ii. 32. 

3 Hist. MSS. Com. Rep. 1.3, App. 2, p. 91. 

* Swiftsure's Log, May 24th. = Thurloe, S. P. iii. 582. 

« lb. 584. ■^ Stviftsure's Log, 25tli May. 

* The accident seems to have been due to careless drawing of the brandy which, in 
lieu of beer, was carried by the ships of the expedition. 



208 MILITARY BISTORT, 1649-1660. [1655. 

to fall in with the Spanish Havana fleet before he should pass the 
Florida Channel. But the flota was never sighted/ and the only 
event of note before the fleet reached home, was the loss of the 
Paragon, which took fire at sea on July 13th, and was burnt with 
a loss of one hundred and ten men. After a passage retarded by 
calms, the fleet dropped anchor at Spithead on August 31st. Penn 
himself at once went round to Chatham, whence on 11th September 
he was summoned to attend before the Council, as was Venables on 
the 20th. Both were examined, chiefly on the resources of Jamaica, 
of which they spoke highly ; ^ and both were at once committed to 
the Tower. 

It is rather hard to guess why this step was taken. Certainly 
it was not due, in Penn's case, to the failure at San Domingo, for 
Cromwell very well knew the importance of what had been accom- 
plished. It is possible to suppose that Cromwell was aware of 
Penn's correspondence with the Royalists. The same may possibly 
have been the case with regard to Venables," though the confine- 
ment of the latter was well merited by his gross mismanagement. 
The imprisonment was not for long. Penn was released * on 
making an abject submission. 

Meanwhile, Goodsonn was acting energetically enough, if with 
no startling effect. On 31st July he left Jamaica to go over to the 
mainland with his squadron. He wished to surprise Rio Hacha, 
but was so much delayed by the shoal water that the attempt 
became useless, as the Spaniards had ample warning to carry off all 
treasure. The same was the case at Santa Marta ; but there, 
though he got little plunder, he sacked the town and captured 
thirty guns. Before returning to Jamaica, he attempted Cartagena, 
where six ships lay, but could do nothing.^ During the winter, the 
force suffered somewhat from sickness, but in March, Goodsonn 
wrote that the soldiers were "fit to clear the island of Spaniards 
and make it secure for the planters," who were yet to come; and 
that " the fleet are in a prosperous condition and ready to embrace 
any action they may be put upon."" 

On April oth, 1656, Goodsonn sailed again, this time for a five 

' Peun to Goodsonn, 24:tli July. 

- Tluu-loe, S. P. iv. 28. 

^ Gr. Penn, ii. 1-4, 15 and 135, sqq. 

* Cal. S. P. Dom. p. 396, 25th October, 1G55. 

« Thurloe, S. P. iv. 159 ; Goodsonn to C. o. S. 

" Th. 600-602 : Goodsonn to Cromwell. 



1654.] BLAKE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 209 

months' cruise/ leaving eight or nine of the heaviest ships behind 
him. He lost nothing, but gained nothing, the second cruise being 
as little successful as the former. He did not remain at sea so 
long as he intended, but returned to Jamaica at the end of May, 
possibly because he had heard that the Spaniards at Cartagena 
intended to land one thousand men on the island.^ 

There Benjamin Blake, who had been acting as vice-admiral, 
quarrelled with Goodsonn, probably on some point of command, 
and, rather than be court-martialled, resigned his commission and 
went home. Goodsonn took no steps against him, but furnished 
Thurloe with the facts of the case, to be used only in the event of 
Blake's trying to vindicate himself.^ 

In August, finding that several ships, were unfit to remain 
abroad, he decided to return home. He moved his flag from the 
Torrington, first to the Marston Moor, and afterwards to the 
Mathias, in which he sailed for England, where he arrived, in 
very bad health, on 18th April, 1657. 

In the Channel and North Sea little had been done in the 
interval beyond checking the privateers and enforcing the Naviga- 
tion Act ; so that the two years' command held by Lawson in the 
Downs was uneventful. 

But Blake had, in the meanwhile, still further added to his great 
name. 

On September 29th, 1654, he had sailed for the Mediterranean, 
with instructions to continue reprisals against the French, to curb 
the African pirates, and, in general, to take charge of the English 
interests which had been so sadly neglected during the Dutch War. 

His fleet, as originally formed, consisted of the following ships ^ 
(see next page), together with five smaller craft. 

Of the destination and purpose of Blake's fleet, nothing was 
known in Europe ; and speculation was busy. At Paris it was 
believed that the intention was to attack the Duke of Guise, who 
was then preparing for his expedition to Naples. " However, Guise 
escaped this pull," says a Paris news letter.^ 

Spain, which had been anxious while the fitting-out was in 
progress, was lulled to security when it was found that Blake's 
course was not to the westward. Blake's orders, indeed, were to 

1 Thurloe, S. P. 748. * G. Penn, ii. 150, 151 (corrected). 

2 Jh. iv. 695. 5 Thurloe, S. P. iii. 41, ii. 653. 
^ lb. V. 154. 

VOL. II. P 



210 



MILITARY EISTOBY, 1649-1660. 



[1654. 



Ships 










Meu. 


Guns. 


Captains. 








(■Robert Blake, General. 
\John Stoakes, Captaiu. 


Georgt . 










350 


60 


Andrew 










300 


54 


Eichard Badiley, Vice-Admiral. 


Un icorn 










300 


54 


Joseph Jordan, Eear- Admiral. 


Langport . 
Hampshire 










260 


50 


Eoger Cuttance. 










160 


34 


Eobert Blake. 


JL 

Bridgeivuttr 










260 


50 


Anthony Earning. 


Foresiqht . 








160 


36 


Peter Mootham. 


Worcester . 








240 


46 


William Hill. 


Plymouth 










! 260 


50 


Eichard Stayner. 


Ktrdish 












170 


40 


Edward Witteridge. 


Diamond 












160 


36 


John Harman. 


Tminton 












160 


36 


Thomas Foules. 


Rulij . 












160 


36 


Edmund Curtis. 


Keivcastle 












180 


40 


Nathaniel Cobham. 


Amity . 












120 


30 


Henry Pack. 


Mermaid 












100 


22 


James Ableson. 


Pearl . 












100 


22 


Ben. Sacheverell. 


3J aid stone 












140 


32 


Thomas Adams. 


Princess Maria 








150 


34 


John Lloyd. 


Elias . 












140 


32 


John Symonds. 



be friendly with Spain. There was to be no war in Europe till 
Cram well should have stolen a march "beyond the line;" and an 
alarm might have resulted in the non-sailing of the Havana fleet. 
Till well on into the next year, when Penn's proceedings were 
known, Blake maintained cordial relations, and received civility and 
support, in Spanish harbours. There was good reason for this, 
however, w^hen it appeared that the fleet was intended to do Spain 
the excellent service, which she could never undertake for herself, of 
reducing the pirates. How little a rupture was expected is shown 
by a letter from the Dutch ambassador in France to the States 
General. This expresses a belief that the English fleet was intended 
to enter the Spanish service.^ 

After touching at Cadiz, ^ Blake went on to Leghorn, where, it 
is said, he extorted compensation from the Grand Duke for the 
expulsion of Appleton. But evidence of this is wanting, nor can it 
be proved that he received 60,000 ducats from the Pope as amends 
for the sale of Rupert's prizes in the Papal States.^ 

From Leghorn, Blake had intended to sail for Trapani and 
thence to Tunis ; but on receipt of news that Tunis Bay was full of 
men-of-war bound eastward for the service of the Sultan, he altered 

^ Thurloe, S. P. iii. 102. ^ Whitelocke, 591. 

3 Campbell, ii. 43 ; Ludlow, ii. 507. Most of Blake's letters for this period are lost, 
but in such as remain there is no reference to any important doings either at Leghorn 
or at Civita Vecchia. 



1655.] THE ATTACK ON PORTO FARINA. 211 

his plans and proceeded to Tunis direct. On February 7th he 
arrived/ and at once sent on shore a paper of demands. But, 
though the Bey professed anxiety to conckide a firm peace, no 
restitution was obtainable. " On this we sailed to Porto Farina,^ 
where the men-of-war lay blockaded by our frigates. We found the 
ships unrigged, their guns planted, and a camp formed ashore. An 
attack seemed difficult. We had only five days' drink, and were not 
satisfied that our instructions allowed of our attacking. We there- 
fore sailed off leaving the Plymoiith, Kentish, Mermaid, Foresight, 
Newcastle and Taunton for that service." 

Blake went to Cagiiari to get drink and to make up his mind as 
to an attack. On March 14th he wrote ^ that his intention was to 
sail with the first fair wind, and endeavour " to bring the business 
... to an end." On March 18th he returned to Tunis, and found 
the Bey more intractable than before. The English were not 
allowed even to buy bread ; and remonstrance was met by a request 
that Blake should cast his eyes on the forts and ships.* Blake did 
look at the forts and ships, and determined to attack them. When, 
with reference to this operation, it is said that Blake was the first 
to use ships against forts, a partial truth only is told. But he was 
the first to do so on a large and successful scale. 

There were nine vessels lying unrigged in Porto Farina on 
April 4th ^ when the attack was delivered. The harbour itself is a 
small bay in the left bank, and at the mouth, of the Medjerda ; and 
is almost closed to the south by a spit of land which is a continua- 
tion of the left bank of the river, and which runs back on itself. On 
the spit of land was a fort mounting twenty guns, and along the 
shores of the bay were other works. Opposite the town were the 
ships. Blake divided his fleet into two divisions, the lighter ta 
attend to the ships, the heavier to batter the forts. 

Standing into the harbour with a gentle breeze, the ships took 
up their stations in perfect order under a severe fire. There were 
two advantages in Blake's favour. The first and main one was the 
enormous superiority of the English gunners, a superiority which 
was not taken into consideration by the Tunisians. The second was 
fortuitous. The breeze that had brought Blake into the harbour 

1 Thurloe, S. P. iii. 232. Blake to Thurloe. 

2 Or El Bahira. 

3 Thurloe, S. P. iii. 232. Blake to Thurloe. 
* Ih. iii. 390. 

^ ' Columna Eostrata,' 141. 

p 2 



212 MILITABl HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1655. 

continued to blow steadily towards the town, enveloping the enemy 
in a dense cloud of smoke. 

Soon the forts were breached, and the guns dismounted ; and 
then came the second part of the work. The boats were manned, 
and, under the command of Stoakes, pulled straight for the ships, and 
boarded. The enemy was sufficiently demoralised to make no great 
resistance. The ships were set on fire, and the squadron drew out 
of the bay to the roads. The loss of twenty-five Englishmen killed 
and forty-eight wounded shows that the enemy's fire had not been 
very deadly ; yet it had been a most gallant action, the difficulty of 
which is apt to be under-estimated by reason of its complete success. 
Blake's doubts as to what the Protector would think of the engage- 
ment w^ere set at rest by the receipt of a very gracious letter.^ 

Meanwhile, in Spain, doubt as to what Penn's movements might 
be was followed by certainty.^ There was no further need of 
disguise, and Blake received orders to cruise off Cadiz for the 
interception of the Plate fleet, and to prevent the sending of 
reinforcements to the West Indies. At Madrid it was believed 
that, by his orders, he was authorized to act against Spain from 
August Ist,^ a belief borne out by his not attacking a Spanish fleet 
on July 15th, and by his subsequent capture of two rich Dun- 
querquers early in August. Such, however, was not the case. He 
received his orders in July,^ and did not attack on July 15th purely 
because the weather and the condition of his fleet, which was very 
foul and defective,^ made it impossible. He stationed himself off 
Cape St. Mary to try to intercept the incoming Plate fleet, but had 
to give up the cruise in the autumn. Besides the state of his ships 
he had his own health to consider ; and by his instructions a large 
measure of discretion had been allowed to him." He therefore left 
the coast, and reached home on October 9th. 

In addition to the more visible results of the work done, which 
included an agreement with Algier, and the affair at Tunis, he had 
accomphshed something else of importance. He had reinstated the 
English flag in the Mediterranean, and had shown that the time 
had come when the Navy recognised its duties for the protection of 

1 Thui-loe, S. P. iii. 547. 

2 Ih. iii. 417, 609, 610 ; Whitelocke, 602. 

3 Thuiioe, iii. 698, 718. 

* Thurloe, S. P. iii. 547. Cromwell to Blake. 
^ Ih. iii. 611, 620. 
« Thurloe, S. P. i. 724. 



1656.] STAYNER AND THE GALLEONS. 213 

traders, and would no longer systematically leave them to fight their 
own battles to the best of their power. 

The peace with France, October 3rd, 1655, was followed a month 
later by a commercial treaty ; and there was no longer any difficulty 
on hand save that with Spain. And this, after mutual reprisals 
towards the end of 1655, resulted in the formal declaration of war 
by Spain in February 1656. 

At the beginning of the new year Blake asked for a colleague ; 
and, by Cromwell's choice, Edward Montagu ^ was appointed, and 
the fleet again sailed for the Spanish coast. Blake and Montagu 
were in the Naseby; and Lawson was appointed on January 25th to 
sail as vice-admiral in the Besolution. But before the fleet left 
England he was suddenly removed from his command on political 
grounds. His old command in the Downs had been given to 
Badiley. 

There is no need to follow minutely the doings of the fleet on 
the Spanish coast in 1656 ; for the record of a blockade is marked by 
few striking incidents so long as the enemy elects to stay in port. 
One incident of note there was, but in that Blake and Montagu 
did not share. When they, with the major part of the fleet, had 
left the neighbourhood of Cadiz and gone to Oeiras Bay for water 
and provisions, the Spanish West India fleet appeared on the 
coast. 

Stayner, in the Speaker, was lying off Cadiz with a squadron of 
six " frigates " when the fleet was reported. In his own words : — ^ 

" In the evening (8tli September) we esjiied eight sail some five or sis leagues to 
the westward of Cadiz, we using the best means that we could to meet with them 
next day, which we did ; it being little wind at N.E. It was nine of the clock before 
we came up with them ; but having a fresh gale in the night, all but we and the 
Bridgewater were to the leeward, and could not come up to us. It proved to be the 
Spanish fleet come from the West Indies, which were four of the King of Spain's 
three merchantmen, and one prize, a Portuguese. We engaged the fleet, but being 
within four leagues of Cadiz, could not stay for our ships ; but we, the Bridgewater 
and Plymouth engaged them, and had a sharp dispute, some of us. But the admiral 
being the smallest ship, we slighted her, for we conceived there was some policy used 
in the flag ; by which meaus, the admiral and the Portuguese prize got into Cadiz. 
The vice-admiral, and one more, we sunk, and burnt two ; we took one. The captain 
of her, which we have on board, saith she hath in her two millions of silver. The 
vice-admiral hath as much, I do believe. The Plymouth chased another, who came 
ashore near St. Peter's ; but it seems they had no silver in her. The ship we took is as 
good as all the fleet besides. The other, tliat Captain Harman hath taken, is very 



^ Or Mountagu, afterwards First Earl of Sandwich. 
^ Stayner to the Generals, G. Penn, ii. 155, 156. 



214 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1656. 

rich ; but little silver in her. Both the prize and our ship are sorely wounded, both in 
masts and hull. There is no news, only I believe the fleet will follow us ; the galleys 
came out. . . . This is all ; only there is a loss of men in some ships, the number I 
know not." 

The action thus modestly and hastily reported, was, from the 
quantity of treasure sent to England, quite enough to make the war 
popular. Much as we may congratulate Stayner on the happy 
event, it is impossible to avoid sympathy for the Spanish vice- 
admiral. His ship, which had fought for six hours before taking 
fire,^ had on board the Marques de Baclajos, who with all his family 
was returning from Lima, whereof he had been Governor for many 
years. Husband and wife, one son and a daughter were burned, 
and the rest were left destitute. 

Montagu in the Sjjeaker, with others of the great ships, 
convoyed the treasure home. The captor went with him, but 
rejoined the fleet in the spring. The resolution voted in Parliament 
on October 1st "that the w^ar with Spain was taken on just and 
necessary grounds, and the Parliament doth approve thereof,"^ was 
probably due to the new argument presented on the war's behalf. 

Blake, though broken in health, stayed out during the winter 
with the remainder of the fleet to endure the hardships of the 
blockade. But it w^as not until Stayner had rejoined in the spring- 
that Blake received news of the treasure-ships which Blake wished 
to intercept. He at once weighed, and on April 20th was off Santa 
Cruz de Tenerife, where the fleet, sixteen in number, was discovered 
moored in the harbour.^ At the entrance to the bay stood a strong 
castle, while round it lay a fringe of smaller forts mounting four or 
six guns each, and connected with one another by a breastwork 
manned with musketeers. The Spaniards were aware of the 
threatened attack ; they had strengthened the defences, landed 
the silver, and kept their men continually on board the ships which 
were held in readiness to sail. It was intended to make no further 
attempt to get to Spain that year, and the fleet was provisioned 
for its return to the Indies.* And the dangers from the many 
heavy guns both in the ships and ashore were intensified by other 
circumstances. 

As Nelson found in later days, the wind at Tenerife is nearly 
always foul for an attack on the harbour. Either it blows off shore, 

' Ct. Penn, ii. 157. ^ jjeath, 391. 

^ Whitelocke, 643. * S. T. Dom. cliv. 104. 



1657.] TEE ATTACK AT SANTA CBUZ. 215 

squally and patchy, involving ships in the risk of being becalmed 
within range ; or there blows dead into the harbour a steady breeze 
with which it is very easy to get in, but impossible to get out. With 
such a wind there could be no such thing as partial failure : there 
could be no drawing back. Either Blake must win a complete 
victory, or he must be annihilated. Few men would have taken the 
risk ; and the daring necessary to such an action raised Blake's 
name higher than it had ever stood before. 

The Spaniards had ten ships drawn up in a semicircle at the 
bottom of the bay off the town, and the six greatest galleons were 
moored in line opposite to the entrance to the harbour. Doubtless 
Blake saw what the Spaniards did not, that the six masked the tiro 
of the ten. 

On the morning of April 'iOth, with a sea breeze and a flowing 
tide, Blake stood in to the bay. His plan was simplicity itself ; to 
destroy the ships and castles before the tide turned, and to trust to 
the ebb to take him out. Stayner led, with instructions that his 
division should attack the galleons while Blake dealt with the forts. 
Accordingly the Speaker, Bridgewater, Providence, Plymouth and 
the other vessels which were with the vice-admiral bore down on 
the galleons, and, as they closed with them, came up to the wind 
and anchored broadside to broadside. To have attempted to anchor 
by the stern between these ships for the purpose of raking them, 
would have exposed the attackers in their turn to a raking fire from 
the ships inshore. As Blake must have foreseen, the fight raged 
chiefly round the galleons. The w^hole six were taken ; but, as soon 
as the forts realised that they had passed into English hands, they 
opened a heavy fire on the prizes. Blake gave orders to burn them. 
This was done, and the smaller vessels too were set in flames. 
Then with the ebb the English had already begun to drift out, 
when a steady land breeze at S.W., an occurrence of the utmost 
rarity among those islands, sprang up. The English loss was forty 
killed and one hundred and ten wounded, and the Speaker was 
rendered unfit for service. How many men the Spaniards lost it 
is impossible to say. Heaven itself fought for the English, as 
Blake might have said. The breeze took them all the way back to 
Cadiz, where they lay till the great seamen received permission to 
go home. 

On July 17th, ^ leaving many of the ships under Captain Stoakes 
^ H. P. Dom. Int. clvi. 17 ; Robert Clarke to Admlty. Com. 



216 MILITARY HIS TOBY, 1649-1660. [1657. 

to finish off the work, whether against Spain or against the pirates, 
Blake set sail for England. But he never saw home again, strong 
as was his desire to live till he could be put ashore. His health 
had been permanently shattered by the hard life of the sea, with 
the added malady of a scorbutic fever, and he died on board the 
George on August 7th, 1657, at the entrance to Plymouth Sound. 
He had not the glorious end of Nelson, but, like Nelson, he fell 
only when his work had been brought to completion. The naval 
history of the period is, with small exceptions, the story of his life ; 
and to him more than to any man had been due the success of 
the Navy and the uplifting of his country. " He was a man of as 
much gallantry and sincerity as any in his time, and as successful." ^ 

Four days after Blake died Eichard Badiley.^ 

Just before he left the station, Blake had received instructions to 
afford help to the Portuguese, should any attempt be made on their 
coasts by the Spaniards.^ Stoakes narrowly watched Cadiz, where, 
after Blake's departure, a great fleet of forty-two sail lay fitting for 
sea ; * but he noticed little progress ; and at the end of November, 
the Spanish vice-admiral took fire and was burnt. This stopped 
preparations altogether ; and Stoakes, keeping ten sail with him, 
sent the rest home under Jonas Poole, his vice-admiral.^ 

With the ten, namely the Lyme, Captain Stoakes, admiral ; Fair- 
fax, Captain Whetstone; Phoenix, Captain Thomas Bonn; Tredagh, 
Jersey, Torrington, Dover, Tiger, Yarmouth, and Malaga Merchant, 
Stoakes passed the Straits. In January, 1658, he was at Leghorn, 
taking measures against piracy ; and he intended to go at once to 
Tunis "to make peace if possible. If not, then to do damage."^ 
His plan involved the keeping of three " frigates " cruising to the 
north of Sicily ; and thus he had only six with him. Unlike Blake, 
he felt called upon to resent paying a price for such captives as 
the Bey should liberate;'^ and he would have fought had his 
force been stronger. But with six weak ships he could do nothing 
against the rebuilt forts, and eight ships of war which lay 
in Porto Farina. He did. however, conclude a satisfactory treaty 
with the Bey.^ His fleet varied considerably in the course of 
his long command, and in November, 1658, three of his ships, 

1 "Whitelocke, 664. ^ j^,_ s c^l. P. P. Dom. 1657, p. 368. 

* S. P. Dom. Int. clvii. 64. Stoakes to Adlty. Comtee. 

^ Ih. 145. « Ih. clxxix. 13. 

^ Ih. 88. 5 Ih. clxxxii. 35. 



1658.] CAPTURE OF PAPACHINO. 217 

the Phcenix, the Bristol, and the Hampshire, cruising between 
Sicily and Sardinia, met " that famous rover, Victorio Papachino, 
the prince of Spanish pirates.^ He was so confident as to give 
us chase, taking us for three Bacallao men. We chased him for 
nearly seven hours before we could bring him by the lee, and 
would not have effected it then had not his sails been all shot to 
pieces. The force of his vessel is ten guns and some pedereros.^ 
She sails well, on which account Papachino always kept her full 
of men for the purpose of boarding. She had but one hundred and 
sixteen men when taken, Captain Kempthorne having killed and 
spoiled the rest. The news of his being in our hands is very 
welcome in this place, and the French are no less joyful than 
ourselves." 

Such was the style of the effective work done by Stoakes ; who 
sailed for home on July 29th, 1659, and dropped anchor in the 
Downs on September 16th. 

In northern waters there was little of note for English ships to 
do at this time. The fighting that delivered up Mardijk and 
Dunquerque to England did not affect the Navy. A fleet of twenty- 
six ships was present at the time off Dunquerque for blockade duty, 
but its service was confined chiefly to passive endurance during 
the severe winter of 1657-1658. 

There was, throughout the period of the Protectorate, continual 
trouble in the Sound ; but England was able to avoid being drawn 
into the eddies. In the spring of 1657, war broke out between the 
Danes and Sweden ;^ and Holland was looked to to help the Danes, 
who were somewhat severely pressed. This, owing to want of in- 
structions, the Dutch fleet did not at first do ; but on receipt of 
orders from the States General, it subsequently took the part of the 
Danes. Thus it was that early in November, 1658, there was fought 
in the Sound that extremely bloody battle in which the Dutch were 
indeed victorious, but \\ath the loss of De With and Eloriszoon 
killed. Soon afterwards England joined with Holland to force a 
peace on the combatants. It agreed with the interests of neither 
that the Baltic should become a Swedish lake with a prohibitive 
toll. 

Ayscue went out in autumn, 1658, as naval adviser to the 
Swedish king, but saw no active service. Goodsonn went as 

' S. P. Dom. Int. clxxxiii. 96, clxxxiv. 9. Bonn to Adlty Comnrs. 
^ J.e. " patereros." ^ Basnage, 480, sqrj. 



218 MILITARY HISTORY, 1649-1660. [1660. 

Ayscue's vice-admiral and brought the fleet home that winter when 
bad weather would not allow it to be kept out longer. In 1659 
a fleet was again sent to the Sound, the commander-in-chief 
being General Montagu, and the vice-admiral, John Lawson. But 
Montagu, at the end of 1659, had a greater interest in home politics 
than in the future of the Baltic trade. Accordingly he abandoned 
the Sound, when the rival kings seemed likely to accept the joint 
ultimatum, and returned to England, which was then in the throes 
preliminary to the Restoration. But the right moment had not yet 
arrived, and he was forced to abandon the command, which was 
taken up by Lawson, with the style of vice-admiral. When the 
Restoration was finally decided upon, Montagu was deputed to bring 
the King to England. Charles was at the Hague, and the reason 
the Dutch had for inviting him thither when the Restoration had 
become imminent, was that they had begun to fear the consequences 
of their long period of hostility to him, and to feel that a little timely 
conciliation might not be amiss. 

On May l'2th, Penn was ordered, as General,^ to command the 
fleet in chief till he should meet with Montagu. To the latter the 
command was then delivered up, and, with Lawson as vice-admiral, 
the Restoration fleet put over to Holland. 

1 Hist. MSS. Com. Eep. 13, Ap. 2, p. 100: 




( 219 ) 



CHAPTEE XXII. 

CIVIL HISTOEY OF THE EOYAL NAVY, 1660-1714. 

Social life in the Xavy — Xaval diarists — Henry Teonge — A cliaplain's kit — Salutes — 
Drinking — Punishments — Christmas at Sea — Signals — Sickness and mortality — 
Thomas Pocock — jSTathaniel Tanhmaun — Richard AUyn — Lower deck profanity 
— The government of the Navy — Victualling — The command of the fleet — 
Promotion — The Xavy List — Distinguishing pennants — The entry of officers — 
Naval pay — Table money — Gratuities for woujids — Seamen's wages — The Press 
— Bounties — Registration of seamen — Grreenwich Hospital — Medals — The Marines 
— The Duke of York's reforms — Sheathing with lead — Captains' journals — Dis- 
tillation — The Judge Advocate — The Surgeon-General — The Board of Longitude 
— Lnprovements in shipbuilding — Superiority of foreign models — The naval revival 
of 1686 — The Navy at the Revolution — List of ships — Establishment of guns and 
men— The Cushee Piece — The bomb-ketch — The " Machine " — Navigation Acts — 
The Law of Wrecks — Dockyards and docks — Buoying and lighting — The Eddy- 
stone — Marine surveying — The Union with Scotland. 




A 



FxAlR better picture of social life in the 
<^-, ..—-^.^Y^ Eoyal Navy can be obtained from such 

if^'-^'J^"^^ sources as diaries, private logs, and autobio- 
graphical inemoirs written bj^ observant naval 
officers, than from such more precise but drier 
authorities as letters on service, official logs, and 
ANGEL OF CHARLES H. rccords of courts-martial. The period of the 
(Front RudiiHj's ' Annah Restoration was the golden period of the English 

uf the Coinage of Great . . , ,i, -r-. i-r-in 

Britain.') diarist ; and the age that saw Pepys and Evelyn 

recording from day to day their impressions of 

things seen and heard on shore, saw also more than one careful 

observer setting down memorials of daily life on board ships of the 

Navy. 

The most interesting of the naval diarists of the epoch now 
under review is the Bev. Henry Teonge, who, born on March 18th, 
1621, had been first a cavalier, then rector of Alcester in Warwick- 
shire, and of the neighbouring parish of Spernall, and then, like other 
poor clergymen of the day, a fugitive from his creditors. It was 
to avoid his duns that in 1675 he went to sea as a naval chaplain. 



220 CIVIL BISTORT, 1660-1714. [1675. 

In that capacity he made two cruises, leaving his son Henry, vicar 
of Coughton, as his locum tenens. In 1679 he returned home for 
the last time ; and on March 21st, 1690, he died. Teonge was 
with Narbrough's expedition of 1675-76 for the chastisement of 
the Barbary pirates ; and his notes on that affair possess consider- 
able historical value ; but the chief importance of his diary ^ arises 
from its obviously faithful and detailed reflex of social life in the 
Navy in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Some account 
of naval manners and customs, as pictured in this volume, is 
therefore offered to the reader. 

The naval chaplains of the time, like the surgeons, were partially 
paid out of deductions made from the monthly wage of every 
seaman, the chaplain receiving a groat, and the surgeon twopence, 
in respect of each man. The Assistance, to which Teonge was 
first appointed, was a fifty-six gun^ fourth-rate, carrying two hundred 
men. His next ship, the Bristol, was of the same force and rating. 
His third ship, the Boyal Oak, was a sixty-four gun third-rate, 
carrying three hundred and ninety men ; so that the chaplain's 
monthly income from the groats was, in the Assistance and Bristol, 
about dG3 6,s., and in the Boyal Oak, about £6 10s. In addition, 
he received ordinary seaman's pay at 195. a lunar month. Teonge's 
whole income from the Navy, per year of thirteen months, was, 
consequently, about i^55 in the two smaller ships, and about £96 
in the larger vessel ; and as he was victualled while afloat, and 
was at the same time free from the attentions of his creditors, 
and leading an enjoj^able life, it is not difficult to understand 
that the position had great attractions for an impecunious comitry 
parson. 

That he was exceedingly impecunious when he left Spernall is 
evident from his diary. He carried all his kit on his body and in 
an old sack. His mare was so out of condition that, upon reaching 
London, he sold her, " with saddle, bridle, and bootes, and spurrs," 
to his landlord for 265., "upon condition that if 265. was sent to 
him in a fortnight's time, the mare might be redeemed, but the 
other things lost." His wardrobe was correspondingly poor ; yet 
he had to pawn part of it in order to supply himself with a small sea 

^ The ' Diary of Henry Teonge,' chaplain on board his Majesty's ships, Assistance, 
Bristol, and Roijal Oak, anno 1675 to 1679. London, 1825. 

- This was her then nominal force. The number of guns as well as of men 
actually carried by this, and all other ships of the seventeenth century, varied from 
time to time. 



1675.] A CHAPLAIN'S KIT. 221 

bed, pillow, blanket, and rug. Teonge does not say how he obtained 
his appointment, but he owed it, no doubt, to some extent to the 
favour of Captain William Holden,^ of the Assistance. Both 
Holden and his lieutenant, Henry Haughton, welcomed the chap- 
lain in London, " with bottells of claret, etc. " ; and on the night 
when Teonge joined his ship, which lay in Long Eeach, he records 
that he " dranke part of 3 boules of punch (a liquor very strainge 
to me) ; and so to bed in a cabin so much out of order, that when 
I thought to find my pillow on the topp, I found it slipt between 
the coards and under the bed." 

The ship left Long Eeach on June 2nd, and next day was at the 
Nore. Until the buoy there was reached, the Assistance must have 
been a pandemonium of drunkenness and immorality, for there were 
many seamen's wives and sweethearts on board, punch and brandy 
were drunk, and the song, " Loath to Depart,"^ was sung ; " so that 
our ship was that night well furnished, l3ut ill man'd ; few of them 
being able to keepe watch, had there beene occasion." 

While the Assistance lay in the Downs, Teonge was enabled to 
add to his scanty kit. " And here," he says, " I might tell you what 
Providence putt into my hands ; which, though littell worth of 
themselves, yet were they of greater use to him that then wanted 
almost every thing. Early in the morning I mett with a rugged 
towell on the quarter deck, which I soone secured ; and soone after. 
Providence brought me a piece of an old sayle, and an earthen 
chamber pott." These few words strangely illustrate the difference 
between both the two chaplains, and the internal economy of 
men-of-war of 1675 and of to-day, and are, perhaps, as suggestive 
as any in the diary. 

On his first Sunday at sea, Teonge held no service, " by reason 
of the buisnes of the shipp." On his second, " I preached my first 
sermon on shipboard, where I could not stand without holding by 
boath the pillars in the steerage ; and the captain's chayre and 
others were ready to tilt downe, sometimes backwards, sometimes 
forward. All our women and olde seamen were sick this day ; I was 
only giddy." The last of the women seem to have been sent ashore 
at Dover on the following Monday week, after having been about 
three weeks on board. Their departure was honoured " with 

^ Teonge calls him Houlding. 

^ The tune of this song was used in the Navy as a trumpet-salute to persons of rank 
on quitting a vessel. 



222 CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. [1675. 

3 cheares, 7 gunns, and our trumpetts sounding," the tune on 
this occasion probably being the one known as " Mayds, AVhere are 
your Hearts ? " 

This was by no means the first useless expenditure of powder on 
the cruise. Several days earlier, a merchantman at the mouth of 
the Thames had taken no notice of the man-of-war as she passed 
out; whereupon, says Teonge, "Wee give him a shott, make him 
loare his top-gallant {id est, putt off his hatt to us) ; and our gunner 
presently goes on board of him, makes him -pay 6s. 6d. for his 
contempt, abateing him 2c?. because it was the first shott." And 
enormous quantities of powder were wasted later. Indeed, questions 
concerning salutes and guns were very burning ones in those days. 
On one occasion, when a Dutch man-of-war was sighted, Captain 
Holden " commanded to tack upon her, which they soone perceiving 
(like a cowardly dogg that lys downe when he sees one com that he 
feares), loares not only his top sayle, but claps his sayle to the mast, 
and Ij'S by. This satisfy s us, as unworthy of so pittifull an onsett, 
and we keepe on our course as before. Yet I can not forget the 
words of our noble captain, viz., ' I wish I could meete with on 
that would not vaile his bonnett, that I might make woorke for my 
brethren at White Hall ' ; meaning officers that were out of employ- 
ment." In the Channel, some East Indiamen were fallen in with. 
"Each of them salute with 5 gunns, and we answer accordingly; 
the last gave us 7 ; and each give us one back, but the last gave 
us 3." At Plymouth, " we salute the Castle with 9 gunns, they 
answer with as many ; wee returne our thanks with 3 more." The 
Assistance convoyed six vessels bound for Tangier. Captain Holden, 
in due course, dined on board one of them, which, when he left her, 
gave him five guns, for which the man-of-war returned three. 
Compliments were, in fact, usually returned with two guns less, 
when both parties were British ; but foreigners were expected to 
return gun for gun. Ships, on parting company, fired three guns.^ 
On joining a senior officer, they fired five, the senior returning 
three, and the other vessel again returning one. A British consul 
received five guns,'-^ and a salute from the trumpets of, "Mayds, 
Where are your Hearts?" An over-obsequious Venetian, who saluted 
with eleven guns, was snubbed by having only five returned to him, 

^ But on parting company with Narbrougli, the Assistance fired eleven, and gave 
tliree cheers, Narbrough answering with eleven, and the Assistance replying with five. 
^ But the consul at Scanderoon received seven — possibly as a personal compliment. 




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1675.] PUNISHMENTS. 223 

The King's birthday was celebrated with thirteen guns/ " the last 
with a shott in her." Yet there were noisier and more costly 
displays than these. When Narbrough entered Malta, the Knights 
gave him forty-five guns, and the salutes and returns lasted for 
" almost two howers." Again, upon the conclusion of the arrange- 
ment with Tripoli, the town fired all its guns, and each of Nar- 
brough's ships returned twenty-one. On St. George's Day, at 
the drinking of the King's health, twenty-five rounds were got rid 
of. And, at the funeral of a captain, the ship fired forty guns, and 
certain Dutch ships, which were in company, fired at " least one 
hundred." 

There was an excessive amount of drinking in his Majesty's 
ships. It was usual, on Saturday evenings, to " end the day and 
weeke with drinking to our wives in punch bowles," and to drink 
as well to the King ; and Teonge never omitted to take his share on 
these occasions. When land was sighted, the fact was celebrated 
in " severall boules of punch drank round about the ship." And, 
when little of importance was doing, we find in the diary such 
entries as, " Nothing to-day, but drinke to our friends in England 
in racckee at night." 

There are many notices concerning naval punishments. On 
June 24th, 1675, Teonge writes : " This day 2 seamen, that had 
stolen a piece or two of beife, were thus shamed ; they had their 
hands tyd behind them, and themselves tyd to the maine mast, each 
of them a piece of raw beife tyd about their necks in a coard, and 
the beife bobbing before them like the knott of a crevatt ; and the 
rest of the seamen cam one by one and rubd them over the mouth 
with the raw beife; and in this posture they stood 2 howers." On 
September 28th, 1675: "This morning one of our men, viz., 
Skinner, a knowne coockould, for goeing on shoare without leave, 
had his legs tyd together, his hands tyd to a greate rope, and stood 
on the syd of the ship to be hoysted up to the yard arme, and from 
thence to dropp downe in to the water 3 times ; but he lookeing so 
very pittifully, and also by the gentlemen's intreatys to the captaine 
for him, who alleaged that he had injurys enough already, as 
haveing a wife a whore and a schold to injure him at home, ergo, 
had the more need to be pittye'd abroade, was spared." On 
January 29th, 1676 : " This day, David Thomas, and Marlin the 

^ This was in 1675. In 1676 the senior officer fired eleven guns, and other ships 
either nine or seven. 



224 , CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. [1678. 

coock, and our master's bo}', had their hand stretched out, and 
with their backs to the rayles, and the master's boy with his back 
to the maine mast, all looking on upon the other, and in each of 
their mouths a maudlen-spike, viz., an iron pinn clapt cloese into 
their mouths, and tyd behind their heads ; and there they stood a 
whole houre, till their mouths were very bloody ; an excellent cure 
for swearers." On August 4th, 1678: "Isaac Webb stood tyd to 
the geares ^ an houre, and had speculum oris placed in his mouth, 
for saying to a seaman in the captain's hearing, ' Thou lyest, like 
a sonn of a w^hore.' " And, twelve days later, " A seaman had 
29 lashes with a cat of 9 tayles, and was then washt with salt 
water, for stealing our carpenter's mate's wive's ring." This last 
entry was made while the Bristol, in which Teonge was then 
serving, lay at Spithead. Signs are not wanting that whenever 
ships of war were in home waters, there were plenty of women on 
board ; and it would even appear that they also were subjected to 
punishment ; for under June 18th, 1678, when the Bristol was in 
the Downs, is the suggestive note : " The scolding woman was well 
washt to-day." 

All the above punishments, save perhaps the one which was 
remitted at the last moment, were fanciful ones, imposed at the 
discretion of the commander, and not prescribed by written regula- 
tions. The serious punishments which seem to have been officially 
recognised at the time, were known as the capstan, the bilboes, 
and ducking ; and they are thus described by the author of the 
' Diologicall Discourse of Marine Affaires ' " : "A capstan barr being 
thrust through the hole of the barrell, the offender's armes are 
extended to the full length, and soe made faste untoe the barr 
croswise, having sometymes a basket of buUetts or some other the 
like weighte, hanging abowt his necke, in which posture he 
continues untill he be made either to confesse some plotte or 
cryme whereof he is pregnantlie suspected, or that he have received 
such condigne sufferinge as he is sentenced to undergoe by command 
of the captaine " ..." The pmiishment of the bilboes is when a 
delinquent is putt in irons, or in a kind of stocks used for that 
purpose, the which are more or lesse heavy and pinching, as the 
qualitie of the offense is proved against the delinquent " . . . " The 

^ Or " jears " : an assemblage of tackles whereby the lower yards of a ship are 
hoisted to, or lowered from, their usual stations. 
2 Harl. MSS. 1341. 



1678.] CHRISTMAS AT SEA. 225 

ducking att the mayne yarde arme is when a malefactor, by having 
a rope fastened under his armes and abowte his myddle and under 
his breatche, is thus hoysed upp to the end of the yarde, from 
whence he is againe vyolentHe lett fall intoe the sea, sometymes 
twyse, sometymes three several tymes one after another ; and if the 
offense be verye fowle, he is alsoe drawne under the verye keele of 
the ship, the which is termed keel-haling ; and whilst hee is thus 
under water a great gunn is given fire righte over his head ; the 
which is done as well toe astonish him the more with the thunder 
thereof, which much troubleth him, as toe give warning untoe all 
others toe looke out, and toe beware by his harmes." 

Of the observance of Christmas Day at sea, Teonge wrote in 
1675: "At 4 in the morning our trumpeters all doe flatt their 
trumpetts, and begin at our captain's cabin, and thence to all the 
officers' and gentlemen's cabins, playing a levite at each cabine 
doore, and bidding good morrow, wishing a merry Christmas. 
After they goe to their station, viz., on the poope, and sound 
3 levites in honour of the morning. At 10 wee goe to prayers and 
sermon : text, Zacc. ix. 9. Our captaine had all his officers and 
gentlemen to dinner with him, where wee had excellent good fayre ; 
a ribb of beife, plumb puddings, minct pyes, etc., and plenty of 
good wines of severall sorts ; dranke healths to the King, to our 
wives and friends, and ended the day with much civill myrth." On 
Christmas Day, 1678, at Port Mahon, fresh beef could not be 
obtained, " yet wee had to dinner an excellent rice pudding in 
a greate charger, a speciall piece of Martinmas English beife, and 
a neat's tongue, and good cabbidge, a charger full of excellent fresh 
fried fish, a douzen of woodcocks in a pye, which cost 15^., a couple 
of good henns roasted, 3 sorts of cheese, and, last of all, a greate 
charger full of blew figs, almonds, and raysings ; and wine and 
punch gallore, and a douzen of English pippins." 

Of signals, Teonge says very little ; but he gives us the sailing 
orders of Captain Holden to his convoy, and Sir John Narbrough's ^ 
signals for desiring to speak to the captains in his fleet. Holden's 
orders were the usual convoy orders of the time, and as they 
illustrate the awkwardness of the prevailing system, they may find 
a place here : — 

^ Sir John's commission at the time was that of " commander-in-chief," but he was 
only a commodore. 

VOL. II. Q 



226 



CIVIL HISTORY, 16G0-1714. 



[167^ 



Sayling Orders, June 20, 1675, between Ms Majesty's ship Assistance, under the 
command of Capt. William Holden, and the other ships then under his conduct. 

" 1. If wee weigh, in the day time, wee will loose our fore top-sayle, and fyre on 
gun. If in the night, wee will fire on gun, and put forth a light in the fore top-mast 
shrouds : which light is to be answered by every ship in the same place. 

" 2. If wee tack in the night, wee will put out two lights, on in the mizen shrouds, 
the other in the fore shrouds, of equal hight. 

" 3. If we anchor in the night, we will fyre on gmi, and put out a light in the 
mizen shrouds, which light is to be answered in the sam place. 

" 4. If we lye by in the night, or try, or hull, by reason of bad weather, wee will 
fyre on gun, and jDut out two lights in our mizen shrouds of equall hight, which lights 
are to be answered : and when we make sayle, wee'l make the signe as for weighing in 
the night. 

" 5. If wee should chance to see any ship in the night, the discoverer is to fyre a 
muskett, and to make false fyres. And if we should not know on another, the hayler 
shall ask, ' What ship is that ? ' The other shall answer, Eoyall Highness ; and the 
hayler shall saj^, ' Prosper.' 

" 6. If any be opressed by reason of carrying sayle, he is to hang out a light att 
bowsprett end, and to fyre a gun, and to make false fyres now and then, till he be assisted. 

" 7. If any spring a leake, or be in distrese by day, let him make a weft, and halle 
up his sajdes that his weft may be scene, whereby to repayre to him. If in the night, 
to fyre on gun, and to put out 4 lights of equall hight. 

" 8. If it prove foggy weather by night or day, we must ring our bells, and fyre a 
musket now and then. And in dark nights, each ship to carry a light. 

" 9. No ship shall presume to goe a head of the light in the night. 

" 10. If any loose company in foule weather, and meete again, those to windward 
shall let rim theire topsayles, and those to leeward shall hall up theire foresayles, and 
mizens if they are abroade. 

" 11. If wee loose company between this and Plimworth, our rendisvouse is at 
Plim worth : if between that and Tangeare, Tangeare.'' 

Narbrough's signals ^ for speaking his captains were as follows:— 



Pennant at— 

Mizzen peak 
Main topmast head 
Fore tojamast head 
Mizzen to^^mast head 
Mizzen topsail yard arm 
Fore yard arm 
Fore topsail yard arm 
Main yard arm . 
Cross-jack yard arm 
Mizzen topsail yard arm 
Spritsail head 
Spritsail yard arm 
Boom on the quarter 
Half up ensign staff 
Boom on the stem 
Ensign staff 



To SPEAK — 

All captains. 

Dragon. 

Neivcastle. 

Success. 

Swcdloiv. 

Assistance. 

Dartmouth. 

Diamond. 

Mary Itose. 

Boehuck. 

Portsmotitk. 

Yarmouth. 

Tripoli jmze. 

Anne and Christopher. 

Homer. 

Wivenhoe. 



' These signals were issued on August 12th, 1675, from on board H.M.S. Henrietta, 
at sea before Trijjcli. Notes appended to them directed that in the event of a captain 



1679.] 



MORTALITY AT SEA. 



227 



Teonge's diary throws a somewhat ghastly light upon the 
sanitary conditions prevailing in the Navy of his day. The causes 
of the mortality, which occasionally more than decimated ships' 
companies within a few weeks, seem to have been mainly bad food 
and water, absence of anti-scorbutics, insufficient clothing, personal 
dirtiness, and exhalations from the bilge, or from other decaying 
matter in the hold. Here are some of the chaplain's entries when 
the Boyal Oak was at Port Mahon, and on her way thence to 
England, in 1679 :— 



Feb. 7. 



Feb. 9. 

Feb. 11. 

Feb. 26. 

Mar. 5. 

Mar. 6. 

Mar. 9. 

Mar. 12. 

Mar. 19. 



Mar. 


22. 


Mar. 


23. 


April 


6. 


May 


1. 


May 


Q 


May 


3. 


May 


7. 


May 


9. 


May 


12. 


May 


16. 



"This day I buried two out of our ship: John Parr and John 

Woolger. I think they were little better than starved to death 

with cold weather." 
" I buried our captain's cabin boy, Imanuell Dearam." 
" I buried Samuell Ward, who had layn sick a longe time." 
" This day I buried John Wilkinson, the carpenter's mate." 
" I buried Izaak Maule, a Sweade." 
" And this day I buried Samuell Massy." 
" This day I buried in the sea William Watson, belonging to the 

carpenter's crue." 
" Here (at Formentera) was buried William Foster of the carpenter's 

crue." 
" Brave Captain Antony Langston,^ dyed a very little after ten o'clock 

tliis night." 
" I buried Francis Forrest, as 'tis said eaten to death with lyce." 
" I buried Joseph Pearson." 

" I buried Isaac Webb out at the gunn-roome poiie." 
" I buried John Johnson out of the gunn-roome porte," 
" I buried Henry Johns out of the gunn-roome porte." 
" I buried Eich. Dell, as before." 
" I buried Thomas Smith." 
" I buried John Horsenayle." 
" I buried Mr. Pilchard Cooling in a coffin." 
" I buried William Wattson." 



being sick, he was to send to the flag-ship, in response to the signal, his lieutenant or 
next officer : that, in case of separation, Tripoli was to be the rendezvous ; and that the 
ultimate rendezvous, for vessels unable to keej) the sea, would be Malta. 

All the signals were to be made with "my pendant." This was probably a red 
one. Admiral Eussell, later Earl of Orford, adopted this system in an order of May 6th, 
1691, but used red, white, and blue pennants in twenty-Jive different positions, 
whereby he was enabled to make signals to seventy-five different ships. Russell also 
made other signals vipou the same principle. If, for example, he wanted a particular 
ship to chase to windward or leeward, he made the signal for her captain, and also 
showed a red or a blue flag in the mizzen rigging. His system rendered fleet 
manoeuvres possible. It was largely based upon a system applied by H.PuH. James, 
Duke of York, about 1665, and embodied in " The Duke of York's Fighting Instruc- 
tions," as drawn up by Sir W. Penn. 

^ Of the Boyal Oah, to which he had exchanged from the Bristol on January 16th. 
He was succeeded by Captain Roome Coyle. 

Q 2 



228 CIVIL BISTORT, 1660-1714. [1692. 

May 25. " I buried Jeffery Tranow." 

May 30. "I buried Joseph Bryan. And we sent to sboare 32 sick men 

pittifuU creatures." 
May 31. " The muster-master mustered us, and wanted above 60 men that 

were on the bookes, all dead at sea." 

This was fearful mortality, for the ship's coniplement was only 
three hundred and ninety officers and men. At the end of the 
nineteenth century a death-rate, even at sea, of twenty-five or thirty 
per thousand per annum is accounted enormous ; but if we take 
the recorded deaths in the Royal Oak during the four months 
ending May, 1679, we find the death-rate to have been in the 
proportion of not less than one hundred and sixty-five per one 
thousand per annum. Yet it does not appear that she was an 
exceptionally unhealthy ship, and it is almost certain that Teonge 
failed to specifically mention each death that occurred during the 
period. 

There are other chaplains' diaries of about the same time. 
One was written by the Eev. Thomas Pocock, chaplain of the 
Banelagh in 1704, and father of Admiral Sir George Pocock. 
Extracts from this, which remains in MS., are printed as an 
appendix to " Memoirs Eelating to the Lord Torrington " (Camden 
Society, 1889). Another was written and published by the 
Rev. Nathaniel Taubmann, who was in the Mediterranean in 
1708-9. A third, quoted by the editor of Teonge's diary, was 
written by the Bev. Eichard Allyn, chaplain of the Centurion 
in 1691-2. From this last is taken the following amusing extract, 
illustrative of the character of the seamen of the time : — 

" April 21st, 1692 .... Tho' the wind was so boisterous, yet the running about of 
shot, chests, and loos things about the ship, made almost as great a noise as that (viz. 
the wind). We had about 16 or 17 buts and pipes of wine m the steerage, all which 
gave way together, and the heads of one of them broke out. We shipped several great 
seas over our quarter as well as wast. Sometimes for nigh the space of a minute the 
ship would seem to bee all under water, and again sometimes would seem fairly to 
settle on one side. The chests, etc., swim'd between decks, and wee had several foot of 
water in the hold. In short, the weather was so bad, tliat the whole ship's company 
declared that they thought they had never seen the like, and that it was impossible for 
it to be wors. Notwithstanding, all our ports were neither caulked nor lin'd, want of 
doing which was supposed to have occasioned the loss of the Coronation.^ During the 
dreadful season I quietly kept my bed, tho' very wet by reason of the water that came 
into my scuttle. The behaviour of our Puggs ^ at this time was not a little remarkable ; 



' The Coronation, a second rate, Captain Charles Skelton, was lost off Uam Head 
on September 3rd, 1691. 
'^ Puggs, seamen. 



1692.] NAVAL PROFANITY, 229 

some few of them would pray, but more of them curs'd and swore lewder than the wind 
and weather. I can't forbear writing one instance of this nature, and that is in the 
story which was told me the next morning of George the caulker, and old Eobin 
Anderson. Poor George, being very apprehensive of his being a sinner, and now in 
great danger of his life, fell down upon his marrow bones, and began to pray : ' Lord, 
have mercy upon me ! Christ have,' etc., and so on to the Lord's Prayer. All the 
while old Robin was near him, and, between every sentence, cry'd out : ' Ah, you cow ! 

Z ds, thou hast not got the hart of a flea ! ' Poor George, thus disturbed at his 

devotion, would look over his shoulder, and, at the end of every petition, would make 

answer to old Robin with a ' God d n you, you old dog ! can't you let a body pray 

at quiet for you, ha ? A plague rot you ! let me alone, can't yee ? ' Thus the one 
kept praying and cursing, and t'other railing, for half an hour, when a great log of 
wood by the rowling of the ship, tumbled upon George's legs, and bruised him a little ; 
which George, taking up into his hands, and thinking it had been thrown at him by 
old Robin, let fly at the old fellow, together with an whole broadside of oaths and 
curses, and so they fell to boxing. I mention this only to see the incorrigible senslesnes 
of such tarpawlin wretches in the greatest extremity of danger." 

One of the first acts of Charles II. after the Eestoration was to 
revive the office of Lord High Admiral in favour of his brother, 
Prince James, Duke of York. When the Duke, in consequence of 
the passing of the Test Act, ceased to hold it, the office was put 
into commission, and so remained until the accession of James II., 
who became his own minister of marine. After the Eevolution ^ a 
new Board of Admiralty was appointed, and successive commissions 
ruled the Navy until 1702. For a short time in 1708, Queen Anne 
personally directed the affairs of the service. A new Lord High 
Admiral was then appointed, but in 1709 the office was once more 
put into commission, and so continued for upwards of a century. 
Lists of the Lords High Admiral and First Commissioners of the 
Admiralty, as well as of the Principal Officers of the Navy, 
Secretaries of the Admiralty, Commissioners of the Navy, etc., 
during the period under review, are appended : — 



Heads of the Admiralty : — 

4 June 1660. James, Duke of York, 

Lord High Admiral. 
14 June 1673. Charles XL 
9 July 1673. Prince Eujiert, First 
Lord. 



14 May 1679. Sir Henry Capel, Kt., 
First Lord. 

14 Feb. 1680. Daniel Finch, later Lord 
Finch, and Earl of 
!Nottmgham and Win - 
Chelsea, First Lord. 



' Early in the new reign there was passed a declaratory Act (2 W and M., 
sess. 2, c. 2), which is the authority for the present constitution of the Admiralty 
Board. It declared that " all and singular authorities, jurisdictions, and powers which, 
by Act of Parliament or otherwise," had been " lawfully vested " in the Lord High 
Admiral of England, has always appertained, and did and should appertain, to the 
Commissioners for executing the office for the time beiug, " to all intents and purposes 
as if the said Commissioners were Lord High Admiral of England." 



230 



CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1711. 



[1660-1714. 



1685. James II. 
8 Mar. 1689. Admiral Arthur Herbert, 
later Earl of Torring- 
ton, First Lord. 

20 Jan. 1690. Thomas Herbert, Earl 

of Pembroke, First 

Lord. 
10 Mar. 1692. Charles, Lord Corn- 

wallis, First Lord. 
15 April 1693. Anthony Gary, Viscount 

Falkland, First Lord. 
2 May 1694. Admiral Edward Eus- 

sell, later Earl of 

Orford, First Lord. 

21 May 1699. John Egerton, .Earl of 

Bridgewater, First 
Lord. 
4 April 1701. Thomas Herbert, Earl 
of Pembroke, First 
Lord. 

26 Jan. 1702. Thomas Herbert, Earl 
of Pembroke, Lord 
High Admiral. 

20 May 1702. George, Prince of Den- 
mark, Lord High 
Admiral. 

29 Oct. 1708. Queen Anne. 

29 Nov. 1708. Thomas Herbert, Earl 

of Pembroke, Lord 

High Admiral. 
8 Nov. 1709. Admiral Edward Eus- 

sell, Earl of Orford, 

First Lord. 
4 Oct. 1710. Admiral Sir John Leake, 

Kt., First Lord. 

30 Sept. 1712. Thos. Wentworth, Earl 

of Strafford, First 
Lord. 

Secketakies of the Admiralty : — 

1G73. Samuel Pepys (Clerk of 

the x\cts from 1660). 
1689. Josiah Burchett. 

Treasure KS of the Navy : — 

1660. Capt. Sir George Car- 
teret, Bt., E.N. 
Arthur Annesley, Earl 
of Anglesea. 

1671. Sir Thos. Osborne, Bart., 
afterwards Duke of 
Leeds. 

1673. Sir Edward Seymour, 
Bart. 



Anthony Gary, Viscount 

Falkland. 
1689. Admiral Edward Eus- 

sell. 
1693. Sir Thomas Lyttleton, 

Bart. 

1710. Eobert Walpole, after- 

wards Earl of Orford. 

1711. Charles Cfesar. 
1714. John Aislabie. 

Commissioners : — 

1686. {See names on p. 243.) 

Controllers of the Navy : — 

Oct. 1688. Capt. Sir Eichard Had- 
dock, Kt., E.N. 
Feb. 1714. Eear-Adm. Sir Charleys, 
Wager, Kt. 

Surveyors of the Navy : — 

30 Sept. 1G68. Sir John Tippets, Kt. 
25 June 1692. Edward Dummer. 
25 Sept. 1699. Daniel Furzer. 
9 Sept. 1706. William Lee (conjointly 
with Furzer until 
May 1713, when Lee 
became Commissioner 
at Portsmouth). 

Clerks of the Acts : — 

Oct. 1688. James Southern. 
Nov. 1689. Charles Sergison. 
Feb. 1701. Samuel Atkins. 

Controller of the Treasurer's 
Accounts : — 

1691. Dennis Liddell. 



the A^ictualling 
Sir John 



Controllers of 
Accounts : — 
Oct. 1688. Vice-Adm, 

Berry, Kt. 
Jan. 1690. Eear-Adm. Sir Eichard 

Beach, Kt. 
Mar. 1692. Samuel Pitt. 
Mar. 1699. Adm. Sir Clowdisley 

Shovell, Kt. 
Aug. 1704. Benjamin Timewell. 

Controllers of the Storekeepers' 
Accounts : — 

1688. Capt. Sir Wm. Booth, 
Kt., E.N. 
Mar. 1689. Capt. Harry Priestmau, 
E.N. 



1660-1714.] 



COMMISSIONERS OF THE NAVY. 



231 



June 1690. Vice-Adm. Sir John 

Ashby, Kt. 
Jime 1693. Capt. Thomas Will- 

shaw, R.N. 
Sept. 1702. Henry Greenhill. 
Jan. 1704. Capt. Thomas Jennings, 

E.N. 

Extra Commissioners : —  

Jan. 1691. Rear-Adm. Sir Geo. 

Rooke, Kt. 
Jan. 1691. John Hill. 
Mar. 1693. Rear-Adm. Sir Clowdis- 

ley Shovell, Kt. 
Sept. 1693. Capt. George St. Loe, 

R.N. 
Mar. 1694. Vice-Adm. Matthew 

Aylmer. 
Mar. 1695. James Southern. 
Dec. 1696. Benjamin Timewell. 
Feb. 1701. George Toilet. 
July 1702. Anthony Hammond. 
Nov. 1702. Vice-Adm. Sir Thos. 

Hopsonn, Kt. 
Feb. 1705. Capt. Sir Wm. Gilford, 

Kt., R.N. 
July 1712. James Hunter. 
Nov. 1713. Capt. Isaac Townsend, 

R.N. 
Nov. 1713. Capt. Lawrence Wright, 

R.N. 

Commissioners at H.M. Dockyards, 

ETC. : — 

Chatham : 
Oct. 1688. Sir Phineas Rett, Kt. 



Oct. 1689. Sir Edward Gregory, Kt. 
April 1703. Capt. George St. Loe, 
R.N. 

Portsmouth : 
Oct. 1688. Rear-Adm. Sir Richard 

Beach, Kt. 
April 1690. Captain Thomas Will- 

shaw, R.N. 
Mar. 1692. Benjamin Timewell. 
April 1696. Henry Greenhill. 
June 1702. Capt. Sir Wm. Gifford, 

Kt., R.N. 
June 1705. Capt. Isaac Townsend, 

R.N. 
May 1713. William Lee. 

Plymouth : 

Dec. 1691. Henry Greenhill. 
April 1695. Capt. George St. Loe. 

R.N. 
April 1703. Capt. Wm. Wright, R.N. 
Feb. 1704. Henry Greenhill. 
July 1708. Capt. Wm. Wright, R.N. 
June 1711. Capt. Rich. Edwards, 

R.N. 

Deptford and Woolwich : 
Oct. 1688. Balthasar St. Michell. 
Aug. 1702. Henry Greenhill. 

Kinsale : 
Mar. 1695. Benjamin Timewell 
May 1702. Capt. Lawrence Wright, 
R.N. (to 1713). 

Lisbon : 
Feb. 1704. Capt. Wm. Wright, R.N. 



The victualling, which had been conducted "upon account" up 
to the Eestoration, was placed by Charles II. in the hands of Denis 
Gauden as contractor. In 1668, two responsible persons approved 
by the King were associated with this gentleman ; but the system 
did not give satisfaction, and on December 10th, 1683, Commissioners 
of Victualling were appointed, with power to contract for provisions, 
and to appoint clerks and purveyors.^ The first commissioners 
were. Captain Sir Richard Haddock, Kt., E.N., Anthony Sturt, 
John Parsons, and Nicholas Fenn. 

The supreme command of the fleet was entrusted by James II., 
at the close of his reign, to George Legge, Lord Dartmouth, who 



Pepys's MSS., ' Nav. Precedents,' 48. 



232 



CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. 



[1696-1714. 



may be regarded as the first of the Admirals of the Fleet. Arthur 
Herbert, Earl of Torrington, took his place after the Revolution. 
But as yet there was no regular succession ; and the position was an 
office rather than a rank. On two or three occasions under William 
and Mary the command was placed in commission. George Booke 
was made Admiral of the Fleet in 1696. Rooke was followed in 



( ' ) 



^t^PX^' A LIST of the Names of 

fuch LicutcnanCi ■ahd jerved in Hn 
Adajcjlys Fleet , during the laie 
War, One hundred vehereof retll front 
time to time be tmituled to H.ilf- 
Tay, during their bum' out of Em- 
ployment a-jho.ir, according to their 
Seniorities, d.id Hu Miji/ly i Efla- 
tli/hmcnt m th.it behalf, Dated the 
I ith of April, I 700. 



II hit h of them are norp Employ d, 
and hem. 



1705 by Sir Clowdisley 
Shovell, who perished in 

1707, Sir John Leake, Kt., 
was appointed to the post in 

1708, and Matthew Aylmer, 
afterwards Lord Aylmer, in 

1709, Leake again taking the 
place in 1710, and Aylmer 
supplanting him once more 
later. Both Leake and 
Aylmer died in 1720, and it 
was not until after that time 
that flag officers were per- 
manently promoted to the 
rank of Admiral of the Fleet. 
Nor, until 1718, was it 
ordered that captains, if duly 
qualified for flag-rank, should 
be promoted by seniority. 
Writing to Rooke in 1703, 
Prince George of Denmark 
said : " Upon making the 
flags last year, all my council 
were of opinion that the 
Crown never tied itself to 
seniority in choosing their 
officers." ^ 

Yet already the Navy List had begun to assume much of the 
character which now distinguishes it. From the year of the Re- 
storation there was an official recognition of the seniority of captains, 
according to the dates of their first commissions as such.^ From 

' Printed in Charnock, ii., 302. 

^ This naturally tended to the encouragement of a spirit of professional pride, and 
to the maintenance of naval traditions. Soon after the Eevolution, also, naval ofticers' 





DjUi of ihclr 1 
Ftrjt Com- 


LteHtcrrOftti NoMCi. 




nitiftont 


TTUmrhry Parker 
■• -• iamucl Til ley 


1 1 April 89 


ao fuxt 89 


Kath Brown. 


2, A.<^. S9 


Clcmpfon Cave 


17 'Jan. ft 9 


Hcnr^- Crcmcr 


I ; l-chr 89 


Narh. Fo^si 


35 /■.*■- 89 


John Tiirkci 


?o Mar 90 


Guftnviis LanR 


I :i April yo 


Hhas Waffi. 


1 A/j> 90 


ohn Pepys 


5 May yo 


acob Fletcher 


4 May 90 


. ohn Jephoott 


36 Jnm 90 


Jof. Berry 


:6 "jiinc 90 


Edward Manning. 


I Aug. 90 


Robert Dobfon 


12 Ant,. 90 


'.' liomas Mead 


3 Dci. 90 


Kath. Hubbard 


16 Da. 90 


William Sharp 


:!l Dei. 90 


lohn Hart 


9 "Jan. 90 


Jonathan Denn 


19 Tart. 90 
1 5 Febr. 90 


Matthew Tate 


Cwcn Serlc 


1 6 Flhr. 90 



Firp Luiiicn.ini of ihc VVorceftet 

Firfi LicuUrtartI of lU Cariill.;. 
53:^JLXx. 1699 Lfove ^tvin f'lm to 
I 1^0 into the Mcrihatlt Seruict 



l/i tk- Mer.kinl Sovtot 

Firjl Lic-iitenant oj tht Tilbury. 

Firjl LtcHUriaiii o) rht Gloteder 



[Midjliipunr. Hxtra. .tithe Quecnbf 

\ rout;h. 

hiiji I nuim.uil of ihi Salisbury. 



Scra/td Licuien.iiii of the Portland. 



Tlird I imlcnartl of ihc Chieheftcf. 
5 June, I7GC. Had Leave i^iverr ht/jl 
to go titto the Mcrchaf/t !^eri/ire. 

A Edward 



PAGE OF OFFICIAL NAVY LIST, 1700. 
(From the original in the Author's Collection.) 



1700.] 



THE NAVY LIST. 



233 



about the year 1667 the separate and subordinate rank of Master 
and Commander^ began to be conferred. From the Eevokition 
there exist hsts of Captains, Masters and Commanders, and Lieu- 
tenants, according to their seniority, and from the commencement 
of the eighteenth century or thereabouts such hsts appeared from 
time to time in printed form. Reproductions of portions of two 



of these are given. One, 
dated April 18th, 1700, 
and issued from the Ad- 
miralty in the following 
July, is entitled, "A List 
of the Names of such 
Lieutenants who served 
in His Majesty's Fleet 
during the late War, One 
hundred whereof will from 
time to time be Entituled 
to Half-Pay, during their 
being out of Employment 
a-shoar, according to their 
Seniorities, and His 
Majesty's Establishment 
in that behalf." Among 
the lieutenants who figure 
in this list, and of whom 
the junior is Thomas 
Mathews, later the gallant 
but unfortunate com- 
mander - in - chief in the 
Mediterranean, there are 
many who are noted 
as " In the Merchant 



Service," or 



as 



Had 



C 5 ; 



'\^^ A Lift of the Names of ftich Captains 

v>ho Served tn Hu Majefty's Fleet, during the 
late War, Fifty Vihereof nill from time to time 
be Entituled to Half-Tay, during their bang 
out of Employment on Shear, according to their 
Seniority, and Hu Majeflyi Ejlablilhment m 
that behalf. Dated the i %th day of ApnJ 
1700. 



FerfoHj Namtu 



Mundcn John 
Cornwall Woolfran 
Fairbornc Stafford 
MyngsChriftophcr 
Graydon John 
Leake John 
Robinfon Robert 
Ley Thomas 
Foulks Symon 
Grcenhill David 
Granvill John 
Di!k5 Thomas 
Coal Thomis 
Bokcnham William 
Beaumont Baziil 
Warren Thomas 
Jennings Thomas 
Hicks Gafper 
Good Edward 
Haughion Henry 
Martin Henry 
Avery John 
Robinfon Henry 
Syncock Robert 
Wifhart lames 
WhetOone William 
Price John 
Jennings John 
Fiiz Pjrnck Rich'' 
Mjin Jfihn 
Robinfon Thomas 
Kirkli/ Richard 
Crawley Thomas 



D-<« ./ F.rft 

(^trnntiffin at 



23 July 8« 

2 J Aug B8 
;o Aug 88 

9 Sfi>t 88 

24 Sept. 88 

26 Stpr. 88 
24 ohoJ; 88 
'22 Dec. 88 

5 Mar 88 

I 2 Mar 8H 
8 Apnl 89 

10 April Ky 
7 Mj; 8y 

I I May 89 
1 8 May 8v 
2y Mj; 8<; 
}0 Msy 89 

6 Junt 89 

I ; June 89 

16 Junt 89 
l6junt 8y 

17 Junt 8y 

27 Jur>f 89 
4%/, 89 

30 7«// 89 

^Ojuif 89 

:6 Nov. 89 

Jan. 89 

4 Ftbr 89 

5 Ftbf 89 
-ftbr. 89 

7 FtBT 8 9 



For what Ship. 



Half moon Prrzt 

Dartmouth 

Richmond 

Sophy a Pnce 

Saudadocs 

Fircdrakc Bomb 

Crown 

Mermaid FiTtP»f 

AJIu ranee 

Cadiz Merch* Fir fhtp 

Advice 

Charles Firtfup 

Pcarle 

Saphire 

Ccnrurion 

John /Dublin Firef^p 

Alexander FiTfjhf) 

Arch- Angel FlirtJ 

Kent 2^ Lrfpr 

BriOol 

Berwick 

K.ing(iJher 

Sampfon HhtJ 

Nonfuch 

Pearic 

Europa HireJ 

Saphire HinJ 

K.ingh(her 

Succcis HtreJ 
A durance 
Guarlaod 

SuCQCls Hirf4 

Richmond 



H''bicb of them new Emplfff'd. 



Commandi •ff' Sally. 

Gene to Newfoundlind. 
Captain of tbt Naflau. 



Captatn i,f the Chicheftcr. 
Captain t" the Admiral 
Captain of the Bl fford. 



Captatn cf tbi Bridgewater. 



Captain of the Harwich 
Captntfj of tbt Revenge. 



Capiam of the Oefyancc 



Edwaida. 



PAGE OF OFFICIAL NAVY LIST, 1700. 
(From the original in the Author's Collection.) 



Leave given him lately to go another Voyage in the Merchant 



clubs began to flourish. Kempthorne, Holmes, Ashby, Berry, and Jennings, are 
known to have belonged to one which met on Tuesdays at the " Mitre," on Cornhill, 
as early as 1674. 'Brit. Fleet,' 496. 

^ Robert Best, appointed " Captain and Master" of the Orange Tree on Sej)tember 
13th, 1667, is usually supposed to have been the first to receive this commission : but 
it appears to have given him regular captain's rank and seniority: and separate 
commander's rank was possibly not introduced until a little later. 



234 CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. [1670. 

Service," etc. Several also are returned as ser\nng as " midshipmen 
extra." From these statements we get a gUmpse of the existence 
of an evil which has always afflicted the naval service after the 
conclusion of any great war — the difficulty of obtaining employment . 
Another Hst is made up of Captains' and Commanders' Lists, dated 
August 18th, 1704. A third list is "A List of the Names of such 
Captains who Served in His Majesty's Fleet, during the late War, 
Fifty whereof will from time to time be Entituled to Half -Pay, 
during their being out of Emplojanent on Shoar, according to their 
Seniority, and His Majesty's Estabhshment in that behalf," and is 
dated, like the first-mentioned list, April 18th, 1700. It is note- 
worthy that several captains in this list are returned as serving at 
the time as lieutenants in various ships of his Majesty. Thus, 
John Balchen, afterwards the Admiral Sir John Balchen who went 
dovTn jn the Victory, in 1744, though a captain of July 25th, 1697, 
is said to be doing duty as first lieutenant of th.e.Burford. 

By an order of 1674, captains officiating as commodores in 
command of squadrons were directed to wear a large red distin- 
guishing pennant. This was the origin of the broad pennant, as it 
is now called. 

The entry of officers was modified by regulations of 1676. The 
preamble to these ran as follows : " Whereas out of our royal desire 
of giving encouragement to the families of better quahty among our 
subjects to breed up their younger sons to the art and practice of 
navigation, in order to the fitting them for further employment in 
our service, we have for some time past been graciously pleased at 
our extraordinary charge to admit of the bearing of several young 
gentlemen to the end aforesaid on board our ships, in the quality of 
volunteers." These volunteers, called " volunteers by order," or 
"King's Letter boys," were from that time forward regularly 
entered at an age not exceeding sixteen years, and were paid £24 per 
annum. But, in the meantime, entry in the old less regular ways 
also continued. Among early King's Letter boys were Byng, Earl 
of Torrington, and Sir John Norris. The regulations of 1676 were 
followed by additional ones of 1677, which provided, among other 
things, that candidates for a lieutenant's commission must be not 
under twenty years of age, and must have served for three years at 
sea, one of the years being served as midshipman. They also 
provided for the examination of the candidate. In 1703, the period 
of preliminary service was increased to six years : and in 1728, when 



1700.] 



FA7 AND EALF-PAY. 



235 



the institution of the King's Letter was abolished and the Naval 
Academy at Portsmouth was estabhshed, the candidates were 
ordered to be examined by the Navy Board, instead of by three 
naval officers. Thenceforward, no one could lawfully become a 
commander, E.N., unless he had first passed as a lieutenant ; and 
no one could lawfully become a lieutenant without previous qualify- 
ing service. Still, for many years afterwards, the legal provisions 
were often more or less openly evaded. And, until 1794, the readiest 
way of entering upon the career of a naval officer was not by joining 
the Naval Academy, but by becoming the " servant "of an admiral, 
or captain, or by being rated as A.B., O.S., or even landsman. 

Half-pay to a limited number of captains was granted in 1673, 
and to certain masters, in 1675 ; and in 1693 it was ordered that all 
flag-officers, and all captains of 1st, '2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th rates, 
and fireships, and the first lieutenants and masters of 1st, 2nd, 
and 3rd rates, who had served for a year in the same capacity in 
ships of those rates, or who had been in a general engagement, 
should have half -pay while on shore. At the same time, the sea-pay 
of officers was largely increased, but in 1700 it was again reduced, 
and a new scale of half -pay was adopted. The old and the revised 
scales were : — 







Full Pay. 


Half-Pay. 






1693. 


1700. 


1700. 






£ 


«. 


d. 


£ y. 


d. 


£ 


c 


d. 






/Admiral of the Fleet . 


6 








5 





2 


10 









Admiral 


4 








3 10 





1 


15 









Vice-Admiral .... 


3 








2 10 





1 


5 









Eear-Admiral .... 


2 








1 15 







17 


6 






Captain to the Admiral ofl 

the Fleet \ 

Captain of a 1st rate . 

„ -'nd „ . . 


2 








1 15 







17 


6 


("to 20 seniors, with 
\ war service. 


re 


1 
1 


10 

4 






1 
16 






1 


10 





„ „ 3rd „ 

,, 4th „ . . 
,, ,, oth „ 


1 



15 
12 







13 
10 

8 


6 




1 

1 


8 





Jto 30 next senior, 
\ with war service. 




„ „ 6th „ . . 




10 





6 





( 










Lieutenant of 1st or 2nd'> 
rate / 




G 





5 







2 


6 


Jto 40 seniors, with 
\ war service. 




Lieutenant of 3rd, 4th, 5th| 
^ or 6th rates . . . . / 




5 





4 







2 





(to 60 next senior, 
\ with war service. 




' Master of a 1st rate 


14 








9 2 





/ 








rH 


» „ 2nd „ . . 


12 


12 





8 8 





3 


10 





(■fo 15 seniors, with 
\ war service. 




„ 3rd „ . . 


9 


7 


4 


6 6 





o 


„ 4th „ . . 
„ „ 5th „ 


8 

7 


12 
15 


4 



5 12 

5 2 




8 


2 


16 





to 15 next senior, 
with war service. 




„ „ 6th „ . . 


6 


12 





4 13 


4 










, Surgeon 


5 








5 





v 









236 CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. [1690-1706 

Table money to flag-officers was first allowed in 1664. It was 
granted to captains in 1686.^ Gratuities for wounds were first given 
to captains in 1666. In the year last named, also, the proportion 
of servants to flag-officers was regulated. In 1693, the proportion of 
servants was revised and reduced, and it then stood : Admiral 
commanding-in-chief, 10 ; other flag-officers, 8 ; captains of 1st or 
•2nd rates, 6 ; captains of 3rd or 4th rates, 5 ; captains of 5th or 6th 
rates, 4. 

There were, of course, in those days, no equivalents to the 
modern Colonial cadetships ; yet, from a very early period, the Navy 
was, at least to a slight extent, officered by persons of Colonial birth 
or training, and the entry of such was, in various ways, encouraged. 
Captain Kobert Fairfax (November 15th, 1690), was a New 

Englander. So was Cap- 
tain Eichard Short, his 
contemporary and friend. 
Captain Wentworth Pax- 
ton (April 7th, 1694), was 
another New Englander. 
And in 1706 a commission 
of vice-admiral was 
granted to Lieut. -Colonel 
Bhett, a gentleman of 
ipai Charleston, who distin- 

SEAMAN S PASS AGAINST IMPRESSMENT, 1691. ' 

,„  T ■,,.,-. , „ ,• ^ guished himself against 

(From an original in the Authors collection.) " o 

the Spaniards. Some 
years later, in 1745, Mr. 
John Bous, master of an American privateer, was promoted by 
Sir Peter Warren to be a commander, E.N., as a reward for special 
services, and was subsequently posted. 

The wages of seamen were not altered ; but various inducements 
were from time to time offered with the object of rendering the 
service more popular. For example, in 1672, a bounty of six weeks' 
pay was given to men entering themselves on board 1st and 2nd 
rates, and one of a month's pay to those entering themselves on 
board 3rd rates." And in 1706, acts for the better manning of the 

' By instructions dated July 15th, 1686, many admirable reforms were introduced 
with a view to the encouragement t)f officers of all ranks. 

^ On the other hand, it was directed in 1067 that men absenting themselves from 
vessels that were fitting should have 2.s. Qd. for each day of absence deducted from their 
pay, and that the fines should be given to the men who remained on duty. 



T! IE Bcircr Nth h-r.-: v I n ■. s 

given him to fojlow h'": trnvate Occafif!r.s on " - . , t 

tJ;.s li V 'f ;■ " ^ 

Div, he 15 :t 'lis r;r.i ■.  : .r- ^n ^-sar.i r' " :. " :.- -. .• 

■>. -—i uniil 
'then;- '-'•■: -.ri' •--;^ •.-::\\t'k. 

Wi!n;. ::■■.: '    .' ' ' - i;.jr-Vrj C^'ci. 



\i Snip. 



[The seal in the corner is that of the Navy Office.] 



1G94.] ESTABLISHMENT OF GREENWICH HOSPITAL. 237 

fleet provided, among other things, that conduct-money should be 
allowed, and that seamen turned over from one ship to another 
should receive the wages due in the former ship. But the press 
had to be continually made use of ere ships could be manned. 
Copies of two interesting passes entitling their holders to immunity 
from the press, are reproduced here. An Act of 1696 provided a 
new form of encouragement to the service. Its object was to 
establish a register for 30,000 seamen, who were to be in readiness 
at all times for the work of the Eoyal Navy, and who were to receive 
a premium or bounty yearly of 40s. each. It was ordered that none 
but such registered seamen were to be promoted to warrants or 
commissions in the Navy, and that such seamen, besides being 
entitled to a double share in prizes, should, if maimed or super- 
annuated, be admitted to 

Greenwich Hospital, 
where also, if they were 
killed on service, their 
widows and children 
should be entitled to re- 
lief. The Act was re- 
pealed in 1710. 

But the greatest of all 
encouragements to sea- 



ctrn, tint the Bearer hereof 



'TpHefe arc to Ccrtific al! uhoiii it nuy (Moll- 



is impioyed 
in their Majcftics Y.irdat you are there- 

fore to let him pals quietly to and again between 
the (aid Yard jnc! his own hnbitation, durinc; 
t!ie (pace of days from the date hereof 

without being otherwayslmpreft. ' Dated this 
of i6 



DOCK yardman's PASS AGAINST 
IMPEf:SSMENT, 1691. 

(From an urigUial in the Author's collecUun.) 
[The seal in the corner is that of the Navy Office.] 



men offered during the 
period under review were 
those held out to them by 
the establishment of 
Greenwich Hospital. 

The project of founding a hospital for disabled seamen is 
attributed to Queen Mary, who was deeply impressed with the 
sufferings of the men wounded at the battle of La Hague ; and it 
was in 1694 that by letters patent the King and Queen devoted 
to the purposes of a national naval hospital " all that capital 
messuage lately built or in building by our Eoyal uncle King 
Charles the Second, and still remaining unfinished, commonly 
called by the name of our palace at Greenwich," together with 
the adjacent land. The motives and objects of the foundation 
are well set forth in the preamble to the Registered Seamen's 
Act of 1696, whereby a contribution of &d. a month towards 
the maintenance of the Hospital from the wages of all seamen. 



238 CIVIL HISTORY, 1G60-1714. [1694. 

whether of the Eoyal ISTavj' or mercantile marine, was made 
obhgatory : — 

"Forasmuch as the strength and safety of this and other of H.M. realms and 
dominions do very much depend upon the furnishing and supplying of H. M. Eoyal 
Navy with a competent number of able mariners and seamen Avhich may be in readiness 
at all times for that service ; and -whereas the seamen of this kingdom have for a long 
time distinguished themselves throughout the world for their industry and skilfulness 
in their employments, and by their courage and constancy manifested in engagements 
for tlie defence and honour of their native country ; and for an encouragement to 
continue this their ancient reputation and to invite greater numbers of H.M. subjects to 
betake themselves to the sea, it is fit and reasonable that some competent provision 
should be made that seamen who by age, woimds, or other accidents shall become 
disabled for future service at sea, and shall not be in a condition to maintain themselves 
comfortably, may not fall under hardships and miseries, may be supported at the public 
charge, and that the children of such disabled seamen, and also the A\idows and children 
of such seamen as shall happen to be slain or drowned in sea sei'vice, may, in some 
reasonable manner, be provided and educated." 

The King did, however, not limit his bounty to the grant of the 
site ; he himself bestowed £2000 a year on the new foundation, and 
invited his subjects to follow the example thus set by adding their 
contributions ; and in the museum at Greenwich is still to be seen 
the autograph roll of benefactors who have left a record of their 
benevolence.^ The architectural designs were by Sir Christopher 
Wren, who supplied them gratuitously. 

The management of the foundation was vested in Commissioners 
who were nominated by the Crown. The government and discipline 
of the hospital were eventually entrusted to a Master and Governor, 
a Lieutenant-Governor, a Treasurer, four Captains, and eight Lieu- 
tenants, R.N.^ Among the Governors have been Rodney and Lord 
Hood ; among the Lieutenant-Governors, Captains AVilliam Locker 
and Sir Richard Pearson, R.N. ; among the Captains, James Cook, 
the navigator, figures ; and among the Treasurers have been John 
EveljTi, the diarist. Sir Charles Saunders, and Lord Biidport. By 
the early days of 1705 there were one hundred pensioner inmates. 
The first of all these to enter, John Worley by name, is com- 
memorated by a portrait, attributed to Sir James Thornhill, which 
still hangs in the Painted Hall. In 1707, the benefits of the 

' See a bicentenary article in the Times, July 14, 1894. 

^ The annual salaries of these were : Governor, £1000 ; Lieut.-Govemor, £400 ; 
Treasurer, £200 ; Captains, each, £230 ; Lieutenants, each, £115. There were also on 
the staff, one clerk to the Governor at £50, and three clerks to the Treasurer, one at 
£100 and two at £50. In addition, there were two chaplains, a physician, a surgeon, a 
steward, a cook, nurses, etc. 



1664.] ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARINE FORCE. 239 

hospital were extended to foreigners who had served two years in 
British ships of w^ar, privateers, or merchantmen ; and unclaimed or 
forfeited prize-money, together with a percentage of all naval prize- 
money, was granted by Parliament to the establishment. An Act 
of 1710 directed that any seaman in the merchant service, who had 
been disabled in defending or taking a ship might be eligible for the 
hospital. 

As in earlier periods, medals were very sparingly distributed, and 
there seem to have been no instances whatsoever of their having 
been officially given to seamen. For Eear-Admiral Dilkes's 
destruction of French shipping near Granville, in 1703, Queen 
Anne ordered gold medals to be struck for presentation to the 
admiral and officers ; but this is almost the sole example of 
the kind. 

One of the most interesting and important naval innovations of 
the time was the establishment of a marine force. The origin 
of this force may be traced to the creation, on October 28th, 1664, 
of " The Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Eegiment of Foot," ^ 
which was placed under the command of Sir William Killigrew, Bart., 
a nephew of George Monck, Duke of Albemarle. Upon the accession 
of James II., in February, 1685, the regiment was re-named " Prince 
George, Hereditary Prince of Denmark's Eegiment of Foot," and on 
February 28th, 1689, it was disbanded. Early in the next year, two 
new regiments were raised, and called the First and Second Marines. 
These regiments were increased to four in 1698, under Colonels 
William Seymour, Edward Dutton Colt, Henry Mordaunt, and 
Thomas Brudenall. They again were disbanded in 1699.^ The 
forces of 1664 and 1690 were, to a certain extent, connected one 
with another, several officers who had served in the original regi- 
ment serving in the later organisations, and there being, therefore, 
a certain continuity, if not of existence, at least of tradition. But 
to the end of the seventeenth century, the Marines in England were, 
to a large extent, experimental. At the beginning of the eighteenth, 
under Queen Anne, with the advantage of the experience already 
gained, the Marines were once more revived, and while still in 
their infancy, gained for themselves a reputation by their behaviour 
at the capture of Gibraltar. 

The seventeenth century regiments were far from being mi- 

^ Also called " The Admiral's Eegiment." 

^ Edye : ' Hist. Eecords of the Eoyal Marines,' passim. 



240 CIVIL BISTORT, 1660-1714. [1670. 

distinguished. Among their officers were Piercy Kirke, who was 
later colonel of the Old Tangier Begiment, " Kirke's Lambs," John 
Churchill, who became the great Duke of Marlborough, George 
Eooke, the victor of Malaga, Sir Clowdisley Shovell, and Sir AVihiam 
Jumper. Moreover, detachments of the regiments did good service 
in several of the actions of the second and third Dutch wars, and of 
the war with France. It should be added that, as early as 1666, 
provision ^ was made for land-officers {i.e. Marine officers, or, in 
their default, officers of troops serving as marines) to be borne in 
ships of all rates, except the 5th and 6th, and that cabins were 
allotted to them. In 1st and 2nd rates there was to be cabin 
accommodation for two, and in 3rd and 4th rates for one. There 
was no general regulation of cabins for subordinate naval officers 
until 1673, so that if, as it would appear was the case, a subaltern 
of Marines afloat in a 2nd rate in 1666 had a cabin to himself, he 
w^as probably better off than several naval officers of equivalent rank. 
Among the general naval improvements of the time, many, for 
the most part of an administrative nature, were due to the energy 
and activity of H.R.H. James, Duke of York, and of Samuel Pepys. 
Among practical improvements that deserve mention here, a leading 
place should be given to the encouragement of the practice of 
sheathing ships, to better their speed, and to preserve their bottoms. 
Sheathing with lead had been usual in the Spanish Navy since the 
middle of the sixteenth century, and had been employed in the case 
of British merchant shipping for several years ere it was utilised for 
British men-of-war. The first ship of the Eoyal Navy to be so 
treated was the Phoenix, which was taken in hand at the desire of 
Charles II., and which was afterwards very favourably reported on. 
This was in 1670. Among ships to be lead sheathed soon after- 
wards, were the Dreadnought, Henrietta, Mary, Lion, Bristol, 
Foresight, Vulture, Rose, Hunter, Hariuich, and Kingfisher. But 
the lead was not always applied in such a manner as to prevent 
the setting up of galvanic action between it and the ironwork of 
the ship ; several shipwrights were privately against the innovation ; 
Sir John Narbrough and other officers were dissatisfied with it, 
and it was at length discontinued.^ The next proposal for the 

1 Add. MSS. 9311. 

2 See ' The New Invention of Mill'd Lead,' London, 1691 ; and ' An Account of 
several new Inventions and Improvements now necessary,' London, 1691. Sir AVilliam 
Petty was probably concerned in the preparation of both these little books. 



1714.] THE DISCOVERY OF THE LONGITUDE. 241 

preservation of ships' bottoms, was brought forward in 1696 by 
a gentleman who invented a composition, which was appHed 
to the Sheeniess. These efforts to deal with one of the most 
troublesome naval problems of the age, were unsuccessful ; but 
they led to further experiments which, in the eighteenth century, 
attained their object. 

From 1686, ofticers commanding his Majesty's ships were 
ordered to deposit perfect copies of their journals wdth the Secretary 
of the Admiralty ; in the previous year, the earliest patents were 
granted for a process of rendering salt water fresh by distillation ; 
in 1695, the brass box compass was first supplied to ships of the 
Eoyal Navy ; in 1660, a Judge Advocate of the Fleet was for the 
first time appointed ; and the office of Surgeon-General of the Fleet, 
by warrant from the Lord High Admiral, was created in 1664. 

The very end of the reign of Anne witnessed the passing of an 
Act ^ which was destined to greatly influence and benefit the science 
of navigation. It provided for the offer of a reward to such person 
or persons as should devise a method for the discovery of the 
longitude at sea. Sir Isaac Newton and Dr. Halley suggested the 
Bill. Commissioners were appointed for judging proposals and 
conducting experiments. These, upon satisfying themselves of the 
reality or probability of the discovery, were directed to certify their 
opinion to the Commissioners of the Navy, who were authorised to 
make out a bill for any sum, not exceeding £'2000, such as the 
Commissioners of Longitude might deem necessary for the making 
of experiments. If the discoverer of the longitude should determine 
it to one degree, or sixty geographical miles, he was to be rewarded 
with £10,000 ; if to two-thirds of a degree, with £15,000 ; and if to 
half a degree, with £20,000. To this offer, the world owes the 
invention and perfection of the chronometer ; although the Act 
of Anne did not bear fruit until many years after it had been 
passed. 

There were several improvements in shipbuilding. In 1663 and 
1664, it was observed that Dutch and French built two-deckers of 
from sixty to seventy guns, carried their lower tiers four feet above 
the water, and could stow four months' provisions ; whereas our 

^ This Act of 1714 was supplemented by Acts of Geo. II. and Geo. III. ; and all 
the Acts were repealed by a new Act of 1774. Philip III. of Spain had offered a 
reward for the same discovery as early as 1598 ; and the States General had soon after- 
wards followed his example. Bm'ney's edition of Falconer's ' Marine Dictionary,' 243. 

VOL. II. R 



242 CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. [1664-74. 

corresponding vessels, copied from Diinquerque models, carried their 
guns but little more than three feet above the water, and stowed 
provisions for only ten weeks. The shipwrights, Sir Anthony 
Deane, and Messrs. Shish, Johnson, and Castle, set to work to 
remed}^ these imperfections ; and there were presently built, among 
other vessels, the Warspite and the Defiance, which carried their 
lower ginas four and a half feet above the water, and could stow 
provisions for six months. Ten years later we copied foreigners 
again, and again improved upon their work. In 1672-73 we were 
in alliance with the French ; and it was once more noticed that 
their ships were more beamy, and more battle-worthy in a sea way, 
than ours. Sir Anthony Deane thereupon took measurements of 
the Superbe, one of the finest of the French seventy-fours, and, in 
1674, launched the Harwich, which was generally agreed to be the 
best vessel of her rate then in existence.^ Up to that time, British 
men-of-war were usually too narrow in proportion to their length, 
and, to be made efficient, had to be girdled. '^^ 

In the later years of Charles 11. , in consequence, to a large 
extent, of the Duke of York's deprivation of office by the operation 
of the Test Act, the Eoyal Navy fell into a very weakly and 
unserviceable state. James II., upon his accession, did his best to 
revive it, but soon discovered that his personal efforts alone would 
be of but little avail ; and therefore, acting upon a suggestion 
of Pepys, he, in 1686, suspended the ordinary conduct of the Navy 

' Pepys's ' Naval Minutes,' 268. 

^ There is no room for doubt that the French ships were, both then and long 
afterwards, immeasurably better sailers than the English. Charnock, after justly 
pointing out tbat, but for this superiority, it would have been almost impossible in 
1708 for Forbin's squadron, in face of Byng's very much larger force, to have left 
Dunquerque, proceeded to the Firth of Forth, and returned to port having suffered only 
what, in the circumstances, was ridiculously small loss, goes on to say: "There remains 
behind a still stronger evidence of this alleged superiority which the French ships 
possessed in respect of form, over those of the English ; and this arises from the 
particulars of the loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion. It was confined 
entirely to ships which had once been in the possession of, and had been built bj% the 
English themselves. Of these, the Salisbury, of 50 guns, was taken. The BlacJcwaU , 
of the same force, with the Deal Castle and Squirrel, of 24 guns each, either foundered 
at sea or were wrecked on the coast of Holland." ..." It is no less worthy of remark 
that very few ships captured by the enemy, from the British, have ever continued long 
the property of their new possessors. If it has so happened tliat one of them, being in 
company with others of French construction, has ever fallen in with any English 
squadron, that ship, almost without exception, has been among those captured, and, 
most frequently, the first which has (alien." . . . " On the other hand, the recapture of 
any ship, frigate, or vessel of inferior rate from the British, which was originally 
French, is a circumstance extremely uncommon." ' Mar. Archit.' ill. 16, 17. 




o 



O 



w 

o 
o 

CO 

m 
o 

H 



1G86.] TEE COMMISSION OF 1686. 243 

by the Commissioners, and appointed a Commission, partly made 
up of the existing Commissioners of the Navy, and partly composed 
of fresh blood, for the settlement of affairs, and the putting of the 
fleet in order. He also directed £400,000 a year to be paid 
quarterly from the Treasury for the furtherance of the objects 
in view. The old Commissioners on this occasion were Anthony, 
Viscount Falkland, Sir John Tippetts, Kt., Captain Sir Eichard 
Haddock, Kt., R.N., Sir Phineas Pett, Kt., Admiral Sir John 
Narbrough, Kt., James Southern, Bear- Admiral Sir Eichard 
Beach, Kt., and Sir John Godwin, Kt. The new Commissioners 
who were added to them were Sir Anthony Deane, Kt., Captain 
Sir John Berry, Kt., E.N., William Hewer, and Balthasar 
St. Mich ell. The Commission did its work with so much activity 
and promptitude, that it was found possible to determine it on 
October l'2th, 1688, by which date the whole Navy, except three 
ships, had been repaired or w^as under repair. There were eight 
months' stores in the depots, and all the vessels under construction 
were upon the verge of completion.-^ The result was that at the 
Eevolution the Navy was much more efficient than it had been for 
many years previously. 

As the Eevolution marks an important epoch as well in naval as 
in national history, and as, moreover, owing to the enormous 
development of the Navy after that time, it will be impossible, in 
this work, to provide space wherein to give full lists of the 
fleet at later periods, a state of the Navy as it existed on De- 
cember 18th, 1688, is here appended.^ Such a state is given at 
length for the last time. Only summaries will be printed of 
the states during the eighteenth century, details of particular 
ships being, however, supplied as may be necessary for the illustra- 
tion or elucidation of particular incidents. 

^ Pepys's ' Memoirs relating to the state of the Koyal Navy,' 1690. 

^ This is compiled mainly from two lists in Pepys's ' Memoirs relating to the state 
of the Eoyal Navy ' ; two lists in Charnock's ' History of Marine Architecture ' ; MS. lists 
in the Sergison Collection ; contemporary MS. lists in the collection of the author, and 
notices in the State Papers. Certain particulars differ from those given for some of 
the same ships in the list on pp. 107-112. Alterations in the modes of measurement, 
and changes in armament and complement will account for the discrepancies. 



R 2 



244 



CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. 



[1688. 



Ships. 


* Built. 
+ Bought. 
t Taken. 


Length. 


Beam. 


Depth. 


Draught. Tons. 


Guns, 


station or 
Condition. 


1 








Ft. 


In. 


Ft. In. 


Ft. 


In. Ft. 


In. 










FiusT Rates : 




























St. Andrew . 


* 


1670 


128 





44 


17 


9 


21 


6 


1338 


96 


In repair 


730 


Britannia . 


* 


1682 


146 





47 4 


19 


7i 


20 





1739 


100 


Refitting 


780 


lioyal Charles . 


* 


1673 


136 





46 


18 


3 


20 


6 


1531 


100 


In repair 


780 


St. George . 


* 


1667 


128 





42 6 


18 


6 


21 





1229 


96 


Refitting 


710 


Boyal James 


* 


1675 


132 





45 


18 


4 


20 


6 


1422 


100 


In repair 


780 


London . 


* 


1670 


129 





44 


19 





20 


6 


1328 


96 


;; 


730 


St. Miclmel . 


* 


1669 


125 





40 Sh 


17 


5 19 


8 


1101 


90 


Refitting 


600 


Royal Prince . 


* 


1670 


131 





45 10 


19 





21 


6 


1463 


100 


Needing \ 
\ repair / 


780 


Sovereign'^ . 


* 


1637 


131 





48 


19 


2 


23 


6 


1605 


100 


In repair 


815 


Second Rates : 




























Albemarle^ . 


* 


1680 


140 


11 


44 4 


19 


7i 


21 





1395 


90 


„ 


660 


Coronation ^ 


* 


1685 


140 





44 9 


18 


2 


16 


2 


1427 


90 


J) 


660 


Duke 


* 


1682 


, ^ 






18 


9 


20 


6 


1546 


90 


5 J 


660 


Duchess . 


* 


1679 


132 


6 


44 6 


18 


3 


20 





1395 


90 


?> 


660 


Katherine . 


* 


1664 


124 





41 


17 


3 


20 





1108 


82 


Refitting 


540 


Neptune. 


* 


1683 


139 





45 8 


18 


6 


21 





1497 


90 


In repair 


660 


Ossory . 


* 


1682 


139 


^ 
( 


44 6 


18 


2 


20 





1395 


90 


660 


Sandwich . 


* 


1679 


132 


6 


44 6 


18 


3 


20 





1395 


90 


660 


Vanguard * . 


* 


1678 


126 





45 


18 


1^ 


20 





1357 


90 


660 


Victory (reblt.) ^ 


* 


1665 


121 





40 


17 





19 





1029 


82 


peeding | 53^ 
\ repair )\ 


Windsor Castle 


* 


1678 


143 





44 


18 


3 


20 





1462 


90 


In repair 


660 


Third Rates: 




























Anne^ . 


* 


1678 


128 





40 


17 





18 





1089 


70 


J) 


460 


Berwick. 


* 


1679 


128 





40 


17 





17 





1089 


70 


)> 


460 


Breda'' . . . 


* 


1679 


124 


6 


39 10 


16 


9 


18 





1055 


70 


jj 


460 


Bur/ord 


* 


1679 


140 





40 101 


17 


3 


18 





1174 


70 


9) 


460 


Cambridge ^ . 


* 


1666 


121 





37 10 


16 


4 


17 


6 


881 


70 


Channel 


420 


Captain . 


* 


1678 


138 





39 10 


17 


2 


18 





1164 


70 


In repair 


460 


Defiance 


* 


1675 


117 





37 10 


15 


10 


17 


6 


890 


64 


Channel 


390 


Dreadnought'^ . 


* 


1654 


116 





34 6 


14 


2 


16 


6 


732 


62 


?5 


355 


Dunkirk 


* 


1651 


112 





33 4 


14 





17 





662 


60 


jCommis- "1 
\ sioning/ 


340 


Eagle"' . . . 


* 


1679 


120 





40 6 


17 





18 





1047 


70 


In repair 


460 


Edgar . 


* 


1668 


124 





39 8 


16 





18 


4 


994 


64 


rComniis- \ 
\ sioning/ 


445 


Elizabeth^' . . 


* 


1679 


137 


6 


40 11^ 


16 


8^ 


18 





1108 


70 


Channel 


475 


Essex 


* 


1679 


134 





40 


16 


9^'18 





1072 


70 


In repair 


460 


Exeter . 


* 


1680 


137 





40 4 


16 


9 il8 





1070 


70 


J5 


460 


Expedition . 


* 


1679 


120 





40 9 


17 


18 





1059 


70 


J> 


460 


Grafton'^ . . 


* 


1679 


139 





40 5 


17 


2 


18 





1174 


70 


J) 


460 


Hampton Court^^ 


* 


1678 


131 





39 10 


17 





18 


6 


1105 


70 


jCommis- "l 
\ sioning/ 


460 


Harwich " . 


* 


1674 


123 


9 


38 10 


15 


8 


17 


6 


993 


70 


In repair 


420 


Henrietta " . 


* 


1654 


116 





35 7 


14 


4 


17 





781 


62 


Channel 


355 


Hop)e 


* 


1678 


124 


5 


40 


16 


9 


10 


6 


1058 


70 


In repair 


460 


Kent 


* 


1679 


134 10 


40 2 


16 


9^ 


18 





1067 


70 


("Commis- "l ^q^ 
\ sioniug/j 


Lenox . 


* 


1678 


131 





39 8 


17 





18 





1096 


70 


In repair 


460 



> Accidently burnt, 1696. 

2 Kenanied rniim, 1711. 

3 Wrecked off Kara Head, 1691. 
* Sunk in the Great Stonu, 1703. 

5 Oondetuned, 1090. 

6 Destroyed after the Battle of Beachy Head, 1690. 
' Blown up at the siege of Cork, 1C90. 



« Wrecked near Gibraltar, 1694. 

» Foundered off the N. Foreland, 1630. 

10 Lost off the .Scillies, 1707. 

11 Taken by the French, 1704. 

12 Taken bv the French, 17o7. 

13 Wrecked off Mount Edgccumbe, 1691. 
n Lost near Plymouth, December, 1089. 



1688.] 



THE FLEET AT THE REVOLUTION. 



245 



Ships. 


* Built, 
t Bought. 
X Taken. 


Length. 


Beam. 


Depth. 


Draught. Tons. Guns. ^^a'i™ "•" 
1 Condition. 


1 




Ft. 


In. 


Ft. 


In. 


Ft. In. 


Ft. 


In. 










Lion (reblt.) 


* 1658 108 





35 


4 


15 6 


17 


6 


717 


60 


In rejiair 


340 


Mary 


* 1649 116 





35 





14 6 


17 





777 


62 


Channel 


355 


Monck . . . 


* 1659 


108 





35 





13 11 


16 





703 


60 


Refitting 


340 


Monmouth . 


* 1668 


118 


9 


36 


10 


15 6 


18 





856 


66 


(Home, to"! 
\ pay off'/ 


400 


Montagu (reblt.) 


* 1675 


117 





36 


6 


15 


17 


4 


829 


60 


In repair 


355 


NorthuTuherA 
land 15 . . / 


* 1679 


137 





40 


4 


17 


18 





1050 


70 


» 


460 


Royal Oal- . 


* 1674 


125 





40 


6 


18 3 


18 


8 


1107 


74 


Needing "! 
\ repair / 
Channel 


460 


Pendennis ^'^ 


* 1679 


136 


9 


40 


1 


17 


17 





1093 


70 


460 


Plymouth . 


* 1653 


116 





34 


8 


14 6 


17 





742 


60 


j9 


340 


Resolution '° 


* 1667 


120 


6 


37 


2 


15 6 


17 





885 


70 


jy 


430 


Restoration ^^ . 


* 1678 


123 


6 


39 


8 


17 


18 





1032 


70 


In repair 


460 


Ruyert . 


* 1666 


119 





36 


3 


15 6 


17 





832 


66 


(Home, to"! 
\ pay off/ 


400 


Stirling Castle^^ 


* 1679 


133 


11 


40 


4 


17 3 


18 





1114 


70 


In ]'epair 


460 


Suffolk . 


* 1680 


138 





40 


6 


16 % 


18 





1066 


70 


J) 


460 


Swiftsure . 


* 1673 


123 





38 


8 


15 6 


17 


6 


978 


70 


5? 


420 


Warspite . 


* 1666 


118 





38 


9 


15 6 


17 


6 


942 


-Q (Commis- \ 
\ sioningj 


420 


York'' . . . 


* 1654 


115 





35 





14 2 


16 


6 


749 


60 Channel 


340 


Fourth Bates : 


























Advice . 


* 1650 


100 





32 


2 


12 3 


15 





544 


48 


)> 


230 


St. Allans . 


* 1687 


107 





32 


lOi 


13 3 


15 


9 


615 


50 


5J 


280 


Antelope 


* 1653 


101 





31 





13 


16 





516 


48 


J5 


230 


Assistance . 


* 1650 


102 





32 





13 


15 


6 


555 


48 


Jamaica 


230 


Assura7ice . 


* 1673 


107 


6 


34 





14 


16 


6 


680 


50 


Channel 


280 


Bonaduenture . 


* 1683 


102 


6 


32 


2 


12 4 


15 


6 


561 


48 


,, 


230 


Bristol . 


* 1653 


104 





31 





13 8 


15 


8 


534 


48 


» 


230 


Charles, galley . 


* 1676 


114 





28 


6 


18 7 


12 





492 


32 


/ Home, "! 

Ipayingoff'/ 


220 


Centurion'". 


* 1650 


104 





31 





13 


16 





531 


48 


Channel 


230 


Constant War \ 
wick '^ . . i 


t 1649 


90 





28 


2 


12 


12 


8 


379 


42 


» 


180 


Crow7i . 


* 1654 


100 





31 


7 


13 


16 





535 


48 


Channel 


230 


St.Dauid'\ . 


* 1667 


107 





34 


9 


14 8 


16 


8 


685 


54 


j> 


280 


Beptford 


* 1687 


108 





33 


6 


13 11 


15 


6 


644 


50 


jj 


280 


Biamond 


* 1651 


105 


6 


31 


3 


13 


16 





548 


48 


?j 


230 


Borer 


* 1654 


100 





30 


8 


13 


16 





530 


46 


J) 


182 


Bragon . 


* 1647 


96 





30 





12 


15 





470 


46 


Sallee 


220 


Falcon . 


* 1666 


88 





27 





12 


13 





349 


42 


( Home, "1 
Ipayingoff/, 


180 


Foresight 


* 1650 102 





31 





12 9 


14 


6 


522 


48 


Channel \ 


230 


Green ivich . 


* 1666 108 





33 


9 


14 6 


15 





654 


54 


99 


280 


Hampshire . 


* 1653 


101 


9 


29 


9 


13 


14 


5 


479 


46 


In repair 


220 


Happy Return '** 


* 1654 104 





33 


2 


13 


17 





609 


54 


Refitting 


280 


James, galley . 


* 1676 


104 





28 


1 


10 2 


12 





436 


30 


In repair 200 


Jersey ^° . 


* 1654 


132 





32 


1 


13 6 


15 


6 


556 


48 


Channel 230 


Kingfisher . 


* 1675 


110 





33 


8 


13 ' 

1 


13 





663 


46 


Refitting 220 


Mary Rose ^' 


* 1654 


102 





32 





13 


16 





556 


48 , 


( Home, 1230 
\ paying oft/ 



"J Lost iu the Great Stonu, 1703. 
•6 She had been lost in October 1689 on the Kentish 
Knock. 

" Lost off Plymouth, December, 1689. 
18 Taken by the French, 1691. 



'■' Had sunk at Plymouth in November 16^0. 
was weighed and made a hulk. 

20 Taken iu the W. Indies, 1691. 

21 Taken by the French, July 1691. 



She 



246 



CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. 



[1688. 



Ships. 


* Built, 
t Bouglit.. 
+ Taken. 


LJ/igth. 


Beam. Depth. 


Draught. Tons. 


Guns. 


station or 
Condition. 


1 






Ft. 


In. 


Ft. lu. Ft. In. Ft. In. 








Mordaunt'^^ . 


t 1683 


101 


9 


32 4^13 16 1 567 


46 


Channel 


230 


Newcastle'-^ . 


* 1653 


108 





33 1 12 2 


16 628 


54 


j> 


280 


Nonsuch^* . 


* 1668 


88 


3 


27 8 40 10 


13 368 


42 


V 


180 


Oxford . 


* 1674 


109 





34 15 6 


17 8 ' 670 


54 


Refitting 


280 


Phoenix . 


* 1671 


90 





28 6 11 2 


13 1 389 


42 


Channel 


180 


Portland 


* 1652 


105 





33 13 [13 


16 


608 


50 


99 


240 


Portsmouth -° . 


* 1649 


100 





29 6 12 6 


16 


463 


46 


•>■> 


220 


Reserve ^ 


* 1650 


100 





32 10 12 8 




576 


48 


( Home, 1 
\ paying off/ 


226 


Ruhij . . . 


* 1651 


105 


6 


31 6 13 


16 


530 


48 


Channel 


230 


Sedge moor -" 


, , 


, , 










48 


Sallee 


240 


Swalloiv 


* 1653 


100 


10 


32' "0 12"0 


15 "0 


549 


48 


Channel 


230 


Sweepstake . 


* 1666 












336 


42 


jCommis- 1 
\ sioning/ 


80 


Tiger (rebuilt) . 


* 1681 


104 





32 8 


13 8 


15 6 


590 


48 


Channel 


230 


Tiger Pi ize^ . 


t 1678 












649 


46 


f Commis- "» 
\ sioning/ 


200 


Woolwich . 














'716 


54 


Channel 


280 


Fifth Rates : 








- 














Rose. 


* 1674 


75 





24 


10 


12 6 


229 


28 


/ New \ 
\ England . 


105 


SapjMre 


* 1675 


86 





27 


11 


13 2 


333 


32 


Sallee 


135 


Sixth Rates : 






















Drake . 


* 1652 


85 





18 


7 8 


9 


146 


16 


Jamaica 


65 


Dumbarton^^ 


% 1685 


77 


8 


22 1 


10 


11 


191 


20 


Virginia 


70 


Fjanfan . 


* 1665 


44 





12 


5 8 


5 6 


32 


4 


In repair 


30 


Oreyliotind . 


* 1672 


75 





21 6 


9 


8 6 


184 


16 


J5 


75 


Lark 


* 1675 


74 





22 6 


9 2 


9 


199 


18 


Channel 


85 


Soldadoes 


* 1673 


74 





21 6 


10 


9 6 


180 


16 


5 J 


75 


Bombs :^ . . 






















Firedrake . 


* 1648 












202 


12 


?» 


75 


Portsmouth . 


* 1674 


59' 





21 1 


9""o 


7""6 


133 


10 


In repair 


35 


Salamander 


* 1687 












110 


10 


J) 


35 


FiRESHIPS : 






















Cadiz Mer- 1 
chant 3« . . i 


t 1688 






. . 


. . 


. . 


320 


12 


/Commis- ) 
\ sioning! 


45 


Cygnet . 


t 1688 










100 


6 


Channel 


30 


Charles . 


t 1688 










90 


6 


J) 


20 


Charles and] 
Henry . . / 


t 1688 








.. 12 


120 


6 


?) 


25 


Dartmouth ^' 


* 1655 


80 





25 10 


10 12  265 


^ 


)> 


55 


Eagle 


t 1654 


85 


6 


25 6 


10 


12 


305 


12 


jGuard, afi 
tSheerness/ 


45 


Eizabeth and) 
Sarah . . . / 


t 1688 


, . 




, , 


.. 


. . 


100 


6 


Channel 


25 


Ouardland . 


* 1654 


81 





24 6 


10 


11 6 


263 




J) 


50 


Ouernsey 


* 1654 


80 





24 


10 


12 


245 




55 


50 


Half Moon ^> . 




. . 




.. 


. . 


. . 


'8 


55 


35 


Mermaid 


* 1651 


86 





25 


10 


12 \ 268 




1 Commis- " 
\ sioning/ 


50 


Owner's Love . 


i 






•• 




. . 217 


10 


r Commis- "l ^q 
\ sioning/ 



'- Bought from Lord Mordaunt. 
23 Lost in the Great Storm, 1703. 
2< Taken bj' the French, 1 69,). 
-5 Had been taken bj' the French. 
26 Included by Pepys by error. She had been lost 
in St. Margaret's Bay in January 1689. 



2' Taken from the Algerines. 

28 Taken from the Earl of Argyle. 

2" Each of these carried two mortars. 

30 Expended at La Hougue, 1692. 

31 Lobt off Mull, >'ovember 1690. 



1688.] 



TEE FLEET AT THE REVOLUTION. 



247 



Ships. 


* Built, 
t Bought. 
X Taken. 


Length. 


Beam. 


! 1 
Depth. Draught. , Tons. Guns. 

1 


station or 
Condition. 


0, 
a 







Ft. In. 


Ft. 111. Ft. 111. Ft. In. 


1 




Fearl . . . 


* 1051 




! 260t 


10 


Channel 


50 


Richard (ind\ 
John . . . J 








.. 


1 




)» 


20 


St.Paup-^ . . 


t 1679 


74 


25 9 11 2hU 


260 


10 


)) 


45 


Richmond . 


* 1655 


72 


23 6 9 9 11 6 


211 


, , 


)) 




Roehiick . . . , 


t 1688 


1 

"  1 


. . . • • • 


80 


6 


)j 


16 


Rose, Salleeprize^^ : 


t 1684 


64 


23 10 2 10 8 


180 


  


? 




Samson ... 


t 1678 


78 


24 1 10 8 12 


240 


y^ ru-uard, atl 
(Sheerness) 


50 


Sophia^* . . ' 


t 1685 


72 3 


20 1 ' 9 6 11 


243 


6 


Channel 


22 


Speedivell 


 1688 








120 


8 


>? 


25 


Supphj ... 


t 1688 


. , 


. . . > 


, , 


70 


6 


55 


20 


Swan ... 


t 1673 


74 


25 10 11 


246 


6 


?j 


22 


Th m a s a n d\ 
Elizabeth^'' ./ 


t 1688 




1 


• • ! 




184 


10 


Commis- "1 
. sionmgl 


40 


Unity 


t 1688 


* * 








120 


6 


Channel 
[Guard, at] 


25 


Youmj Spragge^^ 


t 1673 


46 


18 


9 


8 6 


79 


10 


Ports- 
[ mouth J 


20 


Hoys : 


















Delight . 


* 1680 


55 5i 


18 5i 


8 6f 


_ 


100 




In repair 


4 


Lighter . 


* 1672 


28 


18 


7 6 


6"6 


65 




?) 


3 


Marigold 


* 1653 


32 


14 


7 


7 


33 




5) 


5 


Nonsuch 


* 1686 


53 81 


18 10^ 


8 4f 


, , 


81 




?) 


5 


Transporter 


* 1677 


66 9 


17 


10 11 


, , 


70 




» 


5 


Unity, horseboat 


, , 


58 6 


15 9 


6 5 


6 


40 




J> 


4 


Hulks: 




















Arms of Hoorn . 


t 1673 


106 


30 3 


12 


18 


516 




)? 


8 


Arms of RotterA 
dam ^^ . . .J 


t 1673 


119 


39 6 


18 9 


18 6 


987 




)) 


7 


French Ruby 


t 1666 


112 


38 2 


16 6 


18 6 


868 




)1 


4 


St. Oeorge . 


* 1622 


116 


38 


14 10 


18 


891 




)) 


2 


Leopard . 


* 1659 


109 


33 9 


15 


17 3 


645 




Sallee 


33 


Maria Frize ^^ . 


t 1684 










120 




Gibraltar 




Fontoon . 


*1678-80 


76" 


14"o 


6"0 


4' 


80 




5) 


3 


State-House ^^ . 


t 1667 


90 


30 4 


11 6 


15 


440 




In repair 


4 


Ketches : 




















Deptford 


* 1665 


52 


18 


9 4 


8 4 


89 


10 


Virginia 


40 


Kingfisher . 


t 1684 


47 9 


15 6 


8 5i 


7 3 


61 


4 


Jersey 


15 


Quaker . 


t 1671 


54 


18 2 


9 


9 6 


94 


10 


Channel 


40 


Smacks: 




















Royal Escape . 


t 1660 


30 


14 3 


7 9 


7 


34 


8 


In repair 


10 


Little London . 


* 1672 


26 


11 


5 8 


4 


165 


2 


)) 


2 


Sheerness 


* 1673 


28 


11 6 


6 


5 6 


18 


2 


5> 


2 


Shish 


* 1670 


38 


11 


6 6 


5 6 


18 


, , 


>5 


2 


Tow-Engine 


t .. 


, , 


, , 


, , 


, , 


10 


. . 


JJ 


2 


Yachts : 




















Charlotte 


* 1677 


61 


21 


9 


7 10 


143 


8 


)) 


20 


Cleveland . 


* 1671 


53 4 


19 4 


7 6 


7 6 


107 


6 


Channel 


30 


Fubbs . . . 


* 1682 


63 


21 


9 6 


7 10 


148 


12 


1 

" 


40 


Henrietta 


* 1679 


65 


21 8 


8 3 


8 9 


162 


8 


! In repair 


20 


Jemmy . 


* 1662 


31 


12 6 


6 


3 6 


25 


4 


i » 


4 


Isabella . 


* 1683 


60 


18 11 


8 Hi 


7 9 


114 


8 


t Channel 


30 



32 A Dutch vessel recovered from the Algerines. 

33 Also called Sallee Rose. 

31 Taken from the Earl of Argyle. 
35 Expended at La Hougue, 1692. 



36 Bought from Adm. Sir Ed. Spragge. 

37 A Dutch East Imliaman. 

38 Taken from Sallee. 

30 I.e., Stadthuis, taken from the Dutch. 



248 



CIVIL HISTORY, 1660-1714. 



[161 



Ships. 


* Built, 
f Bought. 


Length. 


Beam. 


Depth. 


Draught. 


Tods. 


GUDS. 


station or 
Condition. 


■5. 




+ Taken. 






















o 






Ft. 


In. 


Ft. 


In. 


Ft. In. 


Ft. 


In. 










Me of Wight . 


* 1078 


31 





12 


6 


6 


6 





25 


4 


In repair 


b 


Katherine . 


* 1674 


56 





21 


4 


8 6 


7 


9 


135 


6 


Channel 


30 


Kitchen . 


* 1674 


56 





21 


4 


8 6 


7 


9 


125 


6 


?5 


30 


Mary 


* 1677 


66 


6 


21 


6 


8 9 


7 


6 


166 


6 


[Guard, at 


30 


Merlin . 


* 1666 


53 





19 


6 


6 


7 


4 


109 


6 


 Ports- 
mouth 


30 


Monmouth . 


* 1666 


52 





19 


6 


8 


7 


3 


103 


6 


Ireland 


20 


Navy 


* 1673 


48 





17 


6 


7 7 


7 


1 


74 


6 


Guernsey 


20 


Qiirrnhnroif/h 


* 1671 


31 


6 


13 


4 


6 6 


5 


9 


29 


4 


In repair 


4 



The first approach to a regular estabhshment of men and guns 
in the Navy was devised in 1677, when, npon the recommendation 
of the Navy Board and certain officers, it was decided to build 
thirty new ships, viz., one first-rate, nine second-rates, and twenty 
third-rates. This establishment was as follows : — 



Guns. 


1st Rates. 


2nd Eates. 


3rd Rates. 


Men per Gun. 


Cannon (42 prs.) 


26 


. . 


. , 


8 


Demi-Cannon (32 prs.) . . . . 




26 


26 


6 


Culverins (18 prs.) 


28 


26 




5 


12-prs 






26 


4 


Sakers 


44 


36 


14 


3 


3-prs 


2 


2 


4 


2 




100 


00 


70 





In addition to the men per gun, the first-rates had complements 
of '296, the second rates of 262, and the third-rates of 160,^ subse- 
quently reduced to 150. Towards the end of the period, 1660-1714, 
guns began to be denominated only according to the weights of their 
shot, and tbe names cannon, culverins, etc., disappeared. 

The improvements in ordnance were, upon the whole, unim- 
portant ; and it is necessary to here mention but one of them. This 
was the introduction of the gun known as the cushee piece, a short 
weapon throwing a small shell or carcase instead of an ordinary 
shot. It was the invention of Kichard Leake, Master Gunner of 



^ Derrick's ' Memoirs of the Eoyal Navy,' App. 28, p. 270. 




S5. 



O 



I 

o 



o 



1660-72.] THE NAVIGATION ACTS. 249 

England, and it seems to have been first employed in action by his 
son, Commander John Leake, of the Firedrake, at the battle of 

Bantry Bay. 

The bomb-ketch became, after the Eevolution, a feature in 
almost every EngHsh fleet. " Machines," or " infernals," were also 
introduced for a time as substitutes for the older fireships, but 
were soon discredited. Some notice of these will be found in the 
succeeding chapters.^ 

The policy illustrated by the Navigation Act of the Common- 
wealth was persisted in under Charles II. In 1660,^ an Act was 
passed providing that all colonial produce should be exported in 
English vessels ; that no man might establish himself as a factor 




AN ENGLISH BOMB KETCH OF 1G!J2. 

(After ChaniucK's copy of the urii/i//(i! (ly<(ii(iht.) 

in the colonies ; and that various sorts of colonial produce could be 
exported only to England and her dependencies. In 1663, it was 
enacted that the colonies should receive no goods whatsoever in 
foreign vessels. And in 1672 the Navigation Act of Charles II. 
prohibited the introduction of nearly all goods except in English 
ships manned by crews of which at least three-fourths were 
English. 

In the last year of Anne, the law of wrecks was amended, the 
statute, 3 Edward III., being confirmed, and it being further 
enacted that in case either the Queen's or merchants' ships, riding 
at anchor near the wreck, should neglect to give assistance upon its 
being demanded, the commander of any such ship should forfeit 

^ And especially uu p. 47Gh. ^ 12 Car. 11. c. 18. 



250 CIVIL HISTOIiT, 1660-1714. [1698. 

£100 to the owners of the vessel m distress. And to encourage 
the rendering of assistance, there was provision for the payment, as 
salvage, of rewards by the owners, and, in defaiilt, for the detention 
of the ships and goods pending satisfaction. Under George I., 
this Act was made perpetual. 

In 1691, one dry and two wet docks were ordered to be con- 
structed at Portsmouth. About three years later new docks and 
storehouses, as well as several official residences, were built at 
Plymouth.^ Money for building a wharf and further storehouses 
at Portsmouth was voted in 1704 ; and in 1710 the purchase of 
land was authorised to facilitate the better fortification of the Eoyal 
Yards at Portsmouth, Chatham, and Harwich. In 1693 there was 
a project to utilise Falmouth as a naval port, and to build docks 
there ; yet, though the harbour was surveyed with this view, 
nothing further seems to have ever been done in the matter. 

The marking, buoying, and lighting of the coasts received much 
attention. In 1694, for example, the Gilkicker mark, near Gosport, 
was erected, and the Horse buoy was moored at Spithead. In 1691, 
Mr. Walter Whitfield had suggested to Trinity House the erection 
of a lighthouse on the Eddystone, to be built at his expense, in 
return for certain dues granted by patent from the Crown. This 
lighthouse was. designed and constructed by Mr. Henry Winstanley, 
of Littlebury, Essex, and a light was first shown from it in 
October, 1698. In 1699, Winstanley strengthened the tower, and 
increased its height from eighty to one hundred and twenty feet. 
He was in the building when the great storm of November '26th, 
1703, swept it away. Its place was presently taken by a structure 
designed and completed by Mr. John Kudyerd, a silk mercer of 
Ludgate Hill, assisted by two shipwrights, Messrs. Smith and 
Norcott, of Woolwich Dockyard. This tower, which was of wood, 
built around a basic core of granite, was ninety-two feet high to 
the top of the baU ; and a light, supplied by twenty-four candles, 
the five largest weighing two pounds each, was first shown from it 
on July 28th, 1708. The hghthouse survived until 1755, when 
it was accidentally burnt down. 

The art of marine surveying made great progress, and many 
excellent charts, especially of home waters, date from the period 
under review. Among the most noted cartographers were Captain 
Christopher Gunman, whose name is commemorated in the 

' I'lvinuuth Citadel had been rebuilt under Charles II. 



1707.] THE UNION WITH SCOTLAND. 251 

Gunman Sand, which he discovered on May 31st, 1670, and which 
hes off Dover; and Captain Greenville Collins (1679), whose charts 
are extremely nmnerous and accurate. 

Thp Union with Scotland, effected on May 1st, 1707, revived and 
rendered permanent an arrangement which had already subsisted 
for a short time under the Commonwealth, but which had ceased at 
the Restoration. The two kingdoms were made one, under the 
title of Great Britain ; the few vessels ^ composing the Scots Navy 
became British, and the already blended national ensigns of the 
two countries were, by proclamation of July 8th, 1707, ordered 
to be worn by the vessels of all British subjects, in the form of 
a canton on a red flag, the Jack itself being reserved as the peculiar 
distinction of Queen's ships. 

^ The ships taken over, with their commanders, were the Edinhurgh, Thomas 
Gordon; the Glasgow, James Hamilton; and the Dumharton Castle, Matthew 
Campbell. All were small and of little importance. 




( 252 ) 



CHAPTEK XXIII. 

MILITARY HISTOEY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 16G0-1714. 
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 

Division uf the subject — Difficulties between England and Holland — The Second Dutch 
War — France joins Holland— First success of Obdam — Battle off Lowestoft, 
June 3rd, 1665 — Death of Obdani, Cortenaer, Stellingwerf, Lawson and Sansom —  
Allegations against tlie Duke of York — Retirement of Jan Evertsen — Sandwich in 
command — Rupert and Albemarle in command — -The threat of De Beaufort — 
Separation of the English fleet— The Four Days' Fight, June 1-4, 1666— Brilliant 
tactics of Albemarle — Capture of the Royal Prince — Rupert rejoins — Death of 
Berkeley and Myngs— " The St. James's Fight," July 25th, 1666— Death of Jan 
Evertsen — Dismissal of Cornelis Tromp — Holmes at Vlieland and Ter Schelling, 
August 8th and 9th, 1666 — De Ruijter at Sea — The fleet of De Beaufort — Capture 
of the Buhls — Negotiations for peace — Opposition of De Witt — Van Ghent in the 
Forth — Dutch descent upon the Thames and i\Iedway, June, 1667 — Van Ghent 
below Gravesend — Capture of Sheerness — Consternation in London — Defences of 
Chatham — Activity of Albemarle and Spragge — Van de Rijn breaks the chain — 
Burning of ships in the Medway — Capture of the Royal Charles — The Dutch are 
reinforced — Scarcity in London — Duplicity of France — Harwich attacked — De 
Ruijter in the Channel — Van-Xes in the Thames — Withdrawal of the Dutch — 
The peace of Breda — France quarrels with Holland — Charles II. provokes the 
Dutch and joins France — The Third Dutch War — D'Estrees and Duquesne— 
English negligence— The Battle of Solebay, May 28th, 1672— Conduct of d'Estrees 
— Death of Sandwich and Van Ghent — De Ruijter's brilliant strategy — Gallantry of 
the English Marines — Effects of the Test Act — Rupert in command — Blockade of 
the Dutch coasts — First Battle of Schooneveld, May 28th, 1673 — Confusion of the 
Allies — Rashness of Tromp — Death of Schram and Vlugh — Second Battle of 
Schooneveld, June 4th, 1673 — Raising of the blockade— The fleets again at sea — 
The blockade renewed — The Battle of Kijkduin, or the Texel, August 11th, 1673 
— Ill-conduct of the French — Rashness of Spragge and Trom]:3 — Death of Spragge, 
De Liefde and Sweers — The Treaty of AVestminster — Efficiency of the Xavy 
under James II. — Folly of the King — Supersession of Strickland — The exi)editioii 
of William of Orange— Herbert in command — The "Protestant Wind" — Sub- 
mission of the Navy — Fine condition of the Frencli fleet — The War of the League 
of Augsburg— French help for the ex-King — The Battle of Bautry Bay, May 1st, 
1689 — Herbert made Earl of Torringtou — Operations of Rooke — Relief of London- 
derry — Faulty strategy of both combatants — Junction of the French Brest and 
Toulon fleets — English mismanagement — Tourville at sea — Battle of Beachy 
Head, June 30th, 1690 — Torriugton ordered to fight — Gallantry of the Dutch — • 
The responsibilities of a commander-in-chief — The "fleet in being," and the 
" potential fleet " — Confusion of the Allies — The French in Torbay — Disgrace of 
Torrington — The three Joint Admirals — Russell, commander-in-chief — Tourville's 



1660.] 



THE FOUR GREAT WARS OF 1660-1714. 



253 



campagne au large — Loss <>f the Corunation, etc.— Projected invasion of England 
—Supposed disaffection in the lieet— The Battle of Barfleur, May 19th, 1692— 
I)aath of Carter — Tourville's able tactics — Chase of the French — Destruction of 
French ships at Cherbourg and La HoUgue, May 22ud and 23rd, 1692 — The 
command again in commission — The disaster to the Smyrna convoy — Decline of 
the French navy — The war against commerce — Loss of the Sussex, etc. — Russell 
winters in the Mediterranean — Russell in the Channel — The Treaty of Rijswijk — 
The Navy during the Peace — Rooke's expedition to Copenhagen in 1700 — The 
War of the Spanish Succession — Death of William IIL — The war in America — 
Beubow in the West Indies — His action with Ducasse, August 20th to 21th, 1702 
— Misbehaviour of some of Benbow's captains — Death of Benbow — Wager in the 
West Indies — Capture of the San Jose/"— Misbehaviour of some of Wager's captains 
— The war in Europe— The attack on Cadiz, 1702 — Causes of the failure — The 
galleons at Vigo — Rooke at Vigo Bay, October 12th, 1702 — Grallantry of Hopsonn 
— Shovell in the Mediterranean — The Great Storm of 1703 — Barcelona bombarded 
— Rooke and the French fleet— Capture of Gibraltar, 1704 — Behaviour of the 
Marines — Battle off Velez Malaga, August 13th, 1704 — Leake in the Mediterranean 
— Siege of Gibraltar — Peterborough and Shovell in the Mediterranean — Capitula- 
tion of Barcelona — Surrender of Cartagena — Storming of Alicant — Norris at the 
mouth of the Var — Siege of Toulon — Death of Shovell — Reduction of Minorca — 
Byng, Whitaker and Baker in the Mediterranean — Norris captm-es Cette and 
^gcle — Jennings in the Mediterranean — Treaty of Utreclit — Results of the war. 

rpHE comparatively brief 
period of English 
history included between 
the restoration of Charles II. 
in 1660, and the death of 
Queen Anne in 1714, wit- 
nessed the outbreak and 
conclusion of no fewer than 
four great naval wars. The 
earliest of these was the 
Second Dutch War, which, 
begun informally very soon after the Eestoration, assumed a 
regular and official character at the commencement of 1665, and 
was terminated in 1667 by the Treaty of Breda. In the course of it, 
England had as her opponents Holland and France, and fought 
without allies. The next was the third Dutch War, of 1672-73. 
In this conflict England had the co-operation of France. The third 
was the war of the Grand Alliance, begun in 1689, terminated by 
the Treaty of Eijswijk in 1697, and waged by England, Holland, the 
Empire, and Spain' against France. The fourth and last was the' 
war of the Spanish Succession, declared in 1702, and ended by the 
Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Again, England, Holland, and the 
Empire, as well as several minor powers, were ranged against 




MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF THE ENGLISH CLAIM 
TO .THE DOMINION OF THE SEA, 1665. 

(From an original kindly lent hij H.S.H. Caidnin 
Prince Louis of Battenbcnj. li.N.) 



254 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1660. 

France, which had the support of the majority of the Spanish 
people, and of Cologne, Bavaria, and Mantua. 

The naval operations of each of these wars may be divided into 
two categories. There were, first, the operations of fleets, opera- 
tions which had a distinct and immediate influence upon the spirits 
and moral of the whole body of combatants, and so upon the issue 
of the strife ; and there also were the operations of small detached 
squadrons and of single ships, operations which, although of much 
interest and importance in themselves, did not form any essential 
part of the strategic campaign, and did not materially affect the 
final result. 

For the sake of convenience, and in order, so far as possible, to 
present the really essential story of each war in a consecutive form, 
the two categories of operations will be separately dealt with — the 
major operations in this, and the minor operations in the following 
chapter. For the same reasons a similar distinction will be made, 
whenever it may appear to be desirable, in the case of the wars that 
have taken place since 1714. It is believed that the clearness and 
continuity of the main narrative could not but suffer by a frequent 
introduction of episodal scenes which, no matter their intrinsic 
attractiveness, have no easily definable bearing upon the general 
issue, and that such scenes will be more fitly treated of apart. 

The peace of 1654 had brought the first Dutch War to a 
conclusion but had not destroyed the ill-feeling between England 
and the Netherlands. The Dutch had been obliged to acknowledge 
the English claim to the honour of the flag, to submit to the irk- 
some provisions of the Navigation Act, and to undertake to exclude 
members of the House of Orange from the office of Stadtholder and 
from the Admiralship of Holland. Their trade had also suffered 
most severely. On the other hand, England had not secured any 
effective satisfaction for the massacre of Amboyna. Thus there 
were left many smouldering sparks which awaited but a breath to 
fan them into flame. The breath was applied very soon after the 
Restoration. Complaints reached England of high-handed action 
by the Dutch East and West India Companies, of the seizure of 
English ships, of interference with English trade in remote regions, 
and of omission on the part of the Dutch to carry out certain stipu- 
lations of the treaty — notably, those for the handing over of Cape 
Coast Castle, on the Gold Coast, and of Pulo Eon, in the East 
India Archipelago. These acts of the Dutch led to the making of 



1664.] 



THE QUARREL WITH HOLLAND. 



255 



reprisals, chiefly under the direction of Commodore (afterwards 
Admiral Sir) Eobert Holmes, an accomit of whose proceedings will 
be found in the next chapter. The tension between the two 
countries was intensified, on the one side, by the discovery of a 
Dutch project for seizing Cormantyne, an English fort, and, on the 
other, by the English capture of New Amsterdam, now New York, 
which Holmes took, not merely by way of reprisals, but also in 




H.R.H. JAMES, DUKE OF YORK, LORD HIGH ADMIRAL 
(aFTEKWARDS JAMES II). 

(.After the portrait hij Sir G. Kncller.) 



virtue of a claim of old standing. Still further friction was occa- 
sioned by the desertion by the Dutch Admiral De Kuijter of the 
English Admiral Sir John Lawson at a moment when the two were 
about to co-operate against the Algerine pirates ; by De Euijter's 
counter-reprisals on the African coast and on the high seas ; and, 
finally, by Admiral Sir Thomas Allin's attack upon the Dutch 
Smyrna fleet off Cadiz. In this action, as will be shown later, 



256 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1665. 

Captain Pieter van Brakel, senior officer in charge of the Dutch 
convoy, was killed. "War, in consequence, was declared by the 
Dutch — who had encouragement from France — on January 14th, 
and by the Enghsh on February '23rd, 1665. France, after some 
hesitation, went to the active assistance of her ally a year later, and 
on January 16th, 1666, also declared war against England. 

Both sides displayed extraordinary energy in their preparations. 
Holland arrested both ships and men belonging to the Dutch East 
India Company, and laid an embargo on all other craft ; but, with a 
view to creating sympathy among British merchants, she presently 
released such English and Scots vessels as had been seized in Dutch 
harbours at the outbreak of hostilities. The English administration 
worked feverishly to make good the numerous faults and deficiencies 
which were revealed by the crisis, and, in the meantime, repaid the 
diplomatic generosity of the Hollanders by freeing such Dutch ships 
as had been seized in British ports. 

Of the two grand fleets the British was the first to be ready. It 
consisted of 109 men-of-war, including "frigates" and armed hired 
vessels, and twenty-eight fireships and ketches, mounting in all 
4192 guns, and having on board 21,006 seamen, marines, and 
soldiers. The flag officers in command were : the Lord High 
Admiral, H.E.H. James, Duke of York, K.G., with Sir WilHam 
Penn as Captain of the Fleet, in the Boijal Charles, 80, Captain 
John Harman, and Admirals H.E.H. Prince Kupert (White) and 
Edward Montagu, Earl of Sandwich (Blue) ; Vice-Admirals Sir 
John Lawson (Bed), Sir Christopher Myngs^ (White), and Sir 
George Ayscue (Blue) ; and Eear-Admirals Sir W^illiam Berkeley 
(Eed), Eobert Sansom (White), and Thomas Tyddiman ^ (Blue). 

This fleet, sailing on April 21st, proceeded with as little delay as 
possible off the Texel, within which the Netherlands fleet was 
assembling ; and it began a blockade of the Zuider Zee and of the 
neighbouring coasts, chiefly with a view to cutting off home-coming 
Dutch vessels, but with the subsidiary design of. engaging the Dutch 
off their own shores should they venture to put to sea. The Duke 

^ Christopher Myngs. Born probably about 1620. Was a captain during the 
first Dutch War. Knighted by Charles II. Yice-Admiral (W.) in the action of 
June 3rd, 1665. KiUed on June 4th, 1666. 

2 Thomas Tyddiman. Born probably about 1620. Captain of the Resolution, 
1660. Acting Bear- Admiral in the Channel, 1664. Flag-officer in most of the actions 
of the Second Dutch war. Knighted, 1665. Led the attack on Bergen, 1665. 
Died, 1668. 



1665.] 



THE DUKE OF YORK IN THE NORTH SEA. 



257 



of York cruised on and off for more than a fortnight, capturing a 
number of merchantmen ; and then, his fleet having suffered some- 
what from bad weather, especially on May 8th, he drew off. His 
desire appears to have been, ere he returned to England, to intercept 
Vice-Admiral M. A. De Euijter, who, as has been seen, had been 
making counter-reprisals on the AVest Coast of Africa, and who Avas 




JACOB VAN WASSENAER, LORD OF OBDAM, LIEUTENANT-ADMIRAL OF 
HOLLAND AND WESTVRIESLAND. 

(After the ciujraved -portrait hij J. Suijderhoef.) 



supposed to be homeward bound ; but provisions fell short, and the 
Duke had to forego his intention and anchor off Harwich, and in the 
mouth of the Thames. 

In the meantime a formidable Dutch fleet had been got together. 
It consisted, in addition to several vessels which were ultimately left 
behind, of 103 men-of-war, seven yachts and dispatch vessels, eleven 
fireships, and twelve galhots, mounting in all 4869 guns, and having 

VOL. II. s 



258 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1665. 

on board 21,556 officers and men.^ It was divided into no fewer 
than seven squadrons ^ of nearly equal strength, each made up 
of three divisions. The squadron commanders, in the order of 
their seniority, were : Jacob van Wassenaer, Lord of Obdam, Com- 
mander-in-Chief, in the jEJe^cZrac/if, 76; Lieut. -Admiral Jan Evertsen, 
Lieut. -Admiral Egbert Meussen Cortenaer Lieut. -Admiral Augustus 
Stellingwerf, Vice-Admiral Cornells M. Tromp,^ Vice-Admiral 
Cornells Evertsen,* and Vice-Admiral Volkhard Adriaensze Schram. 
Each of these had under him two junior flag-officers, or captains 
acting as such ; so that, in the battle which ensued, the extra- 
ordinary number of twenty-one Dutch and nine British flags flew. 

The Dutch put to sea on May 13th and 14th, and, a few days 
later, Obdam, who cruised in the neighbourhood of the Dogger 
Bank, was able to report to his Government that, on the evening of 
May 20th, he had sighted several vessels which he had at first 
supposed to be the English fleet ; that he had approached them and 
found them to be English-Hamburg merchantmen, convoyed by a 
man-of-war of thirty-four guns ; and that he had captured all. The 
ships, he said, were laden with pitch, hemp, tar, cables, cable-yarn, 
planks, iron, copper, copper wire, cloth, etc., and were very valuable 
prizes. The number of vessels taken was, according to the English 
accounts, ten, inclusive of the man-of-war; but some Dutch writers^ 
claim that twenty-two prizes were made. Obdam himself does not 
in his dispatch mention any specific number. 

This capture involved a very serious loss, not only to the 
merchants concerned, but also to the British Government, which 
was still largely dependent for naval stores upon the countries lying 
on and near the shores of the Baltic, and which, at the moment, 
had the greatest need of such supplies. The disaster consequently 
caused much outcry, and led to the fleet being immediately hurried 
again to sea. It weighed from the buoy at the Gunfleet on May 29th, 

^ List in the Rijks Archief. A second official Dutch list gives the number of 
oflBcers and men as 21,631. 

2 The Dutch squadrons were thus distinguished : — (1) flag at the main ; (2) flag 
at the fore ; (3) flag at the mizzen ; (4) yellow pennant ; (5) red pennant with white 
stripe ; (6) white pennant with red stripe ; (7) blue pennant with yellow stripe. List 
in the Eijks Archief. 

* Comelis Martenszoon Tromp, son of the great Admiral M. H. Tromp. Born 
1629. Created a baronet by Charles IL, March 25th, 1675. Liutenant-Admiraal- 
Greneraal of Holland and Westvriesland. Died, May 22nd, 1691. 

* " The Old." 

" E.g. Van den Boscli : ' Leven van J. van Wassenaer.' 



1665.] THE BATTLE OFF LOWESTOFT. 259 

and lay for the night off Aldborough, where the Duke seems to have 
received news that the enemy was not far from him. The fleet 
subsequently proceeded to Southwold Bay, where it anchored at 
6 A.M. on June 1st. 

Obdam, if the personnel of his force had been better than it was, 
might have followed the retiring English to their coasts early in 
May, and dealt them a serious blow ere they were once more ready 
for sea ; but he realised that the discipline of many of his ships 
was bad, that jealousy existed among his officers, and that some of 
the impressed vessels of the East India Company were not to be 
depended upon. He, therefore, had no desire, even at the end of 
the month, to force an action until such time as he should find 
himself more advantageously situated. But his Government, which 
did not see things with his eyes, ordered him to keep close in 
with the EngHsh coast, and to find and engage the foe ; ^ and 
he obeyed. 

At mid-day, consequently, on June 1st, it was reported to the 
Duke of York in Southwold Bay that the enemy was about six miles 
to the E.S.E. ; whereupon the commander-in-chief weighed and put 
to sea. There is much contradictory evidence as to the direction of 
the wind at the time. It is probable, however, that it was favour- 
able to the Dutch, and that Obdam's only reason for not attacking 
at once was that his ships were scattered, and that he desired to 
enable the whole of his force to come up. He consequently kept 
away to seaward during the afternoon and night. On the morning^ 
of June '2nd, he was visible about five miles to the S.E., and at 
8 A.M. Lowestoft was eight miles to the N.W., and the enemy 
had closed to a distance of three miles or less. But that day 
there was no farther approach until towards evening. The wind 
then shifted from E. to S., later veering to S.W. by W.,^ with the 
result that, at about 2.30 a.m. on June 3rd, the fleets were some 
fourteen miles N.N.E, of Lowestoft, and the English had the 
weather-gauge. 

Prince Rupert led the van, the Duke the centre, and Sandwich 
the rear. At 3.30 a.m. the action began, and it would appear that 
the two fleets, each in line ahead, passed one another on opposite 
tacks in the set manner of the time, though some accounts declare 
that they passed through one another. Having passed, each turned 

1 Dispatch of May 29tli ; Aitzema, 446. 

^ Coventry's report to the Duke of York says S.W. 

s 2 



260 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1665. 



sixteen points and renewed the encounter. The Dutch seem to 
have ahered course in succession, their van remaining their van, 
their centre their centre, and their rear their rear ; but the EngHsh 
altered course simultaneously, so that, at the second passage, their 
rear became their van. The Dutch in vain strove to gain the 
weather-gauge ; and it was probably owing to these efforts that at 
about 1 P.M., in the course of the second or a subsequent passage, 




CORNELIS TROMP AS LIEUTENANT-ADMIRAL OF THE MAZE. 

(After the enoraved portrait by A. BhteJlngh.) 

[This represents him as he was at the time of the third Dutch war. A portrait of him in 
his old age will be found at p. 820.] 



Sandwich's squadron found itself mixed up with the Dutch centre, 
and, either by accident or by design, broke through it, so cutting 
the enemy's fleet into two parts. It is likely that it was by acci- 
dent, for the English accounts admit that by that time, owing to the 
smoke, there was great confusion, and that friendly vessels narrowly 
escaped firing into one another. Indeed, there is no doubt that, 
after a certain time had elapsed, order on both sides almost ceased to 
exist, and the action degenerated into a gigantic melee. 



1665.] 



THE BATTLE OFF LOWESTOFT. 



261 



In the course of the struggle, Opdam, in the Eendracht, 76,^ 
found himself close to the Duke of York in the Boyal Charles, 80 ; 
and the two commanders-in-chief promptly and hotly engaged one 
another. The Eendracht attempted to board the Boyal Charles, but 
without success. She nevertheless plied her broadside so well and 
continuously that the Duke was in the greatest danger of being sunk 




EGBERT MEUSHKN COKTENAEK, VICE-ADMIRAL OF HOLLAND, 
WESTVRIESLAND. 

(From the ci/r/ravu/g hij Jan KrnUngc.) 



or of having to surrender. Charles Berkeley, first Earl of Falmouth, 
Mr. Boyle, second son of the Earl of Burhngton, and Lord Muskerry, 
with others, were killed at the Duke's side by a single chain-shot, 
and his Eoyal Highness was covered with their blood, and even, 

^ This was lier nominal force, though English writers call her an 80 and even 
an 84. Her real force was only three 36-pounders, twenty-two 24-pounders, fourteen 
18-pounders, twelve 12-pounders, and twenty-two 6-pounders : total, seventy-three 
guns. List in Rijks Archief. 



262 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1665 

according to one account, slightly wounded in the hand by a splinter 
from Mr. Boyle's skull. But, at the height of the fight, the 
Eendracht suddenly blew up, only five souls out of four hundred and 
nine who had gone into action in her escaping with their lives. It 
is probable that the accident was occasioned by the ignition of some 
loose cartridges and the extension of the flames to the powder-room, 
but popular tradition in Holland ascribes the catastrophe to another 
cause, and declares that a negro servant of Obdam fired the maga- 
zine from motives of revenge. 

The explosion, and the loss of their commander-in-chief,^ in- 
creased the confusion of the Dutch, many of whom began to give 
way and to put before the wind. Yet some of the squadrons, and 
numerous individual ships, still gallantly held their ground. Jan 
Evertsen assumed the chief command, but the news of his having 
done so did not reach Cornelis Tromp, who, knowing of the death of 
Obdam, and presently learning also that Cortenaer '^ had succumbed 
to a wound in the thigh, and that Stellingwerf had been killed by a 
ball through the body, imagined himself to be the senior surviving 
officer, and took command of so much of the fleet as remained near 
him. As late as two days afterwards Tromp wrote to the States- 
General that he did not know what had become of Evertsen. 
There can surely be no better proof of the disorganisation of the 
Dutch. 

Yet, with certain disgraceful exceptions,^ they fought magnifi- 
cently. Captain Bastiaen Centen, in the East India Company's 
ship Oranje, 76, pressed the Montagu, 52, very hard, and, according 
to Dutch reports, even had possession of her for a time, until she 
was retaken by the Boyal James, which lost her captain, James Ley, 
third Earl of Marlborough, and Charles Weston, third Earl of 
Portland, a volunteer on board, during the fight. The gallant 
Oranje subsequently caught fire, and her brave commander, who 

^ There is a tine monument to Obdam in the Groote Kerk at the Hague. 

^ There is a monument to Cortenaer in the church of St. Laurens, Eotterdam. 

^ The Nagelhoom and Hilversum were shamefully surrendered. The Carolus 
Quintus was betrayed by her mutinous crew. In consequence of misbehaviour, three 
captains were subsequently sentenced to be shot ; three were publicly degraded ; two 
more were dismissed the service ; and the master of Cortenaer's ship was made to stand 
on a scaffold with a lialter round his neck, and was afterwards banished. Captain 
Laurens Heemskerk, of the Vrede, who was condemned in contumacy, later vindicated 
the sentence of his judges by assisting Sir Robert Holmes in August, 1666, and by 
serving against his country on board the French flagship at Solebay in 1672. ' Nederl. 
Zeewezen,' ii. 34, 35 ; 146, 147 ; 302. 



1665.] 



LOSSES OF THE DUTCH. 



263 



was saved from her ere she blew up, ultimately died of his wounds. 
Captain Jan de Haen, in the Stad eti Landen, 56, actually took the 
Charity, 46, and eventually carried her into port as a prize. It is 
but fair to say, however, that the Charity had first been sadly 
mauled in succession by the Liefde, 70, Elf Steden, 54, and 
Cruijningen, 58, and that, before she was boarded, about ninety of 
her people escaped from her and later reached the shore. 

But the day was lost ; and such minor incidents as the blowing 
up of the poop of the St. George, or the fatal wounding of Yice- 
Admiral Sir John Lawson, who had been detached after some 
Dutch ships which were making off, failed to revive the spirits of 
the enemy, even for a moment. By 7 o'clock, p.m., the Dutch were 
in full flight. Jan Evertsen, and the vessels with him, made for 
the mouth of the Maas. Tromp and his ships, in somewhat better 
order, made for the Texel. It was when each man, conscious of 
defeat, was thinking mainly of himself, that two serious disasters 
occurred. On one part of the scene of action, the Maarseveen, 78, 
Ter Goes, 30, and Svanenburg ,^ all belonging to different squadrons, 
ran on board one another, and were set on fire, and destroyed. 
On another part, four ships, the Prins Maurits, 53, Coeverden, 56, 
Utrecht, 48, and one more, similarly fouled one another, and being 
caught, while still interlocked and unmanageable, by an English 
fireship, were all burnt. 

According to Sir William Coventry's report" to the Lord High 
Admiral, the prizes taken and already brought into British ports, 
were as follows : — 

Ships. 
Carolus Quinttis 
Hilversum 
Delft . 

Yacht, De Ruijter 
Jonge Prina . 
Mars 

Nagelboom 
Wappen van Zeeland 
Bui . . . 



Guns. 


Men 


54 


230 


60 


290 


32 


130 


18 


80 


.36 


160 


50 


200 


54 


225 


44 


180 


36 


150 



But to these should be added the Hiils tc Swieten, 70 guns, 300 men, 
the Geldersche Buijter, 48 guns, 180 men, the West Vriesland, 

' The Svanenhurg is not mentioned in the official lists of the fleet in the Eijks 
Archief, but all accounts agree that she was present, and that she perished as here 
stated. 

^ Written in London on June 13th. Sir William was secretary to the Duke. 



264 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714:. 



[1665. 



50 guns, 260 men, and probably one more, making fourteen in all, 
besides four wliicli were abandoned after capture, in consequence of 
their unseaworthy condition. About fourteen in addition seem to 
have been destroyed. If this estimate be correct, the total loss of 
the Dutch was about thirty-two sail. Their loss in officers and men 
was about 4000 killed and 2000 taken. 

The British loss was, in comparison, very shght. That the 
Charity was taken is admitted by all. The Dutch claim to have 
also taken the John and Mary, but nothing else. Of killed, there 
were only about 250, of wounded, about 340 ; and the Dutch cannot 
have carried off more than about a couple of hundred prisoners at 




MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF THE DUKE OF YORK S VICTORY OFF 
LOWESTOFT, JUNE 3rD, 1665. 

(Front an original klndlu lent Ijii H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis oj Battcnherg. B.N. ) 



most. But the victory cost the lives of two British flag-officers 
and three captains, Vice-Admiral Sir John Lawson,^ Eear-Admiral 
Robert Sansom,^ Captain James, Earl of Marlborough,^ of the 
Boyal James, Captain Robert Kirby,^ of the Breda, and Captain 
James Ableson,^ of the Guinea. 

But for the pertinacity of Tromp, who covered the retreat, the 
Dutch would have suffered still more severely. Two other causes 

 1 Was wounded in the knee. The injury was at first not considered to be serious, 
but gangrene supervened, and Lawson died at Greenwich <>n June 29th. 

- Had commanded the Mari/ Rose and later the Dunkirk in 166-1, in which year 
also he had served as rear-admiral vmder Prince Kupert. 

^ Had commanded the squadron sent to take possession of Bombay. He fell in 
his forty-sixth year. 

■* Had previously commanded the Ruhij and the Constant Warivick: 

''' Had previously commanded the Bear and the Expedition. 



1665.] THE FAILURE TO CHASE. 265 

contributed to save them from utter destruction. One was that, 
after the action, it blew hard towards the dangerous Dutch coasts, 
and that the victors, according to Colhber, had expended all their 
fireships. The other was the failure of the English to press the 
pursuit. This is thus accounted for by Bishop Burnet : — 

" After the fight, a Council of War was called to concert the method of action 
when they should come up with them. In that Council, Penn, who commanded under 
the Duke, happened to say that they must j^repare for better work the next engage- 
ment. He knew well the courage of the Dutch was never so high as when they were 
desperate. The Earl of Montagu, who was then a volunteer and one of the Duke's 
court, told me it was very visible that made an impression upon him, and all the 
Duke's domestics said he had got honour enough : why should he venture a second 
time? The Duchess had also given a strict charge to all the Duke's servants to do all 
they could to hinder him to engage too far. When matters were settled, they went to 
sleep, and the Duke ordered a call to be given him when they should get up with the 
Dutch fleet. It is not known what passed between the Duke and Brouncker, who was 
of his bed-chamber, and then in waiting ; but he came to Penn, as from the Duke, and 
said the Duke ordered the sail to be slackened. Penn was struck with the order, but 
did not go about to argue the matter with the Duke himself, as he ought to have done : 
but obeyed it. When the Duke had slept, he, upon his waking, went out upon the 
quarter-deck, and seemed amazed to see the sails slackened, and that thereby all hope 
of overtaking the Dutch was lost. He questioned Penn upon it. Penn put it upon 
Brouncker, who said nothing. The Duke denied he had given any such order; but he 
neither punished Brouncker for carrying it nor Penn for obeying it. He, indeed, put 
Brouncker out of his service ; and it was said that he durst do no more. Brouncker 
was so much in the King's favour and in the Mistress's. Penn was more in his favour 
after that than ever before ; which he continued to his son after him, though a Quaker : 
and it was thought that all that favour was to oblige him to keep the secret." 

The catastrophe was, for the moment, very demoralising to the 
Hollanders. There were regrettable public demonstrations ; and in 
their angry excitement the people were unable to discriminate 
between those who had done well and those who had done ill. Jan 
Evertsen, against whose personal and professional character nothing 
was ever seriously alleged, was mobbed at the Briel, and being flung 
into the water, barely escaped with his life. Disgusted at such 
treatment, he temporarily withdrew himself from the service, in 
which he was ultimately to perish very gloriously. 

But the Dutch Government, although it was torn by faction, 
did not similarly lose its self-control. On the contrary, it at once 
began the most strenuous efforts to repair damages, and to fit a new 
fleet for sea. Cornells Tromp expected to be entrusted with the 
command of the reorganised force ; and, indeed, he deserved the 
distinction ; but De Buijter, a greater than he, was on his way 
home, and would soon be available ; and the States very wisely 



266 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1665. 



overlooked the considerable claims of Tromp, and trusting that the 
latter's patriotism would outweigh his personal feelings, kept open 
the appointment for De Buijter. Tromp afterwards co-operated 
on several occasions wath his chief, but the affair caused great 
bitterness, and the two gallant seamen, even while working side by 
side for their country, w^ere thenceforward prevented by their 
personal differences from co-operating to the best advantage. 

On the EngHsh side there was even greater dispatch. The 
Duke of York and Prince Eupert having hauled down their flags, 
the Earl of Sandwich assumed the chief command of a fleet which 
sailed from South wold Bay on July 5th. Arriving off the Texel, 
the Earl satisfied himself that there was no likelihood of the Dutch 




[NAVAL REWARD OF CHARLES IL, 1665. 
(From an original kindly lent by H.S.n. Captain Prince Louis of Battenberg, R.N.) 



being ready to come out for some considerable time. He therefore 
turned his attention to the making of dispositions which he hoped 
would result, firstly, in the interception of De Euijter, who was 
known to be on his way home from America by way of the north of 
Scotland, and secondly, in the capture or destruction of certain 
Dutch Smyrna and East India ships, which had taken refuge at 
Bergen, in Norway. 

Sandwich missed De Euijter, who, with his squadron, returned, 
and safely anchored at Delfziel late in July. The Earl also failed 
at Bergen, whither he detached Eear-Admiral Sir Thomas Tyddiman^ 
(Eed) to carry out his scheme. An account of Tyddiman's action 
will 1)6 found in the next chapter. De Euijter put to sea to convoy 

' He had been kniglited for his share m the victory of June 3rd. 



1666.] 



TEE FLEETS OF 1666. 



267 



the Bergen ships to a Dutch port ; but, although he reached them 
without mishap, he lost several of them on the way back. Particu- 
lars of this affair, and of other captures made by the fleet under 
Sandwich, will also be found in the next chapter. The year 1665, 
indeed, witnessed no second important action ; and after France, at 
the beginning of 1666, had joined the Dutch, the English grand 
fleet was placed under the combined command of Prince Eupert and 
the Duke of Albemarle, Sandwich, who was under a cloud on 
account of alleged peculations, accepting the post of Ambassador 
to Spain. 

Authorities differ as to the exact constitution of the two fleets 
which were pitted against one another in the summer of 1666, but 
careful comparison seems to indicate that the strength of the 
opponents was as follows : — 

Dutch. 

2 
11 

21 

18 

19 

13 

1 

9 

8 

i'Ti' Thus, excluding small craft, the English, under Prince Eupert 
and the Duke of Albemarle, disposed of 80 ships, which mounted 
4460 guns and carried 21,085 officers and men ; while the Dutch, 
whose force was under De Euijter, Cornelis Evertsen,^ and Cornelis 
Tromp, disposed of 85 ships, which mounted 4615 guns and carried 
21,909 officers and men. 

When, therefore, on May 29th, Eupert and Albemarle arrived in 
the Downs, their joint command was so little inferior to the 
command of De Euijter, who was still in port, that, after the 
experiences of the previous year, it may well have appeared to 
unprejudiced onlookers as if, granting to the English a continued 
superiority in discipline, the Joint Admirals had little to fear from 
their distinguished enemy. 

But a strategical blunder, for which neither Eupert nor Albemarle 
was responsible, imperilled the whole position. France, as has been 
said, had thrown in her fortunes with the Dutch, and had declared 



Sh 

Fi! 
Ya 


ips of above 90 guns 

„ from 80 to 90 guns 
„ 70 to 80 „ 
„ 60 to 70 „ 
„ 50 to 60 „ 

, „ 40 to 50 „ 
„ 30 to 40 „ 

, under 30 guns . 

•eships . . . . 

chts, ketches, etc. . 






English 

2 

2 

7 
14 
25 
22 

8 

'P 
? 



1 a ' 



The Old." 



268 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1666. 



war on January 16th. News, which subsequently proved to be 
false, reached London that a French fleet of thirty-six sail, under 
the Due de Beaufort, was on its way from the Mediterranean, and 
was, indeed, already approaching the mouth of the Channel, with a 
view to joining hands with De Kuijter ; and upon the receipt of this 
news, Charles II. at once ordered Eupert to detach himself to the 
westward with the White Squadron, or about one-third of the 




GEORGE MONCK, DUKE OF ALBEMAKl.K, K.G., ADMIRAL AND GENEllAL-AT-SEA. 
(Frurn W. T. Mutes cngravimj after the portrait by Sir P. Letij.) 



English fleet. The Prince was to lie off the Isle of Wight, where 
he would probably be reinforced by about ten vessels from Plymouth, 
and was to see to it that the anticipated junction was not effected. 

Says Mahan : "A position like that of the English fleet, 
threatened with an attack from two quarters, presents one of the 
subtlest temptations to a commander. The impulse is very strong 
to meet both by dividing his own numbers, as Charles did ; but, 
unless in possession of overwhelming force, it is an error, exposing 




Z- e. me rctera ra v i-cre- 






i^Jti LcA t ec c^i2^^ ' ( aa/i<)Xo o/i 



ter 



1666.] THE FOUR DAYS' FIGHT. 269 

both divisions to be beaten separately." Rupert and Albemarle 
together had eighty ships wherewith to oppose De Euijter's eighty- 
five. The Dutch superiority was not so marked as to rob the 
English of a reasonable prospect of victory. But Eupert having 
been detached with about twenty-four ships to meet the ten from 
Plyinouth, Albemarle was left with only about fifty-six in face of a 
gallant foe who was more than half as strong again. Charles's 
order, then, was a fatal error. If he had directed both Eupert and 
Albemarle to fall upon De Euijter, or at least to blockade him ; or 
even if he had directed both of them to proceed westwards, and to 
crush the supposed squadron of De Beaufort, his strategy, leaving 
contingent questions aside, would have been defensible ; but there 
is no excuse to be found for his division of an inferior force holding 
an interior position. 

The order from London reached the fleet as soon as the latter 
arrived in the Downs, and Prince Eupert accordingly parted 
company,^ with a fair easterly wind at his back. The same wind 
which was thus favourable to him also favoured De Euijter, who 
left port, and had got as far as a point nearly midway between 
Dunquerque and the Downs, when the breeze changed to south- 
west, and the weather became somewhat thick. He therefore 
anchored. This was in the early morning of June 1st. 

As he lay, his rear, under Tromp, was to the south-east, and 
consequently somewhat to windward of his centre, which was under 
his own immediate eye ; and his van, under Evertsen, was to the 
north-west, and so still more to leeward than he himself was. 
Almost dead to windward was the Duke of Albemarle, who was 
sighted at about 9 o'clock, a.m., and who sighted his enemy at 
much the same time. Albemarle weighed, and, although so inferior 
in force, determined to attack with energy, trusting that, by 
retaining the wind, he might always be able to avoid committing 
himself too far. Unhappily, his windward position proved to be a 
distinct disadvantage, inasmuch as, the sea being lumpy, it prevented 
many of his vessels from using their lower tier of guns, or, in other 
words, their heaviest metal. Opening the lower ports on the 
leeward side resulted in the flooding of the batteries and in danger 
to the ships. 

Having approached, Albemarle stood along the irregular Dutch 
line on the starboard tack, leaving the van and centre (the Dutch 
^ Leaving, however, the flag-officers of the White Squadron behind with Albemarle. 



270 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 16G0-1714. 



[1666. 



proper right and centre) out of gunshot, and passing on until he was 
abreast of the rear (the Dutch proper left) . He advanced in column 
— a foiTuation most difficult for a large number of vessels to preserve 
in a satisfactory manner — and the consequence was that, when he 
came abreast of Tromp, he had but about five-and-thirty ships close 
up with him and well in hand, the remaining twenty straggling and 
tailing out so as to afford little support either to him or to one 
another. Albemarle, nevertheless, put his helm up and ran down 
upon Tromp, whose ships, cutting their cables, made sail on the 
same tack, and stood across towards the French coast, hotly 






.^■^^ 



/- ' 







THE FOUR days' FIGHT, 1660. 

A. The attack on June 1st (the first day). 

B. The conehision of that day's action. 



engaged. The Dutch centre and van also weighed or cut their 
cables, and followed on the same course, but, being far to leeward, 
did not get into action until about noon. 

When the action had continued in this fashion for nearly three 
hours, Albemarle, probably because he found himself too close to 
the shore, seems to have ordered his ships to put about together 
so as to return on a north-west course. This evolution turned what 
had been the English rear into the van ; and the van, thus newly 
constituted, presently got into furious action with De Kuijter and 
the comparatively fresh Dutch centre. No doubt the EngHsh ships 
had already suffered severely. This new encounter threw the head 



1666.] THE FOUR DAYS' FIGHT. 271 

of the colmnn into some confusion, of which De Knijter knew how 
to take advantage ; and presently three or four of the Enghsh 
ships found themselves cut off from their line and surrounded. 

One of these was the Swiftsure, bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral 
Sir William Berkeley ^ (W) , a promising offlcer of only seven-and- 
twenty years of age. Badly disabled, the Swiftsure was boarded 
simultaneously from several quarters ; yet Berkeley would not sur- 
render, and he continued fighting, almost alone, until, receiving a 
ball in the throat, he staggered back into his captain's cabin and 
flung himself on to a table, where he was found dead. His body 
met with the most generous treatment from the Dutch, who, on 
June 30th, despatched to England a highly laudatory letter, and 
offered either to return the remains or to bury them with honour in 
Holland. Besides the Sioiftsure, a hired vessel, said to have been of 
60 guns, and the Loyal George,"^ 44, were surrounded and taken, 
chiefly by the efforts of Captains Hendrik Adriaensze, Jacob Andries 
Swart, and Willem van der Zaen. 

Eear-Admiral Sir John Harman (W), in the Henry, was also cut 
off and surrounded ; and, he being in a short time completely dis- 
abled, one of the enemy's fireships grappled him on the starboard 
quarter. He was, however, soon freed by the ahnost incredible 
exertions of his lieutenant,^ who, having in the midst of the 
flames loosed the grappling-irons, swung back on board his own 
ship unhurt. The Dutch, bent on the destruction of this un- 
fortunate vessel, sent a second fireship, which grappled the Henry 
on the port side and set her sails on fire. This caused so much 
panic that about fifty of the crew jumped overboard. Harman, 
however, drew his sword, and, running among the people, threatened 
to kill the next man who should endeavour to leave the ship, or who 
should fail in his duty ; and thus order was restored and the flames 
were got under, not, nevertheless, until a topsail-yard, in falling, had 
broken Harman's leg. A third fireship approached, but the He)iry, 
with her lower-deck guns, sank her. Cornelis Evertsen then bore 
up for the crippled vessel, and the Dutch admiral hailed Harman to 
surrender, promising him quarter. " It has not come to that yet," 

1 Third son of Sir Charles Berkeley, of Bruton, who became in 1665 Lord Fitz- 
harding. Sir William was brother of that Earl of Falmouth who had fallen in the 
action with Obdam in the previous year, and whose Irish title reverted to his father. 

^ The Loyal George was also hired. 

^ Thomas Lamming. For this service he was made captain of the Ruhy. His 
subsequent career is unknown. 



272 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1666. 

shouted Harnian in return ; and with his next broadside he killed 
the gallant Evertsen and freed himself. In spite of the injuries to 
his ship he succeeded in carrying her into Harwich, and by the 
following evening he had so far refitted her that, oblivious of his 
broken leg, he put to sea again, hoping to be back in time to see the 
conclusion of the fight. But ere he could rejoin the fleet the action 
was over.^ 

Evertsen and Berkeley were not the only flag-oflicers to fall on 
that bloody first day of the great Four Days' Battle. Kear-Admiral ^ 
Frederick Stachouwer also perished. Tromp was dismantled, and 
had to shift his flag ; De Euijter himself fared almost as ill ; and 
on each side two or three ships were sunk or blown up and several 
captains were killed. 

Albemarle continued on the port tack, taking the remnants of 
his battered column past the division of Evertsen, very few ships 
of which had been able to get into action, owing to their leewardly 
position at the commencement. The battle continued until about 
10 P.M. Towards the end of the day Albemarle, according to one of 
De Euijter's dispatches,^ anchored in order to collect his ships, 
although this is scarcely credible. He is said, however, to have 
weighed again as the Dutch neared him ; and there is no doubt 
that, after firing had ceased, the bulk of his fleet was well to the 
west, or west-north-west of the enemy. 

Captain Mahan considers that, " the merit of Monck's attack as 
a piece of grand tactics is evident, and bears a strong resemblance 
to that of Nelson at the Nile. Discerning quickly the weakness of 
the Dutch order, he had attacked a vastly superior force in such 
a way that only part of it could come into action ; and though the 
English actually lost more heavily, they carried off a brilliant 
prestige, and must have left considerable depression and heart- 
burning among the Dutch." * 

For some time during the night Albemarle stood off on the port 
tack repairing damages. The Dutch, occupied in the same way, 
were in no condition to pursue. In the morning of June 2nd, the 
English returned to continue the engagement. They found the 
enemy on the port tack, the original van leading. The Dutch were 

' From particulars in Campbell, ii. 353, 354 ; Kenuet. iii. 281 ; and Charnock's 
' Biog. Navalis ' : said to be taken in part from Harman's own narrative. 
^ The Dutch title is Schout-bij-nacht. 
" To the States-General, dated the morning of June y\. 
* 'Inf. of Sea Power upon Hist.' 121. 



1666.] THE FOUR DAY^' FIGHT. 273 

at first to windward, but, by a little manoeuvring, Albemarle's ships, 
which were the more weatherly and the better handled, presently 
regained the weather-gauge. There were that day in the English 
line forty-four ships, and in the Dutch about eighty ; and the wind 
was as before, though there was less of it. 

The two fleets passed one another on opposite tacks, the English 
being in good order, but the Dutch overlapping, and being in places 
crowded together, so that the fire of many ships was partially or 
wholly masked. Tromp, who commanded the rear of the long 
Dutch column, noticed this when the heads of the columns were 
still nearly abreast of one another ; and, as he had plenty of time 
for the execution of the manoeuvre, he chose, upon his own responsi- 
bility, to go about and so ultimately to gain the wind of the English 
van. This independent and, indeed, insubordinate action, would 
have greatly added to the anxieties of the Dutch commander-in- 
chief, even if it had not been complicated by the almost simul- 
taneous vagaries of part of the Dutch van. On Tromp's behalf it 
may be said that, although he did wrong, he erred from pure love 
of fighting and with the mistaken idea that he was acting for the 
best. But two other insubordinate flag-ofiicers in the van quitted 
the line from very different motives. To De Ruijter's dismay they 
kept broad off from the centre of the English column, and, while 
apparently endeavouring to get away, not only exposed themselves 
to be raked, but also threw the whole Dutch line into confusion. 
De Euijter, threatened with the general disruption of his command, 
and anxious to succour Tromp, had no alternative but to keep 
broad oif also, and then to haul up for the protection of the rear, 
standing back to it on the starboard tack. 

The whole English force was for a time concentrated upon 
Tromp, who, by his own act, was separated from his friends, and 
who suffered severely. But, as De Ruijter returned to the rescue, 
Albemarle had to relinquish the attack for fear lest the Dutch 
might gain the wind of him. He seems to have continued his 
course for a short period on the starboard tack, and so to have 
caused a lull in the action. During this, Tromp went on board 
De Ruijter, and, though he was cheered by the people, he seems to 
have been very coldly received by his chief. 

While the Dutch were still in great disorder Albemarle appears 
to have put about and repassed them, they lying huddled together 
like a flock of sheep. But he was too weak and disabled to press 

VOL. II. T 



274 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1666. 

such slight advantages as the situation offered him. When, how- 
ever, De Knijter had again formed some sort of hne, the English 
once more went about and passed him, the Dutch commander-in- 
chief, now at the extreme rear of his column, losing his main-top- 
mast and mainyard in the encounter. Yet once again did Albemarle 
put about ; but when, this time, he had passed the enemy, the 
Duke had had enough of it, and he continued towards the north-west 
or west, being, in point of fact, in full retreat. The Dutch pursued 
in a long straggling line, De Euijter's flagship, on accoimt of the 
damages which she had sustained, finally dropping out of sight in 
the rear. 

The second day had been but little less costly than the first. 
Each side had lost about three ships sunk, burnt, or blown up ; 
and Tromp's dangerous adventure had sacrificed the life of the 
vice-admiral of his squadron, Abraham van der Hulst.^ 

On the third day, the wind being easterl}^, Albemarle continued 
his retreat to the w^estward, maintaining good order, sending his 
most disabled ships ahead, and himself bringing up the rear with 
such vessels — about twenty-eight in number — as were still in fair 
fighting trim. The object of the English admiral was to avoid a 
general renewal of the engagement until he should succeed in 
effecting a junction wdth the squadron of Prince Eupert. By 
sacrificing three hopelessly mauled craft, which would have delayed 
his progress, and which he burnt, he attained his end ; for the 
Dutch, though they pursued closely, did not venture to molest him, 
probably because they were themselves in very evil plight. During 
the retreat, however, the English suffered a severe loss. The Boyal 
Prince, 90,^ bearing the flag of Admiral Sir George Ayscue (W.), 
ran aground on the Galloper, and being surrounded by the enemy,^ 
and attacked simultaneously by two fireships, had to strike after she 
had lost about one hundred and fifty killed. Tromp, who w^as at 
the time on board the ship of the Dutch Eear-Admiral Isaac Sweers, 
received the surrender, and was very desirous of carrying the prize 
to Holland, but, at De Euijter's orders, she was burnt. 

At about the same time a fleet of some twenty sail was 

^ There is a monument tu Van der Hulst in the Oude Kerk at Amsterdam. 

- Her armament was, at the time, fourteen 48-pounders, fourteen 32-ixiunders, thirty 
24-pounders, sixteen 12-pounders, and fourteen 6-pounders. She had on hoard a 
quantity of treasure. 

^ Ayscue, in his letter to tlie King, from Loevestein, on Jime 10th, says that other 
EngUsh vessels were also surrounded. 




a, 









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1666.] 



THE FOUR DAYS' FIGHT. 



'lib 



sighted to the westward. 
The Dutch at first took 
it to be the expected 
French force under the 
Due de Beaufort. Had 
it really been that force 
Albemarle's fate would 
have been sealed. Hap- 
pily it was Rupert's 
division. De Jonge ^ 
suggests that it was the 
knowledge of this fact 
which induced De Euijter 
to order the burning of 
the Boijal Prince. To- 
wards nightfall the two 
English squadrons once 
more united. Under 
Albemarle and the Prince 
there were then about 
fifty-eight or sixty sail, 
and under De Ruijter, 
about seventy -eight fit 
for action. 

On the morning of 
June 4th, the wind blew 
once more from the 
south-west, and was 
very fresh. The ac- 
tion recommenced all 
along the line on the 
port tack, the English 
being this time to lee- 
ward. For a couple 
of hours the two 
fleets ran thus, firing 
furiously. During 
that period two 

Zeewezen," 



Pan JVess 
CD <ID <Z3 



Tron/p 

en '-ZJ ^J^ 'TH 




cn 



<D 



<D 



'ft 



'^/e/'- 




THE FOUR days' FIGHT, 1666. 
June 4th. Position I. 



Tromp 

^ ^ ^ ^ 



^^ 




qT; 



Q. 



^ -^ ^ ^^ 



^c 



/fuyfltf I 




THE FOUR days' FIGHT, 1666. 
June 4th. Position II. 



^ 



T'O^ 



CD 



<:i3 



^an^^ ^ 







1 'Nederl. 
ii. 78. 



THE FOUR days' FIGHT, 1666. 
June 4th. Position III. 
Note.— In the above plans, groups, and not single 



ships 



are repesented. 



T 2 



276 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1666. 

Dutch vessels seem to have been burnt, and at the end of it — 
perhaps, as Mahan suggests, owing to the superior weatherliness 
of the EngHsh — great part of each hue had broken across the 
original course of the other, so that many of the Dutch were to 
leeward. There was consequently much confusion. De Buijter, 
with his largest group, was still to windward, and Albemarle, with 
his largest group, was still to leeward ; but the other groups were 
scattered, some of each side being to windward and some to lee- 
ward. The Dutch Rear-Admiral Jan Jansze van Nes, with fourteen 
ships of the van, was rashly pursuing three or four English vessels 
which, under a press of sail, had gained the windward of the head of 
the enemy's column. Tromp, with the Dutch rear, was to leeward 
of De Euijter and of the main body of the English. (Position I.) 
By carrying sail he overhauled Van Nes and brought him back, 
passing round the English centre. In the meanwhile, however, 
De Euijter and Albemarle, in hot action, were both beating to 
windward, so that Tromp and Van Nes came up to leeward of the 
Dutch centre, wdth the English centre between them and it. 
(Position II.) Seeing the situation, De Euijter signalled the ships 
about him to keep away before the wind. This manoeuvre broke up 
the English centre, through which passed the Dutch centre, probably 
in a very irregular line abreast. (Position III.) For a short space 
the fight was hot. Then ship by ship, sorely shattered, the English 
gained a windward position, and comparative safety ; for by that 
time it blew half a gale. Albemarle was in no condition to attack 
again, though he seems to have followed the enemy for some dis- 
tance. As for the Dutch, apart from the fact that they were to 
leeward, they were, no doubt, quite exhausted, besides being well 
satisfied with the success which they had gained.^ 

Concerning the losses on each side, it is difficult to arrive at a 
•definite conclusion owing to the conflicting nature of the various 
accounts. The Dutch appear to have had about six or seven vessels 
.sunk or burnt, and two thousand officers and men killed or wounded. 

^ The chief priuted authorities for the Four L>ays' Fight are : Van den Bosch, 
'LevenvanDe Euijter'; 'Memoires du Comte de Guiche ' ; Aitzema, 'Leveu vauC. 
Tromp'; Brand, ' Leven van De Euijter'; De Jonge, ' Leven van Evertsen'; Pepys's 
' Memoirs ' ; ' Memorials of Sir W. Penn ' ; certain letters of De AVitt ; Sir W. Temple, 
' Observations ' ; Swinnas, ' Eng. Nederl. en Munst. KrakeeL' ; the Dutch account 
in ' Eev. Mar. et Col.,' Ixxxii. 137 ; Gumble, 'Life of Monck ' ; Sir John Harman's 
Account ; Skinner, ' Life of Monck ' ; ' Lettres et Mem. du Comte d'Estrades ' ; Philip's 
<;ontinuation of Heath's Chronicle ; Parker, ' Hist, of Own Time ' ; ' A True Narrative,' 
«tc. London, 1666, fol. 



1666.] 



THE FOUR DAYS' FIGHT. 



277 



The English undoubtedly lost very much more heavily. In addition 
to the Rorjal Prince burnt, and the Sioiftsiire and Loyal George 
taken, they certainly lost the Essex, 58, Clove Tree, 62, Con- 
vertine, 54, Bull, 40, Spread Eagle and Little Katherine, all of 
which were carried home by the Dutch, besides two or three other 
ships which struck, and eight or ten more which were sunk or 
blown up ; and the number of their killed and wounded, placed by 
Lefevre-PontaHs, in his Life of Jan de Witt, at five thousand, is 
probably not exaggerated. Moreover they lost between two and 
three thousand prisoners. The death of Berkeley on the first day 
has been already noted. The English also lost another flag-officer 




DUTCH MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF THE FOUR DAYS' FIGHT, 1666. 

(From an oririiixil kiihlli/ lent by H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Battenbcrg, E.N.) 

in the person of Vice- Admiral Sir Christopher Myngs, who had 
his flag in the Victory, and who fell on the fourth day. Van den 
Bosch narrates that, having received a ball through the throat, 
this gallant officer remained on deck a good half-hour, compressing 
the wound with his fingers in order to stop the flow of blood, until 
a second shot struck him in the neck and killed him. Among the 
English commanders who fell during the long battle were Captains 
John Coppin of the St. George, Peter Mootham, of the Princess, 
"Walter Wood, of the Henrietta, Henry Terne, of the Triumph, 
Philemon Bacon, of the Bristol, Thomas Whitty, of the Vanguard, 
Eoger Miller, of the Plymouth, John Chappel, of the Clove Tree,^ 
and Jeffery Dare, of the House of Siveeds."^ 

' Late Nagelhoom, Dutch prize. ^ Late Huis te Swieten, Dutch prize. 



278 MA JOB OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1666. 

The English had been badly beaten but their moral had not 
suffered. The battle had demonstrated that their discipline and 
seamanship were better than those of the enemy ; and it encouraged 
them to hope that, against a Dutch foe of approximately equal 
numerical strength, they would be victorious. The Hollanders, 
on the other hand, had no ground for any extreme elation. They 
had, it was true, won a battle, but it was against a fleet which, 
although of very inferior force, had sustained one of the longest 
fights in the history of naval warfare, had inflicted no insignificant 
amount of damage, and had not been crushed. Both sides, in 
consequence, felt that a decisive result had not been arrived at. 
Albemarle and Eupert still commanded a "potential" fleet, and, so 
long as they commanded it, the Dutch had the real problem of the 
war still unsolved before them. 

Yet, in spite of their consciousness of the very partial nature of 
their advantage, the Dutch must have been astonished at the 
celerity with which the battered English squadrons were refitted, 
reinforced, and sent to sea again. Kot until about July 15th had 
the Dutch themselves any considerable fleet ready for action ; and 
then, although they had embarked troops with the object of effecting 
a landing somewhere on the British coasts, the attitude of the 
English prevented them from making any attempt of the kind, 
and the soldiers were put ashore again. Had the Due de Beaufort 
joined with the expected French squadron, De Euijter might have 
deemed himself strong enough to essay an invasion ; but Louis XIV. 
was no very ardent ally, and his ships failed to appear when they 
would have been most useful. 

The greater part of the English grand fleet was assembled off 
the mouth of the Thames by July 22nd, on the evening of which 
day it anchored at the Gunfleet, the enemy being then also at 
anchor about eighteen miles to the N.N.E. On the morning of 
the 23rd both fleets weighed, but, owing to calms, could not 
approach one another. On the following night it blew very hard, 
with lightning and thunder, and some damage was done, especially 
to the English. 

As before, Albemarle and Prince Eupert were in joint command 
on the Enghsh side, both having their flags in the Boijal Charles. 
The White Squadron was under Admiral Sir Thomas Allin, and 
the Blue under Admiral Sir Jeremy Smyth. With them were 
Vice- Admirals Sir Joseph Jordan (E.), Sir Thomas Tyddiman (W.), 



1666.] THE ST. JAMES'S FIGHT. 279 

and Sir Edward Spragge (B.) ; and Kear-Admirals Sir Robert 
Holmes (R.), Richard Utber (acting AV.), and John Kempthorne 
(acting B.). On the day of the action the fleet seems to have 
consisted of 81 ships of the line and " frigates," carrying 4460 gmis, 
besides about 18 fireships/ 

The Dutch were under the supreme command of Admiral M. A. 
de Ruijter, who had under him Lieut. -Admirals Aert Jansze van Nes, 
Cornells Tromp, Jan Corneliszoon Meppel, Tjerck Hiddes de Vries, 
and Jan Evertsen, who, in response to the call of his country, had 
returned to the service upon the death of his distinguished brother. 
The other flag-officers who had served in the previous action served 
again, Isaac Sweers being promoted to the place of the dead Van 
der Hulst, and Captain Willem van der Zaen taking Sweers's place 
as Rear- Admiral. The vacancy caused by the death of Stachouwer 
was filled by the promotion of Captain Govert 'T Hoen. On the 
day of the action the Dutch fleet included 88 ships-of-the-line and 
" frigates," 10 yachts or dispatch vessels, and 20 fireships, mounting 
in all 4704 guns.^ The Dutch, therefore, had a distinct, yet not a 
great, apparent superiority. 

During the 24th the Dutch seem to have kept the wind, and the 
English to have in vain manoeuvred to obtain it. The night found 
the two fleets in the broad part of the estuary of the Thames, 
between Orfordness and the North Foreland, the Dutch being to 
the N.E., and the wind blowing generally from the northward, but 
varying from N.N.E. to N. As early as 2 a.m. on the morning 
of Wednesday, the 25th, St. James's Day, Rupert and Albemarle, 
who had anchored, weighed ; and from that hour until about 
10 A.M. the fleets slowly approached one another. Particulars of 
the manner of approach are both scanty and, to some extent, 
conflicting. The English seem to have been in line of battle close 
hauled or a point large on the port tack. Sir Thomas Allin's 
squadron leading ; the Dutch, in line of battle with the wind on 
the port quarter, or steering about six points large, Evertsen's 
squadron leading ; and, as they closed, the wind veered to N.W. 
It is evident that the Dutch line was ill-formed, so much so, indeed, 
that to some observers it looked as if bowed into a half moon : 
and, while the van and centre were crowded, there was a con- 

^ From lists in ' Holl. Mercurius ' ; ' Kort en Boudigh Verliael ' ; Aitzema ; the 
Eijks Archief ; and contemporary English publications. 
^ De Jonge, i. 787. 



280 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1666. 

siderable interval between the centre, under De Euijter, and the 
rear, under Tromp. On the other hand it is probable that 
the Enghsh line was as regular as a line of such length — five or 
six miles at least — could be. The regularity of the English line 
during that war often extorted the admiration of foreign and even 
of hostile critics. 

It was about 10 a.m. when the leading vessels of the two columns 
arrived within gunshot of one another. Allin, as he thus came 
up, engaged Evertsen and the Dutch van, the squadrons holding 
parallel courses on the port tack, and the Dutch being to windward. 
In a similar manner the English centre, as it came up, engaged 
and went away with De Euijter and the Dutch centre. But when 
Smyth, with the Enghsh rear, came up with Tromp, the latter, 
always fond of independent action, and anxious, it may be, to 
distinguish himself above his chief, put before the wind and broke 
through just ahead of the English rear, thus, as on a previous 
occasion, separating himself by his own act from his friends. To 
De Euijter, who wrote bitterly to the States-General of Tromp 's 
conduct,^ it appeared that his subordinate had allowed his squadron 
to fall far astern of its station, and to be cut oft' by Smyth ; but 
the balance of evidence tends to show that, though Tromp was often 
headstrong, perverse, and insubordinate, he never, by deliberate 
remissness, postponed action for an instant, and that, on this 
July 25th, as usual, he erred rather on the side of excess of 
rashness than of that of either slothfulness or prudence. 

From the moment when Allin joined battle with Evertson, and 
went aw^ay in hot action with him, to the time when Tromp 
quitted the Dutch line, two hours, or thereabouts, elapsed. It 
was then noon, and the wind had, since 11 a.m., blown again from 
the northward. Tromp's was the strongest of the Dutch, and 
Smyth's was the w^eakest of the Enghsh squadrons ; and, if only 
Tromp's manoeuvre had been executed at the order, or even with 
the full comprehension, of De Euijter, it might, from some points 
of view, be defended. But De Euijter was only mystified. Tromp 
and Smyth, engaged in more or less confused melee, eventually went 
away on the starboard tack, and were presently lost to sight in 
the dn-ection of the English coast ; while the two vans and centres, 
broadside to broadside, headed nearly due east. 

The English van from the first asserted its superiority over 

^ Dispatch of July 2r,tli. 



1666.] THE ST. JAMES'S FIGHT. 281 

the Dutch van. The latter fought magnificently, and, in a very 
brief period, lost no fev^er than three flag-officers — Jan Evertsen, 
Tjerck Hiddes de Vries, and Kudolf Coenders ; but it was over- 
powered, and at one o'clock was in full flight to the eastward. 

The English centre had a more difficult and prolonged task 
before it, for, as usual, De Euijter and the captains under his 
immediate command behaved most stubbornly and gallantly. The 
English commanders-in-chief had to shift their flag ; the Boijcd 
Katlierine and St. George had to haul out of action; and De Euijter's 
flagship, the Zeven Provincien, was entirely dismasted after a hot 
and savage conflict with Sir Kobert Holmes in the Hennj. At 
4 P.M. the Dutch centre gave way ; but both squadrons were by 
that time in a terrible plight, and for some hours they seem to have 
drifted together to the southward, too mauled and exhausted to 
continue any kind of general action. Towards night the English 
recommenced the engagement ; but by that time De Euijter had 
to some extent re-formed his squadron, and, having stationed Vice- 
Admiral Adriaen Banckers, with twenty of the least damaged ships, 
at the rear of his line, began a masterly retreat. The battle con- 
tinued in a desultory way during the night, and became brisk again 
on the morning of the 26th ; but the wind being then strong from 
the N.E., and the shallows close at hand, the pursuit was at last 
discontinued. Before the retreat began Banckers's first flagship, 
a vessel of 60 guns, and a ship called the Sneelt van Harlingen, 50, 
had been abandoned and burnt. 

In the meantime the two rears had been closely engaged to the 
westward. Dutch accounts have it that Smyth continually gave 
way, and that he did so designedly, in order to further separate 
the Dutch rear from the van and centre. Tromp, and Meppel, who 
was with him, certainly seem to have had at first the best of the 
conflict, for they burnt the Besolution, 64; and it is maintained on 
their behalf that, having gained the wind, they chased throughout 
the night of the 25th. Yet, be this as it may, on the morning 
of the 26th, Smyth had the wind once more, and was in chase of 
Tromp, who had somehow learnt in the interval that his friends 
had suffered defeat, and that part of them had taken refuge in the 
Wielings. Smyth chased hard all day. Eear- Admiral Govert 'T 
Hoen was killed. In the evening Albemarle and Eupert, far to 
leeward and unable to interfere, saw Tromp flying for his ports, 
with Smyth at his heels. At 11 p.m. on the 26th the Engfish 



282 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1666. 



van and centre anchored off the Dutch coast. On the following 
morning, when Smyth rejoined, he reported that his enemy had 
escaped, and, with such shattered force as remained to him, was 
safe behind the shoals. 

Such was the St. James's Fight, or, as some have called it, 
the second battle of the North Foreland. It was a brilliant and 
decisive English victory. The Dutch lost about twenty ships. 




REAn-ATnUKAL SIR KOBKKT HOLMES, KT. 

(From the origiiud in the possession of Lord Seijtcsbury.) 

four thousand killed, and three thousand wounded, and, in addition 
to the four flag-officers already mentioned, numerous captains, 
including Euth Maximiliaan, Hendrik Vroom, Cornelis van Hogen- 
hoeck, Hugo van Nijhoff, and Jurriaan Poel. The victors, on the 
other hand, lost only the Resolution and two or three fireships,^ 



' Although De liuijtcr, in his dispatch of July 2Gth, says that two EugUsii ships 
had been seen to sink, and that two more had been burnt. 



1666.] SIR ROBERT HOLMES IN THE VLIE. 283 

and a relatively small number of men/ No flag-officers fell, and 
the only captains who lost their lives seem to have been Hugh 
Seymour, of the Foresight, John Parker, of the Yarmouth, Joseph 
Sanders, of the Breda, Arthur Ashby, of the Guinea, and William 
Martin of the hired East Indiaman London. 

The Dutch dismissed Tromp,-^ superseding him by Willem 
Joseph van Ghent, a colonel of marines. They also punished 
several inferior officers who were thought to have misbehaved 
themselves. De Euijter, on the other hand, was generally recog- 
nised to have conducted himself with prudence and ability, and 
was allowed to retain his command. From Louis XIV. he 
received the military order of Saint Michel, in diamonds, and a 
gold medal. 

The victory gave the complete command of the sea to the 
English. They anchored for a time in Schooneveld, one of the 
favourite anchorages of the Dutch fleets, and then moved slowly 
up the coast, making captures everywhere, and thoroughly alarming 
the country. As they went northward the renegade Dutch captain, 
Laurens Heemskerk, informed the commanders-in-chief that on 
the islands of Vlieland and Ter Schelling there were valuable 
magazines and stores, and that within them lay nearly two 
hundred sail of richly laden merchantmen, some lately arrived 
from abroad and some waiting for an opportunity to sail ; and 
that they were convoyed by only two men-of-war. A council of 
flag-officers determined that these should be immediately attacked, 
and confided the conduct of the affair to Eear-Admiral Sir Eobert 
Holmes (E.), with, as his immediate second in command. Captain 
Sir William Jennings. 

To Holmes were entrusted nine men-of-war of the lower rates, 
with five fireships and seven ketches. Three hundred men for 
the venture were specially chosen from each squadron of the fleet, 
two-thirds of them being soldiers and marines under Sir Phihp 
Howard, and one-third seamen. 

At 7 A.M. on August 8th this little squadron parted company 
from the rest of the fleet, and betook itself to an anchorage about 
three miles outside the first buoys marking the channel into the 
Vlie, the strait, that is, separating the two islands from one 
anotiier. Thence the Eear-Admiral sent in the Fan/an, ketch, 

1 Some accounts, indeed, place the number at only three hundred. 

2 Tromp returned later to the service and greatly distinguished himself. 



284 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1666. 

which, presently returning, reported that ships, as described by 
Heemskerk, were indeed wathin. Holmes determined to attack 
the vessels before dealing with the storehouses ashore ; and, leaving 
the Advice and Hampshire, two of his largest craft, outside the 
buoys to attend to any sail that might escape him, he weighed 
with the rest of his force, and, not without difficulty, for the 
wind was contrary, made his way into Ter Schelling Eoad, where 
he anchored the Tiger, in which he had entered, and shifted his 
flag to the Fanfan. Signalling for his captains to come on board, 
he gave them the plan of operations, and ordered the Pojibroke, 
which drew less water than the other ships, to proceed with the 
fireships and make as quick work as possible of the Dutch 
vessels. 

Captain Henry Browne, of the Bichard, at once made for and 
grappled the larger of the two convoying men-of-war, and soon 
burnt her. The second man-of-war, threatened by another fireship, 
cut her cables and backed on to a sand-bank, where she was taken 
a little later by some of the boats of the squadron and also burnt. 
Each of the other fireships grappled one of the largest of the 
merchantmen. By that time the Dutch were in confusion, and 
Sir Eobert, taking advantage of it, sent in Sir William Jennings,, 
with all the available boats of the squadron, to complete the 
disaster. The officers in charge w^ere ordered not to plunder, 
but only to destroy ; and so well did they carry out the duty 
that, in a very short time, about one hundred and seventy ships ^ 
were delivered to the flames. About a dozen only escaped by 
running up into a creek where the boats could not follow 
them; and even these few were damaged. The affair was spoken 
of for years afterwards in England as " Sir Eobert Holmes, his 
Bonefire." 

On the following day men were landed without opposition on 
Ter Schelling, the chief village of which was plundered, and, with 
a number of storehouses, set fire to and partially burnt. The 
damage done afloat and ashore was enormous, and the value of 
the property destroyed was estimated at the equivalent of at least 
£850,000. A previous attempt upon Vlieland had been abandoned 
owing to the state of the weather. The total English loss during 
these operations did not exceed about twelve men killed or wounded, 
and four or five fireships, which were very profitably expended. 
' ] )e Jonge says " not fewer than a hundred and forty." 



1666.] CONDUCT OF FRANCE. 285 

Sir Kobert Holmes promptly re-embarked his men and rejoined 
the fleet, which, after making a few more prizes on the coast, 
returned to its ports. 

The effect of these proceedings was to prompt the Dutch to 
strain every nerve to restore their prestige ; and almost as soon as 
the English had withdrawn to their own coasts De Euijter was 
once more at sea. He sailed on August 26th with eighty-one 
men-of-war, thirteen fireships, and several other craft, and on 
the 30th was off the North Foreland, the English fleet being in 
Southwold Bay. De Euijter had instructions to endeavour to 
effect a junction with the long-delayed squadron of the Due de 
Beaufort, which was reported to have left La Kochelle ; and he 
therefore stood across to look into Calais and Boulogne. The 
English followed close with about one hundred sail ; and a general 
action would have resulted had not a violent storm ended the 
battle almost ere it had begun. Van den Bosch ^ asserts that on 
this occasion the Dutch Admiral Sweers took an English man-of- 
war^ and set her on fire, but no confirmation of the story is 
obtainable from English sources. He also asserts that De Euijter 
lay for some time off Boulogne awaiting De Beaufort, the English 
having previously retired to Portsmouth in consequence of the 
bad weather. There is some doubt as to the sequence and inter- 
dependence of events ; yet it seems to be certain that De Euijter 
had no mind to risk an action before being joined by his French 
allies ; that the storm relieved him from a very dangerous situation ; 
and that, in the event, the English were obliged to withdraw to 
St. Helens and he to Dunquerque. He is said to have so deeply 
taken to heart the dilatoriness of the French that he contracted 
a fever. To recover his health he entered the Maas, and went 
for a short time to Amsterdam. 

De Beaufort's conduct exactly reflected the hesitating and 
undecided pohcy of his master, Louis XIV. who, though the ally 
of Hofland, was extremely unwilhng to be of any practical use 
to that country, and who was, moreover, loath to risk any part 
of the new fleet which Colbert had created for him. De Beaufort 
had with him, or on the point of joining him, at La Eochelle a 
very considerable force, and, as this was the first great fleet ever 

' ' Levens der Zeehelden.' 

2 Said by De Jonge, ii. 150, to be the Loyal Charles, .56. If this be so, she was a 
hired vessel. 



286 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1666. 



collected by France, the following list of it, taken from Guerin, 
should be of interest : — 



Ships. G 

St. Philippe^ 
Royal e'^ . 
Dauphin . 
St. Louis 
Reine 
Cesar 
Jules . 
Tlierese . 
HercuJe . 
Soleil 

St. Joseph . 
Dragon . 
Palmier . 
Ecureuil . 
Etoile de Diane 
Fran^oise 
Notre Dame. 
Croissant d'Afriqiie 
Soleil d^Afrique 
Ste. Anne 
Infante (I.) . 



uns. 


Meu. 


Ships. 


Guns. 


Men 


7J: 


600 


St. Antoine . 


. 30 


200 


56 


400 


Elheuf . . . 


. 34 


230 


56 


350 


Vierge . 


. 34 


200 


56 


400 


Lion d'Or . 


. 30 


250 


56 


400 


Postilion 


8 


80 


52 


350 


Ligournois . 


. 24 


250 


40 


250 


Vendome * 


. 72 


600 


60 


350 


Diaraant 


. 60 


400 


40 


300 


Ruhis 


. 50 


400 


38 


230 


Triomplie 


. 40 


300 


34 


230 


Mazarin . 


. 40 


300 


36 


250 


Mercoeur. 


. 36 


230 


36 


230 


Beaufort . 


. 36 


230 


38 


230 


Infante (II.) 


. . 30 


200 


36 


250 


Victoire . 


. 30 


230 


36 


230 


Hermione 


. 30 


200 


36 


230 


HirondeUe . 


. 30 


220 


36 


230 


Dunqtierquois . 


. 24 


200 


34 


232 


Bourbon . 


. . 50 


400 


16=5 


120 


N. D. des Anges 


. . 16 


150 


22 


80 
With 15 


Grand Charles . 
fireships. 


. . 34 


130 



1 Flag of De Beaufort, Capt. Gabaret. 

3 Commanded by the celebrated Chateanrenault. 



- Flag of Vice-Adm. the Chevalier Paul. 
■» Flag of the great Abraham Duquesne. 



This force, or even part of it, might have been of great assistance 
to De Enijter, but De Beaufort, hampered by continually changing 
orders, and influenced by his personal anxiety to be as far away 
as possible from Colbert de Terron, who had been given some 
sort of control over him, never brought it farther northward than 
Dieppe, and then returned to Brest. In the course of these move- 
ments the Bubis,^ losing her friends, and mistaking an English 
squadron for a French, fell in with Sir Thomas Allin off Dungeness, 
and w^as captured wdth but little difficulty on September 18th. 
ColHber^ relates that six French and Dutch vessels were in her 
company at the time, and that two of the Dutch were driven 
ashore and burnt. The Buhis, as the French Biihy, was added 
to the Navy, as also was the Victoire, taken during the same year, 
and renamed the French Victory. 

The negotiations on the subject of the return of the body of 
Sir WilHam Berkeley, who had fallen in the Four Days' Fight, 

' Captain de la Roche. She figures in the above list. Some EngHsh accounts 
exaggerate her armament at the time of her capture to 54 and even to 70 guns. 
^ ' Columna Rostrata,' 187. 



1667.] KING CHARLES' ti NEGLIGENCE. 287 

paved the way to overtures for a peace between England and the 
States ; and presently Sweden offered her services as mediator. 
Both parties were tired of the war, and in Ma}^, 1667, a conference 
to consider the terms of an arrangement was opened at Breda ; 
but, as Mahan^ puts it, Charles, "ill disposed to the United 
Provinces, confident that the growing pretensions of Louis XIV. 
to the Spanish Netherlands would break up the existing alliance 
between Holland and France, and relying also upon the severe 
reverses suffered at sea by the Dutch, was exacting and haughty 
in his demands. To justify and maintain this line of conduct he 
should have kept up his fleet, the prestige of which had been so 
advanced by its victories. Instead of that, poverty, the result of 
extravagance and of his home policy, led him to permit it to 
decline ; ships in large numbers were laid up, and he readily 
adopted an opinion which chimed in with his penury, and which, 
as it has had advocates at all periods of sea history, should be 
noted and condemned here." This opinion, as expressed by 
Campbell, was, "that as the Dutch were chiefly supported by 
trade, as the supply of their navy depended upon trade, and, as 
experience showed, nothing provoked the people so much as 
injuring their trade, his Majesty should therefore apply himself 
to this, which would effectually humble them, at the same time 
that it would less exhaust the English than fitting out such mighty 
fleets as had hitherto kept the sea every summer." Charles was 
further persuaded by his mother that any elaborate preparations 
on his part would dispose the States to think that he was not 
sincerely desirous of peace. The result was that, instead of 
commissioning a grand fleet of about a hundred sail, the King 
ordered out two small squadrons only to undertake the summer 
service for 1667. 

The Grand Pensionary, Johan de "Witt, disliked the prospect 
of peace because, as he admitted to D'Estrades, then French 
Minister to Holland, peace would render him less necessary and 
so diminish his authority ; because it would be favourable to the 
interests of the House of Orange, to which he was opposed ; 
and because, during the war, he had done unconstitutional acts 
for which, though they had been done with the best objects, he 
might be called to account in peace time." These feelings, and 

' 'Influence of Sea Power,' 131. 

2 ' Mems. du Cte. d'Estrades,' iii. 393, 483, 521. See also iv. 



288 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1667. 

the temptation afforded to him by Charles's negligence, determined 
him to utilise certain information which he had acquired in 1666 
concerning the shoals and channels at the mouth of the Thames, 
and to deal a sudden blow at England in that quarter. Louis XIV. 
was apprised of the project and undertook to direct the Due de 
Beaufort to co-operate in its execution. In pursuance, however, 
of his former ambiguous policy, he seems to have made this promise 
merely in order to encourage the Dutch to strike, and when they 
had perfected all their preparations and were finally committed to 
the adventure, he conveniently forgot to keep it. 

De "Witt went warily to work. Instead of at once preparing 
such a force as was necessary for the attainment of the object in 
view, he assembled a comparatively small fleet of a score of ships, 
with four fireships and a few galliots, ostensibly for the chastise- 
ment of Scots privateers ; and in April he sent it to sea under 
Van Ghent, the ex-colonel of marines, with about one hundred 
and fifty sail of merchantmen in convoy. Van Ghent, after seeing 
his charges clear of danger, entered the Forth, and on May 1st 
appeared before Leith. An attempt on the part of a division 
under Captain Thomas Tobijas ^ to ascend the Firth and burn the 
shipping there was unsuccessful, and the Dutch contented them- 
selves with an unsystematic bombardment of Burntisland, and 
with the capture of six or seven small prizes, with which they 
presently returned home to participate in De Witt's main project. 

The operations of Van Ghent served to blind England and to 
conceal the preparation of the more formidable fleet which was 
destined for the attempt upon the Thames. This was collected 
in the Texel, whence it sailed on May 27th for Schooneveld, and 
thence, on June 4th, for England. On the night of the 4th, being 
not far from the mouth of the Thames, it encountered bad weather 
from the S.W., and suffered some damage ; but the wind soon 
moderated, and the fleet anchored a few miles from land. At 
that time it consisted of only 54 ships of the line, with small 
■craft, but on the 6tli it was joined by a Friesland contingent under 
Lieutenant-Admiral Hans AVillem van Aylva, another ex-colonel, 
who had been promoted to the vacancy occasioned by the death 
of Hiddes de Vries ; and the united force then comprised 64 ships 
of the line and "frigates," 7 armed dispatch yachts, 15 fireships, 

^ Two of Avliose subordinate captains were subsequently fjunished fur dereliction of 
<luty. De Jonge, ii. 164. 



1667.] THE DESCENT OF THE DUTCH. 289 

and 13 galliots, inoiinting 3330 gnns, and having on board 17,416 
officers and men. On the evening of June 7th, De Emjter moved 
np to, and dropped anchor in, the King's Channel, and that night 
commmiicated the plan of operations to the flag officers, who, on 
the following morning, explained it to their captains and to the 
military officers who were to be employed. Chief among the latter 
was Colonel Thomas Dolman. 

The plan was briefly as follows. The main body of the fleet 
was to lie in Thames mouth, w^hile a squadron passed up as far 
as the Hope, and then returning, entered the Medway, doing what 
damage it might to English property and shipping, and seizing 
Sheerness, the defences of which were at the time in- an unfinished 
condition. De Ruijter, who was to remain with the reserve, would, 
in the event of the appearance of the enemy in force, fire two guns 
as a signal for the recall of the detached squadron. 

This squadron was made up of two ships of 60 guns, six of 50, 
four of from 40 to 45, and five of from 32 to 36, with five armed 
yachts, most of the fireships, and all the galliots ; and it was 
entrusted to the command of Lieutenant- Admiral Van Ghent. 
Although he had little or no experience of naval afl^airs, he was 
elected, firstly, because he was an Amsterdam officer, and the 
Amsterdam contingent was the strongest in the fleet, and secondly, 
because it was thought that, for the peculiar oj)erations which 
were contemplated, military experience would be scarcely less 
serviceable than naval. Van Ghent thereupon shifted his flag 
from the Groat Dolpliijn, 84, to the Agatha, 50. "With him 
went Cornelis de Witt, who accompanied the expedition as pleni- 
potentiary, and who had been enjoined by his brother, the Grand 
Pensionary, to w^atch all the operations in person, and not to let 
Van Ghent out of his sight. Van Ghent's vice-admiral was Jan 
de Liefde, and his rear-admiral David Vlugh. Both were tried 
seamen of courage and resource. Van Ghent's flag-captain was 
Hendrik van Vollenhoven. 

The detached squadron started up the river early on the morning 
of June 9th. The tide was flowing, but the wind w^as from the 
3.W., so that little progress was possible, and Van Ghent presently 
anchored again. Later in the day, however, the wind changed 
to S.E., and, while Van Ghent weighed and proceeded, De Euijter, , 
with the main fleet, took advantage of the opportunity to come 
up as far as the Middle Ground. 

VOL. II. u 



290 MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1660-1714. [1667. 

There were English ships in the Hoi^e and near Gravesend, 
but towards evening the wind dropped ; and Van Ghent failed to 
reach them ere they effected their escape to narrower and safer 
waters. He anchored for the night a little below Gravesend, and 
on the morning of the 10th fell down the river again. De Kuijter 
reinforced him with ten men-of-war and two fireships, and at noon 
Van Ghent entered the Medwaj^, an English " frigate " ^ and some 
fireships slipping their cables and fleeing before him towards 
Chatham. Captains Jan van Brakel, Pieter Magnussen, and 
Eland du Bois were ordered to bombard Sheerness Fort, while 
Colonel Dolman " landed with soldiers and marines ; and in an 
hour and a half the place was evacuated by its defenders under 
Sir Edward Spragge, who retreated up the river and established 
himself in a battery near Gillingham, nearly opposite Upnor Castle, 
where later he rendered excellent service. 

Two yachts and some boats were sent up the Medway to sound 
the channel and were ordered to return as soon as they should 
sight any English ships ; and De Witt and Van Ghent decided 
to prosecute the affair on the following day. 

The appearance of the Dutch, and especially the capture of 
Sheerness, threw the English Court into consternation. The Duke 
of Albemarle with some land forces hurried to Chatham, where 
panic reigned and all was in confusion. The dockj^ard officials 
were more concerned for themselves and their private property 
than for the fate of the ships, docks, and stores. It was most 
difficult to secure workmen. Half the population had fled. Albe- 
marle, however, managed to sink some ships ^ below Gillingham, 
and to lay a strong iron chain across the river immediately above 
them. This chain had long before been prepared for the defence 
of the upper reaches of the Medway, but does not seein to have 
been properly stretched and moored until Albemarle took it in 
hand. Nor was it protected until, by great exertions, he placed 
a small battery on shore at each end of it, and stationed the 
Unity * just outside its eastern extremity. He had to contend with 
scarcity of labour and the anxiety of the civilian population to 
hurry elsewhere ; yet he succeeded not only in accomplishing this 

1 The Unity. 

- A renegade English republican. 

^ Two large vessels and five fireships. 

* C. de Witt calls her the Jonathan. Disp. of June loth. 



1667.] TllK DUTCH IN TEE MED WAY. 291 

work and in strengthening the defences and garrison of Upnor 
Castle, but also in to some extent blocking the river above the chain, 
so as to impede the progress of the Dutch should they burst through 
the lower obstructions. Immediately above the chain, with their 
broadsides commanding it, he moored the CayuJua Quint us and 
the Mathias, and a little above them the Monmouth. He directed 
the Royal Charles, 100, one of the finest ships in the Navy, which 
lay near the Monmouth, to be towed farther up the river, but, owing 
either to misunderstanding or to the lack of boats, the order was 
never carried out. Finally, he ordered a Dutch prize, the Slot van 
Honing en, which had been renamed the Mary, to be sunk in a 
certain specified position, but, owing to the ignorance or the careless- 
ness of the pilots, she was run aground in the wrong place and 
could not be brought off again. Above all these defences lay in 
order the Royal Oak, Loyal London, Old James, Katherine, Princess,. 
Geldersche Ruijter (renamed Golden Ruyter), Triumph, Rainbow, 
Unicorn, Henry, Hilversum, and Vanguard, the last named being just 
below Eochester Bridge. Abreast of the Mary, and again abreast 
of the Loyal London, Princess, and Old James respectively, there 
were batteries on shore ; but several of these defences were not in a 
tenable condition, and some had not even all their guns mounted. 

The Dutch do not appear to have advanced on the 11th. They 
however sent up towards Gillingham a division consisting of four 
men-of-war, three armed yachts, and two fireships ; and at 7 a.m. 
on the morning of June 12th Van Ghent's squadron weighed, and, 
with a fresh N.E. breeze, began to make its way up the Medway. 
Captain Jan van Brakel in the Vrede, 40, accompanied by the 
fireships Susanna ^ and Pro Patria, led the van ; and while the 
Vrede engaged, boarded, and carried the Unity, the fireships made 
for the chain. The Susanna charged it without effect, but the 
Pro Patria, Captain Jan Danielszoon van De Eijn, broke through 
it and at once placed herself alongside the Mathias, which she 
set on fire, and which quickly blew up. By that time several fire- 
ships and other craft had crowded through and had got out their 
boats. Van Brakel, who had quitted the Vrede for the Schiedam^ 
a craft of less draught, boarded the Carolus Quintus, after she had 
driven off' two fireships, took her, and turned her guns upon the 
land batteries at each end of the chain. These he soon silenced, 

^ De Jonge calls her Susanna. Some coutemporary dispatches indicate, however^ 
that her name was Schiedam. 

u 2 



292 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1G60-1714. 



[1661 



and then a party of Dutch landed and blew up a magazine attached 
to one of the batteries. 

By this time De Kuijter himself had arrived upon the scene. 
During the rest of the operations his barge, and the boats of the 
other Dutch flag officers, were frequently engaged with both the 




STERN CARVIXG FROM II.M.S, " ROYAL CHARLES," 100. 
{Captured hi/ Ihf Dutch in the Mrdircn/ iti 1GG7, ivid voir preserved in the liijks 2Iiis:einn at AmKlerdaJii.) 

The following is a translation of the Dutch inscription upon the above: "These arms 
deeorated the lioijal Charles, of 100 guns, the largest ship in the English Navy ; which, with 
several other vessels, was captured during the glorious operations in the river of Eochester in 
the year 1C67, under the chief command of Lieut.-Admiral M. A. de Euijter. and the Kegent. 
C. de Wit. In the same year she was brought into the Maas ; and in 1673 she was broken up at 
Ilcllevoetsluis." 



ships and the batteries. The Royal Charles, which had but thirty- 
two of her guns mounted, was the next vessel to be captured, and 
as soon as she liad struck, and the Agatha had passed the chain, 
the flag of the States was hoisted in the English three-decker, 
which thenceforth became Van Ghent's flagship for the rest of 
the day. 



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I(3(i7.] THE DUTCH IN THE MED WAY. 293 

Efforts were made by the defence to tow or warp away the 
Monmouth, which was only partially rigged, but she fell foul 
of the Manj, which had been grounded, as above mentioned, in 
the wrong position, and was taken and set fire to. 

The scene at that moment to be witnessed below Chatham has 
not often been paralleled in naval history. In some respects it 
resembled the scene at Toulon in December, 1793, and in others, 
the scarcely less imposing scene in the Bay of Navarin in 
October, 1827. The river was full of moving craft and burning 
wreckage ; the roar of guns was almost continuous ; the shrieks of 
the wounded could be heard even above the noise of battle, the 
clangour of trumpets, the roll of drums, and the cheers of the 
Dutch as success after success was won ; and above all hung a 
pall of smoke, illumined only, as night closed in, by the gleam 
of flames on all sides and the flashes of guns and muskets. 

In the night several of the Dutch ships took the ground. On 
the 13th it was decided to attack the vessels lying higher up, above 
Upnor Castle. That work, however, commanded by Major Scott, 
n.nd the battery under Sir Edward Spragge, nearly opposite to it, 
proved to be very formidable obstructions to the continued progress 
of the enemy. The Dutch, it is true, after a hard struggle, succeeded 
in setting fire to the Boijal Oak, the Loyal London,^ and the Old 
James,"^ but wiien they had done so they were in no condition to do 
more ; and neither the sunken Katherine, yet a little higher up, 
nor the scuttled Vanguard at Rochester Bridge, was needed to bar 
the channel. The enemy had expended all his fireships except two, 
and dared go no farther. On the 14th, therefore, he retired, 
carrying off with him the Boi/al Charles and the Unit//, and 
rejoined his main body at the mouth of the Medway.^ 

The English defence was hampered by the fact that, owing to 
the parsimonious policy of the Government, most of the ships in 
the Medway were partially dismantled, all were but one-half or 
one-quarter manned, and some were actually laid up in ordinary 

^ In the case of the Loyal Lu)uluu and the Old Juincn, tlie Hames were ultimately 
extinguished. 

^ Swinnas ; Penn ; Pepys ; Albemarle's Kepurt ; Journal of Van Brakel : Journal 
of Van Nes ; Life of De liuijter in ' Levens der Zeeheldeu,' pt. ii. ; ' Kort en Boudigli 
Verhael ' ; printed letters of De Ruijter, Van Ghent, and De Liefde ; Eeports of C. de 
Witt; Parker's 'History of Own Time'; Gumble's 'Life of Monck ' ; 'Mems. of 
J. Shefiield, Duke of Buckingham ' ; State Letters of lioger, Earl of Orrery ; Arlington, 
lietters ; Coke's ' Detection ' ; Basnage ; Le Clerc ; Neuville ; Ludlow, ' Memoirs,' etc. 



294 MAJOR OPERATIONS, lGGO-1714. [1667. 

at the time of the attack. Yet there can be no doubt that, in spite 
of the enormous difficulties of the situation, the EngHsh fought 
stubbornly. A land officer. Captain Dowgiass, who had been 
ordered on board the Boijal OaJx, and directed to hold her to the 
best of liis al)ility, perished gallantly with the ship when at length 
the enemy succeeded in burning her. "Never," he declared, upon 
being advised to retire, "shall it be told that a Dowgiass quitted 
his post without orders."-^ The total Dutch loss does not appear 
to have exceeded one hundred and fifty men. The English must 
have suffered very much more severely. 

At the mouth of the Medway the Dutch fleet was reinforced by 
a Zeeland squadron of five large men-of-war and five fireships under 
Lieutenant-Admiral Adriaen Banckers, and, soon afterwards, by a few 
other vessels, which brought up the total strength in sail of the line 
and " frigates " to eighty-four. Thereupon Van Ghent was detached 
with eighteen ships and " frigates," a storeship, and three galliots, 
to meet and convoy some home-coming East Indiamen. Another 
;jquadron, under Vice-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen, " the Younger," a 
son of Jan Evertsen, was ordered to cruise betw^een Harwich and the 
Foreland. A third squadron, under Rear-Admiral Van der Zaen, 
was stationed between Harwich and the King's Channel. As for 
the bulk of the fleet under De Kuijter, it remained for several days 
before Queenborough, and then, anticipating danger from fireships, 
moved to the mouth of the Thames. During that time an efficient 
blockade of the river was maintained, and the price of coals in 
London rose from 15.s. to 140.s\ a ton, the price of other sea-borne 
products rising in proportion. A reconnaissance up the Thames as 
far as the Hope showed the Dutch that the channel had there been 
effectively obstructed by means of sunken ships, among which, 
according to Van den Bosch, were the Hals te Swieten and the 
Phwnix, and that heavy batteries had been erected "" on both banks. 
Meanwhile, De Ruijter looked anxiously for the arrival and co- 
operation of the Due de Beaufort, whose assistance at that juncture 
might have brought England to her knees. But it was not the 
policy of Louis XIV. to crush Charles for the benefit of the 
Netlierlands ; and not only did De Beaufort stay quietly at anchor 

' Sir W. Temple t(. Lord Lisle; ' Works,' ii. 40. 

'^ Chiefly by the exertions of Cajjt. Sir John (iriliith of the l)uk(' ><{' York's 
Maritime Regiment, who was Governor of Gravesend Fort. S. P. Doni. Car. ii. ( civ. 
4'-', an.l Ent. Bk. xxiii. 438. 



1667.] THE DUTCH AT LANDGUABD FORT. 295 

at Brest, but also it presently appeared that there was so amicable 
a private understanding between England and France that Holland 
had nothing further to hope from the latter. 

On the evening of July 1st the bulk of the Dutch fleet anchored 
off Aldborough, and at dawn on the 2nd it weighed, and, after 
having proceeded for some time to the northward, tacked, stood 
again to the south, and passed Orfordness at about 7 A.M., bent 
upon attacking Harwich.^ At 1 p.m. the greater part of the force, 
which consisted of forty-seven sail, besides tenders, drew in within 
half gunshot of the shore near Felixstowe Cliffs, but out of reach of 
Landguard Fort, and, getting out its boats, threw ashore about three 
thousand men, two thousand of whom lost no time in delivering two 
successive assaults on Landguard Fort. The first was repulsed after 
three-quarters of an hour's fighting ; the second, after about a 
quarter of an hour only ; and finally, the enemy, after losing about 
one hundred and fifty men, retired, leaving their scaling-ladders 
behind them in their haste. 

In the meantime the thousand or twelve hundred men who had 
been left near the place of landing were attacked by the trained 
bands under James, third Earl of Suffolk. The struggle with them 
was continued in a desultory manner until about 10 p.m., when the 
routed Dutch returned from the attack on the fort. The enemy 
then managed, though with considerable loss, to re-embark. Just 
after he had done so, a detachment of five hundred foot, under 
Major Legge, arrived from Harwich. The fight, however, was then 
over ; and it is neither Legge nor the Earl of Suffolk who must be 
credited with the honour of having saved Landguard. The credit is 
due to Captain Nathaniel Darell of the Duke of York and Albany's 
Maritime Eegiment of Foot, and to his gallant marines. Darell, 
who was Governor of Landguard, and who was slightly wounded on 
the occasion, had, but a month before, been represented to the 
king and council as a malignant Papist and an incompetent. Well, 
indeed, did he vindicate himself.- The family of Darell-Blount, of 
Calehill, Kent, still possesses one of the ladders abandoned by the 
Dutch. The attack on shore was commanded by the same renegade 
Colonel Dolman who had captured the fort at Sheerness. 

^ Sir Joseph Jordan with a small squadron then lay in the Stour ; but his force was 
f:\r too weak to justify him in leaving it, in face of so powerful a force. 

2 Londun Gazette, 1-i July, 1667; Hill's ' Nav. Hist.' 510; Pepys's 'Diary '(Ed. 
1848), iv. 107 : S. P. Dom. Car. ii. ccviii. 72 ; Brandt, ' Leven van De Kuijter,' 563. 



29G MAJOR OPERATIOXS, 16(iO-17il. [1GG7. 

Having returned to the mouth ot tho Thames, De l\uijter 
divided his fleet into two squadrons, one ol wliich he retained under 
his o^^^l orders, and the other of which he entrusted to Lieutenant- 
Admiral Aert Jansze van Nes. AVith his own squadron, and accom- 
panied hy Cornells de "Witt, he entered the Channel and excited 
much alarm upon the south coast of England. He appeared before 
several ports, including Portsmouth, and captured several vessels, 
but he made no very serious attempts upon any place, and 
encountered no English fleet during his cruise. 

The squadron of Van Nes, left to blockade the Thames, had a 
much more eventful experience. Here is a summary of a journal 
of its proceedings printed in Van den Bosch's Life of De Euijter : — ^ 

" On July loth we sailed ^ix leagues, aud saw the Xaze N.W. hy ^V. four miles from 
us. V\'e were tiien forty-three sail in company, part men-of-war, jiart tiresliips, and part 
victuallers. On the 14:th, the wind blew so hard from the N.E. that we had to take iu 
all sail, but happily the fleet suffered no damage. On the 18th, two victuallers parted 
company to the S.S.E. On the 21st, eight men-of-war, eight tireships, and eight 
victuallers left us to join the Admiral-in-Chief ; but, on the otlier hand, A'ice-Admiral 
Enno Doedes Star appeared with nine ships aud twenty-one Flamand merchantmen, 
and presently joined us with eight of the men-of-war. ... On the 23rd, we learnt from 
two vessels laden with prisoners that up the river lay five English men-of-war and 
twenty fireships. At about 9 o'clock, six of our men-of-war, imder Vice- Admiral Star, 
pushed up and anchored a little above 'Blacktyl,' while lifteen men-of-war and thirteen 
fireships, under Lieut.-Admiral Van Xes, Lieut. -Admiral INIeppcl, and ^'ice-Admirals 
Sweers and Schram, advanced further. ... At noon we heard a heavy cannonade and 
saw several ships burning. On the morning of the 2-4th, our vessels came in sight 
again. Towards 4 o'clock our people rece)mmenced firing briskly, and so matters went 
on imtil late in the evening. On the 25th, our vessels returned, having exiaended all 
their fireshi]is and burnt seven English craft ; but the enemy was tlien where our ships 
had lain. In tlie afternoon the English came down somewhat lower, but we, having 
the advantage of the east wind, advanced towards them . . . and they retired, although 
they still had a strength of five men-of-war, thirteen tireships, and many small craft. 
At da-wn on the 26th, with a light E.N.E. wind, we Aveighed and made towards tlie 
island of Sheppey. At about 10 a.m., twenty-three or twenty-four English vessels 
came down ^ the river on the flootl, aud set upon us. . . . There were fifteen or sixteen 
fireships and a couple of ' frigates' of 1(! or 20 guns, 'i'hc rest were small. Capt. 
Kaelhout (of the Iforderivijck) had two tireshiiis on board of him, but drove them off 
with great courage and small loss. Kear- Admiral Jan Matthijssc was also assailed by 
one, but happily got free from her. Our advanced ships fired on them so hotly that 
they gave way, and drifted over towards Sheppey. . . . Our btiats chased two of their 
fireshijis, one of which ran aground on She])]icy, and was set on fire, though her people 
escaped, while the other took refuge in an inlet. The other three fireships before 
mentioned passed through our fleet without doing harm, . . . but two of their ships 
caught fire and were burnt befnro our eyes. . . . Ou tiie 2Sth of ,!uly we left the river 
once more. . . ." 



' ' Lcvcns der Zeehelden,' pt. ii. 

^ This is apparently an error. This little English squadrtm came up t]\c river, and 
was last from Harwich. 



J';(;7,] SERVICES OF Hi'UAGGE AND .JORDAN. 297 

It is possih)le that the above account may not have been in- 
tentionally coloured, but it is certainly incorrect in many particulars 
and incomplete in others. On the 2yrd, when the Dutch got up to 
the Hope, they encountered a small squadron,^ which had been 
placed under the orders of Sir Edward Spragge, who, however, 
had not then arrived to take command. Van Xes attacked ; 
and, although he had to expend twelve or thirteen fireships in 
destroying six or seven English vessels, he was successful in driving 
the enemy under the guns of Tilbury Fort. But on the 24th, when 
8ir Edward had arrived, the English attacked, and obhged the 
Dutch to retreat, with the loss of their last fireship ; and on the 
25th Sir Edward still followed them, though at a distance, and 
does not appear to have been repulsed. He anchored, however, at 
about 5 A.M., when the tide began to make up river, weighing and 
following again at 1 p.m. On the 26th, Sir Joseph Jordan, with 
his twenty small vessels from Harwich, entered the Thames. He 
seems to have fought the enemy as he passed in to join Sir Edward ; 
but it is just possible that, taking advantage of the shoals, he passed 
in without fighting, and that he did not engage until he and Sir 
Edward were united. 

The commanders of several of the English fireships which had 
been stationed to defend Gravesend unhappily misbehaved them- 
selves in a very disgraceful manner on this critical occasion. Of 
their officers, one, William Howe, of the Virgin, was sentenced by 
court-martial'-^ to be shot, and was executed on November 18th ; and 
three, Joseph Paine, of the Blacknose, Anderson Gibbons, of the 
JoJin and Elizabeth, and Kalph Mayhew, of the Blessing, were 
ign ominously dismissed the service.^ 

After quitting the Thames, the Dutch hovered off the coasts and 
created alarm in various quarters ; but ere they had time to under- 
take any other venture of importance, the signature of the Treaty 
of Breda * put an end to the war. This settlement, which was 

^ Of five "frigates," seventeen fireships, and some small craft. 

' C. M. November 4tli, 1667. 

' C. M. November 11th, 1667 ; Gazette, No. 208. The sentence on each was that 
he was " to be sent ou board the Vidorij Prize at Deptford, on the 18th of the sama 
month, where he was to have a halter put about his neck, and a wooden sword broken 
over his head : he was then to be towed through the water at a boat's stern, from the 
ship to Deptford Dock, a drum beating all the time in the boat, and to be rendered 
incapable in future of nny command." Gibbons, in addition, was sentenced to be triced 
up by tlie arms during the punishment of the other two. 

* July 31st, 1667. 



298 



MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1667. 



a tripartite one, executed between England on the one hand, and 
Holland, France, and Denmark on the other, provided, among other 
things, for the restoration of St. Christopher, Antigua, and Mont- 
serrat to England, and of Acadia, now Nova Scotia, to France ; for 
the retention of New York and New Jersey by England, and of 
Surinam by Holland ; and for a modification of the Navigation Act 
in favour of the Dutch. But the Honour of the Flag in the British 
seas was confirmed to England. 

France had already shown a desire to get possession of the 
Spanish Netherlands and Franche Comte. Soon after the con- 
clusion of the Treaty of Breda, Holland, England, and Sweden 
formed an alliance, with the object of checking Louis XIV., ere his 
power should become too great. This alliance, of which Holland 




MEUAL COilJIKMORATIVK OF THE PEACE OF BKEDA, 1667. 

{From, an original kind!// lent hi/ H.S.H. Prhii-c Lonh <if Battcnhcnj, R.N.) 



was the moving spirit, exasperated France. She, however, appeared 
to yield, and then set to work to plot the destruction of the United 
Provinces. There was much sympathy between the English people 
and the Dutch, but more between Charles and Louis ; and the 
latter w\as soon able to break up the alliance, and to conclude an 
offensive league with Charles. Charles, in fact, was bribed, firstly, 
by actual payments of money; secondly, by promises of Netherlands 
territory, and thirdly, by Louis's concession that, in the coming war 
afloat, an English officer should command in chief. Having come 
to this arrangement, Charles lost no time in provoking a conflict. 

A yacht having been directed to bring home the wife of Sir 
William Temple from the Continent, her captain was ordered to 
deliberately place himself in the way of a Dutch fleet at sea, and, 



ir;72.] THE TITTRD DUTCH WAR. 299 

if it did not strike, to fire at it. Van Ghent, who commanded the 
Dutch fleet, was treated in this ontrageons manner, but pocketed 
the insult. Then came a demand on the part of England for more 
specific recognition by Holland of the English sovereignty of the 
seas. The Dutch evinced an obvious desire to preserve peace, but, 
perceiving that all concessions would be useless, they, as a pre- 
cautionary measure, commissioned seventy-five ships of the line, 
and a mnnber of smaller vessels, in February, 1672. This was all 
the excuse that Charles II. needed. On March 12th, without any 
declaration of war, Sir Eobert Holmes, by order, waylaid and 
attacked the Dutch home-coming Smyrna and Lisbon convoys ;^ on 
March 19th, Charles declared war, and on March 27th, Louis XIV. 
did likewise. 

The war which followed was not, as the previous war had been, 
a maritime war only. France, the most formidable military nation 
in Europe, pressed the Republic continually by land ; and, had it 
not been for the naval genius of De Ruijter, and for the masterly 
manner in which he utilised the sea power of his sorely-tried 
country, Holland must have collapsed under the terrible ordeal to 
which she was exposed. 

" Tlie naval war," says Mahaii, "ilitTers from those that preceded it in more than 
one respect, but its most distinctive feature is that the Dutch, excejit on one occasion 
at the very beginning, did not send out their fleet to meet tlie enemy, but made what 
may pro[)erly be called a strategic use of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which 
were based their sea operations. To this course they were forced by the desperate odds 
imder which they were fighting ; but they did not use their shoals as a mere shelter ; 
the warfare they waged was the defensive-offensive. When the wind was fair for 
the Allies to attack, Iluijter kept under cover of his islands, or at least on ground where 
the enemy dared not follow ; but when the wind served so that he might attack in his 
own way, he turned and fell upon them. There are also apparent indications of tactical 
combinatidus on his pait of a higher order than have yet been met; though it is 
jiossible that the jiarticular acts referred to, consisting in partial attacks amounting to 
little more than demonstrations against the French contingent, may have sprung from 
political motives. . . . There is, however, an equally satisfactory military explanation 
in the supposition that, the French being yet inexperienced, Euijter thought it only 
necessary to contain them while falling in force upon the English. The latter fought 
throughout with their old gallantry, liut less than their old discipline ; whereas the 
attacks of the Dutch ^vere made with a sustained and unanimous vigour that showed a 
great military advance. The action of the French was at times suspicious ; it has been 
alleged that Louis ordered liis admiral to economise his fleet, and there is good reason 
to believe that towards the end nf the two years that England remained in his alliance 
he di.l do so." ^ 

The first object of the allies was to effect a junction of their 
^ See Chap. XXV. 



■2 I 



Influence of Sea Towei- upon History,' 144, 14.' 



'^1 



»() MAJOR OPERATIONS, lGGO-171!. [1672. 



tleets ; the next was to utilise the combined force for the making of 
a descent upon the coast of Zeeland, and so for assisting the 
operations of the French army which had entered the Netherlands, 
and which Louis XIY. commanded in person. 

The French fleet destined for co-operation with the English, 
consisted of thirty-three ships of the line and "frigates," eight 
fireships, and four storeships, mounting 1926 guns, and having on 
board 10,966 ofiicers and men. It w^as commanded-in-chief by 
Jean d'Estrees, Vice-Admiral of France, an officer who, until 1668, 
had been a lieutenant-general in the army, who knew little or 
nothing of naval affairs, and who was an incapable leader. He 
hoisted his flag in the St. Philippe, 74. The second in command 
was Abraham Duquesne, an able and experienced seaman, but 
a quarrelsome man, who was jealous of D'Estrees, and whom 
D'Estrees seems to have hated. He had his flag in the Terrible, 70. 
As chefs d'escadre, or commodores, under these two officers, were 
Captains Treillebois de La Rabesniere, in the Superhe, and Des 
Ardens, in the Tonnant. Tourville, whose name came into 
prominence twenty years later, commanded the Sage, 50. 

The English fleet seems to have consisted of 65 ships of the line 
and " frigates," 22 fireships, and a considerable number of ketches 
and small craft, mounting 4092 guns, and having on board 23,530 
officers and men. Its commander-in-chief was H.R.H. the Duke 
of York, Lord High x\dmiral, in the Prince. As usual, the fleet 
was organised into three squadrons, the Ked, or centre, the AVhite, 
or van, and the Blue, or rear ; but on this occasion the White 
squadron consisted of the French contingent, D'Estrees taking the 
place and functions, and hoisting the flag, of the Admiral of the 
White. The Admiral of the Blue was Edward, Earl of Sandwich, 
in the Boyal James. Among the other English flag-ofdcers were 
Sir Joseph Jordan, in the Sovereign, Sir John Harman in the Boyal 
Charles, and Sir John Kempthorne in the St. Andrew. There 
seems to have been no love lost between the English and their 
allies, and Dutch writers relate that English prisoners declared after 
the battle that they had no ill-feeling against the Hollanders, but 
would have been delighted to fight the French. In this case the 
inherent weakness of a fleet formed of ships of two or more nation- 
alities was intensified by the facts that the English did not trust 
the French, and despised them as seamen, and that the French, 
besides being jealous of one another, were jealous of the English. 



LOT 2.] STBENGTH OF THE FLEETS. oUi 

The Dutch, on the other hand, were, at sea if not ashore, united 
and disciphned as they had never been during the previous war. 
Their fleet, according to a hst prepared by Cornehs de Witt, who 
accompanied it as Plenipotentiary of Their High Mightinesses, 
consisted of 75 ships of the hue and "frigates," 86 fireships, and 
22 yachts and small craft, mounting 4484 guns, and having on 
board 20,738 officers and men. The commander-in-chief was the 
great De Kuijter ; ^ Lieutenant-Admiral Adriaen Banckers com- 
manded the van or left ; Lieutenant- Admiral W. J. van Ghent 
commanded the rear or right ; and among the other flag-officers 
were Vice-Admirals Cornelis Evertsen,^ De Liefde, and Sweers, 
and Rear-Admirals Jan Jansze van Nes, Jan den Haen, and Jan 
]\Iatthijsze. 

The strength of the two fleets, omitting small craft other than 
fireships, was therefore : — 

Slii])s uf tlie line and " frigates" 
Fireships ...... 

Gnns ....... 

Officers and men ..... 

Knowing of the contemplated junction between the French 
and English forces, the United Provinces made great exertions 
to fit out their fleet in time to enable it to strike at the latter in 
the mouth of the Thames ere the French should arrive from Brest. 
Says Mahan : — 

" The wretched lack of centralisation in their naval administration cansed this 
project to fail. The province of Zeeland Avas so backward that its contingent, a large 
fraction of the whole, was not ready in time ; and it has been charged that the delay 
was due, not merely to mismanagement, hut to disaffection to the party in control of 
the government. A blow at the English fleet in its own waters, hy a superior force, 
before its ally arrived, was a correct military conception; judging from the after-history 
of this war, it might well have produced a profound effect upon the whole course of the 
strusgle." 



Allies. 


Dutcli. 


98 


75 


30 


36 


6,018 


4,484 


34,496 


20,738 



■•&o* 



^ In his favourite flagship the Zeven Provincien, a vessel that deserves to rank 
with Nelson's Victory. Built at Delfshaven, and carrying eighty guns, she first went 
to sea in 1665, De Ruijter's flag being then hoisted in her. She served through the 
second and third Dutch wars, but was no longer his flagship when De Euijter recei\'ed 
his fatal wound at the battle of Agosta. She suffered severe damage at La Hougue, and 
seems to have been broken up in 1694. ' Nederl. Zeewezen,' i. 638, 642 ; ii. 488, i^GS ; 
iii. 305, 685. 

^ Cornelis Evertsen, " the Younger," son of Liut.-Admiraal Jan Evertsen. Served 
in the second war with England. Led a squadron at Solebay and in other actions 
<if the third war. Commanded in the "West Indies. Died, 1679. 



302 MAJOR OPERATIONS, lGGO-1714. [1672. 

D'Estrees early in May reached Portsmouth, where he was 
presently joined by the English fleet ; and a little later the allies 
put to sea in company. De Euijter at length sailed, and, in the 
Korth Sea, captured the French Victory, 38.^ On May 19th, he 
fell in with the allied fleets'- about tw^enty-1'our miles E.8.E. of 
the Gunfleet, but, though anxious to engage them, he lost sight 
of them in consequence of the thickness of the weather. The 
Duke of York and D'Estrees, instead of following up the enemy, ^ 
anchored in Southwold Bay, or Solebay, then apparently a con- 
siderable indentation on the Suflblk coast, but now, owing to 
changes in the conformation of the shore, no bay deserving of the 
name. The land runs nearly north and south. The fleets were 
anchored almost parallel with it, the French squadron, or proper 
van, being to the south, the Blue squadron, under Sandwich, being 
to the north, and the Bed squadron, under the Duke of York 
himself, being in the centre. Captain Christopher Gunman, who 
was serving as Master of the Prince, wrote in his ' Journal,' on the 
•26th, " we received intelligence that the Dutch were gone off our 
coast over to their own." 

We do not know how the wind was when they anchored, but 
it is recorded that on May 27th it blew stiffly from the N.E., 
and that Sandwich, being that day, with other flag-ofiicers, at a 
council of war on board the Prince, ventured to suggest that, as 
matters were, the fleet was in danger of being surprised upon a 
lee shore, and that, in his opinion, they ought to weigh and put 
to sea. The Duke, however, instead of taking the advice, seems 
to have hinted that the Earl's very praiseworthy caution was the 
eflect not so much of prudence as of apprehension. In a very few 
hours Sandwich's prescience was amply vindicated. The failure of 
others to take advantage of it probably cost the gallant Earl his life. 

A little before three o'clock the report of guns was heard in 
the fleet, and soon afterw^ards a French craft, which had been on 
the look-out in the north-east, came back before the wind with all 

^ Yj\.-Victoire, taken from the French in the previous war. 

■^ S. P. Doni. ii. B. C. 301). Gunman, in his ' Journal,' says that aUhougli the 
Allies were to the windward of the enemy, when the fleets sighted one another on the 
llHli, they made no effort to attack, deeming that they could not get up with the 
Dutch in time to fight an effective action that day. 

2 It is asserted (S. P. Dom. ii. 1>. C. 309) that the Allies were in sight of the Dutch 
on May 21st, the day before they anchored in Solebay. Gunman's ' Jouinal ' confirms 
this, and adds that the Dutch stood to tlie southward; so that the Allies seem to have 
deliberately refrained frt)m taking the offensive. 



1672.] THE BATTLE OF SOLEBAY. 303 

sail set to report the approach of the enemy from that quarter. 
The AUies had many boats ashore with watering parties and were 
taken quite unawares. Sandwich's squadron, which was to wind- 
ward, cut its cables with great promptitude and stood out on the 
starboard tack — probably in consequence of some previous orders 
from the Duke of York, or possibly in response to a signal from 
the commander-in-chief ; but in spite of the fact that Sandwich 
was early engaged, and that he did his utmost to hold the atten- 
tion of the Dutch, the alHed fleet seems to have been only saved 
from destruction by the wind dropping. But for that the enemy's 
fireships would have got into the body of the fleet while it was still 
in confusion. 

De Euijter's fleet, which came from the E.N.E., was in two 
grand divisions of line abreast. The advanced division consisted 
of eighteen ships of the line or " frigates," accompanied by a large 
number of fireships. The second, or main division, consisted of 
the bulk of the fleet, and was commanded on the left by Banckers, 
on the right by Van Ghent, and in the centre by De Buijter himself. 

The Duke of York, like Sandwich, stood out on the starboard 
tack, that is, to the northward ; but D'Estrees, either misappre- 
hending the directions of the commander-in-chief, or acting in 
pursuance of previous orders from Paris, stood out on the port 
tack, that is, to the south-east ; so that an ever-widening gap 
immediately opened out between the French and their English 
allies. 

De Buijter, in the previous war had experienced the value of 
a French alliance, and, no doubt, appreciated at its proper worth 
the indifferent French seamanship of that day. Moreover, it is 
possible that he may have suspected that D'Estrees had been 
directed to run no great risks. He therefore detached Banckers 
with a comparatively small force to hold in check the 33 French 
ships, and, with the rest of his fleet — probably about 50 or 55 sail 
of the line and " frigates," besides most of his fireships — made for 
the 65 ships of the allied centre and proper rear.^ 

While the wind was light, falling almost to a calm, the allied 
centre, with the assistance of its boats, got into some kind of 
order. When the wind freshened again it blew from the S.E., 

^ Some English historians claim that after this separation of the forces, tlie Dutcli 
were to tlie English in the proportion of three to two. This claim seems to be 
untenable. The Dutch were then, apparently, still inferior in numbers. 



o04 MAJOR OPEllATIONS, 1660-] 714. [1672. 

thus giving the EngHsh more sea room to the northward. D'Estrees 
kept away, and was not pressed by Banckers, who, although he 
had the wind, contented himself with a distant cannonade ; yet, 
owing no doubt to some extent to Colbert's order to the French 
r.dmiral to make his report as favourable as possible, French 
historians, almost without exception, describe their countrymen 
as having borne a very important share in the action, and as having 
greatly distinguished themselves. It will be sufficient, in support 
•of this, to quote the following from Guerin : ^ 

"The White squadron . . . received Banckers with valour. . . . The Yice- 
Admiral of France, Avho liad been directed at all hazards, Avhile econmuisinp; tlie naval 
forces of the kingdom, to make a demonstration sufficient to save the honour of tiie 
royal flag, certainly fulfilled in a most satisfactory way the second part of his orders ; 
and in consequence of the ardent bravery of his captains, he was led even farther than 
the Court would have wished him to go. . . . The French retook the English ship 
Katherine which the enemy had captured, and prevented the capture of another 
English vessel commanded by Lord Ossory. The ship commanded by Captain de 
Valbelle was specially noticed by the English for the generous devotion with which she 
hastened to the assistance of all the allied vessels that were endangered. She could not 
]irevent the loss of the Boyal James, 100, bearing the flag of the Admiral of the 
Blue," etc., etc. 

Most of this is pure imagination. The French kept as much 
as possible out of the fight ; and, although Commodore Treillebois 
de La Eabesniere was fatally wounded, and Commodore Des Ardens 
lost a leg — although the French even lost two ships — the White 
squadron, if it escape the charge of cowardice, must be convicted 
either of treachery or of the grossest incapacity on the part of 
its leaders. The French had no hand in the retaking of the 
Katherine ; they were never, after the battle had begun, in a 
position to affect, either one way or the other, the fate of the 
Victory, the Earl of Ossory's ship ; and Captain de Valbelle's 
activity, if exerted at all, w^as exerted at such a distance from the 
allied centre and rear as to be far beyond the notice of English 
officers. After the action D'Estrees and Duquesne quarrelled as 
to the behaviour of the latter ; and, to pacify the former, Duquesne 
was superseded, although no judgment was passed upon his conduct. 

When Sandwich, with the English rear, had been for a time 

hotly engaged with the Dutch rear, or right, under Van Ghent, the 

English centre, under the Duke of York, got into equally hot action 

with the Dutch centre under De Ruijter. Sandwich, in the lioi/al 

 James, soon found himself gallantly and closely attacked by Captain 

' ' TTist. Marit. de France,' iii. 220-222. 



1G72.] 



THE BATTLE OF SOLEBAY. 



305 



Jan van Brakel in the Groot HoUandia, a ship of much inferior force, 
which, it appears, had left, or been detached from, the Dutch centre, 
and had joined Van Ghent. Brakel behaved in the most brilliant 
manner, and his vessel eventually lost no fewer than 150 killed and 
50 wounded out of her complement of 300 ; ^ but the Groot HoUandia, 
which was a 60-gun ship only, must have been eventually overpowered 
by the Boyal James, a 100-gun three-decker, had not the latter been 




EDWARD MONTAGU, EARL OF SANDWICH, ADMIRAL AND GENERAL-AT-SEA. 

(From J. Cochran's engraving a.ftcr the portrait by Sir P. Lchj.) 



presently attacked as well by two fireships and by Van Ghent in 
person. Sandwich defended himself against these for two hours, 
sinking the fireships and killing Van Ghent ; but, at about noon, a 
third fireship ^ grappled the Boyal James and set her on fire. 

^ ' Generale Lijst vaude Doodeii,'in C. de Witt'.s Jourual, and letter of Carel Jans to 
the Plenipotentiary. 

^ Commanded by the same Jan Danielszoun van De Rijn who had broken the chain 
in the Medway. 

VOL. II. ' X 



306 MA JOE OPEBATIONS, 1660-1714. [1672. 

Sandwich held his ship to the last, and then, according to what 
seems to be the most probable account, entered a boat, accompanied 
by his son-in-law,^ in order to go to another vessel. The boat, 
however, overcrowded by the number of people who flung them- 
selves into her, sank, and all on board were drowned. Contemporary 
feeling blamed Sir Joseph Jordan, the vice-admiral of the Earl's 
squadron, for the death of Sandwich, alleging that Jordan quitted 
his own chief at a critical moment in order to support the Duke 
of York who was hard pressed. Captain Eichard Haddock, who 
commanded the Boijal James, and who survived, in a letter to the 
Duke of York, wrote : " Some short time after. Sir Joseph Jordan 
. . . passed by us, very unkindly, to windward, and with how 
many followers of his division I remember not, and took no notice 
of us at all." This certainly seems to give some tinge of truth 
to popular opinion ; but it is fair to add that Jordan had previously 
received certain special directions from the Duke, and appears to 
have engaged to support him ; and that the fact of Jordan having 
kept the wind on the occasion in question subsequently enabled 
him to break the Dutch centre and to throw it into considerable 
confusion. After the action he was promoted. On the other hand 
he was not again employed afloat. The Earl's body, picked up a 
few days afterwards, was recognised by the George ^ and star on 
the coat, and was ultimately buried with great ceremony in Henry 
the Seventh's Chapel at Westminster. 

The fight made by Sandwich and the ships of his immediate 
following, and the death of Van Ghent, demoralised the Dutch 
rear, which, for a time, retired almost out of action. This allowed 
the English Blue squadron as a body to join the English Eed and 
to concentrate upon De Euijter and the Dutch centre, which 
suffered very severely. The battle continued until 8 or 9 p.m., 
but towards its conclusion the Dutch rear rejoined the commander- 
in-chief ; and, as the French made no move to assist their allies,^ 
the Dutch were at length able to withdraw to the northward.^ 

' Sir Philip Carteret. ^ Exhibited at the E, N. Exhib. ISiH. 

^ Hoste, however, says that D'Estrees conteiniilated tacking and breaking through 
Banckers's squadron so as to rejoin the Enghsli. Had he tried this nianccuvre, the 
resvdt would probably have been most disastrous to hinn, and, as Mahan thinks, would 
in all likelihood have overwhelmed him with a fate similar to that of the Sj^anish 
admiral off St. Vincent in 1797. 

■• They still, nevertheless, hovered near, for Christopher Gunman's 'Journal' of the 
29th, after stating that the Prince and ships in company had stood that morning to the 
northward, contin\ies : " The Dutch, seeing no more of ova- ships than so small a 



1072.] TEE BATTLE OF SOLEBAY. 307 

Claimed both by the Dutch and by the Allies as a victory, the battle 
of Solebay was, in reality, a drawn fight. The Allies held the field 
and made a prize ; but the Dutch effected their main object, which 
was to prevent or delay their enemy from crossing the North 
Sea and co-operating with the French in the Netherlands. It 
must be admitted also that the action added to the already great 
fame of De Euijter, who confessed that he had never before been 
present in so hard fought and obstinate an engagement. 

The losses on both sides were heavy. The Dutch ship 
Stavoren, 48, Captain Daniel Elsevier, was taken ; and the 
Jozua, 60, Captain Jan Dick, was sunk by gunshot.-^ Strange 
to say, Van Ghent was the sole Dutch officer of high rank who 
was killed outright, though Captain Joost Michiels Cuijcq, of the 
Windhoiid, subsequently died of his wounds. Among the wounded 
were Banckers, Engel de Buijter, son of the Dutch commander- 
in-chief, Brakel, and many other officers of distinction. The loss 
of private men was very serious, though not so serious as on 
the side of the English. The gallant Sandwich was the only 
English fiag-officer to fall, but a number of captains perished 
in the performance of their duty. Willoughby Hannam, of the 
Triumph ; Geoffrey Pearce of the St. George ; Sir John Cox,^ First 
Captain of the Prince ; Sir Frescheville Holies, of the Cambridge ; 
John Waterworth, of the Amie ; the Hon. Francis Digby, of the 
Henry, and Captain Ezekiel Yennis, of the Alice and Francis, 
fireship, were among these. Digby, besides being a captain in 
the Eoyal Navy, was a captain in the Duke of York and Albany's 
Maritime Regiment of Foot (the Marines of that day), and ^- is 
remarkable as having been the first naval officer to hold the double 
commission. Yet another captain, R.N., Walter Perry, who, 
however, at the time of the action, was serving in a lieutenant's 



number, came after us : but we, coming up with our own ships, so that we were then 
about 80 sail of ships, did tack upon them, which when they saw, and we coming near 
that they could see wliat number of ships we had, they stood away from us for their 
own coast as fast as they could, E.S.E. and S.E. by E." Indeed, the action would 
have been renewed that day had not a fog come on after the " Blody Plagg " had 
actually been hoisted by the Duke. 

^ On the following day the Dutch also lost the Westergoo which accidentally 
blew up. 

2 Sir John Cox was First Captain, or Captain of the Fleet ; Captain John Nar- 
brough was flag-captain ; and Captain Christopher Gunman served as Master of the 
Prince. After the death of Cox, Narbrough was made Captain of the Fleet, and 
Gunman, flag-captain. 

X 2 



308 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1672. 



capacity in the Boyal James, lost his hfe. How severely the 
Marines suffered may be gathered from the fact that out of twelve 
captains on the strength of the Duke's regiment, four, namety, 
Thomas Bennett, Thomas Broiiilej^ Eoger Vaughan, and Francis 
Digby above-mentioned, were killed. Writing to Lord Arlington's 
secretary, and referring to this battle. Captain Silas Taylor, of 
Harwich, said : " Those Marines of whom I soe oft have wrote 
to you behaved themselves stoutly."^ This, so far as is known, 
is the first application of the term " Marines " to the military 
force which, a few years earlier, had been specially raised for 
service afloat ; and it is therefore of much historical interest. 

The total English loss in officers and men has been estimated 




FRENCH MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF SOLEBAY, 1G72. 

(Frum ii/i original kindly lent bij H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis uf 
Battrnhcrn, R.N.) 



at 2500. The Duke of York was obliged, in the course of the 
action, to shift his flag to the St. Michael, and later, to the London. 
Besides the Boyal James, another ship was blown up, and two 
vessels were sunk. The Boyal Katherine was captured, but quickly 
retaken, though her captain,^ with others of her people, remained in 
the hands of the Dutch. ^ 

The successes of the French on land had by this time brought 
the Netherlands to a deplorable condition. Owing to lack of 
ammunition great part of the fleet had to be laid up. Owing to 

1 S. P. Dom. Car. ii. B. 310. ^ gij. joj^^ Cliicheley. 

^ * A True Relation,' etc., in a letter from Henry Saville (1672, Ibl.) ; ' Mems.' of 
Jokn, Duke of Buckingham, ii. ; Ludlow's ' Memoirs,' iii. ; Parker's ' Hist, of Own 
Times ' ; Arlington's Letters ; ' Menis.' of Sir John Reresby ; Neuville, ' Hist, de HolL' ; 
Basnage, ' Anns, des Provs. Unies.' ; Letters of C. de Witt and De Ruijter ; Brand, 
' Leven v. De Ruijter' ; Van den Boscli, 'Levens der Zeehelden'; Sketches by W. van 
de Velde, wlio was present, etc. etc. 



1G73.] RETIREMENT OF THE DUKE OF YORK. 309 

lack of credit the States could discount their bonds only at 30 per 
cent, of their nominal value. It was thought right to offer to treat, 
and commissioners were sent to London for that purpose. But 
Charles II. made demands which were inadmissible ; his represen- 
tatives behaved disingenuously ; and the negotiations were quickly 
broken off. The failure to secure peace caused something very 
much like a revolution in Holland, and led to the fall of the party 
of the De Witts ^ and the election of William Prince of Orange 
as Stadtholder, Admiral, and General of the provinces of Holland 
and Zeeland, and as Admiral and Ge"neral of all the other provinces. 

The battle of Solebay had sufficed to delay, but not to prevent, 
the allied fleets from crossing to co-operate with the French. The 
fleets actually crossed in June, with a large body of troops on board. 
De Euijter with such ships as were still in commission, kept 
among the shoals and preserved a watching attitude ; and as the 
English and French could not induce him to venture out and give 
battle, they first blockaded the coast and then made preparations 
for a landing in force on the island of Texel on July 4th. But 
a storm defeated the intention and forced the Allies to sea ; and, 
for reasons which are not very apparent, the project was thereupon 
abandoned. 

No other naval operations that had great influence upon the 
issue of the war took place during the year 1672. There was 
much activity both in the East and in the West Indies ; but the 
transactions there were scarcely of a nature to demand notice in 
this chapter, and will be more fitly described in the next. 

In 1673 the passing of the Test x\ct rendered it impossible for 
Roman Catholics to retain offices of profit or trust under the Crown ; 
and one of the results was the resignation by the Duke of York 
of the post of Lord High Admiral, and, indeed, of his position in 
the Navy. No new Lord High Admiral was appointed, but Prince 
Rupert was given authority almost equivalent to that of a modern 
First Lord of the Admiralty (though the King himself had the 
largest share in the management of the department), and was 
entrusted with the chief command of the fleet 

The divided administration was extremely prejudicial to the 

welfare of the service. The fleet was not ready for sea until long 

after it should have sailed. Sir Robert Holmes, one of the best 

flag-officers of the day, was not employed, chiefly because he was 

^ And very speedily to the murder of the De Wilts themselves. 



310 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1673. 

in favour with the Duke of York ; and, although Prince Rupert 
appHed for Holmes as one of his seconds, Sir Edward Spragge was 
appointed instead to that post, and was then, without any explana- 
tion being vouchsafed to the Prince, despatched on a confidential 
mission to the Court of France, whence he returned only just in 
time to hoist his flag ere the fleet put to sea. Friction and delay, 
indeed, allowed the Dutch, in spite of the enormous difficulties with 
which they had to contend, to send out their main fleet before 
the Enghsh had a proper fleet collected ; and, but for Prince Rupert's 
personal energy, the enemy would probably have assumed the 
offensive, and have repeated the descent which they had inade upon 
the Thames and Medway at the close of the Second War. When, 
in April, the Prince learnt that the Dutch were purposing to block 
the mouth of the river by sinking hulks laden with stones in the 
channels, and that they had the necessary vessels in readiness, he 
hastily got together such ships of moderate size as were in a con- 
dition to go to sea, and made a demonstration ^ which prevented the 
execution of the project, although the enemy actually entered the 
mouth of the river for the purpose on May '2nd. The Dutch 
thereupon returned to Schooneveld. They had previously failed 
in an attempt to intercept the English home-coming convoys from 
the Canaries and Bordeaux. 

As before, the object of the Allies was, if the Dutch could not 
be brought to action, then to blockade the enemy, to make a 
descent on the coast of Holland, and to land troops. The 
manner in which De Ruijter met this intention was masterly in 
the extreme. 

After the Allies had joined forces. King Charles and the Duke 
of York visited the combined fleets on May 19th. The English 
contingent, consisting apparently of 54 ships of the line, about 
8 " frigates," and 24 fireships, was under Prince Rupert, as com- 
mander-in-chief, in the Boyal Charles, and Sir Edward Spragge, 
Admiral of the Blue. The other flag-officers were Vice- Admirals 
Sir John Harman (Red), and Sir John Kempthorne (Blue) ; and 
Rear- Admirals Sir John Chicheley (Red), and Thomas Butler, 

^ ' An Exact Eelation,' etc. (1673, 4to.), states that at that time the French at Brest 
declined to come out until the English were in the Channel; and that Prince Rupert, 
from the Thames, in dchance of the enemy, who was riding at the Gunfleet, passed 
through the passage called the Narrow — and this, too, against the wind ; which so 
surpiised the Dutch, that, seeing the end of their lying there lost, they sailed back 
again to their own ports. 




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1673.] DE RUJJTER LEAVES PORT. 311 

Earl of Ossory (Blue). The French contingent was composed of 
27 ships of the hne, 2 "frigates," and 18 fireships, and was under 
Admiral Jean, Comte d'Estrees, in the Heine, 104 ; Vice-Admiral 
des Ardens, in the Terrible, 70, and Eear-Admiral the Marquis 
de Grancey, in the Orgueilleux , 70. The Allies consequently 
disposed of 81 ships of the line, 10 " frigates," and 42 fireships, 
besides dispatch vessels and other small craft. 

The Dutch had but 52 ships of the line, 12 " frigates," and 
25 fireships, in addition to small craft. These were under De 
Euijter, as commander-in-chief, Cornelis Tromp, who had been 
reinstated in the service and given the post vacated by the death 
of Van Ghent, as commander of the van, and Adriaen Banckers, as 
commander of the rear. 

About May 20tli the Allies sailed. They had on board a number 
of troops ; and 6000 additional soldiers lay at Yarmouth, ready to 
be embarked and transported to Holland in the event of the Dutch 
suffering a decisive defeat. On the 25th the Dutch were sighted 
at their anchorage in Schooneveld ; but first a calm and then 
heavy weather prevented any steps from being taken to bring them 
to action until the morning of the 28th. 

The line of the Dutch coast near the mouth of the Schelde 
runs N.E. and S.W. The wind that day was S.S.W., and was 
favourable, therefore, both for entering and for leaving the anchorage 
in which De Euijter lay. Prince Eupert sent in a light draught 
squadron of 35 vessels, with 13 fireships, to tempt the Dutch to 
come out. This force comprised both French and English craft ; 
yet, strange to say, it appears not to have been placed under the 
orders of a flag-officer ; and the evidence tends to show that some, 
if not all, of the captains concerned were in doubt as to wdiich of 
them was the senior. De Euijter needed no drawing. He had 
already shortened in his cables, and he was consequently able to 
weigh with a rapidity that surprised the Allies. While they crowded 
back in confusion towards their main body, the Dutch, in excellent 
order, pressed after them ; and a general engagement resulted 
much sooner, in all probability, than Prince Eupert had anticipated. 

De Euijter, in his dispatch, distinctly says that Des Ardens 
was with the Eed squadron under Prince Eupert, and that De 
Grancey was with the Blue squadron under Spragge ; and, although 
certain French historians indignantly deny that any such arrange- 
ment was adopted, there seems to be no doubt that, with a view 



312 



MAJOB OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1673. 



to prevent the French from holding aloof, as at Solebay, their 
ships were formally mixed up with those of the English, and that, 
just as there were French vessels in the squadrons of Prince Eupert 
and of Spragge, so were there English vessels in the White squadron 
under D'Estrees. This distribution was perhaps judicious so long 
as every captain realised and clearly admitted his subordination 
to the flag under which he was temporarily acting ; but the lack 
of proper organisation in the advanced division, and its hasty 
retirement before the out-coming Dutch, had the effect of adding 
to each squadron at the last moment a number of ships which did 




THE SOUTHERN NETHERLANDS. 



not properly belong to it, and which, it may be, did not recognise 
their adventitious relation to it. Every craft, as she fell back, 
took refuge with that squadron which happened to be the easiest 
for her to reach ; and so the confusion of the advanced division 
communicated itself to some extent to the main fleet. This was 
of no small advantage to the Dutch, who derived further benefit 
from the fact that, since the advanced division as it withdrew was 
between them and the Allies, the latter dared not for some time 
fire, for fear lest they should injure their friends. 

Owing to these and other causes, the allied line was not fairly 
formed when, at about noon, the Dutch began the action. It is 



1073.] THE FIRST BATTLE OF SCHOONEVELD. 31o 

impossible to follow in detail the manoeuvres of the two fleets. 
Tromp's impulsive valour got him into difficulties ; and, as usual, 
he managed to separate himself from his fellow admirals. His 
first flagship the Gouden Leeuiv, Captain Thomas Tobijas, was 
disabled, and narrowly escaped being burnt by a fireship, which, 
by direction of Sir William Reeves, captain of the Edgar, had 
been laid alongside of her. He then shifted his flag to the Prins 
te Paard ; and, upon that vessel being seriously damaged, to the 
Amsterdam, finally removing it to the Coyneetstar} De Euijter, 
with the greatest gallantry, rescued him from the consequences 
of his rashness, and, in the course of the day, deliberately broke 
the line of the squadron of D'Estrees. Captain George Legge, 
later Earl of Dartmouth, distinguished himself in the Boyal 
Katherine by taking the Dutch ship Jupiter, which, however, 
was presently retaken. Spragge also, and Lord Ossory, behaved 
brilliantly ; and the French fought well. But the action, though 
bloody, was indecisive ; and at night De Euijter, who had no 
intention of being drawn far from the shoals, anchored again 
within the sands, about two miles W.N.W. of "Westkapelle, while 
the Allies brought to about two miles N.W. by W. of him.- No 
ships changed ovra.ers, and neither English nor Dutch seem to have 
had any vessels larger than fireships burnt or sunk ; though, on the 
night following the battle, the Dutch Deventer, 70, which had 
behaved magnificently under Ca^Dtain Willem van Cuijlenburgh, 
especially in action with the French Foudroyant, 70, Captain 
Jean Gabaret, and which had been almost knocked to pieces, 
foundered at her anchors, carrying down with her most of her 
people, including her commander. But the French had two ships 
sunk, besides five or six fireships.^ 

The loss of life was greater on the side of the Allies than on 
that of the Dutch. In both fleets the loss of officers was particularly 
heavy. The Dutch lost Vice-Admiral Volkhard Adriaensze Schram, 
Rear-Admiral David Vlugh, and Captains van Cuijlenburgh and 

^ Tromp's letter to his sister, written on tlie following day, is characteristic : " Dear 
Sister," it runs, " yesterday we went into the dance, and God be praised, we are sound, 
and have enjoyed ourselves like kings. I am in my fourth sliip, the Comeetstar, and 
mean to have a fine dance to-day. AVe make the French run, so that they have to set 
sky-scrapers and everything else ; and, if things go on to-day as before, I trust that our 
praj'er and that of all our friends will be heard, and that we shall be freed from 
tyranny. Adieu. Courage. Things are bound to go well." 

- The wind seems to have been then W.S.W. 

^ S. P. Dom. Car. ii. B. 335, f. 262. 



314 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1673. 

Jacob van Bergen ; the French lost Captains Kocuchon, Ozee- 
Thomas, de Tivas, and Serpault. And the English lost Captains 
William Finch, of the Yorli, Thomas Foulis, of the Lion, and John 
Tempest, of the Sweepstake. 

The Allies, of com.'se, had but very limited facihties for repairing" 
damages, whereas the Dutch were at home, and had the resources 
of their country immediately behind them. The Allies, moreover, 
had to be on their guard, both by night and by day, when the wind 
was favourable, for another sortie by De Euijter ; whereas the latter, 
who had no reason to apprehend attack, could choose his own time 
for moving, and could rest his men in the interval. It was, there- 
fore, the duty of the Allies to be ready for instant action, upon 
penalty of being surprised with results far worse than those which 
had followed the battle of May 28th. 

Prince Rupert apparently realised the situation. On the evening 
of June 3rd, the wind coming from off the land, he made certain 
preparations, and afterwards sat up during the entire night. But 
Spragge was more negligent. On the following morning, when 
there was a strong breeze from the north-east, he went with Lord 
Ossory on board the commander-in-chief, and either remained so 
long, or had such difficulty in getting back again, that when, 
at 11 A.M., De Euijter weighed and began to come out, the 
English Blue squadron had to w^ait for its admiral. 

The accounts of this, the second battle of Schooneveld, are 
confusing and even contradictory. So far as can be gathered, the 
French were again mixed with the English, the Blue, or rear, being 
to windward, and the White, or van, being to leeward of the allied 
centre. Finding his crew somewhat slow in weighing, Prince 
Rupert cut his cable, and the example was probably followed by 
other ships of his own squadron ; so that the allied centre was 
quickly under sail. The AVhite also seems to have weighed 
quickly. But the Blue, delayed by the absence of Spragge and 
Ossory, was some time behind the other squadrons, so that when 
Prince Rupert signalled to make sail on the starboard tack upon a 
north-westerly course, with a view to drawing the Dutch away from 
their coasts, the Blue squadron still lay in some confusion to 
windward. At length, however, the whole of the allied fleet was in 
motion, though not in good order. The Blue had the van position 
and the White the rear, the natural formation being thus reversed. 
The Dutch made no difficulty about following their enemy, yet 



1673.] THE SECOND BATTLE OF SGHOONEVELD. 315 

necessarily took some time to come up with him, and at first the 
action was at long range only ; but by 5 p.m. all the squadrons were 
hotly engaged, Tromp holding his course with Spragge, De Euijter 
with the Prince, and Banckers with D'Estrees ; and each squadron 
plying its opponent broadside to broadside. So the action continued, 
save when De Euijter made an ineffectual effort to pass through the 
allied centre, until about 10 p.m. Soon afterwards, apparently, the 
Dutch stood to the south-east, and next morning the two fleets were 
out of sight of one another. It is clear that De Euijter believed, 
even as late as June 7th, when he sent off his dispatch on the 
subject, that, after he had quitted the Allies in the darkness, they 
had held on their course for the English coast ; but Prince Eupert's 
dispatch to Lord Arlington, while admitting that the Dutch altered 
course at about midnight, declares that at 2 a.m. the Allies altered 
course also, and pursued until 6 a.m.^ It may be safely assumed 
that, had the Allies been in a condition to do otherwise, they would 
not have permitted their enemy to retire without follovnng him very 
closely indeed, and that they would not have allowed a period of at 
least two — possibly as much as four — hours to elapse, ere they made 
after him at all. On the other hand, De Euijter's withdrawal is 
perfectly consistent with the Dutch claim that the Allies had some- 
what the worse of the encounter; for the Dutch were, and had 
been ever since Solebay, acting in pursuance of a well-defined 
strategical policy, which demanded that they should not venture far 
from their own coasts, and should, after each engagement, return as 
quickly as possible to the comparative security of their shoals. 

Neither side could, however, affect to make very much of the 
affair. The Dutch lost no ships, and, though they had several 
badly damaged, they had but 216 officers and men killed, and 
285 wounded. The Allies likewise lost no vessels, other than 
fireships, and their loss in men seems to have been about the same 
as that of their opponents. But the English had to lament the 
death of Captains Eichard White, of the Warspite, and Eichard 
Sadlington, of the Grown. D'Estrees, after the action, complained 
bitterly of the conduct of Spragge ; and Tromp, of that of his 
vice-admiral, Isaac Sweers ; but the latter quarrel was smoothed 
over by the Prince of Orange, and Sweers served again with 
gallantry, and, as will be seen, died for his country only a few 
weeks afterwards. 

1 S. P. Bum. Car. ii. B. 385, f. 19. 



;ii6 



MA JOE OPERATIONS, lt)60-1714. 



[1673. 



The Allies did not attempt to at once resume their station off the 
Dutch ports. On the contrary, they returned to their own harbours 
to refit and refresh, the English reaching the Nore on June 8th, and 
the French proceeding to Brest and Bochefort. Scarcely had the 
English anchored ere a Dutch squadron of observation, under 
Rear- Admiral Jan den Haen, appeared off the mouth of the Thames. 
Den Haen reported that on the 12th the bulk of the fleet lay 
between Queenborough and Gravesend, that great efforts were 
being made to get it ready for sea again as rapidly as possible, and 
that a very large body of troops was waiting to be embarked in it 
with a view to a new attempt upon the coast of Holland. The 
Dutch were still more active ; and their fleet, refitted and reinforced, 
sailed on June '23rd, and was off Harwich on the evening of the 
25th. But some infectious disease, apparently the plague, almost 
immediately broke out in most of the ships, and De Buijter had to 
return. 

King Charles and the Duke of York visited the fleet in the 
Thames on June 13th, and did their utmost to further the prepara- 
tions ; but delays of one kind and another supervened ; the French 
fleet did not rejoin until the middle of July ; and not until July 17th, 
did the Allies put to sea. In the English fleet was a large number 
of soldiers. 

The strength of the forces collected for what proved to be the 
final battle of the war was, according to what seem to be the most 
trustworthy accounts : — 





English. 


French. 


Total 
Allies. 


Dutch. 


Ships of the line and fri.g;atos 

Fireships 


62 


30 


92 
28 
23 


75 

22 


Ketches. va,clits, etc 




1ft 






1 


1 






143 


115 



The English and Dutch commanders-in-chief and flag-officers 
of squadrons were the same who had served in the two actions off' 
Schooneveld ; and D'Estrees still commanded the French contingent, 
but, in addition to Des Ardens, he now had with him, as cJiefs 
d'escadre, De Martel, and the celebrated Chateaurenault. 

All .Dutch accounts have it that De Ruijter put to sea at about 



1G7;J.] THE ALLIES OFF THE DUTCH COAST. 317 

tlie same time as the Allies, sighted them on the evening of 
July 20th, and subsequently offered them battle ; but that they 
declined it, and that he, fearing lest a change of wind or any other 
cause might prevent him from getting back to his own coasts in 
time to be of use in their defence, once more proceeded to his old 
anchorage in Schooneveld. English accounts mention this state- 
ment only to deride it ; but in the Eijks Archief there is a copy of 
a letter of De Euijter, addressed to the Prince of Orange, under date 
of August t2nd (July 23rd), 1673, and as this letter corroborates the 
statement, and, indeed, was, no doubt, the original authority 
for it, the fact of the fleets having sighted one another must be 
credited/ 

The allied fleet stood on and off near the mouth of the Maas, 
threatening to effect a landing near Briel, and then proceeded off 
Scheveningen, where the threats were renewed. But the Dutch, 
though the whole country was terribly alarmed, were prepared for 
an attack. Moreover, the presence on the spot of the Prince of 
Orange inspirited the defence, while the presence in Schooneveld, 
only sixty or seventy miles to the southward, of a "potential " fleet, 
under so able a man as De Euijter, must have inclined the allied 
admirals to think twice ere beginning an operation which they 
might not have time to complete without being disturbed by 
interference from seaward. 

The Prince of Orange presently ordered the Dutch fleet to sail 
in search of the enemy, and on July 28th it weighed from Schoone- 
veld, and moved up to Scheveningen, whence the Allies had shortly 
before departed, heading to the N.N.E. The Dutch authorities on 
land were in doubt as to whether De Euijter's immediate services 
would be more usefully devoted to convoying some very valuable 
home-coming East Indiamen that were daily expected, or to 
fighting the enemy ; but the Prince of Orange, who was in no 
doubt on the subject, determined in favour of fighting, and on 
August 2nd, visited the fleet, and, on board the Zeven Provincien, 
discussed with the naval chiefs the course to be pursued. On the 
morning following the Dutch fleet weighed again ; but almost 
immediately afterwards a strong gale sprang up from the N.W., 
and, lasting for several days, prevented any progress from being 
made. Not until the 7th could De Euijter proceed for the neigh- 
bourhood of the Texel, where the Allies were reported to be ; and 

^ See also ' Nederl. Zeewezen,' ii. 399-401 ; and ' Leven van De Ruijter,' 835-837. 



318 



21 A JOB OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



ri673. 



not until 10 a.m. on the 10th were the two fleets in sight of one 
another. The wind was then from the E., and the Dutch were 
heading N.N.W. The AUies at once headed S.S.W. Later in the 
day the wind veered to N.W., and, as this gave the AlHes the 
weather-gauge and the choice of the method of attack, De Kuijter 
kept very close to the beach, so that the enemy dared not approach 
him ; and in the evening turned to the southward, so as to avoid 
being cut off from his base in Schooneveld. In the night, the 
wind again shifted, this time to E.S.E., giving the Dutch the 
weather-gauge ; and, at daybreak, De Euijter stood down into action. 




THE NORTHERN NETHERLANDS. 



The battle which ensued is known in Holland as that of Kijkduin, 
and in England as that of the Texel. 

The Allies were on the port tack, the French, who formed on 
this occasion a squadron by themselves, leading. Prince Eupert 
being in the centre, and Spragge's squadron forming the rear. The 
Dutch also were in three squadrons ; but, while the squadrons of 
the Allies were equal, or nearly equal, in numerical strength, the 
Dutch van, under Banckers, consisted of only ten or twelve ships, 
the other two squadrons, under De Ruijter and Tromp respectively, 
each consisting of thirty-two or thirty-three. As in previous en- 



1(;73.] THE BATTLE OF THE TEXEL. 319 

counters, De Euijter decided, if possible, to simply hold the French 
in check, and to fall with somewhat superior force upon the English. 
He therefore sent Banckers against D'Estrees, and attacked the van 
and rear with about sixty-five ships to the English sixty-two. 

The battle, so far as the French were concerned in it, was not 
of long duration, and may be very briefly described in Captain 
Mahan's words : — 

" M. de Martel," he says, " commanding the van uf the French, and consequently 
the leading sub-division of the allied fleet, was ordered to stretch ahead, go abovit, and 
gain to windward of the Dutch van, so as to place it between two fires. This he didi; 
but, as soon as Banckers . . . saw the danger, he put his helm up and ran through the 
remaining twenty ships of D'Estrees' squadron with his own twelve — a feat as credit- 
able to him as it was discreditable to the French — and then, .wearing, stood down 
towards De Euijter, who was hotly engaged with Eupert. He was not followed by 
D'Estrees, who suffered him to carry this important reinforcement to the Dutch main 
attack undisturbed." ^ 

Prince Kupert, while engaging De Ruijter, kept away, with 
a view to drawing the Dutch from their own shores ; and De 
Ruijter followed him. Thus the centre became separated by a 
considerable distance from the van. This separation supplied 
D'Estrees with a pretext for not further co-operating with his 
commander-in-chief ; yet it did not prevent Banckers, a seaman 
of a very different type, from presently joining De Ruijter. 

Sir Edward Spragge, in the rear, seems to have felt it incumbent 
upon himself to wait for Tromp and the Dutch rear. He therefore 
hove to, and, of course, drifted quickly to leeward, thus as effectively 
— though from different motives — separating the rear from the 
centre, as D'Estrees had separated the van. Tromp, when he came 
up, drifted away with him in hot and close action. Tromp and 
Spragge were men of kindred kidney, brave, rash, and insubordinate, 
and they seem to have delighted in this personal conflict. The 
Boijal Prince, Spragge's first flagship, soon became disabled, and 
the admiral shifted to the *S7. George, which in her turn, after about 
four hours' fighting, was reduced to the condition of a wreck. 
Tromp was similarly obliged to shift from the Gouclen Leeuw to 
the Comeetstar. Spragge was removing to a third ship, the Boyal 
Charles, when a round shot struck his boat and sank her. Before 
this happened the wind shifted, and a heavy shower of rain fell, 
brought down probably by the firing. 

Prince Rupert, in the meantime, was terribly pressed by De 

1 ' Infl. of Sea Power,' 153.  



320 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[le'; 



Euijter, reinforced by Banckers. De Ruijter, thus strengthened, 
had at least two-and-forty ships to Rupert's two-and-thirty. In 
spite of the confusion of the battle, the great Dutch admiral still 
had his squadron well under control, and was able to utilise it to 
the best tactical advantage, for he cleverly cut off the rear sub- 
division ^ of the allied centre, by detaching eight or ten ships ; and 




SIB CORNELIS TROMP, BART., COUNT VAN SYLLISBURG, LIEUTENANT- 
ADMIRAL-GENEKAT. OF HOLLAND AND WESTVRIESLAND. 

{From a Dutch engraved portrait of about 1690.) 



then, with his remaining two-and-thirty, or thereabouts, surrounded 
the remaining two-and-twenty of the English. Never, perhaps, did 
a commander of inferior forces handle them with greater tactical 
ability, or more skilfully create for himself a temporary local 
superiority. It speaks well for the steadiness of Rupert's officers 
and men that the van and centre sub-divisions of the Red squadron 

' Under Rear-Admiral Sir Jolm Chicheley, (R.) 



1673.] THE BATTLE OF THE TEXEL. 321 

were not crushed. In time, after losing heavily, they managed to 
extricate themselves ; and then Prince Eupert, anxious to reunite 
with Sir John Chicheley, and seeing that Spragge's squadron was 
still in difficulties, ran down towards his rear, De Ruijter following 
him on a parallel course, but neither centre firing, possibly, as 
Mahan suggests, because ammunition was threatening to fall 
short. At 4 P.M. the centres and rears reunited, and, a little later, 
the action recommenced and continued until 7 p.m. 

Towards the end of the day De Ruijter made great but vain 
efforts to destroy the disabled Boyal Prince, which, however, was 
saved by the interposition of the Earl of Ossory. The combat 
seems to have ended in consequence of the approach of the French. 
De Ruijter withdrew, not actually victorious, yet with every reason 
to feel satisfied ; for he had freed the Dutch ports from blockade, 
and had reduced the Allies to such a condition that they had no 
further thought of landing troops on Dutch soil.' 

Neither side lost any ship of importance. The English yacht 
Henrietta was sunk, and several fireships were expended ; but there 
were no prizes. The loss of officers was, however, heavy ; and, 
especially among the English, many of whose ships were full of 
troops, the number of inen killed and wounded was considerable. 
In addition to the gallant Spragge, Captains Richard Le Neve,^ 
of the Edgar, John Hayward, senior,^ of the Boyal Charles, Sir 
William Reeves,* of the Sovereign, John Rice, of the Marigold, 
fireship, and Francis Courtnay,^ of the Dunkirk, fell. The French 
lost Captain d'Estival, of the Invincible. The Dutch lost two vice- 
admirals, Jan de Liefde and Isaac Sweers, and Captains Jan van 
Gelder, a son-in-law of De Ruijter, David Sweers, Hendrik Vischer, 
and Dirck Jobse Kiela. 

Prince Rupert blamed D'Estrees and Spragge for the indecisive 
nature of the action ; D'Estrees blamed Prince Rupert for having 
run to leeward. De Martel, in a letter to Colbert, did not hesitate to 
call D'Estrees a coward, who was unworthy of his country ; and, for 

1 Rupert's Dispatch : S. P. Dom. Car. II. B. .366, f. 432. 

^ He was also a captain in Prince Rupert's Maritime Regiment. He was, as his 
monument in Westminster Abbey testifies, but twenty-seven when he died. He had 
previously commanded the Phanix (1671) and Plymouth (1672). 

^ An old officer, who had commanded the Plymouth at the time of the Restoration. 

* Had distinguished himself as captain of the Essex, when she was taken in the 
Four Days' Fight in 1666, and on numerous other occasions. 

^ Captain, 1666, when he was appointed to the prize Golden Ruyter. 

VOL. II. Y 



^22 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1G60-1714. [1674. 

his pains, he was sent to the Bastille for two years. The result 
was in no sense creditable to the allied commanders ; and although 
Spragge and Tromp, in their insubordinate fashion, fought ad- 
mirably, and Prince Eupert and most of the English commanders 
behaved with great gallantry, the real heroes of the day were 
undoubtedly De Ruijter and Banckers. 

Before the autumn of 1673 the common political hostility of 
England and Holland to the ambitious plans of Louis XIV. had 
begun to create so powerful a bond of union between the two 
countries that even commercial rivalry was powerless to keep them 
apart. In England the sympathies of the people had been for years 
rather with the Dutch than with the French ; the former had 
proved themselves brave enemies, the latter had exhibited them- 
selves as untrustworthy, if not treacherous, allies ; and the accession 
to power in Holland of the House of Orange contributed much 
towards removing the chief differences which had estranged the 
governments of the two great maritime nations. Charles II., in 
consequence, became somewhat more flexible in his demands ; and, 
after a little negotiation, peace between England and the States was 
concluded at AYestminster on February 9th, 1674. 

The provisions of the treaty were particularly advantageous to 
England. The Right of the Flag was formally and fully admitted 
by the Dutch ; arrangement was made for the settlement of disputes 
connected ^\'ith trade to the East Indies ; places taken by either side 
during the war were to be restored ; and the States agreed to pay an 
indemnity of 800,000 crowns. A subsidiary treaty stipulated that 
neither party should assist the enemies of the other, and that the 
English regiments in the French service should be suffered to die 
out, no further recruiting being allowed for them. On December 1st 
following, a treaty of commerce was concluded between the two 
countries, and in 1677 the Anglo-Dutch alliance was cemented by 
the marriage of the Princess Mary of York to William, Prince of 
Orange. 

During the remainder of the reign of Charles II., and the whole 
of the reign of James II., the fleet was not called upon to carry out 
any further warlike operations of first-rate importance. Such minor 
undertakings as the Royal Navy was from time to time concerned in 
will be found described in the next chapter. But the events of the 
Revolution of 1688 brought the fleet once more into intimate con- 
nection with the fortunes and fate of the country ; and, although 



1688.] THE NAVY AND THE REVOLUTION. 323 

there was, happily, no fighting at sea upon that occasion, the share 
home by the Navy, and by naval officers, in effecting, or at least in 
facilitating, the accession to power of William and Mary cannot be 
here passed over in silence. 

The most useful English naval allies of the Prince of Orange 
were Admiral Arthur Herbert, afterwards Earl of Torrington, who, 
having opposed the repeal of the Test Act, had been dismissed from 
all his employments, civil as well as military ; and Captain Edward 
Russell, afterwards Admiral the Earl of Orford. The latter was 
particularly active during the period immediately preceding the 
Revolution, and served as messenger between the Prince and his 
supporters in England. The former became William's professional 
adviser in Holland, and eventually commanded the fleet which 
convoyed the new sovereign to Torbay. 

Towards the end of his reign, James II. had brought the fleet to 
a high point of material efficiency ; but he had so conducted himself 
that, although he was still popular in the service as a naval officer, 
as a monarch he excited very little loyalty. The Royal Navy was, 
as a body, strongly opposed to Roman Catholicism ; yet, upon its 
becoming known in England that William, the Protestant champion, 
was preparing to invade the country, James not only appointed a 
Roman Catholic officer. Sir Roger Strickland, Rear-Admiral of 
England, to the command of the active fleet, but also sent priests 
on board the ships, and encouraged the celebration of Mass there. 
By thus identifying his cause with that of a religion which was not 
that of the majority of his subjects, he committed a great political 
error, and, from the first, prejudiced his prospects. Officers and 
seamen were antagonised, the priests narrowly escaped physical ill- 
treatment, and it became exceedingly difficult to bring up the 
complements of the ships to their proper strength, men who would 
gladly enough have fought for their country being in the high(!st 
degree unwilling to strike a single blow, even indirectly, for the 
advancement of popery. 

This, however, was not James's only error. When, early in 
June, 1688, Strickland's squadron was ready for sea, it was kept 
upon the English coast, instead of being sent to observe the ports 
of Holland. At first it was allowed to idle in or about the 
Strait of Dover, with its cruisers plying northward to Orfordness, 
and south-eastward to Boulogne. As the danger increased, the 
squadron moved to the Nore, and then to the Gunfleet. Not until 

Y 2 



324 MAJOn OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1688. 

September did James appear to realise that Strickland was not the 
commander-in-chief to lead English officers and men at such a crisis. 
Admiral the Earl of Dartmouth was then appointed to the position, 
the King relegating Strickland to the second post, and, a few days 
later, entirely superseding him in favour of Vice-Admiral Sir John 
Berry. These changes, however, were made too late. Distrust and 
discontent, combined with private influences judiciously exerted, had 
by that time completely sapped the allegiance of almost half the 
officers ; and although the fleet at the Gunfleet, towards the end of 
October, made a noble show, it is doubtful whether one-third of it 
would have offered any determined resistance to Herbert and the 
Dutch, had they then provoked a battle. 

Forty men-of-war, eighteen fireships, and three yachts or other 
small craft were with Dartmouth ; but there were cabals in every 
forecastle, and political meetings in nearly every captain's cabin ; 
and when Sir William Jennings, one of James's most thorough 
adherents, and a few other officers of similar unquestioning 
loyalty to the King, proposed at a council of war that the fleet 
should cross the North Sea and there watch the motions of the 
Dutch, the project met with little support. 

It ma}^ be that it was because James suspected the true condition 
of affairs afloat that he attempted so little with the fleet. He cannot 
but have been discouraged by the fact that outbreaks in the royal 
dockyards and revolts in Jersey and Guernsey occurred at the very 
moment when the attitude of the fleet and of the maritime popula- 
tion was of the utmost importance to him. Yet it is astonishing 
that he so easily resigned himself to a passive policy, and, still more, 
that he did not call in the aid of his ally the French king, whose 
fleet had, by that time, become a fine fighting machine, very different 
from what it had been in the last Dutch w^ar. The Earl of 
Sunderland, however, is reported to have advised his master that 
the one thing which it was quite certain that Enghshmen would not 
suffer was French interference in their affairs. 

William collected his fleet at the mouth of the Maas. As 
finally constituted, it consisted of fifty ships of the line, twenty -five 
" frigates," twenty-five fireships, and about four hundred transports, 
containing 4092 horse and 11,090 foot. Lieut. -Admiral Cornelis 
Evertsen, " the Youngest," son of Cornelis Evertsen, " the Old," 
commanded up to October 17th, the other flag-officers and all the 
captains being Dutch. On October 17th Admiral Arthur Herbert 



1688.] 



777 A' EXFEDITION OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE. 



325 



hoisted his flag in the Leijden, 62, and assumed supreme control : 
WilHam himself went on board the Briel, 30, on the 19th ; and in 
the following night the fleet put to sea. On the 20th the wind was 
first N. and then N.AV., and very heavy weather prevailed, so that 
on the 21st the whole force returned to the Maas and anchored off 
Briel and Hellevoetsluis. It did not sail again until November 1st, 
when the intention was to make the Humber and to effect a landing 
there ; but the plan was altered, and, with a wind blowing briskly 
from the E.S.E., the fleet crossed almost to within sight ^ of 
Dartmouth's squadron off the Shipwash, near the Gunfleet. 

The weather and his position were such that Dartmouth could 
not weigh in chase ; and Herbert proceeded down Channel. Dart- 




MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF THE hANDIKG OF WILLIAM III., 1688. 
(From an oriijinal kiudli/ lent hij H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Battenberg, R.N.) 



mouth was unable to pursue until the 4th. On that day the Dutch 
came to a determination to land part at Dartmouth and part at 
Torbay ; but in the night, owing to the incompetence of the pilots, 
the fleet overshot both places. The fault was, however, corrected 
by the wind, which shifted from E. to S.W., and which, while aiding 
the Dutch to return, impeded their pursuers. William landed at 
Torbay on November 5th. Dartmouth, who had been driven back 
to the Downs, and who, upon sailing again and getting as far as 
Portland, was once more driven back to Spithead and St. Helens, 
soon realised that the cause which he had undertaken to defend was. 
lost. He unwillingly held a council of his of&cers, sent ashore such 

' A few of tlie transports were actually seen by the English through the fog which 
prevailed. 



326 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1689. 

commanders as were Roman Catholics, and agreed to an address to 
William. By the middle of December he had made his full sub- 
mission ; and, before the end of the year, the Navy everywhere had 
formally adhered to the new order of things.^ 

At the time of the accession of William and Mary the young 
.French navy had reached a pitch of development to which it had 
never previously attained, and to which it did not for many years 
attain again. The intelligence and energy of Colbert had created a 
splendid fleet, which was numerically equal, if not superior, to the 
combined fleets of England and Holland ; and the officers and men 
of the service had learnt experience in the best schools of the day, 
fighting at one moment with the Dutch against the Enghsh, and at 
another, with the Enghsh against the Dutch. Nor had the French 
navy been without its successes. If it had not defeated the great 
De Euijter, it had at least slain him. 

Yet Louis XIV. failed to seize the magnificent opportunities 
which came to liim in consequence of the growth of his naval 
strength. When he could have crushed England and Holland at sea 
he allowed his attention to be diverted landwards ; and his enemies, 
profiting by his omission in the critical years 1689 and 1690, took 
measures which soon deprived him of his temporary superiority. 

France was alread}' at war with the Empire, with Sweden and 
with Spain, when the policy of the Prince of Orange caused her to 
plunge into active hostilities with the Netherlands also. There is 
little doubt that she could, had she so chosen, have prevented 
William's expedition to England ; but, instead of endeavouring to 
do so, she wasted her strength on shore. Not until William was 
established in his new kingdom did Louis move so much as a single 
ship in the interests of his all}^ and co-religionist, the fallen James II. 
Even then France did not declare war against England, but con- 
tented herself with personal hostility to the Prince of Orange, 
apparently believing that England, far from ranging herself behind 

' Authorities for the exjjcditiou of William : Burnet, i. 703 ; Evertsen's General 
( )rders of Oct. 16-26 ; Scheltema, ' Mengelwerk,' iii. ; Letters of A. van Citters ; 
Letters of Will. III. ; JhU. Mercttrius ; * Mems. relating to the Lord Turrington ' 
(Byng) ; ' An Impart. Acct. of . . . the Life ... of Torrington ' (Herbert), 1691 ; 
Herbert's Instructions of Oct. 17tli ; Lutterell, ' Relat. of State Affairs,' i. ; Dalrymple, 
* IMeras. of Grt. Brit, and Ireland ' ; Wagenaar, ' Yaderl. Hist.,' xv. ; d'Avaux, ' Negocia- 
tiona'; ' Notid. der Admiraliteiten,' 1688 and 1689; 'Mems. of Sir J. Reresby ' ; 
Qiiincy, ' Hist. Milit.,' ii. ; Bohiin, ' Hist, of the Desertion '; Hornby, 'Caveat agst. the 
Wliigs'; 'Life of Capt. Stephen Martin' (Nav. Eec. Soc.) ; Le Clerc, 'Hist, des 
Provs. Unies ' ; ' Mems. of Jno. Duke (if Buckingham ' ; Falle, ' Hist, of Jersey.' 



KibO.] THE BATTLE OE BANTU 1' BAY. 327 

him, regarded him as an invader, and was still at heart true to 
James II. But, in pursuance of his policy of alliance with the 
exiled king, Louis, when at length he did move his fleets, behaved 
generously, if not altogether wisely. He fitted out at Brest thirty 
ships of the line and seven "frigates," which conveyed James and 
5000 troops to Kingsale, where the ex-King landed on March 12th, 
1689, and the men two days later. Nearly all Ireland, except 
Ulster, was opposed to the Prince of Orange ; and, for the moment, 
the prospects of James looked rosy. 

As soon as news of this expedition reached England Admiral 
Arthur Herbert was ordered to take command of a fleet which was 
being collected at Portsmouth, and was directed to hasten to Ireland 
with part of the force, leaving the rest to follow as it became ready 
for sea. In pursuance of his instructions, Herbert sailed for Cork 
with twelve vessels in the first half of April ; but, finding that the 
French had quitted the coast, he cruised in search of them ofl" Brest 
and at the mouth of the Channel, and, still failing to discover the 
enemy, headed again for the south of Ireland. By that time more 
ships from Portsmouth had joined him. On April 29tli he sighted 
a considerable fleet, which, however, he soon lost again. On the 
80th he looked into Baltimore, and, seeing nothing there of the 
enemy, came to the conclusion that the French must be to the 
westward of him. He therefore bore away with an east wind for 
Cape Clear. In the evening he had the satisfaction of sighting the 
fleet of which he was in search. It was standing into Ban try Bay. 
Herbert lay in the offing for the night, and in the morning stood in 
after the foe. 

This French fleet, consisting of twenty-four ships of the line, two 
"frigates," and ten fireships, had left Brest to carry to Ireland a. 
quantity of stores and ammunition, and was under the orders of 
Louis Francois de Eousselet, Comte de Chateaurenault,^ as 
Lieutenant-General, in the Ardent, 66, with the cJiefs d'escadre 
Jean Gabaret, in the Saint-Michel, 56, and Forant, in the 
Courageux, 56, as second and third in command. In addition to 
the force which had come directly from Brest, there were in the Bay 
three " frigates " under Captain Duquesne-Mosnier, who had been 
left behind by the previous expedition in order to serve the interests 
of James on the Irish coast. One of them was commanded by an 

^ Born 16.37 ; LieuteDant-General, 1688 ; Vice-Aditiiral of tlio Levant, 1701 i 
Marshal of France, 1703 ; died 1716. — Jal, ' Ab. Duquesne.' 



328 



MAJOR OFERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1681). 



English officer who had adhered to the late king in his misfortunes. 
The whole French force upon w^hich Herbert descended conse- 
quently amounted to twenty-four ships of the line, few of which 
apparently mounted more than sixty guns, five " frigates," and ten 
fireships. The fleet with Admiral Herbert on the day of the action 
was as follows : — 

Order of Battle of the Exclisii Fleet in the Actiox off Bantky Bay.' 



Rate. 


Ship. 


Guns. 


Men. 


Commanders. 


3 


Defiance . 


64 


400 


Capt. John Ashby. 


4 


Portsmouth . 


46 


220 


Ca])t. George St. Loe. 


3 


Plymouth 


CO 


■MO 


Ca])t. Bichard Carter. 


4 


Puby .... 


48 


230 


Ca])t. Frederick Froud. 


4 


Diamond . 


;' 48 


230 


Capt. Benjamin Walters. 


4 


Advice 


48 


230 


Capt. the Hon. Jolm Granville. 


3 


Mary . 


62 


365 


Capt. Matthew Aylmer. 


4 


St. Albans 


50 


280 


Capt. John La3'ton. 


3 


Edgar 


64 


445 


Cai)t. Clowdisley Shovell. 


3 


{Elizabeth (tiag o 
1 Adm. Herbert. 


<\ .0 


460 


Capt. David Mitchell. 


3 


Pendennis 


70 


460 


Capt. George Chnrehill. 


4 


Portland . 


50 


230 


Capt. George Aylmer. 


4 


Deptford . 


54 


280 


Capt. George Hooke. 


4 


Woolwich 


54 


280 


Capt. Kalpli Sanderson. 


5' 


Dartmouth' . 


36 


150 


Capt. Thomas Ley. 


4 


Green xrich 


54 


280 


Capt. Christopher Billop. 


3 


Cunibrid(jf 


70 


400 


Capt. John Clements. 


4 


Antelope . 


48 


230 


Capt. Henry AVickham. 


3 


York .... 
Fireships. 


60 


340 


Capt. Ralph Delavall. 


o'-' 


Firedrake . 


12 


65 


Commander John Leake. 


5» 


Sol da does 


16 


75 


Capt. Francis Wyvill. 


2 


Salamander . 


10 


35 


Commander Thomas Crawley. 



' 111 tlie previous year the Dartmouth had been classed as a tireship. 

2 The Firedrake and Salamander, though here classed as fireships, were really bombs. The former carried 
si.\ patereroes in addition to h(T guns. The latter had two mortars. 

3 Tlie Soldadoes had been classed in the pre\'ioiis year as a sixth-rate. Besides her guns she ssems to have 
carried ten patereroes on this occasion. 

As Herbert went into the Bay on the morning of May 1st, 
Chateaurenault, who, according to French accounts, would have 
attacked earlier had he not desired to first land as many troops and 
stores as possible, weighed to meet the English. The latter, being 
to leeward, experienced some difficulty in working up towards the 
French, who^ bore down in excellent order and began the engage- 
ment at about 10.30 a.m. AVhen the English commander-in-chief 
saw the force of the enemy, and realised how disadvantageous 

^ Compiled mainly rem the list in ' Memoirs relating to the Lord Torringtoii," 37, 
compared with MS. official List of Commissions of Captains in Author's coll. 



1G89.] TEE BATTLE OF BJNTRY BAY. 329 

for his own fleet would be an action to windward in waters so 
narrow, he put about and went out of the Bay under easy sail, so as 
to be able to manoeuvre, with a view, if possible, to gain the wind, 
and so as to bring his very indifferent line into something like order. 
The line was improved ; but, owing to the caution of the French, 
the wind could not be gained. The action continued, however, 
until about 5 p.m., and, in the course of it, the French ship 
Diamant, 54, commanded by the Marquis de Coetlogon, was most 
seriously damaged by an explosion of ammunition which had been 
accumulated in her captain's cabin. Towards the end of the battle 
the English had been so worsted that, but for two facts which told 
accidentally in their favour, Chateaurenault would, in all probability, 
have decisively defeated them. One was the absence of the French 
fireships, which were still landing stores in the Bay. The other was 
the jealousy with which the chefs d'escadre Gabaret and Forant 
regarded Chateaurenault, who was much their junior in point of 
service. These officers tacitly refused to press the advantage ; and 
at length the French commander-in-chief found it prudent to tack 
and stand again towards the shore. Having completed his mission 
he returned to Brest on May 8th. In consequence of the battle, 
war between England and France was immediately declared. 

Admiral Herbert, who thus narrowly escaped a crippling disaster, 
made for Portsmouth. His fleet had lost one captain, George 
Aylmer, one lieutenant, and ninety-four men killed, and about three 
hundred officers and men wounded. The English had not been so 
inferior as to render their action a brilliant one : the French success 
had scarcely been so pronounced as to be entitled to the name of 
victory ; yet apparently both nations were satisfied. When King 
William visited Portsmouth a few days later he created Herbert 
Baron Herbert of Torbay and Earl of Torrington, knighted Captains 
Ashby and Shovell, presented each seaman with a gratuity of ten 
shillings, and made special provision for the widows of Captain 
Aylmer and others who had fallen. These royal attentions from the 
new monarch, to servants of the fidelity of many of whom he was 
still in much doubt, were, perhaps, politic ; but it can hardly be said 
that they were all fully deserved.^ 

1 Herbert's Disp. of May 2nd ; London Gazette ; Jal, ' Abraham Duquesne,' ii. 
' An Impart. Acct. of the Life of Torrington ' ; Chandler's ' Debates ' ; ' Mems. relating 
to the Lord Torrington ' (Byng) ; ' Life of Capt. Stephen Martin ' ; MS. List of 
Commissions in Author's coll. 



330 MA JOB OFEJi'ATIONS, 1660-1714. [1689. 

A little later, Torrington, reinforced by a Dutch contingent and 
by a squadron under Vice-Admiral Killigrew, cruised for a time on 
the French coast, but presently returned owing to lack of provisions, 
and especially beer, having accomplished nothing. 

Before proceeding to Portsmouth, Admiral Herbert detached the 
Dejjfford, 54, Captain George Kooke, as commodore, and the Antelope, 
48, Captain Henry Wickham, to the northvv^ard, to pick up other 
vessels, and with them to carry out certain special services. London- 
derry was hard pressed by the Jacobites ; Major-General Piercy 
Kirke, with a body of troops, was waiting in Cheshire to go to its 
relief, and Rooke's first duty was to facilitate this important opera- 
tion. The commodore anchored in the Clyde about May 10th, and 
thence sent word to the expeditionary force, which lay in the mouth 
of the Dee, to join him off Cantire. The junction was not fully 
effected until the beginning of June, but on or before May '22nd, 
the Greyhound, 16, Captain Thomas Gillam ; Kingfisher (yeich), 4:, 
Commander Edward Boys; and Henrietta (yacht), 8, Commander 
Sir William Sanderson, met Rooke at the appointed rendezvous, and 
subsequently co-operated with him, pending the arrival of Kirke's 
transports, in dispersing some malcontents on the small islands 
of Gigha and Kara. On June 8th, the transports, convoyed by the 
Bonaventure, 48, Captain Thomas Hopsonn ; StvaUow, 48, Captain 
Wolfran Cornewall ; and Dartmouth, 36, Captain John Leake, ^ and 
apparently also by the Portland, 50, Captain Thomas Ley, appeared 
off Cantire, and the expedition set . sail for Loch Foyle ; but it was 
driven by stress of weather into Rathlin Bay, and there detained 
until the middle of the month. When at length it reached Loch 
Fojde, Kirke, who, perhaps, in consequence of his previous experience 
in the Marines, had been given charge of some of the vessels, made 
a reconnaissance up the river, and w^as so impressed by the boom 
and the shore defences wherewith the Jacobites below Londonderry 
had barred the stream, that he decided to await reinforcements 
ere attempting to succour the garrison. Booke thereupon entered 
Lough Swilly, where he annoyed the enemy ; and then cruised 
off the coast in search of some small French vessels which he knew 
to be in the neighbourhood ; but he was at length advised that 

1 Juhii Leake. Boru, 1650. Caiitain, 1689. Relieved Londondeirj-. Com- 
manded the Ea(]h at Barfleur, 1692. Eear-Admiral, 1702. Vice-Admiral, 1703. 
Knighted, 1704. Commanded the van at Malaga. Commander-in-chief in the 
Mediterranean, 1705-07. Admiral, 1707. Admiral of the Fleet, 1708. First Lord 
of the Admiralty, 1710. Died, 1720. 



1689.] THE RELIEF OF LONDONDERRY. 331 

Kirke had altered his mind.'^ He therefore returned with the 
Deptford and Dartmouth, and again confided the latter to Kirke's 
orders. 

Among the ships belonging to the convoy in Lough Foyle were 
the Moimtjoy, of Derry, Micaiah Browning master, and the Phoenix, 
of Coleraine, Andrew Douglas master. The two gallant skippers 
volunteered to endeavour to force their way up, and to the Dart- 
inunfh was assigned the honour of accompanying them. On 
July '28th, under a heavy fire, the Mountjoy led the perilous 
attempt. Batteries played upon her and her consorts ; musketry 
fire rained upon the ships from both banks : but the Mountjoy struck 
the boom and broke it. The elasticity of the mass of cables, chains, 
and spars caused her, however, to recoil, and she drifted on to a 
inudbank, while the Phoenix entered through the gap. The Mount- 
joy, nevertheless, was not far behind her consort. As soon as he 
found himself aground. Browning fired a broadside into the nearest 
body of the enemy. The concussion of this brought the ship off, 
and she also passed the boom, though with the loss of her brave 
master. The Dartmouth had rendered valuable aid in covering the 
merchantmen and in assisting to sweep the banks of the river with 
her guns, and at ten o'clock that night the three ships, not much 
the worse for their adventure, reached Derry quay and began to 
unload their welcome stores. On the night of July 31st the 
discomfited Jacobites burnt their camp and abandoned the siege. 

Captain Rooke continued to cruise in the neighbourhood of 
the North Channel, and on August 13th, he escorted transports 
carrying Schomberg's army to Belfast Lough, and so facilitated the 
capture of Carrickfergus. With the ridiculously inadequate force at 
his disposal, he made admirable arrangements, and kept careful 
watch from Malin Head as far south as Dublin and the Isle of Man. 
From time to time he received small reinforcements ; and early in 
September he found himself able to divide his little squadron, 
leaving part in the North to co-operate with the army there, and 
going south with the remaining ships. On September 16th, he made 
an attempt to burn the Jacobite shipping in Dublin Bay, but was 
driven off by a gale. Two days later he was off Cork, and under a 
heavy fire, took possession of the principal island in Queenstown 
Harbour. Owing, however, to the condition of most of his vessels, 

' This was in consequence of the receipt of positive orders from Marshal Schomberg. 
See MS. in Nairne Coll., Bodleian Library. 



332 MAJOn OPEBATIONS, 1660-1714. [1689. 

he was unable to prolong bis cruise ; and on October 13tb, be 
ancbored in tbe Downs. ^ 

Booke's services on tbis occasion were undoubtedly of niucb 
value, yet tbey are bere described at greater lengtb, perbaps, tban 
tbeir intrinsic importance deserves. Tbey illustrate bow thorougbly 
mismanaged was tbe French naval campaign ; and it is on that 
account that tbey chiefly merit attention. France was superior at 
sea ; she had inflicted a severe check, if not a positive defeat, upon 
tbe principal English naval force in home waters ; she bad the ball 
at her feet. Yet, although, very soon after Ban try Bay, she bad 
afloat a larger fleet than ever, she failed to apply it in the locality 
where it might easily have produced a decisive effect upon the 
fortunes of her ally, James II. She might have captured Booke 
and bis little squadron, ensured the fall of Londonderry, prevented 
Schomberg from landing in Ireland, and established herself, at least 
for a time, in almost unchallenged possession of tbe Irish Sea and its 
approaches. Instead, she contented herself with sending a few im- 
potent small craft to the true sphere of action, and with allowing tbe 
bulk of her naval forces to make a useless promenade in tbe Channel. 

England, however, was guilty of not less glaring strategic mis- 
takes at tbis critical moment in her history. When war was 
declared, it was known in London that there was a strong French 
naval force at Toulon, and that this would make an effort to join 
hands with the fleet in Brest ; yet no serious efl^orts were made to 
stop tbe threatened concentration, and, ere the summer of 1689 was 
over, a squadron of twenty ships of the line, four " frigates," eight 
firesbips, and several storeships passed round unchallenged from the 
Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Tourville,^ who thereupon assumed 
command there, then bad at his disposal no fewer than sixty-two 
ships of war, and thirty firesbips, besides other vessels in proportion. 
More ships still remained at Toulon, and although the government 
of William did attempt to prevent them from passing tbe Strait of 
Gibraltar, there was, as will be seen, so much delay and mismanage- 
ment, that tbe French effected their object with very little difficulty. 

At the time of the Revolution there was no English naval force 
of any moment in the Mediterranean. Towards the end of 1689, 

' Gazette; Bucliairs letter in KaimeMSS. ; 'Life of Sir John Leake'; 'Hist.de 
la Revel, d'lrlaude ' ; ' Hist, of Eed. of Ireland ' ; AValker, ' True Acct. of tlie Siege of 
Londonderry ' ; ' MS. Mems. of Sir G. Eooke ' ; ' Life of Sir G. Rooke.' 

^ Anne Hilarion de Cotentin, Comte de Tourville ; born 1642 ; Vice-Adm. of tbe 
Levant, 1689; Marsbal of France, 1693; died 1701; Jal, 'Diet. Crit. de Biog. et d'Hist.' 



IGUO.] MISMANAGEMENT OF ^HE CAMPAIGN. 333 

the government decided to send one thither ; and a considerable 
squadron was told off for the purpose. To the command of this, 
Vice-Admiral Henry Killigrew was ultimately appointed. He had 
Mediterranean experience, having served as senior officer of the few 
vessels that were on the station previous to and immediately after 
the accession of William and Mary. But, while the squadron was 
still being collected, the government received from its ally, the King 
of Spain, a request that it would furnish an escort from Flushing to 
Corunna for a princess whom his Majesty had just previously 
married by proxy. In spite of the strain upon the naval resources 
of the country, it was rightly or wrongly deemed politic to grant the 
request, and a second squadron, ultimately entrusted to Admiral 
Edward Kussell, was prepared for the purpose. In this squadron 
were included some of the ships which were eventually to be under 
Killigrew, and Eussell was directed, after accomplishing his compli- 
mentary mission, to send them on from Corunna to Cadiz. 

Bussell's squadron was the first to depart. It sailed on 
December 1st, 1689, for Flushing ; but, owing to the unreadiness 
of the royal bride, to contrary winds, and to other causes, it did 
not reach Corunna until March 16th, 1690. There, the grounding 
of one of the ships caused additional delay, but at length the 
Mediterranean contingent parted company for Cadiz; and Eussell, 
returning, anchored at Spithead on April 28th, 

Killigrew was appointed to his command on December 28th, 
1689, but did not succeed in getting away from Torbay until 
March 7th, 1690. He had with him one second-rate, four third- 
rates, seven fourth-rates, one fifth-rate, and two fireships, and was 
to pick up at Cadiz one second-rate, and two third-rates detached 
thither by Russell. Moreover, he was joined by a Dutch contingent 
under Lieutenant- Admiral Philips van Almonde. He was directed 
firstly to convoy the outgoing trade ; and then, with the greater part 
of his force, to watch the French in the Mediterranean, to protect 
British interests there, and, in case the Toulon ships should evade 
him and pass the Strait of Gibraltar, to follow them. He reached 
Cadiz on April 8th, but was obliged to remain there for some time 
in order to repair certain of his ships which had suffered in a storm. 
On May 9th, he heard simultaneously from Alicant, Malaga, and 
Gibraltar that the Toulon squadron had been seen from each of 
these places. Some of his ships were still not ready for sea ; but he 
sailed on the 10th, with one second-rate, two third-rates, four fourth- 



334 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1690. 

rates, two fifth-rates, and two Dutch ships of the hne, and next day 
was joined by other vessels which had been detached to Gibraltar. 
These brought up his strength to one second-rate, three third-rates, 
six fourth-rates, two fifth-rates, and two fireships, besides five Dutch 
ships. 

Acting on information, he stood over to Ceuta and Tetuan, but 
found there nothing of importance. Eeturning towards the Spanish 
side, he sighted ten ships to the northward of him. These were the 
French. French writers say that they offered battle, and that 
Killigrew refused it. The weight of evidence shows, however, 
that Killigrew chased them for twenty-four hours, and failed to 
come up vdth them only because all his vessels were foul. Indeed, 
as he was in superior force, it is altogether improbable that he 
wilfully neglected any measure that might have brought on a general 
action. But, after losing sight of them, he certainly failed to follow 
them up with all possible energy. The result was that they joined 
the already large French force in the Channel in time to contribute 
to the result of the battle of Beachy Head, and that he did not reach 
Plymouth mitil after that battle had been fought. When he at 
length arrived, so great was the panic that he was hastily ordered 
into Hamoaze, lest his squadron should be carried off by the 
triumphant enemy. 

Nor was this the extent of English mismanagement. The grand 
fleet was further weakened by the detachment of Sir Clowdisley 
Shovell, with a small squadron, to convoy King William to Carrick- 
fergus ; and Shovell, like Killigrew, was consequently unable to take 
part in the great action of 1690. In the meantime, such force as 
was in Irish waters did not prevent a French division under 
D'Amfreville from conveying six thousand French troops to Cork, 
and from safely carrj-ing back thence to Brest about the same 
number of Irish soldiers. 

What has been written will go far to explain why, when the 



Notes to Table on opposite pxif]^- 

' Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir John s [he Knglisli fireships were: 
Ash by (R.). Centre. Rear. 

2 Flag of Admiral Lord Torriugton, Wolf, Thos. Urry. /"oa-, William Stone. 

Comniander-in-fhief. Vulture, Jas. Moody. Thomas and Elizabeth, Thos. Marshall 

s Flag of Rear-Admiral Rooke Roebuck, Isaac Townsend. Charles, Anthony Roope. 

(R-)- Dolphin, Vi'm. Vickars. GrifTni, Clifford Chamberlain. 

* Flag of Vice- Admiral Sir Ralph Owner's Love, Thos. Heath. HarvJc, Wm. Ilarman. 

Delavall (B.). Spiedwell, .John Mason. Cijgnet, Robert \Villmot. 

Hound, Thos. Foulis. Hunter, Thos. Kercher. 

Spy, Fredk. Weighman. Cadiz Merchant, David Greenhill. 



1G90.] THE FLEETS AT THE BATTLE OF BEACH Y HEAD. 



J35 



THE ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FLEETS TN THE ACTION OFF BEACHY HEAD. 



ANGLO-DUTCH FLKET. 



Ships. 



. Wapen van Utrecht 

]\''apenvan Alkmaar 

Thdien. 

West Vriesland . 

/'rinses Maria . 

f'astricum 

Agatha 

Stad en LandcH . 

Maagd van Enkhui 
zen. 

yoord Holland . 

Maagd L'a7i Dordrecht 
I { Hollandia 
rt Velutve 

Provincie van 
Utrecht . . 

Maze .... 

Vriesland. 

Elswout . 

Reijgersherge . 

Gekroondf. Burg. 

yoord Holland . 

Veere .... 

Coitienne . 
*And four fireships. 



\ 



GlTNS. 



« 



, Plymouth. 

Beptford . 

Elizabeth . 

Sandwich^ . 

Erpedition 

W'lirsj^ite . 

Woolwicli . 

Lion . 

Rupert 

Albemarle 

Grafton . 

Royal Sov:ireign 

Windsor Castle 

Lenox . 

Stiri ing Castle 

York . 

Suffolk . . 

Hampton Court 

Duchess 3 . 

Hope . 
XRestoration . 

*Constant Warwick 

*And eight fireships.^ 



M 



K 



Anne . 
I Bonaventure 

Edgar. 

Exetur, 

Breda . 

St. Andrevj 

Coronation * 

Royal Katherine 

Cambridge 

Berwick . 

Swallow . 

Defiance . 
\ Captain . 

*An(ieip;htflresh 



ips 



64 
50 
60 
82 
92 
50 
50 
52 

72 
4t> 
68 
74 
6S 

50 
64 
64 
50 

74 
62 
72 
60 
50 



60 
50 
70 
HO 
70 
70 
54 
60 
66 
90 
70 
100 
90 
70 
70 
60 
70 
70 
90 
70 
70 
36 



COMMANDEES. 



70 
48 
64 

70 
70 
96 
90 
82 
70 
70 
43 
6t 
70 



Decker. 

Calf. 

Call's. 

(V.-Ad. van Callenburgh.) 

CR.-Ad. Gillcs Scheij.) 

Kuijper. 

Van der Zaaii. 

Abraham Taelman. 

Van der Poel. 

Swaen. 

Au'honij Pieter>on. 

(Lt.-Ad. Corn. Evertsen.) 

(R.-Ad. Jan van Brake 1.) 

Jan van Convent. 

Jan Snellen. 

Philips van der Goes. 

Noortheij. 

A. F. van Zijll. 

(V.-Ad. C. van de Piilte.) 

(R.-Ad. Jan Dick.) 

Muselman. 

A. den Boer. 



FRENCH FLEET. 



Ships. 



Gdss. 



COMMANDEKS. 



Richard Carter. 
William Kerr. 
David Mitchell. 

.John Clements. 
Stafford Fairborue. 
.Tames Grother. 
John Torpley. 
George Pomeroy. 
Sir Francis Wheler. 
Henry, Duke of Grafton. 
.John Neville. 
George Churchill. 
Hon. John Granville. 
Anthony Hastings. 
Thomas Hop-sonn. 
^VolfI•an Cornewall. 
.lohn Laytou. 
Thomas Gillam. 
George Byng. 
William Botham. 
John I5everley. 



.John Tyrrel. 
John Hubbard. 
John Jt-nnifer. 
George Mees. 
Matthew Tenuant. 
Ptobert Dorrell. 
John Munden. 
Matthew Aylmer. 
Simon Foulks. 
Henry Martin. 
Benjamin Walters. 
John Graydon. 
Daniel Jones. 



o 



' Brusque . 
Arrogant . 
Arc-en-Ciel 
Henri . 
Souverain 
Brillant . 
Neptune . 
Sans Pareil 
Fidnle . 
Diamant . 
Serieux 
Tonnant . 
Sole it Royal 
Saint- Bhiliprpi 
Marquis . 
Furieur, . 
Fortune . 
Apollon . 
Saint-Michel 
Entreprenan 
Magnifique 
Content . 
Vcrmandois 
Cheval Marin 
Fongueux 
*Faucon . 
*And si.x fireships 



Comte . 

\igHant . 

Parfait . 

Triowphant 

Bourbon . 

Vaillant . 

Hue 

Capable . 

Brave . 

Franfois . 

Agreable . 
n Florissant 

Grand. 

Belliqueux 

Prince 

Prudent . 

Modere 
I Fleuron . 

A ima ble . 
pij Intrijnde . 

Gloricux . 

Illustre 
\ Terrible . 

* l.eger 

*And six fireships. 



50 
54 
44 
62 
80 
66 
46 
58 
46 
56 
56 
70 
98 
80 
80 
60 
58 
56 
54 
56 
76 
56 
58 
40 
58 
44 



40 
52 
b2 
70 
62 
48 
48 
54 
54 
46 
58 
80 
80 
74 
56 
52 
50 
54 
70 
80 
60 
66 
74 
44 



Fier 


68 


Fort . . . 






52 


Man re. . 






52 


Eclatanl . 






64 


Conquiranl 






1 70 


Courtisan 






62 


Indien 






50 


Trident 






52 


Hardi . 






58 


Saint- l.ouis 






56 


Excellent . 






56 


Pompeux . 






74 


Dauphin l!o)/al 




110 


Ardent 






62 


Bon . . 






52 


Pendant . 






5J 


Courageux 






60 


Couronne . 






58 


Ferme . 






1 ^* , 


Temeraire 






i 52 ! 


*Solidc 






48 


*AlcioH . 






44 


*Eole . . 






50 


*And six fireships. 





De Relingues. 

De La Haneloire. 

De La Galissonuiere. 

De Septesmes. 

(V.-Ad. de Villette-Mur 

De Pointis. L5ai.) 

De Roussel. 

De Ryberette. 

Des Goultes. 

De La Roque-Persin. 

De Montbrou. 

d'Aligre. 

(Ad. Chateaurenault.) 

d'Infreville de St. Aubin. 

De Digoin du Palais. 

Treillebois de la Vigerie. 

De Sevigne. 

(R.-Ad. df Laugeron.) 

De Vaudricourt. 

Du Rivau-Huet. 

De Ferville. 

Jean Hart. 

Du Tast. 



De Recours. 

Chev. des Adrets. 

De Sainte-Maure. 

d'Amblimont. 

(R.-Ad. de Nesmond.) 

De Beaujeu. 

De Forbin. 

De La Rorgere. 

De Forbin (Jardanne. 

De Serquigny. 

De Bellefontaine. 

Marquis de La Porte. 

(Ad. Conite de Tourville.) 

Marquis de Coijtlogon. 

DeChateau-Morand. 

Desnots. 

Pallas. 

Bidault. 

De Villars. 

De Sebeville. 

(V.-Ad. d'Amf.eville.) 

De Saint-Pierre. 

Dii Chalard. 

d'Amfreville. 

De Saint-Marc. 

De aiontbault. 



De La Roche-Courbon- 

De Chalais. [Blenac. 

De Macliault. 

(R.-Ad. de Flacoiut.) 

d'Hervault. 

De Feiiquieres. 

De Pallieres. 

De La Boissiere. 

De Champigny. 

d'Hailly. 

De La Motte-Genouille. 

De Gogol in. 

(Ad. Victor Marie 

Des Francs. [d'Estrees.) 

Barou des Adrets. 

Des Herbiers. 

Des Augeis. 

De Chabert. 

Du Magnon. 

(V.-Ad. Jean Gabaret.) 

De Bellei^le-Era^d. 

De Rfismadec. 

Pannetier. 

Du Rouvroy. 



Vessels thus indicated * were not in the line ol' battle. 



For notes to Table see opposite page. 



336 



MAJOR OPERATWX;S, 1000-1714. 



[1690. 



Anglo-Dutch fleet, under Torrington and Conielis Evertsen/ met 
the greatest fleet which France up to that time had ever sent to 
sea, the former was notably weaker than the latter. The fleets 
which thus met are shown in Table on p. 385 ante. 

The strength of the line-of-battle on each side was, therefore : — 





Anglo- 


Dutch. 


French. 


Ships. 


Guns. 


iShips. Guns. 


Van . . . 


oo 


1374 


20 1214 


Centre . 


I'l 


1110 


25 1518 


Bear, 


i;5 


912 


23 1390 




56 


3690 


08 


4122 



This was, no doubt, a considerable disparit}^ for the French had 
ill line 'I'l per cent, more ships than the Allies, although, on the 
other hand, the Anglo-Dutch vessels averaged about six more guns 
apiece than the vessels of Tourville. At Trafalgar, Nelson was 
proportionably quite as inferior to Yilleneuve and Gravina, yet he 
fought them and beat them. It is fair to bear in mind that, while at 
Trafalgar it was the smaller force that enjoyed the great advantage 
of being of a single nationality, at Beachy Head it was the larger. 
At Beachy Head, nevertheless, the odds against Torrington were 
not heavy enough to justify him in looking upon victory as hopeless. 

Tourville quitted Brest on June loth, 1G90. Torrington at that 
time lay in the neighbourhood of the Isle of Wight, awaiting, and 
from day to day receiving, reinforcements of English and Dutch 
ships. Indeed, his force did not attain its full strength until very 
shortly before the battle which was fought at the end of the month. 
In that age it was still customary for the belligerent powers to 
withdraw their grand fleets from sea at the beginning of winter, and 
to send them out again at the beginning of summer. Navies, in 
fact, Hke armies, habitually went into winter quarters. Yet, although 
by the middle of June the ordinary season for the resumption of 
hostilities was already several weeks old, and although Torrington 

1 Cornells Evertsen, known first as " the YouBgest," and later as " the YouDger," 
son of Lieut.-Adnilral C. Evertsen, " the Old." Distinguished himself in the Second 
War with England, especially in the affair of the Smyrna fleet, at Solebay, and in the 
West Indies. Accompanied William III. to England. Led the van at Beachy Head. 
Died Lieut.-Admiral of Zeelaud, 1706. 




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1690.] THE BATTLE OF BE ACHY HEAD. 337 

knew very well that a large armament was getting ready to fall 
upon him, the port of Brest was altogether unwatched, and not a 
single English cruiser was on the look-out to the westward of 
St. Helens. On June 20th, the French were off the Lizard ; on 
the 23rd, they were off St. Alban's Head. Not, apparently, until 
then did Torrington become fully aware that they were anywhere 
near him. On that day he weighed and stood off shore to the S.E., 
anchoring again late in the afternoon, with Culver Cliff bearing 
S.W. by S., about six or seven miles. At five on the following 
morning he weighed again, with a fresh gale from the N.E. by N., 
and stood away S.E. by E. In the evening he again anchored, with 
Culver Chff bearing nearly W.N.W. At 5 a.m. on the 25th, he 
once more weighed, and exercised the fleet at tactics until 9 a.m., 
when, the wind having veered to S.S.E. and a thick fog having come 
on, he anchored, Dunose being W.N.W., about fifteen miles. 

Half an hour later a "frigate " came in with her topgallant sheets 
flying and her guns firing. This was the signal for the approach of 
the enemy in force. The fleet at once weighed, the wind being 
S.S.E., and stood to the eastward; and, soon afterwards, the French 
were sighted to the westward. Jn the afternoon, the Blue squadron 
was ordered to lead towards the foe ; but although a shift of wind 
gave the Allies the weather-gauge, no action resulted. Indeed, it was 
decided, at a council of war, that the fleet was too weak to engage 
the enemy ; and a dispatch to that effect was sent by express to 
Queen Mary, who, in the absence of King William in Ireland, was 
at the supreme head of a^airs. That night both fleets anchored. 
On the 26th, still in full sight of one another, they drew into line ; 
but the wind dropped, and rendered an attack by either side im- 
possible. In the evening, with a light breeze from N.W., Torrington 
stood up Channel, the French following him at a distance of about 
twelve miles. And so, now anchoring, now weighing, now sighting, 
and now losing sight of the French, the English slowly withdrew, 
until the evening of the 29th, when dispatches arrived containing 
explicit orders for the French to be fought. Next morning, when 
there was a fresh gale from about N.E., and Beachy Head lay ten or 
twelve miles to the northward, Torrington, who was to windward, 
formed his fleet in order of battle, and bore down in line abreast 
upon the enemy, van upon van, centre upon centre, and rear upon 
rear. The French, who were on the starboard tack, heading 
N.N.W., awaited the onslaught with their head-sails aback. 

VOL. II. z 



338 



MAJOB OFEBATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1090. 



The allied van, consisting of the Dutch contingent under Evert- 
sen, was the first part of the fleet to get wdthin range. As it did so, 
the ships of which it was composed hauled their wind together on 
the starboard tack — on a parallel course, that is, with the course of 
the enemy — and then, hotly engaging, edged towards and pressed 
the French van with the greatest gallantry and determination, 
backing and filling as the enemy did. 

Torrington, with the allied centre, did not take an equally direct 
course for the enemy, but, at first stood more to the southward, as 
if with the intention of cutting off the French rear. When, 
however, Ashby who, with his division, was imitating the example 




DUTCH SHIP OF THE LINE " HOLLANDIA," 71. BUILT IN 1683. 

Flagship of Lt.-Adm. Cornells Evertsen (III.) at Beachy Head. 

{Frum the drawino by A. L. ran Ealdciibnch.) 

of Torrington, observed how great a gap was growing between the 
centre and the Dutch, he altered his course in such a manner as to 
lessen the interval somewhat, and Torrington stood after him, 
Kooke duly standing after Torrington, Each of the three divisions 
of the allied centre kept well together ; but when at length both 
fleets were heading in roughly parallel lines to the N.N.W., there 
were considerable spaces not only between the three divisions of the 
allied centre, but also between the centre and the van, and between 
the centre and the rear. 

Delavall, with the allied rear, meanwhile engaged the French 
rear very closely, in spite of its largely superior force, and backed 



1690.] 



THE BATTLE OF BE ACHY BEAD. 



339 



and filled to keep abreast of it in the most 'deliberate and pertinacious 
manner. 

By accident or design, the centre of the long French line, which 
seems to have been very correctly formed and preserved, so far as 
the distances betvi^een the ships were concerned, was bowed or 
sagged to leew^ard. That fact may have suggested to Torrington 
the design, which he must be supposed to have abandoned soon after 
it was conceived, of concentrating upon, and cutting off, the enemy's 
rear. The plan of action which apparently he next adopted, and 
which he pursued throughout the early part of the engagement, was 
to keep the allied centre, or at least the centre and rear of his own 



*w^ 
v**^ 

^^^'* 

*>^"^ 

X'*-^. 
'^%. 







**-? 




THE BATTLE OFF BEACHY HEAD. 

June 30th, 1690. 

squadron, at long gunshot to windward, with a view to preventing 
Tourville from tacking and doubling upon Delavall's squadron. But 
this plan was a faulty one. It did not prevent the head of the 
French Blue squadron, when the Dutch had been for some time 
engaged, from going about and so placing the Dutch between two 
fires ; nor did it prevent the head of the French White squadron, 
when it had severely mauled Ashby, from pushing forward to 
complicate the perplexities of the gallant but unfortunate Evertsen. 
The Dutch might have held, and, indeed, did for some time hold, 
their own against the three divisions of Chateaurenault ; but when 
these three divisions were reinforced by the divisions of De Nesmond 
and of Tourville himself, the Dutch, overpowered and engaged on 

z 2 



.340 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1690. 

both sides simultaneously, were exceedingly hard pressed. But for 
a calm which opportunely befell, they would, in all likelihood, have 
been destroyed. 

During the calm, the French centre got out its boats in order to 
low more ships into action. The Allies, on the other hand, shrewdly 
dropped anchor wdth all sail set, Torrington first placing himself 
between the Dutch and the enemy. The result was that when the 
ebb tide made strongly to the S.W., the French, who had not 
anchored, were gently carried out of gunshot, and not until they 
were three miles from the Allies did they anchor also. 

So ended the battle of Beachy Head, or, as the French style 
it, of Bezeviers. The Dutch had begun firing at about 9 a.m. ; 
Delavall's squadron had attacked the French rear at 9.30 a.m. ; and 
the allied centre had opened at long range at about 10 a.m. It was 
1 P.M. when part of the French van doubled upon the Dutch ; about 
3 P.M. w^hen the wind fell;^ and about 5 p.m. when the Alhes 
anchored. The loss of officers and men had naturally been con- 
siderable ; but, thus far, the only vessel lost was one, apparently 
small, belonging to the Dutch. For want of anchors, she had 
drifted among a mass of French vessels, and had been taken or 
sunk. Numerous ships of the Allies were, however, in a perilous 
condition, owing to loss of spars or to shot-holes between wind and 
water. 

Torrington, in his official dispatch, dated from off Beachy Head 
on July 1st, said : — 

" What the consequence of this unfortunate battle may be, God Almighty only 
knows ; but this I dare be positive in, had I been left to my liberty, I had prevented 
any attempt upon the land, and secured the western ships, Killigrew, and the mer- 
chantmen. . . . Had I undertaken this of my own head, I should not well know 
•what to say ; but its being done by command will, I hope, free me from blame." - 

It is, undoubtedly, always somewhat unfair to a naval com- 
mander-in-chief when a superior authority, at a distance from the 
scene of operations, undertakes to direct the details of his strategy 
and to force his action.^ Torrington had desired not to fight, and 

' Torriugton's dispatch says that the calm came on after the action had lasted two 
hours. The times here given are taken from ' Mems, relating to the Lord Torrington 
(Byng) ; and from Dutch and French accounts, and most of them are corroborated by 
the evidence at the court-martial. 

2 S. P. Dom. (K. Will's Chest), B. 7, f. 161. 

' "While the late Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby was still on the active list of 
the Navy, and when there appeared to be some chance of difficulties with a foreign 



1690.] TOBRINGTON'S STRATEGY. 341 

had been, rightly or wrongly, of opinion that he could best serve his 
country's cause by avoiding a decisive battle, pending the arrival of 
reinforcements. His views, as expressed by himself, were : " Whilst 
we observe the French, they cannot make any attempt, either upon 
ships or shore, without running a great hazard, and, if we be beaten, 
all is exposed to their mercy." ^ Weeks afterwards he declared: 
"Had I fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the 
kingdom had lain open to an invasion. ... As it was, most 
men were in fear that the French would invade, but I was always 
of another opinion, for I always said that, whilst we had a fleet in 
being, they would not dare to make an attempt." ^ 

One may not challenge the sincerity of Torrington's beliefs ; nor 
is it necessary to attack, as many of his contemporaries did, the 
honesty of his motives. Yet it is possible that, upon at least two 
important points, the admiral was wrong. It may be that he over- 
rated the menace of what he called his " fleet in being." A fleet 
merely " in being " is not, of necessity, a menace at all. It is not 
a menace unless it be also "potential," and by "potential" is 
implied " able and ready to act up to the limit of its strength at 
the required moment and at the required point." At the time of 
the descent of William III., Dartmouth's fleet, though certainly "in 
being," was in no sense " potential." In the first place, it was 
prevented by the weather from placing itself in the position where 
it could have acted with effect ; in the second place, it was so 
disaffected that, had it been offered battle, it would not have acted 
up to the limit of its strength at the required moment. Torrington's 
fleet, as a body, was willing enough to do its best against the enemy, 
as was amply proved by the conduct, at Beachy Head, of the Dutch^ 
and of Ashby's and Delavall's portions of the command. But it 
might have easily happened, had the French chosen to attempt a 
sudden landing, that Torrington could not have reached the 



Power, it was intended that, in case of a fleet having to be sent to the enemy's coast, a 
cable ship should accompany it, paying out cable as she went, in order that Whitehall 
should always be able to communicate with the commander-in-chief. The Author 
asked Sir Geoffrey his ojiinion of this arrangement : " I think," he said, " that a 
commander-in-chief thus tied to the Admiralty would be at a grave disadvantage, as 
he would be liable to be controlled by men ignorant of the state of affairs at the scene 
of action. If I were that commander-in-chief, therefore, I suspect that you would 
hear of the cable breaking, soon after the fleet had left port." Yet, if not used to 
unduly control a commander-in-chief, a cable to a fleet in wartime might surely be 
invaluable. 

^ Letter to Nottingham. ^ Torrington's defence. 



342 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1690. 

threatened spot in time to prevent it. The enemy might have 
elected to run the risk, in view of the discontent and readiness 
for comiter-revohition which were supposed to prevail in England. 
The weather, moreover, might at any moment have given the 
French an opportunity of snapping up KilUgrew, Shovell, and the 
incoming merchantmen, or of evading Torrington and making for 
Scotland. It was probably these aspects of the situation that struck 
Queen Mary and her advisers, and that induced them to order 
Torrington to fight as soon as he should have the advantage of the 
wind. It is not so important to discuss whether Torrington's views 
or the government's views were the juster, as it is to determine 
what w^as Torrington's duty in the position in which he found 
himself after the receipt of the Queen's commands. 

Three courses were open to him. He might have taken upon 
himself the grave responsibility of disobedience. A Nelson would 
have done that, had he been absolutely convinced in his own mind 
that to fight was to imperil his country. Or he might have fought 
the fight of the forlorn hope, firing as long as he had a plank beneath 
him. A Nelson would, in certain circumstances, have been capable 
of that also. " Though," said Nelson, " we are but eleven to 
eighteen or twenty, we won't part without a battle." And again: 
"By the time the enemy has beaten our fleet soundly, they will do 
us no harm this year." The third course was to compromise, by 
obeying the letter, and disobeying the spirit of the order. This 
course Torrington adopted. He fought, but he did not fight with 
aU his might. He did not throw his whole heart and strength into 
the encounter. He still adhered to his own conclusion that, after 
all, to preserve a " fleet in being " was the great point to be aimed 
at. He was defeated and driven into the Thames ; yet no French 
invasion followed. It is scarcely conceivable that if he had fought 
with less reserve, and had done much more injury to the enemy than 
he actually did, the apprehended invasion would have been in any way 
facilitated. But it is conceivable that if he had swept aside his own 
prejudices, and looked only and with a single eye to damaging his 
foe to the utmost, he might have won one of the most brilliant and 
decisive victories in naval history. Even had he failed, the French 
would have been little less complete masters of the Channel than 
they actually became. 

At 9 P.M. on the evening of the battle, the tide changed, and the 
Allies weighed and stood to the eastward, with the most seriously 



1690.] LOSSES JN THE BATTLE. 343 

disabled ships in tow. Next day it was decided at a council of war 
to destroy these ships rather than hazard an engagement for their 
protection. Tourville pursued, but, instead of ordering a general 
chase, preserved his line of battle. If he had been less deliberate, 
he would have taken many prizes. Yet his pursuit was close 
enough to induce the Allies to carry out their decision as regards 
many of the disabled vessels. Off Dover the pursuit was abandoned, 
and on July 9th, the Allies, still in great confusion, anchored at the 
Nore, and, lest they should be followed, prepared to remove the 
buoys at the mouth of the river. ^ 

In this battle the French lost no ship, and but one officer of rank. 
Their loss in men was considerable, but much inferior to that of the 
Allies. They claim to have destroyed, or caused the destruction of, 
no fewer than fourteen Dutch and English vessels, and to have 
taken one ship. Neither in the Dutch nor in the English archives 
is there, however, anything to substantiate this claim. Of the allied 
ships of the line, not more than eight or nine appear to have been 
lost, among them being the Anne, 70, which was beached near 
Winchelsea, and burnt by her captain, John Tyrrel ; the Wapen van 
Utrecht, 64, which sank after the action ; the Maagd van Enkliui- 
zen, 72, the TJiolen, 60, and the Elswout, 50. If other vessels were 
destroyed, they were probably Dutch fireships which were expended 
in the ordinary course. Among the English officers who perished 
were Captains William Botham of the Bestoration, and George 
Pomeroy- of the Biipert. Captain John Jennifer of the Edgar, 
who was badly wounded, lingered until early in the following year. 
Three Captains of Marines, Erasmus Philips, of the Hampton Court, 
John Barrington, of the Bestoration, and Thomas Mitchell, of the 
Anne, were also killed. Among the Dutch officers who fell were 
Eear-Admirals Jan van Brakel and Jan Dick, and Captain 
Noortheij.^ 

' Lediard says that, although an order to that effect was given, the buoys were not 
actually taken up. 

- Pomeroy, though mortally wounded, did not die until July 10th, 1690. 

^ Authorities for the events of the Battle of Beachy Head : Minutes of the Court 
Martial, Dec. 8th, 1690 ; Torrington's Disp. in S. P. Dom. (K. Will's Chest), B. 7, 
f. 161 ; ' Mems. relating to the Lord Torrington ' (Byng), 43-51 ; ' Reg. van den 
Lt.-Adm. C. Evertsen ' ; Evertsen's Pieport in Rijks Archief : Ships' Pay Lists in 
P.R.O. ; MS. List of Commissions in Auth.'s coll. ; ' Eelat. du Commis. Castigny ' (of 
Triomphant) in Arch, de la Mar. Franf. ; ' Reasons for the Tryal,' etc. (1690) ; Lists 
of Ships in l)e Jonge, iii., App. ; Hoste, ' L'Art des Armees Navales ' ; Richer, ' Vie de 
Tourville,' ' Vie de V. M. d'Estrees ' ; various tracts in Roy. Lib. at Amsterdam ; 



344 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1690. 

The effect upon the country of the inteUigence of the defeat 
was somewhat tempered by the news, which arrived ahnost simul- 
taneously, of King William's victory on the Boj'ne on July 1st. 
Nevertheless, there was a great, and, all things considered, not 
unnatural outcry against Torrington. 

On July 8th, the French fleet stood for a time towards its own 
coasts ; but on the 27th, it was off Berry Head, and subsequently 
entered Torbay. Some of its small craft made a raid on Teign- 
mouth, and burnt a few ships there. On July 29th, the enemy was 
off Plymouth, and on August 5th, off Eam Head ; but Tourville then 
withdrew, and the panic occasioned by his mastery of the Channel 
gradually subsided. It is difficult to understand why Louis XIV. 
did not press his advantage. The shattered fleet of the Allies was, 
it is true, still " in being," but if an invasion had been seriously 
attempted in the early days of July, it is extremely probable that, 
for several w^eeks, it would have met with little, save on shore, to 
jeopardise its success. 

Torrington, leaving the command to Ashby, landed soon after 
he had entered the river. He was presently sent to the Tower, and 
a commission was ordered to Sheerness to inquire into the circum- 
stances of the late miscarriage. In December, the commander-in- 
chief was tried by a court-martial, over which Vice-Admiral Sir 
Ealph Delavall presided ; but, although he was unanimously 
acquitted, and returned to London on December 11th in his 
barge with his flag still flying, he was superseded and never again 
employed. He was a gallant man, and, undoubtedly, he had acted 
throughout with the best intentions. Seignelay reproached Torring- 
ton's adversary, Tourville, with being " brave of heart and coward of 
head." The description seems to apply even more accurately to 
Torrington himself, whose main fault arose out of the fact that 
when William's necessities called for the services of genius, the 
services of no more than fair ability were forthcoming. 

The allied fleets having been refitted and reinforced, the chief 
command was entrusted in August to three officers conjointly, 



Mems. du Cte.de Forbin ' (1729) ; Sylvius, ' Sakeu v. Staat en Oorlog'; Chandler's 
'Debates'; Wagenaar's ' Yaderl. Hist.' ; London Gazette; HoU. Mercurius ; 'Nauw- 
keurig Verbaal' (Eotterdam, 1090); Journ. of H. of Comms. ; 'Hist, and Proc- 
of H. of Lords,' i. and ii. ; Sue, ' Hist, de la Mar. Fran9.' ; Guerin, ' Hist. Mar. de 
France ' ; Evertsen family papers ; Letters of A. van Citters ; ' The Account given by 
Sir J. Asliby,' etc. (1091) ; Richer, ' Jean Bart ' ; Yanderest, ' Jean Bart.' 



1691.] TOUBVJLLE'S " CAMPAGNE ATI LARGE:' 345 

Sir Eichard Haddock, Henry Killigrew, and Sir John Ashby. As 
the season advanced the heavier ships were laid np. Most of 
the rest were employed in conveying troops to Ireland, where a 
small squadron, under Captain the Duke of Grafton, as senior 
officer, was left to assist in operations against Cork.^ The main 
body of the fleet returned to the Downs in October, and then 
dispersed to its ports for the winter, only a cruising force remaining 
in commission under Eear-Admiral Sir Clowdisley Shovell. In 
December Admiral Edward Eussell was appointed Admiral of the 
Fleet. 

The year 1691 saw very little fighting on a great scale afloat, and 
is mainly remarkable in naval annals as having witnessed Tourville's 
brilliant strategical operations, which are remembered in French 
history as his campagne au large, or deep-sea cruise.^ Eussell, joined 
by the Dutch, was at the head of about one hundred sail of the line. 
Tourville had few more than seventy. He nevertheless sailed 
from Brest in June, and, during nearly the whole of the summer, 
managed to remain in or off the chops of the Channel, and to 
harass English trade without once allowing his opponent to bring 
him to action. "The actual captures," says Mahan, "made by 
Tourville's own fleet were insignificant, but its service to the 
commerce-destroying warfare of the French, by occupying the 
AlUes, is obvious." Moreover, while the Allies were drawn else- 
where, French convoys passed safely to and from Ireland. 
Tourville captured some merchantmen homeward bound from 
Jamaica, but missed the far richer Smyrna convoy, which reached 
Kingsale without mishap and was thence escorted into the Channel 
by Eussell. 

After Tourville had returned to Brest, the Allies went to 
Torbay to refresh their men, and then cruised again for a short 
time. In the autumn, as was usual in those days, the heavy ships 
withdrew for the winter, only small craft continuing to keep the 
sea. The withdrawal was very disastrous to Eussell's command. 
A storm overtook the English fleet and scattered it as it was 
endeavouring to bear up for Plymouth in thick weather. On 
September 3rd, the Coronation, 90, having first been totally dis- 
masted, foundered with her captain, Charles Skelton, and almost 

^ For the siege of Cork, see Chap. XXV. 

^ Tourville's dispatches in the Archives de la Marine ; Hoste, ' Traite des 
Evol. Nav.' 



S4.6 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1692. 

all her crew, off Ram Head; and the Harwich, 70, went ashore 
and became a wreck under Momit Edgcmnbe. The Eoyal Oak, 
74, and Nortliiimherland, 70, grounded, but were fortunately got 
off again, and many other vessels, Dutch as well as English, very 
narrowly escaped disaster.^ 

Early in 1692 King William, always anxious to prosecute the 
war on land, went to Holland. In March the ex-King James 
went to Cape La Hougue, where transports had been collected, 
and a large mixed force had been assembled in readiness to embark 
and to attempt an invasion of England. Queen Mary, who, during 
her husband's frequent absences on the Continent, was the active 
head of the government, pressed forward the preparation of the 
fleet, and caused a large camp to be formed near Portsmouth 
under the command of General Thomas ToUemache." Eussell 
was again appointed Admiral of the^fieet. Delavall, who had come 
back from Cadiz, whither he had escorted a squadron of merchant- 
men, was sent to scout off the French coast ; and Eear- Admiral 
Richard Carter, with a small force, was also dispatched on a 
■cruise in the Channel. As soon as the greater part of the 
main fleet w^as ready it proceeded to Rye Bay ; ^ a large Dutch 
contingent joined it on May 9th ; and on the 11th the united 
squadrons sailed to the w^estward. On the 13th, off St. Helens, 
they were reinforced by the divisions of Carter and Delavall ; and 
on the 15th a council of all the English and Dutch flag-officers 
was held. 

At that time there w^as in England a very prevalent belief that 
many officers of the Royal Navy were disaffected to the House 
of Orange, and would seize an early opportunity for abandoning 
its cause and deserting to James and Louis. The belief, for which 
there seems to have been remarkably Httle basis, probably originated 
with, and was disseminated by, impulsive Enghsh Jacobites, who 
imagined that, without some such encouragement, the ex-King and 
his French allies would never be induced to essay a bold stroke. 
Lord Melfort either credited it, or supposed it politic to affect to 
credit it ; and he represented to Louis in specific terms that Rear- 

' Home Off. Recs., Admiralty, 10 ; Burchett, 448, 449. 

'^ In most contemporary documents, this gallant officer is called Talmash. 

^ The rajDid assemblage of the fleet \vas much facilitated by the energy of Russell, 
who, contrary to the advice of the pilots, quitted the Downs with a very scant wind, 
and successfully carried his heavy ships past the dangers of the Goodwins and the 
Varne. 



1692.] 



THE NAVY PROFESSES ITS LOYALTY. 



347 



Admiral Carter and certain captains were among those who would 
actively assist in the restoration of the fallen dynasty. It is doubtful 
whether Louis placed any faith in the story ; nor, perhaps did Queen 
Mary, to whose ears rumours of intended treachery filtered, attach 
much importance to the tale ; yet she deemed it right to apprise 
Bussell of what she had heard, Her Majesty's communication, sent 




EDWARD RUSSELL, EARL OF ORFORD, VISCOUNT BARFLEUR, 
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET. 

(From Vcrtuc'ti engraving after the painting hg T. Gih.-ion.) 



through the Secretary of State, was discussed at the council of war 
on May 15th ; and, in reply, all the flag-officers and captains in the 
fleet signed an address in which the Queen was assured of their 
loyalty and devotion.^ 

Tourville, as in the previous years, was the French commander- 



 Gazette, 2767 ; 'Mercure Hist, et rol." xii. 646. 



348 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1692. 



in-chief. The long accepted beHef that he had received from Louis 
definite orders to fight the Allies upon meeting them, is, apparently, 
without foundation ; but it is true that reflections which had been 
made upon his conduct of operations in 1690 and 1691 had decided 
him to take risks such as his own uninfluenced judgment would 
have bidden him avoid. His state of mind was known at the 
French Court. It was there realised that, with a view to restoring 
a reputation which he wrongly fancied to be tarnished, he w^ould 
probably essay some desperate stroke ; and, as it was believed that 
he might be ignorant of the accomplished junction of the Dutch 
with the English, two separate dispatches were sent to him to 
inform him of that fact, and to desire him, in consequence, to 
avoid an action. Neither reached him, and thus it was that he 
fought the brilliant but disastrous battle of Barfleur. After waiting 
in vain for a squadron which he expected from Toulon under 
Admiral Victor Marie d'Estrees, Tourville quitted his anchorage 
in Bertheaume Bay, and, with such inadequate force as he had, 
entered the Channel on May 17th. 

The fleets which were about to meet were very disproportionate 
in every respect, and may be thus sunnnarised : — 



3 



Allies. 



Flag-officers. 



/Vice-Adm. G. van Callenburgh 
I E.-Adm. P. van der Goes . 
I Vice-Adm. G. Sclieij 
( Lt.-Adm. P. van Almonde . 



I 



a 
H I 5 



E.-Adm. J. G. Muijs . . . 
Vice-Adm. C. van de Putte 
E.-Adm, Geleijn Evertsen . 

E.-Adm. Sir C. Shovell . . . 
Ad. of the Fleet E. Eussell . 
Vice-Adm. Sir 11. Delavall . 

Vice-Adm. Geo. Eooke. 

Adm. Sir J. Asliby. 

II.-Adiu. E. Carter .... 

Total ships of the line 
"Frigates" and fireships 
Guns 



No. of 

Ships. 



*Jd 



31 



32 



99 

38 

6756 



French. 



Flag-offlcers. 



M. de Villette-Murcai. 
Comte de Tonrville 
M. de Langerou 

M. de Coetlogon . 
V.-Adni. Gabaret . 
M. Pannetier . 



No. of 
Ships. 



M. de Nesmond 
Lt.-Genl. d'Amfreville 
M. de Eelingues . 



14 



16 



14 



Total ships of the line .. 44 
" Frigates " and fireships [ 13 
Guns ' 3240 



' As the constitution of the Kuglisli portion of the allied fleet is of more special interrst, it is given in 
detail. The following was its intemled CMn.stitutiou ; but a few of the.se ships did not join until after the 
action, and, on the other hand, the Porlsmoiitl,, 46, Capt. John Bridges (2); the Holdadoes, 16, Capt. Wni. 



1692.] 



THE ENGLISH FLEET AT BARFLEUB. 



349 



Flags. 
Cen'tre or Red Squadron. 
Admiral of the Fleet, Edward Russelh Tt,.;,„„„,-„ 
Captain of the Fleet. David Mitchell j^' ^lannia. 
Vice-Admiral, Sir Ralph Delavall . Royal Sovereign. 
Rear- Admiral, Sir ClowdisleyShovell Koijal William. 



Ships. 



Guns. 



Captains 



Plymouth . 
Ruby . 
Cambridge. 
Oxford . 
Sandwich . 
Roi/al William 
Breda . . 
Kent . . 
St. Albans . 
Swiftsure . 
Hampton C'oui 

i Phaeton . 
Fox . . 
Strombolo 
Hopewell 
Grafton . . 
Restoration . 
Greenwich 
London . 
Britannia. 
St. Andrew 
Chester . 
Eagle ... 
Rupert . 
Elizabeth . 

I Flame 
Roebuck . 
Vulture . 
Spy . . 
Burford . . 
Centurion . 
Captain 
Devonshire. 
Royal Sovereign 
Royal Catherine 
Bonaventure . 
York . . 
Lenox . 
St. Michael 

iExtravagan 
Wolf. . 
Vulcan . 
Hound 



60 
5(J 
70 
5t 
90 
100 
70 
70 
50 
70 
70 



70 
70 
54 
96 
100 
96 
48 
70 
66 
70 



70 
48 
70 
80 
100 
82 
48 
60 
70 
90 



10 
8 
8 



John ]Maiue. 
George Mees. 
Richard Lestac'v. 
James Wisliart. 
Anthouj- Hastings. 
Thomas Jennings. 
David Lambert. 
John Neville. 
Richird Fit/.patrick. 
Richard Clarke. 
John Graydon. 
Robert Hancock. 
Thomas Killingworth. 
Thomas Urry. 
William Jumper. 
William Bokenham. 
■James Gother. 
Richard Edwards. 
Matthew Aylme:'. 
John Fletcher. 
George Churchill. 
Thomas (jillam. 
John Leake. 
Basil Beaumont. 
Stafford Fairborne. 
James Stewart. 
Francis Manlj'. 
Hovenden Walker. 
John Xorris. 
Thomas Harlow. 
Francis AV^yvill. 
Daniel Jones. 
Henry Haughton. 
Humphre.y Sanders. 
Wolf ran Come wall. 
John Hubbard. 
Robert Deaae. 
John Muuden. 
Thomas Hopsonn. 
Fleetwood Ernes. 
James Greenaway. 
Joseph Soanes. 
Thomas Foulis. 



Flags. 
Blue or Rear Squadron. 



A Imiral, Sir John Ashby . 
\'ice- Admiral, (jeorge Rooke . 
llear-Admiral, Richard Carter 



Victory.- 
yeptuve. 
Duke. 



Ships. 



Gnxs. 



Captains. 



Albemarle .... 
Resolution. 

Monck 

Expedition 
I'hatham .... 
Windsor Castle . 
Xeplune .... 
Ronal Oak i . . . 

Advice 

yorthumberlaiid . 
[/ion 

I Half-moon . 8 
Owner's Love 10 
Cadiz Mer- 
chant . .12 
Lightnirig . s 

Berwick .... 

Defiance .... 

Montagu .... 

Warspite .... 

Adventure .... 

Vanguard .... 

Victory 

Duchess .... 

Monmouth .... 

Edgar 

ISpeeilwe'l . 8 
)Grifin . . 8 
j£Jna ... 8 
[Blaze ... 8 

Stirling Castle . 

Dreadnought . 

Crown 

Suffolk 

Woolwich .... 

Ossory 

Duke 

Cnrnwall .... 

Essex 

Depfford .... 

Hope 

j Thomas and 

I Elizabeth . 10 
F.s. < ,, 

1 \esuvius. . 8 

\ Hunter . . 8 

Charles Galley 32 

1 .Joined afterthe action 



no 
Til 
1.0 
71) 
50 
i(H 
91) 
74 
fill 
711 



711 
B, 
t)2 
70 
44 
90 
100 
90 
6B 



I.S 



70 
64 
511 
70 
54 
90 
90 
80 
70 
50 
70 



Sir Francis "Wheler. 
Edward Good. 
Benjamin Hoskins. 
Edward Dover. 
John Leader. 
Earl of Danby. 
Thomas Gardner. 
George Byng. 
Charles Hawkins. 
Andrew Gotten. 
R(ibert ^\Msemau. 
John ICnapp. 
John Perry. 

Robert Wynn. 
Lawrence Keek. 
Henry Martin. 
Edward Guniey. 
Simon Foulks. 
Caleb Grantham. 
Thomas Dilkes. 
Christop er Mason. 
Edward Stanley. 
John Clements. 
Robert Robinson. 
John Torpley. 
Thomas Simouds. 
Robert Partridge. 
Richard Carverth. 
Thomas Heath. 
Benjamin Walters. 
Thomas Coall. 
Thomas Warren. 
Christopher Billop. 
Christopher Mj-ngs. 
John Tyrrel. 
William Wright. 
Edward Boys. 
John Bridges (1). 
William Kerr. 
Henry Robinson. 

Kdward Jjittleton. 
John Guy. 
Thomas Rooke. 

Joseph Waters. 



Having sent ahead some " frigates " — the Hghter and faster 
part of his fleet — to reconnoitre the French coast and watch the 
motions of the enemy, Eussell sailed on May 18th. At 3 a.m. on 
the morning of Thursday, the 19th, when he was off Cape Barfleur,^ 
the Chester and Charles Galley, which were then scouting to the 
westward, fired guns, and made the best of their way towards the 
flag. Upon arriving within signalHng distance, they reported that 
the enemy was in sight. The wind was S.AV., and, the French being 



Prower; the Greyhound, 16, Capt. Wm. Kiggens; the Reserve, 48, Capt. Thos. Crawley; and the Hawk, 
fireship, Capt. Wm. Harman, which may have been picked up by the fleet while cruising, seem to have 
been added. 



^ When the French were sighted the Cape bore S.W. b^ S., about 21 miles. 



350 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1692. 



to the south-west of the Allies, Tourville had the option whether 
he would or would not engage. He had not received the order 
to avoid an action ; he believed that he was expected to fight ; and 
mortification at the manner in which his previous proceedings 
had been criticised inclined him to the combat. Moreover, he 
seems to have been at first quite ignorant as to the overwhelming 
strength of the AUies, and to have supposed that not more than 
five and forty ships were opposed to him. He therefore ordered 
his whole fleet to keep away together for the enemy, who, heading 
S.S.W., awaited him on the starboard tack in the natural order, 
the Dutch, that is, being in the van, and Ashby, with the Blue 




MEDAL COMMEMORATIVK OF THE ACTIONS OFF CAPE BARFLEUR 
AND LA HOUGUE, 1692. 

(From an original kindly lent by H.S.R. Captain Prince Luids of Batfenberg, B.K.) 



squadron, occupying the rear. Supposing for a short time that 
the French might stand to the northward, Eussell had signalled 
his own rear to tack; but when, soon after 4 a.m., he saw the 
enemy standing to the southward and preparing to form line on 
the same tack as the Allies, he annulled the order ere Ashby had 
gone far towards obeying it. Tourville indeed accepted the 
challenge in the handsomest manner, when he might have dis- 
covered a dozen excellent reasons for declining it. 

" "When," says Mahan, " they were within easy range, the 
French hauled their wind on the same tack, keeping the weather- 
gauge. Tourville, being so inferior in numbers, could not wholly 
avoid the enemy's fine extending to the rear of his own, which 




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1692.] THE BATTLE OF CAPE BARFLEUB. 351 

was also necessarily weak from its extreme length ; ^ but he avoided 
Torrington's error at Beachy Head, keeping his van refused,^ with 
long intervals between the ships, to check the enemy's van, and 
engaging closely with his centre and rear." Thus formed, the 
two lines headed from N.N.E. towards S.S.W. Eussell was not 
entirely satisfied with his own line, which was completed at about 
8 a.m. He calls it an "indifferent" one. Tourville's line was also 
ragged, but the resolute manner in which his ships bore down was 
remarked by all. 

Kussell's last order, ere the action began, took the shape of 
directions to Admiral van Almonde to endeavour to weather the 
enemy as soon as possible. It was about 10.30 a.m. when the 
French centre hauled its wind and opened fire on the Eed squadron 
at three-quarter musket shot; and, it falling calm almost immediately 
afterwards, the Dutch could not, for the time, do much towards 
carrying out the desires of the commander-in-chief. Nevertheless- 
several of their ships succeeded in getting into close action, and 
the Zeven Provincien, De Euijter's famous flagship, had that day 
nineteen killed and fourteen badly wounded, while the Admiraal 
Generaal lost nine killed and thirty wounded, among the latter- 
being Rear- Admiral van der Goes. 

The hottest fighting, however, was in the centre ; and at 1 p.m. 
Tourville, in the Soleil Boyal, was observed to be towing off to 
windward with his sails and rigging badly damaged. At about 
2 P.M. the wind, such as there was of it, shifted to N.W. by N., 
and five fresh and almost untouched French ships of D'Amfreville's 
squadron thereupon ranged themselves three ahead and two astern 
of the Soleil Boyal, and, in the most devoted manner, endeavoured 
to relieve her. The chief opponents of the group thus formed 
were the Britannia, London, and St. Andreio ; and, for an hour, 
these ships, and others near them in the line, were very hotly 
engaged. All day it had been misty, and, soon after three, a fog 
began to gather very thickly over the scene of action. This caused 
much confusion on both sides, and it was doubtless in consequence 
of it that the Sandwich drove through the remnants of the French 
line, and, in the heavy fire which was turned upon her from all sides, 
lost her captain, Anthony Hastings. Before the fog became so thick 
as to oblige all ships to cease firing, Shovell's division had doubled 
upon the Soleil Boyal and her immediate supporters; and it is 

' /.''. its attenuation. ^ I.e. at Ions; ounshot to windward. 



352 



2JJJ0H OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1692. 



not, therefore, astonishing that when Tourville's ship next became 
visible she still was towing out of action to the northward. The 
Britcuinia and other vessels attempted to tow after her, the wind 
having again dropped ; but soon the fog once more shrouded every- 
thing. 

At about 5 P.M. a light breeze sprang up from the eastward, 
and the weather became a little less thick. The French were 
then discovered heading west ; and as much of the allied fleet as 
could be communicated with was ordered in chase. There was 
a partial renewal of the battle until about 8 p.m., when the 




BARFLEUR, LA HOUGUE, AND CHERBOURG. 



fog, denser than ever, put an end for the night to all combined 
action. 

It w^as when this fog was at its worst that Eear- Admiral Carter's 
division of the allied Blue squadron by hazard fell in with the 
main body of the flying enemy, and, for half an hour, engaged it 
in the ever-growing darkness. Carter was the ofiicer whose loyalty 
and good faith had been most peculiarly suspected. Other officers 
had been believed to be disaffected ; but rumour had charged 
Carter with being corrupt and treacherous as well. That night 
he silenced for ever those who would have impeached his honour. 
A shot struck him, and, as he realised that death had come to him. 



1692.] 



CHASE OF THE FRENCH. 



353 



he said to Wright, his Hag-captain : " Fight the ship as long as 
she will swim." Later, both fleets anchored.^ 

The morning of Friday, the '20th, broke foggy ; but at 8 a.m. 
the Dutch, who were to the southward of the Commander-in-Chief, 
sighted the enemy, and, the weather lifting a little, and the wind 
being E.N.E., a general chase was ordered. The French crowded 
to the west. At 11.30 a.m. the wind, which remained light, changed 
to S.W., and at 4 p.m., unable to make head against the tide, both 
the French and the Allies anchored. At 10 p.m., the tide then 
favouring, they weighed again with a freshening breeze. At 
midnight the Brita?inia lost her foretop-mast, which had been 










gtlr%-%ffisi 




TOURVILLE's flagship, " LE SOLEIL ROYAL." 
(From the drawing by A. L. van Kahlcnhach.) 



wounded on the previous day ; and the Eed squadron waited for 
the damage to be made good, while the Blue squadron and the 
Dutch continued the chase. 

On the 21st, the chase was prosecuted as before, the fleets 
anchoring when the tide was against thein, and weighing when 
it was favourable. In the course of the morning, Tourville hauled 
down his flag in the Soleil Boyal and transferred it to the Amhi- 
tieux, 92, which already carried the flag of De Villette-Murgai. He 
did this because he foresaw that, looking to the position into which 

^ A pension of £200 a year was settled on Carter's widow. — Ailnilty. Min. of 
Oct. 9th, ir)92. 

VOL. II. 2 A 



354 MAJOR OPERATIONS, lOGO-lTU. [1092. 

she had been driven, the Soleil Boyal must go ashore unless the 
wind changed ; and at about 11 a.m., in fact, the three-decker took 
the ground near Cherbourg, and her masts were cut away by 
her people. Vice-Admiral Delavall was therefore ordered to take 
command of enough ships to deal with the stranded flagship and 
with several vessels which hovered near her, and to send the rest of 
the craft which were with him to join the main body of the fleet. 
Towards evening a large force of French was seen entering the Bay 
of La Hougue, and at night the Allies dropped anchor just outside. 

In the meantime, Sir Ealph Delavall found with the Soleil Boyal, 
in Cherbourg Bay, two more large ships of the line. Transferring 
his flag to the St. Albans, he took W'ith him the Buby and two 
fireships, and went in to reconnoitre ; but being met with a hot 
fire, retreated. On the following day, Sunday, the 2'2nd, he sent 
in his boats and three fireships, covering them with the guns of 
his larger vessels.^ The attack was stoutly opposed both by the 
ships and by a fort on shore ; but Commander Thomas Heath, of 
the Blaze, succeeded in burning the Soleil Boyal, 106 ; Commander 
James Greenaway, of the Wolf, destroyed the Triomphant, 14 ; ^ and 
the boats disposed of the Admirable, 90. Commander Thomas 
Foulis, of the Hound, had his ship set on fire by hostile shot ere 
he could get sufficiently near to the Soleil Boyal to grapple her. 

The main body of the fleet spent the greater part of Sunday, 
the 22nd, in w^orking, as far as possible, into the Bay of La Hougue, 
near the head of which twelve large French ships were seen to 
have taken refuge. Twenty other French ships, chased by Ashby 
and some of the Dutch, saved themselves by running through the 
dangerous Eace of Alderney, and so getting into St. Malo. Yet 
five more escaped to the eastward, and four are said to have rounded 
Scotland ere they again entered a French port. But the twelve in 
the Bay of La Hougue never quitted the asylum which they had 
been obliged to seek. 

On Monday, the 23rd, Vice-Admiral Kooke,^ with several men- 
of-war and fireships, w^as ordered to destroy the French shipping 
in the bay. The enemy, however, had hauled the vessels so close 

^ xVinong these Delavall specifies the Rescrce, but it is imt quite certain that she 
belonged to the fleet at the time. 

^ Delavall, in his dispatch, calls this ship the Conquerant ; but tlie Conquerant was 
apparently not destroyed. Tlie true name appears, no dntibt, in the Frencli accounts. 
See p. 3oG. 

^ Rooke shifted his flag for the occasion to the Earjle. 



1G92.] 



THE ACTION IN THE BAY OF LA HOUGUE. 



355 



in shore that only small, craft could approach them.-^ The boats 
of the fleet were then got out, and, with the fireships, they burnt 
six French ships that night. The troops destined for the invasion 
of England assisted in the defence ; and so shallow was the water 
into which some of the ships had been run that the French cavalry 
rode right down among the English and Dutch boats, and some of 
the troopers were actually pulled from their chargers by the seamen's 
boathooks. On the English side there was very little loss. On 
the following morning the boats were sent in again to complete 
the destruction, and the remaining six men-of-war were all fired. 
Several transports and storeships, which had taken refuge up a 




MEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF THE BURNING OF FRENCH SHIPS AT 
LA HOUGUE, ETC., 1G92. 

iFrom an niigimd kimlUj lent hij H.S.H. Captain Prince Loui>f of Battenherg, B.N.) 



creek, were also given to the flames ; and the ex-King James, who 
witnessed the whole spectacle, experienced the mortification of 
seeing his hopes of an invasion of England, and of a re-acquisition 
of a crown, annihilated, and the finest ships of his only ally 
rendered for ever harmless. Until far into the nineteenth century 
the weather-worn ribs of some of those ships were still visible at 
low spring tides in the Bay of La Hougue. In March, 1833, 
numerous relics were recovered from the wreckage. They are now 
preserved in the Musee de la Marine in Paris. 

Russell's detailed dispatch, describing the affair, and dated from 
Portsmouth on June 2nd, informed Nottingham that sixteen French 



' They were also well covered by the fire of forts. 



2 A 2 



356 



MA JOB OPEBATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1692. 



men-of-war had been destroyed, and professed to give the names of 
fourteen of them.^ The Commander-in-Chief seems to have been 
mistaken both as regards the number and as regards many of the 
names. Papers in the French archives show that, in addition to 
the three ships aheady mentioned as having been destroyed near 
Cherbourg by Delavall, the French lost the following twelve vessels 
of the line ; and there is apparently no ground for supposing that 
any other craft, except fireships, transports, and storeships, met 
their fate either during, or as a consequence of, the six days' 
operations : — ^ 



St. Louis 


56 


Tonnant 


70 


Fort . 


52 


Terrible 


74 


Gaillard 




Fier . 


68 


A mhitieux . 


92 


Bourbon 


66 


Marin ifiqtie . 


76 


Merveilleux . 


92 


St. F/iilippe . 


80 


Foudroyunt . 


90 



Tourville and his captains had made a most gallant defence, and 
had, indeed, done wonders, seeing that, when night fell after the 
battle of Cape Barfleur on May 19th, they had not lost a single 
ship. Had Barfleur had no morrow, the action would have been 
a French triumph ; for, although much of the allied line was never 
fully engaged, the French fought from beginning to end against 
enormously superior forces. The battle presents no very interesting 
tactical features, but it pointedly illustrates the strategic maxim 
that the best place in which to attack a naval enemy is close to 
his own shores. Credit is due to Bussell for the promptitude with 
which, in face of difficulty, he arranged his junction with the 
Dutch ; but it can scarcely be contended that at Barfleur, and 
during the subsequent movements, he could, with his greatty 
superior fleet, have well done much less than he did. He won a 
victory of vast importance, yet of no particular brilliancy. Tourville 
lost a very small amount of reputation in the encounter, and Russell 
gained as little.^ 

^ Dutch accounts also over-estimate the French loss in ships of the line, laitting it 
at seventeen or eighteen sail. 

^ The English fireships expended were the Half -moon, Cadiz Mercliant, Blaze, 
Tliomas and Elizabeth, Fhaeton, Fox, Hopewell, Extravagant, Wolf, and Hound. 

3 Lutterull, ' llelat. of State Affairs,' ii. ; ' Memoires de Forbin ' ; ' Adui. Russell's 
Letter,' etc. (1690 fol.); Almonde's Disp. of May 24th; Delavall to the Earl of 
Nottinghana of May 22nd; Burnet's 'Hist, of Own Time,' ii. ; 'Mercure Hist, et 
Pol.' xii. ; Kennet, iii. 639 ; Oldmixon, ' Hist, of the Stuarts,' ii. ; ' Hist. Milit.' ii. ; 
London Gazette ; * Life of K. Will.' ; Burchett, ' Memoirs ' ; lleincourt, iii. ; ' Mems. of 



1693.] THE THREE JOINT ADMIRALS. 357 

Admiral Eussell, leaving Sir John Ashby and Vice-Admiral van 
Callenburgh off the French coast, returned to St. Helens. It was 
hoped that the French ships, which had taken refuge in St. Malo, 
would come out, and, endeavouring to get into Brest, w^ould be 
intercepted ; but the expectation was disappointed. A retaliatory 
descent upon the French coast was next projected ; yet, although 
enormous preparations were made, and great sums of money spent, 
lack of decision in high places, and general mismanagement, led at 
length to the abandonment of the scheme. 

In the following year Eussell, who had had differences with 
the Earl of Nottingham, was not employed; and on March 18th, 
1693, the command of the grand fleet for the ensuing summer 
was put into commission, and entrusted to Henry Killigrew, Sir 
Clowdisley Shovell, and Sir Balph Delavall, who acted jointly in a 
single flagship flying the Union at the main. A great many vessels 
hoisted the pennant ; a large Dutch contingent joined, and vast 
plans were discussed ; but owing to dilatoriness, confusion, and 
contradiction of orders, bad organisation, and deficient intelligence, 
no good was effected, and a serious disaster was suffered. 

A huge flotilla of merchantmen — English, Dutch, German, 
Danish, and Swedish — bound chiefly for the Mediterranean, and 
generally spoken of as the Smyrna fleet, had for some time been 
awaiting a safe opportunity to leave the Channel and pass the 
Strait of Gibraltar. It was determined that the grand fleet should 
escort these ships soine leagues to the south-west of Ushant, and 
should then return, leaving Vice-Admiral Kooke, who had been 
knighted by King William on February 16th, to convoy them 
farther on their voyage. The French Court had good intelligence 
of what was going forward, and, with a view to intercept this rich 
flotilla, Tourville, with about seventy ships from Brest, and Victor 
Marie d'Estrees, with about twenty ships from Toulon, were ordered 
to make rendezvous in Lagos Bay, and there to lie in wait. Though 



Eussell ' ; ' Observats.' of M. de Crisenoy ; Letter of James to Louis ; Kussell's short 
Disp. of May 20tli ; Daniel, ' Hist, de la Mil. Franc.' ; De Larrey, ' Hist, de France ' ; 

* Not. der Admiraliteiteu,' 1692 ; Papers of Scheij Family ; Dalrymple, ' Mems. of 
Grt. Brit, and Ireland,' i. ; llicher, ' Vie de Tourville ' ; Contin. of Aitzema, iv. ; 

* Europ. Mercurius ' ; MS. List of Commissions in Auth.'s coll. ; ' Mems. de Villette- 
Mur9ai'; 'Mems. de Berwick' (1778); Papers of Tourville, Grabaret, D'Amfreville, 
Coetlogon, and ' Ordres du Pioi,' in the Archives de la Marine ; ' Life of Capt. Stephen 
Martin'; Extrs. from Rooke's Journal (Charnock, i. 405); 'Bull, de la Soc. de 
rtiistoire de la France,' 1877. 



358 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 166C-171J. 



[1G9J 



Tonrville proceeded thither with all his force, very little suspicion 
was awakened in England. The saihng of D'Estrees was, however, 
reported soon after it had taken place. 

In the meantime, the Smyrna fleet, nmnbering four hundred 
sail, more or less, had quitted the Channel. On the evening of 
June 6th, Sir George Eooke, with his valuable charge, parted 
company and proceeded, while the Joint Admirals and the main 
force returned, and dropped anchor in Torbay on June 21st. Two 
days later, rumom'S having arrived that the two French fleets were 
out, and had effected a junction, it was determined to put to sea 
again and follow the convoy. But difficulties, real or imaginary, 
arose, and in the result the fleet did not sail. If it had sailed at 
once, it would still have been much too late to avert the catastrophe. 
Dispatches, intended to warn Sir George of his danger, were 
actually sent after him ; but they also were too late. 

The men-of-war with Eooke were as given below : — 

CoxvoY FOR THE Smykxa Fleet, June, 1693. 



Ships-. 


Guns. 


COMMAKDEKS. 


Ships. 


Guxs. 


COMMANDEP.S. 


Royal Caki. . . . 


64 


Gerard Elnis. 


^Jdmiraal Generaal* 


84 




Breda ^ 


62 


? 


3 Gehhrlaiul . . . 


72 


Andries Stilte. 


Monmouth .... 


58 


Peter Pickaid. 


'Zeeland .... 


64 


Philip Schrijver. 


iMmley Castle (hived). 


56 


George Meester. 


3Wapen van Medem- 






Monck 


52 


Statfurd Fairboine. 


blik 


64 


Juriaan van der Poel 


Lion 


52 


Thomas Gardner. 


3 Oost-Stellingwerf . 


52 




iMyal Merchant (hired) 


50 


Philiii Harris. 


3 JS'ijmegen .... 


10 




Princess Anne (bired). 


48 


VVilliain AValvelin. 


i Schiedam .... 


50 


W. van Eeohteren. 


Tiger Prize .... 


48 


Robert Sincock. 


3 H'ajje?) (•(( )( Dc 






WooUcich .... 


4(i 


Christopher Myngs. 


Schei-mer 


44 




Newcastle .... 


46 


John liaker. 


Salamander, bimili . 


10 


Tliomas Pindar. 


('hathaiii .... 


44 


Jolin Leader. 


Susanita, bomb . 




? 


Smyrna Factor (hired) 


40 


Edward Littlet(,ii. 


Dispatch, brig. . 




.lames Pi acock. 


Sheerness .... 


28 


.fohn Xorris. 


Speedrcell, firesliip . 


8 


Thomas Simonds. 


Larh- 


16 


Peter Wotton. 


\ulti(re, fireship . 
Muscovia Meri.haut,\ 
storesliip. . . .) 
3 Tun fireships. 




William Lindsej-. 
Daniel Parsons. 



' Flag of V.-.\dm. Sir (ieorge itooke. 

- Flag of 1{.-Adm. Thomas Hopsonn. He apparently acted also as captain. 

3 Dutcli. ■• Flag of E.-Adm. P. van der Goes. 

Dropping from time to time such vessels as were bound for 
intermediate ports, Eooke, with a fair wind, kept his course towards 
the Strait. He encountered nothing to warn him of his danger. 
On June 15th, he ordered the Lark into Lagos Bay to obtain news ; 
but, going close in shore, she was becalmed, and so failed to carry 
out her instructions. On the 16th, two of the look-out ships ahead 
of the fleet discovered and engaged two Frenchmen ; but, seeing 
other French ships under Cape St. Vincent, they deemed it prudent 
to retire and report to the Vice-Admiral. Eooke proposed to lie to 



1693.] THE I) ISA S TEL' TO THE SMYRNA FLEET. 359 

until the enemy's strength should be ascertained, but he allowed 
himself to be over-persuaded by his captains ; and the squadron 
proceeded. At daybreak on the 17th, ten sail of French men-iaf-war 
were seen and chased, and a French fireship was taken. The crew 
falsely declared that only fifteen French ships of the line were in 
the neighbourhood ; but, by noon. Sir George could count eighty. 
Sixteen of these showed a disposition to attack, whereupon the 
English men-of-war stood off towards the convoy. Van der Goes 
advised that an engagement should be avoided ; and Eooke, though 
much doubting whether this could be done at so late a stage, took 
all possible measures to get away without fighting, and, at the 
same time, directed such of the convoy as might be able, to 
endeavour, during the night, to take refuge in San Lucar, Faro, 
or Cadiz. But the enemy's van pursued closely, and, in the evening, 
brought the rearmost ships of the convoy and some of the Dutch 
men-of-war to action. Thereupon Captains Schrijver and Van 
der Poel, who found themselves to leeward of the foe, very gallantly 
tacked towards the shore, drawing the enemy after them, and 
deliberately sacrificing their ships in hopes of saving the rest. 
They made a most desperate defence, and partially accomplished 
their object, but were at length taken. In the meantime, the 
convoy was so much dispersed that on the morning of the 18th, Sir 
George, who had stood off all night with a fresh N.N.W. gale, found 
but fifty-four vessels near him. That day a few French still hung 
about him. On the 19th, after having discussed the situation with 
his officers, the Vice-Admiral made for his rendezvous off Madeira. 

The amount of damage done by the enemy was presently found 
to be extremely serious. In addition to the two Dutch ships of the 
line, about ninety-two of the merchantmen were taken, burnt, or 
sunk, the value of the whole being estimated at upwards of a 
million sterling. Kooke's prudence, and the fact that some of 
Tourville's orders were not properly obeyed by his captains, saved, 
however, the greater part of the convoy. Nor was Tourville able to 
do such damage as he did without embroiling himself with the 
Spanish authorities at Malaga, Cadiz, and Gibraltar, in each of 
which ports some of the convoy had taken refuge. The blame for 
the disaster lay not with Rooke but with the authorities at home. 
They appear to have had no proper machinery for obtaining early 
intelligence of the enemy's movements, and to have been, for the 
time, incapable either of deciding or of acting with the promptitude 



360 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-17U. [1694. 

necessary in time of war. How far the Joint Admirals must be 
held responsible is doubtful. ^Yhen their conduct was called in 
question, they were successfully defended in Parliament ; but it is 
ob\aous that the system of three-headed command was inherently 
bad ; and the experiment of commissioning Joint Admirals of the 
Fleet was, fortunately, never repeated, save once, under somewhat 
different conditions, in 1705.^ 

The remaining years of the War of the League of Augsberg 
witnessed no great sea battles, nor any single maritime event of 
the first importance. Such minor operations as were undertaken 
will be found described in the next chapter. After the battle of 
La Hougue the direct military action of the allied navies was 
exerted in three principal ways, namely, ' in attacks upon the 
French ports ; in threatening the left flank of the French advance 
into Spain up to the moment when AVilliam became disposed to 
peace ; and in protecting sea commerce. It was not exerted in 
the destruction of fleets, for the reason that, after 1693, Louis XIV. 
commissioned every year fewer and fewer ships of the line, and that 
France gradually, for the time, relinquished the dream of maritime 
supremacy. The warfare against the French coasts produced little 
except local effect ; but the threatening of the flank of the French 
advance in Spain also drove Tourville into Toulon, kept him there, 
and saved Barcelona until England and Holland ceased to desire a 
prolongation of hostilities. As for the protection of sea-borne com- 
merce, it was so indifferently managed that, although the allied fleets 
remained in almost unchallenged possession of the seas, the damage 
wrought by French privateers ultimately had an important influence 
in bringing the sea nations to wish for peace. Upon this subject 
Captain Mahan makes some observations which must be quoted. 

" The decay of the Frencli fleet," he points out, " was gradual, and . . . the moral 
ollect of its appearance in the Channel, its victory at Beachy Head, and gallant conduct 



' Authorities for the affair of the Smyrna fleet : Burchett, ' Mems.' 185, etc. ; 
Gazettes, No. 2888, 2893, 2894, 2895 ; Corr. of Will. III. and Heiusius ; Littleton's 
Letters in ' State of Europe,' July and Aug. 1693 ; Le Clerc, ' Hist, des Provs. Unies,' 
iii. 426; 'Life of Sir G. Rooke'; 'Merc. Hist, et Polit.' xv. 332; De Quincy, 'Hist. 
Milit.' ii. 703 ; Du Mont, ' Mems.' ; Letter of Wolfl'sen, Dut. Eesid. in Portug. ; Disps. 
of Schrijver and Van der Poel ; Disps. of Consul Amia, and of Schonenberg ; Eichei-, 
'Vie de Tourville'; Burnet, 'Hist, of Own Time,' ii. 115, etc.; 'Hist, de la Mil. 
Fran9.' ii. 492 ; ' Notul. der Adm. van Amsterdam ' ; ' Europ. Mercur.' July, 1693 ; 
Eorbin, ' Mems.' i. 340 ; Disps. of Tourville, D'Estrees, Coetlogon, llenau and Gabaret, 
in Arch, de la Marine, etc. 



1694.] THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON COMMERCE. 361 

at La Hougue remained for some time impressed on the minds of the Allies. This 
imjDression caused their ships to be kei3t together in fleets, instead of scattering in 
pursuit of tlie enemy's cruisers, and so brought to the latter a su];)port almost equal to 
an active warfare on the seas. Again, the efficiency of the English Navy . . . was 
low, and its administration perhaps worse ; while treason in England gave the French 
the advantage of better information. ... In truth, it was immediately after La 
Hougue that the depredations of cruisers became most ruinous ; and the reason was 
twofold; tirst, the allied fleet was kept together at Spithead for two months and more, 
gathering troops for a landing on the Continent, thus leaving the cruisers unmolested ; 
and, in the second place, the French, not being able to send their fleet out again that 
summer, permitted the seamen to take service in private ships, thus largely increasing 
the number of the latter. The two causes working together gave an impunity and 
extension to commerce-destroying which caused a tremendous outcry in England. ' It 
must be confessed,' says the English naval chronicler, ' that our commerce suffered far 
less the year before, when the French were masters at sea, than in this, when their 
grand fleet was blocked up in port.' But the reason was that the French, having little 
commerce and a comparatively large number of seamen, mainly employed in the fleet, 
were able, when this laj' by, to release them to cruisers. As the pressure of the war 
became greater, and Louis ctmtinued to reduce the number of his ships in commission, 
another increase Avas given to the commerce-destroyers. ' The ships and officers of the 
royal navy were loaned, under certain conditions, to private firms, or to companies who 
wished to imdertake privateering enterprises, in which even the cabinet ministers did 
not disdain to take shares'; indeed, they were urged to do so to please the King. . . . 
The commerce-destroying of this war, also, was no mere business of single cruisers : 
scjuadrons of three or four up to half-a-dozen ships acted together under one man. . . . 
Still, as the war went on and efficiency of administration improved, commerce-destroying 
was brought within bounds. At the same time, as an evidence of how much the un- 
supported cruisers suffered, even under these favourable conditions, it maybe mentioned 
that the English report fifty-nine^ ships of war captured against eighteen admitted by 
the French dvu'ing the war, a difference which a French naval historian attributes, 
with much probability, to the English failing to distinguish between ships of war 
properly so-called, and those loaned to private firms. Caj^tures of actual privateers do 
not appear in the list quoted from. . . . The results of the war of 1689-1697 do not 
therefore vitiate the general conclusion that 'a cruising, commerce-destroying warfare, 
to be destructive, must be seconded by a squadron warfare, and hj divisions of ships- 
of-the-line, which, forcing the enemy to unite his forces, permit the cruisers to make 
fortunate attempts upon his trade. Without such backing the result will be simply 
the capture of the cruisers.' . . . ISTotwithstanding their losses, the sea nations made 
good their cause." ^ 

The chief work of the main fleets of the AlHes during the period 
1694-1697 may be very briefly summarised. 

Sir Francis Wheler departed for the Mediterranean, as com- 
mander-in-chief there, in the last days of 1693. He had under his 
charge a considerable fleet, and a convoy, and was instructed to look 

1 These are Burchett's figures. He puts the English loss during the war at 
50 men-of-war mounting 1112 guns, and the French loss at 59 men-of-war mounting 
2244 guns. For a nominal list of Enghsh losses, see the Appendix on pjx 535-537. 
This is probably more correct than Burchett's figures. It is impossible to compile a list 
of the French losses. 

^ ' Infl. of Sea Power upon Hist.' 194-106. 



362 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1060-17 U. 



[1694. 



out off Cadiz for the home-coming Spanish Plate fleet, so as to 
ensm-e its safe arrival in port. He was also directed to provide for 
the security of convoys returning from Spain and the Mediterranean ; 
then to proceed as far as Malta with such merchantmen as were 
bound for the- Levant; and, having detached ships to show the flag 
before Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, to join the Spanish fleet and 
annoy the enemy until the returning Levant ships should require 
his escort back to the Channel. He carried out the first part of his 
commission ; but, when about to enter the Mediterranean in company 
with a Dutch contingent under Admiral Callenburgh, he encountered 
a very heavy gale, with haze and violent rain. In this storm, which 
occurred on the 18th and 19th of February, 1694, the following 
English ships of war, besides many merchantment, were unhappily 
lost : — 




Sir Francis Wheler and Captain Hawkins both perished with the 
Sussex. Captains AVard and Meester were saved. Commander 
Colfe's fate is unknown, but his name disappeared from the Navy 
List at the same time as his ship. Bear-Admiral John Neville 
succeeded to the command of the squadron, but was not able to 
prevent a French fleet from Brest from passing the Strait of 
Gibraltar on May 4th and proceeding to join the force at Toulon. 

In the meantime, the command of the grand fleet of the Allies 
had been conferred upon Admiral Edward Eussell, who, leaving part 
of it under Sir Clowdisley Shovell at St. Helens for the purposes of 
the projected attack on Brest, ^ sailed to the chops of the Channel, 
and there learnt that the Brest fleet had quitted port on April 15th, 
and that a large French convoy, bound east, lay in Bertheaume Bay. 
He detached Captain Peter Pickard, in the MuiiuioiitJi, with two or 
three ships, to deal with this convoy, and himself returned to 

' See next cliaiiter. 



1694.] ENGLAND AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. 363 

St. Helens. Thence, when the arrangements for the attack on 
Brest had heen matured, the whole fleet sailed. On the night of 
June 5th, 1694, it separated, one part under Admiral John Lord 
Berkeley of Stratton (B.), making for Brest, and the other, under 
the Commander-in-Chief, keeping on to the southward. 

Russell was in due course joined by Rear-Admiral Neville, the 
Dutch contingent under Callenburgh and Geleijn Evertsen, and a 
small Spanish squadron ; and he entered the Mediterranean, reaching 
Cartagena on July 13th. The combined French fleets had been off 
the Spanish coast in the neighbourhood of Barcelona, but, hearing 
of the approach of the Allies, they withdrew to within the Isles of 
Hyeres, near Toulon. Thus the situation in Catalonia, where the 
French w^ere actively operating on shore, was rendered somewhat 
less difficult for the Spaniards. But it was foreseen that, upon the 
withdrawal of the Allies, the French fleet would return to the coast, 
and Russell was therefore urged to winter in the Mediterranean. 
The Commander-in-Chief insisted that this was out of the question, 
and, after having been as far north as Barcelona, he steered for 
Malaga with the intention of going home. At Malaga, however, he 
received orders from the Admiralty directing him to continue upon 
the station, and to make his winter headquarters at Cadiz. 

The decision of the home government was both wise as regards 
the strategic conduct of that campaign, and important as regards the 
general policy of the country. The fleet went northward again to 
Alicant ; the French lay quiet ; and England definitively laid the 
first foundations of her position as a Mediterranean power. That 
winter the ships refitted at Cadiz. For some years afterwards 
England had no permanent naval base of her own in or near the 
great inland sea, but when she had once realised that the keeping of 
a large force there was beneficial to her interests, and that it gave 
her enlarged opportunities of offensive defence, it became inevitable 
that she should sooner or later seek to acquire bases for the further- 
ance of her new policy. She had already for a time held Tangier, 
but that was before she had learnt her lesson. Her adoption of 
something like a deliberate and steady attitude with respect to the 
Mediterranean dates only from 1694. 

In the spring of 1695, Russell cruised off the east coast of Spain, 
and to Sardinia ; in August he co-operated in a fruitless attack upon 
Palamos, which was in the hands of the French ; and in September 
he returned to England with part of his command, leaving the rest 



364 MAJOll OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1696. 

of it at Cadiz in charge of Bear- Admiral Sir David Mitchell (E.), 
pending the arrival of Admiral Sir George Eooke (W.), who had been 
appointed to supersede him. Eooke reached Cadiz on October 16th. 

Eooke did not deem the force at his disposal adequate either in 
numbers or in condition for active operations against the French, 
and withdrew the whole of it into Puntal Eoad for the winter. 
Tempted, however, by news that some French vessels were in 
Lagos Bay, he detached Sir David Mitchell, with eight of the 
cleanest vessels and two fireships, in search of the, enemy ; but in 
vain. In January he was directed to return home, unless he had 
reason to believe that the French w^ere likely to put to sea in 
strength not greatly superior to his own ; and on April '2'2nd, 1696, 
he entered the Channel. Had he been properly reinforced, he might, 
and doubtless would, have considerably annoyed the enemy ; but the 
government of the day apparently thought the spasmodic bombard- 
ment of French Channel ports ^ more important than the main- 
tenance of the command of the sea ; and in consequence, vessels 
which might otherwise have been detached to Eooke, were employed, 
under Lord Berkeley of Stratton, in various adventures w4iich had 
but little real influence upon the course of the war. 

Early in 1696, Admiral Eussell took command of a fleet which 
had been gathered in the Downs in view^ of an apprehended French 
invasion from Dunquerque and Calais ; and in April a division of this 
fleet bombarded Calais.^ In the course of the same month, Eooke, 
having returned from the Straits, superseded Eussell, and received 
instructions to do his best to prevent any fleet from Toulon from 
entering one of the northern ports of France. His force, however, 
was relatively small, his ships were undermanned, and many of the 
vessels which he had brought from the Mediterranean were not in 
a condition for service. The French from Toulon, with forty-seven 
ships of the line, consequently got round to Brest ere he was in a 
position to intercept them ; and, although he w^as soon afterwards 
joined by a Dutch contingent, he had to content himself with lying 
in Torbay, and depending upon his cruisers to give him early 
information of any further French movements. Soon afterwards 
Eooke w^as recalled to his duties at the Admiralty, and the post of 
Admiral of the Fleet was entrusted to Lord Berkeley of Stratton. 

During the early summer. Lord Berkeley and his subordinates, 
as will be seen in the next chapter, inflicted some annoyance upon 

' See next chapter. 



1697.] THE TREATY OF RIJSWIJK. 365 

the French Atlantic seaboard ; yet an opportunity of attacking a 
large French fleet which lay in Camaret and Bertheaume Bays was 
allowed to pass unutilised. Lord Berkeley, dying on February 27th, 
1697, was succeeded in connnand of the main fleet by Sir George 
Eooke.^ But owing to mismanagement, lack of organisation, and 
deficiency of intelligence, a French squadron under Chateaurenault 
succeeded in putting to sea from Brest with impunity ; and, beyond 
the convoying of the trade, little real service was efl'ected. Ships, 
when they were most needed, were found to be foul ; they were 
seldom fully manned and never properly provisioned. There were 
few flag-officers who were willing to assume the responsibility of 
initiative ; and although the Treaty of Bijswijk, concluded on 
September 11th, 1697, terminated the war in a manner satisfactory 
to the Allies, and flattering to King William, it is hardly to be 
contended that, during the eight years' struggle, the English Navy 
added much to the reputation which it had acquired under Cromwell 
and Charles II. 

By the treaty, France acknowledged William to be King of 
England, and Anne to be his successor, and undertook to withdraw 
its assistance from the ex-King James. France also surrendered all 
conquests made by her since the Treaty of Nijmegen, and placed the 
chief fortresses of the Netherlands in the hands of the Dutch. 

During the peace the Navy was far from being inactive. The 
cruises of Eear-Admiral Benbow in the West Indies, of Captain 
Thomas Warren in the East Indies, and of Captain John Munden 
in the Mediterranean, contributed greatly to the repression of piracy. 
The operations of these officers, and of others who were elsewhere 
employed up to the time of the outbreak of the next war, do not, 
however, call for detailed description in this chapter, and need be 
but briefly treated of in the next. Of rather more importance was 
Admiral Sir George Eooke's expedition to the Baltic in the year 1700. 

A difference which had arisen between Sweden and Denmark 
threatened to involve other powers as well ; and it was deemed 
advisable by the governments of England and Holland to intervene 
promptly in order to preventing a serious conflagration. It was 
determined, on the one hand, to assist Sweden, and on the other, 

^ Rooke, while in command, fell in, off the coast of France, with a fleet of Swedish 
merchantmen, and, rightly judging it to be loaded with property belonging to the 
enemy, captured it all. Sweden protested ; even England disapproved ; but Eooke 
was firm ; and eventually all the ships were condemned as lawful prizes. A most 
viseful lesson was thus taught to neutrals. 



o66 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 16(30-1714. [1700. 

to obtain fair treatment for Denmark ; and with these ends in view, 
a combined fleet of EngHsh and Dutch men-of-war nnder Eooke, as 
commander-in-chief, and Lieutenant-Admiral Philips van Almonde, 
proceeded to Gothenburg, where it anchored^ on June 8th. Sir George 
later entered the Sound, and on July 6th, joined the Swedish fleet ; 
whereupon the Danes, who had previously betrayed a disposition to 
challenge an action at sea, retreated to Copenhagen, and there 
established themselves behind sunken vessels and booms, protected 
by numerous guns, not only on shore but also upon floating stages. 
It was thought impracticable to force the harbour, but the Danish 
fleet was bombarded for some hours at long range. Little damage 
being effected, the King of Sweden landed towards the end of July 
with a body of troops and prepared to lay formal siege to the city. 
Happily, however, the differences were composed ere the siege could 
be actually begun. This early example of armed intervention in the 
interests of the peace of Europe led to the signing of the Treaty of 
Travendal on August 18th, 1700.' 

Very soon afterwards a new cause of quarrel arose between 
France and the Allies. Charles II., the last Spanish king of the 
Habsburg dynasty, died on November 1st, 1700. The Spanish crown 
was thereupon claimed by Louis XIV., on behalf of his grandson 
Philip, Duke of Anjou, and, some time later, by the Emperor 
Leopold I., on behalf of his son Charles. England and Holland 
ultimately sided with the Empire, and the question of the inheri- 
tance presently brought about the War of the Spanish Succession. 
But hostilities did not immediately result ; for, finding that Parlia- 
ment was indisposed for war, King William formally recognised 
Philip,^ and contented himself with fitting out a considerable fleet 
as a measure of precaution against the further ambitions of France. 
By the first week of July, 1701, Sir George Eooke was at Spithead in 
command of a large force, and in August and September he cruised 
in the Channel. On September 20th, he returned to St. Helens, 
and was ordered thence, with his heavier ships, to the Downs. 

The anticipated further aggressiveness of France quickly showed 

' Tlie fleet ancliored in Yinga Suimd, close to the towu. 

- ' Life of Sir G. Rooke,' 63, etc. ; Gazette, No. 3602 : Joiini. of Y.-Adm. C. 
Evertsen ; Disp. of Almonde of July 17tli; Eesoluts. of the Councs. of War; Corr. of 
Will. HI. and Heinsius ; Burnet, ' Hist, of Own Time,' ii. 243 ; Burchett, ' Xav. 
Hist.' Y. c. iii. ; 'Merc. Hist, et Tolit.' .xxix. ; 'Jour, of Sir G. Eooke, 1700-1702,' 
(Navy Rec. Soc). 

^ This was before Charles's candidature was put I'orward. 



1702.] THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. 367 

itself. The ex-King James had died at St. Germain on Sep- 
tember 16th, and Louis XIV., who, had he desired peace and been 
truly inclined to adhere to the spirit of the Treaty of Kijswijk, would 
surely have allowed the event to make no difference to his policy, 
seized the opportunity for provoking hostilities by causing Prince 
James Edward, the son of James II. and Mary of Modena, to be 
proclaimed King of England, Scotland, and Ireland. This action 
had an immediate effect upon British public feeling. The English 
ambassador was abruptly withdrawn from Paris ; and when, at the 
end of the year, King William called and met a new Parliament, he 
found it ready to assist him in resenting to the utmost the attitude 
of Louis. But King William, worn out in the service of his two 
countries, did not live to see the beginning of the struggle. He died 
at Kensington on March 8th, 1702, and not until May 4th following 
was the declaration of war published. 

The original policy of William was directed not so much to dis- 
puting the claim of Philip to the throne of Spain as to the seizing, 
for the benefit of the commerce and colonial ascendancy of his own 
dominions, of such portions of the Spanish American possessions as 
he could, and to imposing upon the new monarchy such conditions 
as would spare England and Holland from any serious diminution 
of the commercial privileges which they had enjoyed under the 
Spanish Habsburg sovereigns. William's policy, as Captain Mahan 
points out, would have directed the main efforts of the sea nations 
not upon the Spanish peninsula but upon America ; and the allied 
fleets might not have entered the Straits. Sicily and Naples were 
to go, not to England, but to Austria. " Subsequent causes," 
continues Mahan, "led to an entire change in this general plan." 
A new candidate, in the person of Charles, son of Leopold I., was 
set up, " and the peninsula became the scene of a doubtful and 
bloody war, keeping the Anglo-Dutch fleets hovering round the 
coasts, with the result, as regards the sea powers, that nothing of 
decisive importance was done in Spanish America, but that England 
issued from the strife, with Gibraltar and Port Mahon in her hands, 
to be thenceforth a Mediterranean power." 

It was while William's original policy was still favoured, and 
before the Allies had made up their minds to actively oppose Philip 
in Europe, that it was determined to send a squadron to the West 
Indies, under Vice-Admiral John Benbow (B.). This squadron, 
detached from Sir George Rooke's force in the Channel, consisted 



368 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1702. 

of two third-rates, and eight fourth -rates. It parted company with 
Sir George off the Scilly Islands on September '2nd, 1701, and was 
escorted by an Anglo-Dutch division under Eear- Admiral Sir John 
Munden (R.) and Bear-Admiral Baron van Wassenaer, until it 
reached a point outside the usual cruising grounds of the European 
fleets of France and Spain. On October 10th, Munden and Van 
Wassenaer returned to the Soundings., and Benbow proceeded on his 
voyage. He reached Barbados on November 3rd, 1701. 

There were at that time very few English ships of war in the 
West Indies, w^here both the French and the Spaniards were in 
considerable force ; and, as an early outbreak of war was anticipated 
by all parties, Benbow made it his business, not only to reassure 
and to support the English islands to the best of his abihty, but 
also to satisfy himself as to the resources and preparations of his 
possible foes. After looking into Martinique he visited Dominica 
and Nevis, and on December 5th anchored in the harbour of 
Port Eoyal, Jamaica, where he remained for some time, chiefly 
employing himself in collecting intelligence concerning the move- 
ments of the French and Spaniards. At the beginning of May he 
was reinforced by several vessels from England, under Commodore 
William Whetstone, who assumed the local rank of rear-admiral 
on the station. Benbow's cruisers were very active, even before 
the arrival of news of the commencement of formal hostilities ; 
and, as soon as it was known that the rupture had actually occurred, 
the Vice-Admiral sent three frigates to endeavour to intercept some 
storeships which, he learnt, were bound for Havana. At the 
same time, he detached Rear-Admiral Whetstone with two third- 
rates, three fourth-rates, and a fireship, to look for a small French 
squadron which, under M. Ducasse, as chef d'escadre, was expected 
from Brest, at Port St. Louis, now known as Cayes, in Haiti. 

Benbow himself left Port Eoyal on July 11th, intending to 
follow Whetstone ; but, receiving intelligence that the real destina- 
tion of Ducasse was not Port St. Louis but Leogane, near Port- 
au-Prince, he proceeded thither, arriving on July 27th. Having 
taken or destroyed several vessels there, and cruised for a few 
days in the neighbourhood, he was informed that Ducasse had 
gone to Cartagena, on the mainland of what is now Columbia, 
and that he was bound thence to Puerto Bello, in Panama. The 
news seems to have been incorrect. Benbow preceded, and did 
not follow, Ducasse towards the Gulf of Darien. Ducasse did 




a. 



^ 



V-. 



m 

'A 
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Ph 

m 

W 

H 

P^ 
O 

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pci 
<1 
Ph 

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Oj 

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1702.] 



BENBOW AND DUCASSE. 



369 



not reach Hispaniola, as Haiti and San Domingo were then 
called, until after the English had quitted the island. He was 
in inferior force, yet he at once went in search of Benbow ; and, 
on the morning of August 19th, the two squadrons sighted one 
another off Santa Marta, a little to the eastward of the mouth 
of the Eio Magdalena. The squadrons were at the time thus 
composed : — 



English. 



Fkkncu. 



Ships. 



Guns. Men. 



Commanders. 



Defiance . 


64 


Pendennis 


48 


Windsor . 


60 


Breda ' . 


70 


Greenwich 


54 


Ruby . 


48 


Fahnouth 


48 



445 Richard Kirkbv. 
230 Thomas Hudson. 
340 John Constable. 
460 Christopher Fogg. 
280, Cooper Wade. 
230: George Walton. 
230 Samuel Vincent. 



Ships. 


Guns. 


Heureux ^ 


68 


Agreable . 


50 


Plienix . 


60 


Apollun . 


50 


Prince de Frise 


30 


A fireship 


, , 


Three small 




craft. 




A transport. 





Men. CommaucJers. 

450 Bennet. 
350 De Roussy. 
350 De Poudens. 
300 De Demuin. 

J Lt. de St. An- 
■• j\ dre. 
. . ' Cauvet. 



1 Flag of Vice-Admiral Benbow, (B.;. 



2 Flag of M. Ducasse, chef d'escadre. 



The French were under topsails, standing along the shore 
towards the west, and were to eastward of the English. Benbow 
had previously given out the line of battle with the ships in the 
order above noted. As some of the vessels were three or four miles 
astern, he made the signal for action, and, under easy sail, awaited 
the stragglers. Later in the day, he sent an order to the Defiance 
and Windsor, which betrayed no signs of haste, to make more 
sail. Towards nightfall an action began ; but, after the Defiance 
and Windsor had received two or three broadsides, they luffed 
out of gunshot. When it was dark, firing ceased. Benbow, who 
kept company with the enemy during the night, thought to shame 
those of his captains who had already misbehaved themselves, by 
himself leading, and by changing the order of battle to : Breda, 
Defiance, Windsor, Greenwich, Buby, Pendennis, Falmouth; but 
on August '20th all the vessels, except the Buby, were far astern 
of the flagship, and remained astern during the whole day. Never- 
theless the Breda and Buby followed the enemy and used their 
chase guns as best they could until after dusk. 

At daylight on August 21st the Breda and the Buby again 
began action, this time at close quarters, with the French ; and 
in the course of the early morning the Buby's spars and rigging 
VOL. II. 2 B 



370 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1702. 

were so much mauled that the Breda had to He to and send hoats 
to tow Captain Walton off. For some time before 8 a.m. the 
Defiance and Windsor were within point-blank range of the rear- 
most ship of the enemy, yet refrained from firing a single gmi. 
In the afternoon the action recommenced ; but, although several 
of the ships astern of him then fired in a desultory way, the brunt 
of the fighting fell upon Benbow, whose rigging suffered severely, 
and who had some of his lower deck guns dismounted. The Breda, 
by night as well as by day, kept up the signal for the line of battle ; 
yet, on the morning of August 22nd, the Greenwich was about 
nine miles astern, and, except the Buhy, which behaved admirably 
throughout, the rest of the ships were not in their stations. 

In the afternoon the wind, which had been E., shifted to S., 
and gave the enemy the weather-gauge. The Breda, by tacking, 
fetched within gunshot of the sternmost of the French, and once 
more engaged them ; but she had no support, and she could do 
very little. On the morning of August 23rd, the French, who 
were six miles ahead of Benbow, were seen to have detached the 
Prince de Frise. At that time some of the Enghsh ships, and 
especially the Defiance and Windsor, were four miles astern of 
station. At 10 a.m., the wind being E.N.E., but variable, the 
enemy tacked. The Breda fetched 'within short range of two 
of them and then pursued as well as she could. About noon the 
Anne, galley, an Enghsh prize, which was one of the small craft 
with Ducasse, was retaken. On the other hand, the Rnbij was 
found to be so disabled that the Yice-Admiral ordered her to Port 
Eoyal. At 8 p.m. the enemy, steering S.E. with a light and 
variable wind from N.W., was two miles ahead of the Breda, 
which had only the Falmouth near her. At midnight the French 
began to separate. 

Very early in the morning of August 24th, the Breda and 
Falmouth got up with, and engaged, the sternmost of the enemy ; 
and at 3 a.m., the Vice-Admiral's right leg was smashed by a chain 
shot. Benbow was carried below ; but, soon afterwards, he ordered 
his cot to be taken to the quarter-deck, whence he continued to direct 
the fight until daybreak. It then appeared that the French ship ^ 
which had been immediately engaged was disabled, but that other 
French ships were coming up to her rescue, with a strong gale from 
the E. The Windsor, Vendennis, and Greemcich, after running to 

^ The Apollon. 



1702.] BENDOW AND DUCASSE. 371 

leeward of the disabled vessel and each firing a broadside, or part of 
a broadside, at her, passed her and stood to the southward. The 
Defiance also passed to leeward ; and, when the French fired a few 
guns at her, she put her helm a-weather, and ran away before the 
wind. None of these ships returned into action. The enemy speedily 
discovered that the majority of the English captains were not serious 
opponents, and, bearing down between their disabled ship and the 




VICE-ADMIRAL JOHN BENBOW. 

(From W. T. Mote's engraving after the jmrtrait by Sir G. Kncllcr.) 

Breda, badly damaged the latter and towed off the former. The 
Breda could not renew the pursuit for some time ; but, as soon ai> 
she had refitted, she went again in chase, with the neglected signal 
for battle still flying. As it was paid no more attention to than on 
the previous days, Benbow directed Captain Fogg to send to each 
ship, and to remind her captain of his duty. Upon this, Kirkby, of 
the Defiance, visited the Vice-Admiral, and urged him to forego 

2 B 2 



372 MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1660-1714. [1702. 

further action. The Commander-in-Chief, desirous of knowing the 
views of the other captains, signalled for them also to come on 
board. Most of them supported Kirkby ; and, realising that in the 
circumstances nothing else could be done, Benbow unwillingly 
desisted from the pursuit, and headed for Jamaica. 

Such is, in brief, the story of one of the most painful and 
disgraceful episodes in the history of the British Navy. At 
Jamaica, on October 8th, and the following days, Kirkby, "Wade, 
and Constable were tried by court-martial for cowardice, disobedience 
to orders, and neglect of duty. The two former were condemned on 
all counts, and were sentenced to death. Constable, acquitted of 
cowardice, was convicted on the other counts, and sentenced to be 
cashiered, and imprisoned during her Majesty's pleasure. Hudson 
would have been tried with these three officers had he not died 
on September 25th. Captains Fogg and Vincent were afterwards 
tried for having signed a protest against continuing the engage- 
ment with the French, although there was a reasonable probability 
that, had the action been properly renewed, a victory would have 
resulted. They alleged that they had signed the protest solely 
because, looking to the previous misbehaviour of the other captains, 
they feared lest, upon a recommencement of the action, the Breda 
and Falmouth, being w^holly deserted, would fall a prey to the 
enemy. Benbow and others bore testimony to the courage and 
general good conduct of these two officers, w'ho, in consequence, 
were sentenced only to be suspended, and that not until the Lord 
High Admiral's pleasure should be known. George Walton, alone 
of the English captains engaged, was not tried. He had borne 
himself with the most uniform gallantry and loyalty ; and he lived 
to do much more good service, and to die with unsullied reputa- 
tion at a green old age, a knight and Admiral of the Blue.^ 

Benbow, a brave and capable, if somewhat unconciliatory 
officer, was obliged to have his right leg amputated. The resultant 
shock, heightened by fever and by disappointment, overcame his 
naturally strong constitution and he died on November 4th, 1702.^ 

^ Authorities for Benbow's ]jrocee(liiigs in the West Indies : Gazettes, 3862, 3865, 
S873, 3878, 3886, 3907 ; Summary of Benbow's Journ. in ' Comp. Hist, of Europe ' for 
1702, p. 515 ; Min. of C. M., Oct. 8th, 1702 ; ' Acct. of the Trials,' etc. (1703 foL) ; 
' Hist, de St. Domingue,' iv. ; Burchett, ' Nav. Hist.' Bk. Y. ; ' Merc. Hist, et Poht.' 
1702, 657 ; 'Pres. Cond. of Eng. Navy' (1702) ; Guerin, ' Hist. Marit.' iv. 155. 

^ Mr. Paul Calton, a son-in-law of Benbow, gave Campbell the following copy of a 
letter written by Ducasse to Benbow after the action : " Sir, — I had little hopes, on 



1702.] TEE WEST INDIES, 1702-1707. 373 

Kirkby and Wade, sent home after their most just conviction, 
were shot at Plymouth on board the Bristol on April 16th, 1703. 
Constable, who was also sent home, either died in prison, or, being 
released, subsided into ignominious obscurity. Fogg and Vincent 
were mercifully treated ; and it would indeed appear that the 
punishment of both was wholly remitted by Prince George of 
Denmark ; for Fogg remained continuously in full pay until his 
death in 1708 ; and no hiatus appears in the record of Vincent's 
service until April, 1704, when, after having been in continuous 
pay for three years, he spent about nine months ashore, and, upon 
the expiration of that period, was appointed to a ship of superior 
rate. The conduct of the French in the long action merits all 
praise. Ducasse went to Cartagena. Returning in the following 
year to Europe, he was chased by Vice-Admiral John Graydon, 
but escaped and reached France in safety. France, it is strange to 
note, made little use of the superiority of force which she enjoyed 
in the West Indies for soiue time after Benbow's death. 

The remaining events of the war beyond the confines of Europe 
were chiefly of a subsidiary, although by no means always of an 
unimportant, character, until 1708 ; when there occurred an action 
which, owing to the fact that the Spain of that day drew her 
treasure almost entirely from her colonies, cannot but have gravely 
affected the general issue. 

Upon the death of Benbow, Captain William Whetstone, with 
the local rank of rear-admiral, succeeded to the command of the 
station, where he remained as second after the arrival from 
England of Vice-Admiral John Graydon. These two officers, and 
Commodore Hovenden Walker,^ returned to England in October, 
1703. Whetstone was promoted to regular flag-rank in 1704, 
and knighted in 1705 ; when he again went to the West Indies 
as Commander-in-Chief. The proceedings there during the five 
years ending with 1707, will be found described in the next 
chapter. In 1707, Commodore Charles Wager was appointed to 
the station. He left Plymouth on April 10th with a small squadron 
and a convoy ; and he had not been long in the West Indies when 
he conceived the project of attacking the Spanish galleons which 



Monday last, but to have supped in your cabin ; but it pleased God to order it other- 
wise. I am thankful for it. As for those cowardly captains who deserted you, hang 
them up ; for, by God, they deserve it." 

^ He had been detached thither from Cadiz in Sej^teraber, 1702. See infra, p. 380. 



374 



MAJOR OPEBATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1708. 



he knew to be upon the point of saiHng from Puerto Bello to 
Spain. The intended route of these galleons, so he ascertained, 
was from Puerto Bello to Cartagena, and thence to Havana, 
where they were to join M. Ducasse, the French chef cVescadre, 
who would convoy them to Europe. Wager detached to the 
Spanish main as many vessels as he could spare, instructing them 
to keep him advised as to the movements of the enemy ; and, 
in January, 1708, he put to sea from Jamaica with a force which 
he deemed just sufficient to cope with the Spaniards ere they should 
effect their junction with the French. 

He cruised for about two months, but then learnt from one of 
his scouts that the galleons would not sail until May 1st ; and, 



/yacri^- 



<.>VJnt^w 



'Scr/a/ia 



C A n. T ^ ^ :e ^ 







THE COAST NEAR CAETAGENA. 



as he had reason to believe that the Spaniards had intelligence 
of his presence off the coast, and were fully on their guard, he 
returned to Port Koyal. On April 14th, he again sailed, and 
although his ships suffered severely from the effects of a storm at 
the beginning of May, he kept the sea with them until May 28th ; 
when, at break of day, he had the satisfaction of sighting two 
suspicious vessels that were standing in for Cartagena. By noon 
seventeen sail could be made out. Wager had with him only four ; 
and the enemy, apparently confident in his numerical superiority, 
held his course without making any additional sail. The English 
chased, and, towards evening, the Spaniards, finding that they could 
not weather a small island which lay between them and Cartagena, 
leisurely formed some sort of a line of battle. 



1708.] WA GEE'S ACTION OFF CARTAGENA. 375 

Wager, who had been made a Eear- Admiral on November 19th, 
1707, but was not yet aware of his promotion, had his broad pennant 
in the Expedition, 70, Captain Henry Long, and was accompanied 
by the Kingston, 60, Captain Timothy Bridges,^ the Portland, 50, 
Captain Edward Windsor, and the Vulture, fireship, Commander 
Caesar Brooks. The enemy's flotilla was made up of the San Josef, 
64, bearing a pennant at the main, another 64, bearing a pennant 
at the fore, a 44, bearing a pennant at the mizzen, a 40-gun ship, 
and eight craft of inferior force. These were in the line. In 
addition to them there were two French vessels, one of 30, and 
one of 24 guns, two sloops, and a brigantine, which took no share 
in the action and which made off ere it commenced. The San Josef 
was in the centre of the line, the other 64-gun ship brought up the 
rear, and the 44-gun ship led the van. 

The Commodore had reason to believe that the whole of the 
Spanish treasure was on board the three ships bearing pennants. 
His information proved to be inaccurate ; but, acting upon it, he 
hailed the Kingston, which was near him, to attack the rearmost 
vessel ; and he sent a boat to the Portland, ordering her to attack the 
vessel at the head of the line. He himself purposed to attack 
the San Josef ; and, seeing nothing for the Vulture to do, he directed 
her to keep to windward. 

It was a fine evening, and there was a light gale from the 
N.N.E. The enemy, to the southward, had tacked, and stood 
towards the N., to weather the island of Baru. Finding that the 
Kingston and Portland did not comply with his instructions, but 
kept too far to windward. Wager hoisted the signal for the line 
of battle, and, at about sunset, got within gunshot of the San 
Josef and soon engaged her at close quarters. After an hour and 
a half's action she blew up.^ It was then very dark, and from the 
Expedition but one other vessel of the enemy was visible. Wager 
kept her in view, and by 10 p.m. came up with and engaged her. 
She turned out to be the 44-gun ship. The Expedition s first 
broadside, which was poured into her stern, disabled her. Wager, 
who was to leeward, then made aboard in order to get to windward 
of her, and would, no doubt, have ultimately taken her single- 

' His Christian name is given as Timothy in most of the MS. and other Navy Lists 
of the time, but the minutes of the court-martial style him Simon ; and in some papers 
he appears as Thomas. His name was almost certainly Timothy. 

^ Of more than six hundred men on board, only eleven were saved. 



376 MA JOB OPEBATIOXS, 1660-1714. [1708. 

handed, even if the Kingston and Portland, which had thus far 
done httle or nothing, had not arrived upon the scene. At 2 a.m., 
just as the moon was rising, she struck, and was taken possession 
of by Captain Long, 

The Commodore remained on deck, and, towards dawn, saw a 
large ship on his weather bow and three more sail on his weather 
quarter ; whereupon he ordered the Kingston and Portland to pro- 
ceed in chase. Captains Bridges and Windsor did as they were 
ordered, but in the afternoon relinquished the attempt. "Wager 
then renewed his signal, and the two ships resumed the pursuit. 
On the 31st they returned, reporting that they had followed the 
second 64-gun ship, and had seen her enter Cartagena ; but that 
she had led them into such dangerous waters that they had been 
obliged to leave her after firing at her. The Commodore was still 
refitting his prize when Captains Bridges and Windsor rejoined 
him ; and, having heard that a galleon had taken refuge behind 
Baru, he at once sent the Kingston, Portland, and Vulture to take 
or burn her. They encountered her as she w^as endeavouring to get 
to Cartagena. As soon as she sighted them she went about, ran 
herself ashore, and was set on fire by her crew ; and the English did 
not succeed in saving anything out of her. The squadron, with the 
prize, reached Port Royal without further adventure on July 8th, 

The loss occasioned to the Spaniards was very heavy. Accounts 
as to the treasure in the San Josef differ. Some place its total at 
as much as thirty millions of pieces of eight ; none at less than 
five millions. But, unfortunately for the captors, the 44-gun ship 
had no government treasure in her. She was mainly laden with 
cacao ; and, although thirteen chests of pieces of eight and fourteen 
pigs of silver were on board, these seem to have been private 
property. She was, nevertheless, a very valuable prize. The 
64-gun ship which escaped w^as reported to be nearly as rich as 
the San Josef. Captains Bridges and Windsor were tried by 
court-martial on board the Expedition at Port Eoyal on July 23rd 
for neglect of duty, and were sentenced to be dismissed their ships. 
Neither was ever again employed,^ 

The remaining occurrences in the West Indies and elsewhere 
beyond European waters up to the year 1714 will be dealt with 

1 Authorities for Wager's notion : Gazettes, 4459, 447G ; Min. of C. M., July 23rd, 
1708 ; ' Hist, Milit.' vi, 124 ; ' Merc, Hist, et Polit.' xlv. ; Burchett, ' Nav, Hist.' 705 ; 
• Comp, Hist, of Europe' for 1708, 251 ; Burnet, ' Hist, of Own Times,' ii, 315, 



1702.] THE EXPEDITION TO CADIZ. 317 

in the next chapter. The major operations in the Old World 
during the War of the Spanish Succession may now be described. 

At the time of the declaration of war, Thomas Herbert, Earl 
of Pembroke, was Lord High Admiral. He was to have taken 
command in person of the main Anglo-Dutch fleet ; but the Queen's 
appointment of Prince George of Denmark to supersede him, and 
the fact that Pembroke was a civilian, led to the command being 
eventually entrusted to Admiral Sir George Booke. It was in- 
tended to open the war with an attack in force upon Cadiz, the 
capture or destruction of which could not, it was felt, fail to greatly 
cripple the naval resources of Spain. Under Eooke were Vice- 
Admiral Thomas Hopsonn (E.), Eear-Admiral Sir Stafford Fairborne 
(W.), and Eear-Admiral John Graydon (B.), together with the five 
Dutch flag-officers, Lieutenant-Admiral P. van Almonde, Lieu- 
tenant-Admiral G. van Callenburgh, Vice-Admiral P. van der Goes, 
Vice-Admiral A. Pieterson, and Eear-Admiral Jan Gerrit, Baron 
van Wassenaer. The fleet consisted of thirty English ^ and twenty 
Dutch ships of the line, besides cruisers, bombs, fireships, store- 
ships, transports, hospital ships, and tenders, which brought up 
the total number of sail to about one hundred and sixty. On 
board the ships were embarked 9663 English, and about 4000 
Dutch troops under General the Duke of Ormonde, and Major- 
General Baron de Sparre. On June 19th, 1702, this great fleet 
weighed from Spithead, and anchored at St. Helens ; and, three days 
later, Eear-Admirals Fairborne and Graydon, with a squadron, were 
detached to look into Corunna, and, if they found any French ships 
in that port, to blockade them there. 

The main body of the allied fleet, delayed by various causes, 
some of which might have been easily avoided, did not get clear 
of the Channel until July 22nd. Fairborne and Graydon found 
nothing in Corunna ; and, after having cruised and taken several 
prizes, they rejoined Sir George on August 8th. Having com- 
municated with Lisbon, and received intelligence and advice from 
the English envoy there, the Admiral proceeded, and, on the 12th, 
anchored in the Bay of Bulls, about six miles from Cadiz. The 

^ The English ships of the line were the Association, Monmouth, Essex, Cambridge, 
Prince George (Hopsonn), Orford, Yarmouth, Grafton, Cumberland, Lenox, Berwick, 
Triumph (Graydon), Torbay, Pembroke, Northumberland, Barfleur, Stirling Castle, 
Burford, St. George (Fairborne), Exj^edition, Chichester, Swiftsure, Kent, Boyne^ 
Bedford, Boyal Sovereign (Eooke), Banelagh, Plymouth, Eagle, and Somerset, 



37^ 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



[1702. 



French men-of-war, and the galleys which had lain in the Bay, 
retired into Puntal Boad. 

Although two or three councils of war had been held after the 
fleet had quitted the Channel, there seems to have still been no 
definite plan of action. Certain it is that the leaders of the Allies 
were very much in the dark, not only as to the situation of affairs 
on shore and as to the state of the garrison and fortifications, but 
also as to the natural conformation of the coast upon which they 
were about to attempt a landing ; and all this, in spite of the facts 
that there had been great English expeditions against Cadiz in 1587, 




1596, and 1625, and that the adventure had been many months in 
preparation. There was, moreover, an ominous lack of energy in 
the attitude of the Commander-in-Chief. Fairborne had been for 
closely following the enemy's ships as they retired into Puntal 
Eioad, and had offered to lead the movement ; but Sir George 
Erooke had refused his consent. 

Another council of war, held in the Bay of Bulls after the fleet 
had anchored and Cadiz had been reconnoitred, did not reveal that 
the allied commanders saw their way clear before them. Sir 
Thomas Smith, Quartermaster-General of the Army, had reported 
after examination that, on the Island of Cadiz, ^ there were three 



' More properly the Islaud of Leon, ou which Cadiz is Imilt. 



1702.] THE FIASCO AT CADIZ. 379 

bays favourable for landing troops ; yet it was determined not to 
.land there. The town was summoned, but the governor civilly 
dechned to surrender his trust ; and again a council of war was 
held. At last a landing was effected on August 15th, near Bota, 
on the mainland to the north of the island. The Spaniards offered 
some resistance, and a heavy swell impeded the operation. Aided, 
however, by a covering fire from the Lenox, Captain William 
Jumper, and from several small craft, the Allies obtained a footing 
on shore and drove the defenders from their batteries ; and on the 
16th, Rota surrendered without further fighting. 

In the meantime, yet another council of war was being held 
afloat. A scheme, the carrying out of which was to depend upon 
various contingencies, was formulated for the bombardment of 
Cadiz ; but as it was never put into execution, it is unnecessary to 
describe it. On the 20th, the town of Puerto Santa Maria, which 
had been deserted, was entered. There the army found spoil and 
wine in plenty ; and, owing to the unwise leniency of Ormonde, and 
the evil example of certain other general officers, the men became 
completely deinoralised, and behaved in the most disgraceful and 
abominable manner. Such seamen as had been put ashore 
conducted themselves not less shamefully ; and it is not surprising 
that the violent and licentious proceedings of the champions of 
Charles of Austria disgusted all the local adherents of that prince, 
and fortified the friends of Philip of Anjou in their hostility to the 
other claimant. Fort Santa Caterina, to the southward of Puerto 
Santa Maria, surrendered on August 22nd ; but, from that day 
forward for nearly a month, the time was wasted in negotiations 
and further councils of war ; and an attempt by the Dutch 
troops against Fort Matagorda, at the entrance to Puntal Eoad, 
having failed, and the enemy having fully utilised their oppor- 
tunities for booming and otherwise obstructing the harbour mouth 
and for strengthening their defences, the stores at Puerto Santa 
Maria and Rota were destroyed, and on September 15th the army 
was re-embarked.^ 

^ Authorities for the attempt on Cadiz : ' Jouru. of Sir Gr. Eooke ' (Navy Eec. 
Soc.) ; Gazettes, 3842, 3843, 3845, 3847, 3850, 3858 ; ' Mems. of Sir Geo. Rooke,' 82 ; 
' Anns, of Q. Anne,' i. 79 ; Disps. and Journs. of Almonde, in the Eijks Archief ; 
Limieres, iii. 101 ; Lamberti, ii. 251 ; Burchett, ' Nav. Hist.' 620, etc. ; ' Merc. Hist. 
et ToUt.' ii. 443; Larrey, iii. 544; ' Comp. Hist, of Europe' for 1702, 312; 'Hist. 
Milit.' iii. 702 ; Burnet, ' Hist, of Own Times,' ii. 330 ; Oldmixon, ' Hist, of the Stuarts,' 
ii. 289 ; ' Life of Sir G. Rooke,' 68-100 ; MS. Lists of Captains in Author's coll. ; De 
Jonge, iii. 578. 



380 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1702. 

At another council of war, held on September 17th on board 
the Banelagh, the allied chiefs decided not to essay an attack upon 
any other place in Spain, but to return to England, after detaching 
to the West Indies, under Captain Ilovenden Walker of the 
Biirforcl, a small squadron, and some transports full of troops, 
which it had been previously determined to send thither. The fleet 
finally left the neighbourhood of Cadiz on September 19th, and on 
the 23rd Captain AValker was signalled to x^art company. 

Thus ended this lamentable and wasteful exhibition of hesitation, 
incompetence and demoralisation. If it had not been happily 
followed within a short time by an event in which the same allied 
leaders and their subordinates bore themselves far more creditably, 
the professional reputations of few concerned in it would have 
survived the disgrace. It is an episode which, while it may not be 
forgotten, and while it is full of teaching and suggestiveness, is not 
pleasant to look back upon. The home authorities and the active 
commanders were alike to blame. No expedition of the kind can 
reasonably expect success unless it be properly provided as well with 
information, intelligence and system as with material resources ; nor 
can national honour result from any undertaking in the conduct of 
which indecision, insubordination, brutality and drunkenness are 
conspicuous. It is refreshing to turn to the subsequent proceedings 
of Sir George Kooke's command. 

It happened that on September 21st several English vessels 
belonging to the fleet had been sent into Lagos Bay to water. 
One of these was the PembroJic, 60, Captain Thomas Hardy. Her 
chaplain, a Mr. Beauvoir, was among the officers who went on shore. 
By accident he encountered, and struck up an acquaintance with, the 
French Consul, a boastful person, who, in his anxiety to magnify 
the power of France, injudiciously hinted that, not far off. King 
Louis, unknown to the Allies, had a considerable force of ships, and 
that with them, in perfect safety, were certain Spanish galleons 
which had lately arrived from the Indies. Mr. Beauvoir, a gentle- 
man of much tact, seized an opportunity of obtaining corroborative 
evidence that M. de Chateaurenault, from Brest, with ships and 
galleons, was in Vigo Bay. Having secured as much intelligence as 
possible, he hurried on board, roused Captain Hardy, who was in bed, 
and told him the news, which was then, by direction of the senior 
officer, sent off to Sir George Eooke. Hardy, with great difficulty, 
discovered the fleet on October 6th ; and the allied Admirals, after 



1702.] THE ACTION IN VIGO BAY. 381 

having held the inevitable council of war, decided that it was their 
duty to attack the enemy. 

It should be noted here that the movements of M. de Chateau- 
renault had already been reported in England, and that the 
government had, in consequence, taken measures to advise Sir 
George, and had also ordered Sir Clowdisley Shovell, from the 
Channel, to reinforce him ; but the news did not arrive from home 
until after the information obtained by Mr. Beauvoir had been acted 
upon. 

Vigo Bay is a roomy opening and excellent anchorage on the 
south-western coast of Galicia. Its entrance is sheltered from the 
force of the Atlantic rollers by the Isles of Bayona, and at its head, 
or eastern extremity, the bay broadens somewhat, and forms the 
harbour of Eedondela. 

Booke steered for Vigo, dispatching ahead a couple of light 
ships which, on the night of October 9th, returned with con- 
firmation of the news brought by Captain Hardy, and with further 
intelligence to the effect that the enemy lay in Bedondela Harbour. 
Early on the following morning, a vessel from Sir Clowdisley 
Shovell's squadron also came into the fleet, reporting that Sir 
Clowdisley was off Cape Finisterre and had orders to join the 
Commander-in-Chief. On the afternoon of October 11th, in hazy 
weather, Booke entered the Bay and anchored off Vigo. 

M. de Chateaurenault was not unprepared. Across the narrow 
mouth of Bedondela Harbour he had drawn a boom of masts, 
yards, chains, cables and casks, of great strength. He had strongly 
anchored it ; and, near each end of it, he had moored one of his 
largest men-of-war.^ Within the boom he had moored five other 
large men-of-war, with their broadsides bearing upon the entrance. 
Covering the southern shore end of the boom were a stone fort of 
ten guns and a heavy improvised battery or platform mounted with 
more guns. Covering the northern shore end was a battery of 
twenty guns. The remaining French ships and the Spanish 
galleons, lay much farther up ; and, so long as the boom remained 
intact, they were well out of gunshot of the Allies. Indeed, the 
whole position was very strong. 

Upon anchoring, Booke again called a council of war, at which 
it was decided that, seeing that the whole fleet could not be 
-advantageously employed in such narrow waters, a detachment 
^ The Bourhon at one end, and the Esfdrance at the otlier. 



382 



MA J OB OPERATIONS, 1660-1714:. 



[1702. 



only should be sent in, unless necessity should arise for the services 
of the whole force ; and that in the meantime the troops should be 
landed to co-operate on the south side. A table showing the ships 
selected for the duty, and showing also the vessels of the enemy, is 
appended : — 

AcTiox IN YiGO Bay axd Eedoxdela Harbour, October 12th, 1702. 



Anglo-Dutch Squadron. 



Feanco-Spakish Squadkon'. 



Ships. 



I (luns. 



Commanders. 



I Mary 

\ Grafton .... 
jTor'bay^ .... 

/ Kent 

j Monmouth .... 
I Phrenix (f.s.^ . 
\vuUure {i.s.) . . . 

i Dordrecht .... 
Zeven I'rovincirii - . 
Velutve 
A fires)iip (f.s.) . . 
i' Berwick .... 
Essex 3 
Swiftsure .... 
Terrible {i.fi.) . . . 
Griffin (f.s.) . . . 
iRanelagh .... 
Somerset < . . . . 
Bedford .... 
/rau'fc(f.s.) . . . 
Hunter {{.<.) . . . 
I Slot Muidin 
Holland^ .... 
Vnie^ 
Reigersberg 
A fireship .... 
ICambridije. 
Xorthumbetland'> 
Orford 
Pembroke .... 
Lightning (f.s.) . 
IGouda 
Wapen vanAllcmaar ' 
Katwijk .... 
A fireship .... 



62 
TO 

80 
"0 



92 

64: 

TO 

70 
7i) 



.XO 
S<0 
7(1 



72 



94 
74 



70 
70 
70 
60 

64 
72 

72 



Association 
Barjieur . 



00 
90 



Edward Hop'^onn. 
Thomas Harlow. 
Andrew Le.ike. 
John .rennings. 
.John Baker. 

Thomas Ltng. 
Barend van der Pott. 
[Starrenburgh. 
Baron van Wasseuaer- 

Richard Edwards. 
John Hnbbiird. 
Robert Wynn. 
Edward R,umsey. 
William Scaley. 
Richard Fitzpairick. 
Thomas Dilkes. 
Henry Haughton. 
Beniiet Allen. 
Sir Charles Rich, Bart. 
Scbrijver. 



Lijnslager. 

? 

Richard Lestock, sen. 
James Greenaway. 
John Xori i.s. 
Thomas Hardy. 
Thomas Mitihell. 
Somelsdijk. 
? 

Beeckman. 



'\\'illiam Bokenham. 
Fiancis Wyvill. 



(These two ships were not in the line, but wei'e 
assigned to the attack of the forts at the mouth 
of the harbour.) 



Ships. 



Fort 

Prompt s . . . 
Assure '■>... 
Esperance . 
Bourbon 

Sirene .... 
Solide .... 
Ferme^'^ 
Prudent 

Oriflanniie. . . . 
J/o(l'>Vii . . . 
Superte. 
Dauphin, . 
Volontaire . 
Triton '2 . . . 
Entreprenaiii . 
Choquante . . . ' 
Favori (f.s.) . ' . 
Jesus Maria Jose . 
Bufona. 
Capitana de Ass(y(-'s 



Three gunboats . 
Seventeen galleon^ 



Guns.' How disposed of. 



70 
76 
66 

70 
US 
60 
50 
72 
60 
64 
56 
70 
4 
AH 
Ai 
22 
8 
14 
70 
54 
54 



Burnt. 
'J'aken 
Taken 
Taken 
Taken 
Taken 
Burnt. 
Taken 
Burnt. 
Burnt. 
Taken 
Taken 
Burnt. 
Taken 
Taken 
Burnt. 
Burnt. 
Burnt. 
Taken 
Taken 
Taken 

Burnt. 



by the English, 
by the English. 
and destroyed, 
by the Dutch, 
and destroyed. 

by the English. 



liy the English, 
and destroyed. 

and destroyed, 
by the English. 



and destroyed, 
and destroyed, 
and destroyed. 



Taken or burnt. 



1 Flag of Vice-Adm. Thomas Hopsonu (R.). 
- Flag of Vice-Adm. P. van der Goes. 
3 Flag of Rear-Adin. Sir Stafford Fairborue (W.). 
* Flag of Adm. Sir George Rooke, Com.-in-Chiff. 

5 Flags of Lt.-Adm. Callenburgh and Vice-Adm. 
the Baron .1. G. van Wassenaer. 

6 Flag of Rear-Adm. John Graydon (B.). 

7 Flag of Vice-Adm. Anthonij Pieterson. 

8 Commissioned on Oct. 16th as the Prompt Prize 
by Captain Edward Rumsey. 



i' Commissioned on Oct. 16th as the Assurance by 
Captain John Mitchell. 

11 Commissioned on Oct. 14th in the same name by 
Captain .Salmon MoiTis. 

11 Commissioned on Oct. 17th as the Moderate by 
Captain .John Balchen. 

!■- Commissioned on Oct. 14th as the Triton Prize 
by Captain William Scaley. 



It was also determined at the council that, in order to encourage the 
men, all the flag-officers should accompany the attack, shifting, if 
requisite, their flags for the purpose ; but it would appear that 
circumstances afterwards arose to render it desirable for Lieutenant- 
Admiral van Almonde to remain off Vigo. Kooke spent most of the 
night of October 11th in passing from ship to ship giving orders, and 



1702.] 



TEE ACTION IN VIGO BAT. 



383 



inspiriting his officers and men ; and he certainly did all that lay in 
his power by such means to ensure the success of the operations on 
the following day. 

Early in the morning of the 12th, the Duke of Ormonde, with 
two or three thousand men, was landed on the south side of the 
Bay, and, advancing to the eastward, ultimately took the land works 
at the south end of the boom. In the meantime. Sir George Booke 
ordered the vessels which had been selected to make the attack, to 
weigh. They did so, forming line in the order given in the table ; 
but when the van had approached within gunshot of the batteries, 
it fell calm, and they were obliged to re-anchor. Presently, how- 
ever, a brisl-: breeze sprang up, whereupon the Torhay, which lay 
nearest to the enemy, immediately cut her cable, and, making all 




VIGO BAY. 



sail, bore up for the boom, under a heavy fire from the foe. The 
boom gave way at the first shock, and, passing within it, Vice- 
Admiral Hopsonn anchored between the Bourbon and the Esperance, 
and resolutely engaged both of them. The other ships of his 
division, and the ships of the division of Vice- Admiral van der 
Goes, had weighed when Hopsonn cut. They came in line abreast 
upon the remnants of the boom, which, because it was less rigid than 
at first, and because the briskness of the breeze had temporarily 
died away, brought them up, and obliged them to laboriously hack 
their passage through it. But, when the breeze freshened once 
more, the Zeven Provincie)i found her way to the opening which 
the Torhaij had made, and laid herself on board the Bourbon, which 
she soon forced to strike. 



384 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1711. [1702. 

Vice- Admiral Hopsonn, who for some time had had a formidable 
opponent on each side of him, and had been practically alone, was 
somewhat relieved by the capture of the Bourbon ; but he was still 
in a perilous situation, for he was attacked by a vessel which the 
French had improvised as a fireship, and he soon fomid his rigging 
in flames. It chanced that this vessel was laden with snuff; and when 
at length she blew up, although she did a great amount of damage, 
her cargo was thrown in such dense masses over the Torhaij that 
it had the effect of partially extinguishing the fire. Hopsonn was 
further relieved by the covering fire of the Association, which had 
by that time brought her broadside to bear upon the land works on 
the north side ; yet the Torhaij, which had lost one hundred and 
fifteen men, killed or drowned, was so battered and burnt as to be 
almost helpless. The Vice-Admiral had subsequently to transfer his 
flag to the Monmouth, which entered the harbour when the fight 
was nearly over. 

After the action had lasted for little more than half an hour, 
M. de Chateaurenault found his land works on the south side 
carried, his boom cut to pieces, his fireship expended in vain, the 
Bourbon taken, and the allied fleet pouring in upon him : and, 
despairing of being able to make any further resistance, he ordered 
his captains to burn their ships, and himself set them the example. 
Owing, however, to the confusion and haste, the directions were not 
in every case carried out, and, as may be seen on reference to the 
table above, many ships fell into the hands of the English and 
Dutch. Most of the officers and men got ashore and escaped; but 
about four hundred fell into the hands of the victors ; and among 
these were the Marquis de la Galissonniere, the captains of the 
Assure and the Volontaire, and the Spanish admiral, Don Jose 
Checon. The victory was most crushing, every vessel in Kedon- 
dela Harbour being either taken or destroyed. Nor was it a very 
bloody triumph. The Torbay was the only ship of the Allies that 
suffered heavy loss. The other ships together seem to have lost 
not more than a dozen killed or wounded ; and the French were 
little worse off. The glory of the day undoubtedly lay largely with 
Vice-Admiral Hopsonn,^ who, for his gallantry and great services, 

' Hopsonn at first deemed that any ship attempting the boom must be lost, lint 
Piooke, upon looking at the boom, thought that it had little strength ; " so that 1 
ordered Mr. Hopsoun and the rest of the officers to execute their orders." Both officers 
were mistaken in their first impressions. See Eooke's Joumal, quoted in Chai-nock. 



1702.] 



THE SPOILS AT VIGO. 



385 



was knighted by the Queen on November '29th following, and 
afterwards granted a pension of £500 a year, with a reversion of 
£300 a year to his wife, in case she should survive him. His 
officers and men were also specially rewarded. 

The treasure and booty taken were of enormous value, the 
flotilla of galleons having been the richest which had ever reached 
Europe from the West Indies. Some of the lading had been 
removed before the action ; but it was estimated that gold, silver 
and cargo, to the value of thirteen million pieces of eight, fell into 
the hands of the victors or were destroyed. 

The town of Eedondela fell to the Duke of Ormonde, but Yigo 
w^as not systematically attacked. It was at one time proposed to 
reduce it, and to leave part of the fleet to winter in the Bay ; but 




MEDAL COMMEMOKATIVE OF THE ACTION IN VIGO BAY, 1702. 

(From an origi/ud Mndlij lent by H.S.H Captain Prince Louis of Battenherg, B.X.) 



Sir George Eooke opposed the project, and would not remain even 
long enough to attempt to weigh such ships as had been sunk, or 
to recover the treasure in the destroyed galleons, his chief reasons 
being that the fleet w^ould shortly have no more provisions, and 
would be unable, if the wind changed to the E., to obtain further 
supplies. 

On October 16th, Sir Clowdisley Shovell, with a squadron from 
England, joined the fleet ; on the two following days the troops were 
re-embarked ; and on the 19th, Sir George Eooke, with part of his 
force, sailed for England, leaving Sir Clowdisley to refit the prizes, 
save as much treasure and as many guns as possible, and complete 
the destruction of such vessels as could not be moved. Sir 
Clowdisley quickly carried out his instructions, effected an ex- 
VOL. II. 2 c 



386 MAJOE OPEBATIONS, 1660-1714. [1702. 

change of prisoners, and on October 26th began his homeward 
voyage. AYhile still oif Vigo, Captain Francis Wyvill of the 
Barfleiir, made prize of the Dartmouth, 50, an English man-of-war 
which had been taken by the French in February, 1695. She was 
restored to the service and commissioned by Captain Thomas Long, 
but, as there was already another Dartmouth, she was, in memory 
of the scene of her recapture, named the Vigo Prize. The passage 
home was a stormy one, and the fleet was dispersed ; ^ yet the whole 
of it, except a prize galleon, and a French vessel w^hich had been 
taken at sea by the Nassau, ultimately reached port in safety." 

Ormonde's recompense was the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland ; 
Kooke's, a privy councillorship : but the conduct of the expedition, 
and especially of the earlier part of it, did not escape severe 
criticism ; and Sir George's instructions and journals underwent 
a long examination by a committee of the House of Lords. The 
report was adverse to Eooke ; yet a vote in his favour was carried, 
and his behaviour was formally approved. It is to be feared that 
the verdict of the House was inspired by political considerations 
rather than by a desire to do strict justice. On the other hand, 
it must be admitted that Sir George had many personal enemies, 
and that of these not the least active was Ormonde, who, when he 
first returned to England, was exceedingly bitter against his naval 
colleague, though, after receiving the Lord-Lieutenancy, he became 
less hostile. If A'igo had not so quickly followed upon the fiasco of 
Cadiz, it is probable that the ministerial influence, strong as it was, 
would not have sufliced to save Sir George from a disgrace similar 
to that which a few years earlier had overtaken Torrington. As 
things stood, Eooke remained Admiral of the Fleet ; and it may be 
added that at the time of the commencement of fleet operations in 
1703, the remainder of the active flag-list was as follows : Admirals, 
Sir Clowdisley Shovell (W.), George Churchill (B.^l ; Vice-Admirals, 

^ While on his way lioine, Shovell was i-ejoined by the Dragon, 50, which, on 
October 23rd, had lost her captain, Robert Hollyman, in a gallant action with a French 
sixty-gun ship. 

^ Authorities for the action in Yigo Bay: Rooke's Journal, quoted by Charnock: 
' Journ. of Sir G. Rooke ' (Navy Rec. Soc.) ; Gazettes, 3858-3863 ; Du Mee, ' Caarte 
van de Landingh,' etc ; Journal of Almonde, and Disps. of Van der Goes, in Archief 
van der ^Marine ; Chandler's ' Debates,' iii. ; St. Philippe ; ' Mems. pour I'Hist. d'Esp.' 
i. 201 ; De Quincy, ' Hist. IMilit.' iii. 717 ; Santa Cruz, ' Reflects.' viii. 93 ; Burchett, 
'Nav. Hist.' 627; 'Conip. Hist, of Europe' for 1702, 388; Oldmixon, 'Hist, of the 
Stuarts,' ii. 291; 'Anns, of (>). Anne,' i. 134; Burnet, 'Hist, of Own Times,' ii. 322 ; 
' Life of Sir G. Rooke ' ; Gueiin, iv. 112 : ' Europ. Merc' (1702) 315. 



1703.] 



SHOVELL TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. 



387 



Sir Stafford Fairborne (E.), John Graydon (W.), John Leake (B.) ; 
and Eear- Admirals George Byng (E.), Thomas Dilkes (W.), and 
Basil Beamnont (B.). 

The naval operations of 1703 were not of great importance. 
Under Sir George Eooke a large fleet cruised in the Channel and the 
Bay of Biscay in May and Jmie ; and portions of it were from time 
to time detached on various services ; but, although the enemy was 




ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET, SIE GEORGE KOOKE, KT. 

{From Bartolozzi's engraving, after a miniature by J. Faher, painted in 1703, ivhen 
Euoke was fifty-three years of age.) 



inconvenienced and his coasts were harassed, no large body of his 
ships was encountered. 

Another great fleet, composed both of Dutch and of English 
men-of-war, sailed for the Mediterranean on July 1st, under Sir 
Clowdisley Shovell, with orders to assist the revolted Cevennois, 
in the south of France ; to do what might be possible towards 
restoring Sicily and Naples to the House of Habsburg ; to 

2 c 2 



388 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1703. 

endeavour to enlist the Algerines, Tunisians, and Tripolitans against 
France ; to settle certain difficulties which had arisen at Leghorn ; 
to convoy the trade ; and, generally, to injure the cause of the 
enemy to the utmost. Sir Clowdisley, whose presence in the 
Mediterranean had the effect of inducing the French fleet to lie 
quietly in Toulon harbour, carried out his instructions to the best of 
his ability ; but, having been directed to return to England before 
the beginning of the winter, he could not remain long enough to 
confer any permanent benefit upon the cause of the Allies. The 
expedition was an ill-designed one, and that it accomplished so little 
was due entirely to the home government, and not at all to Shovell. 
His cruisers made several prizes, accounts of the taking of some of 
which will be found in the next chapter. On the other hand, owing 
to the careless manner in which the ships had been victualled, there 
was a lamentable loss of life ^ on board the fleet during its absence 
from England. It arrived in the Downs on November 17th, 1703. 

While most of it still lay there, there occurred on November 26th 
one of the most violent and fatal storms of which we have record. 
Between eleven and twelve o'clock at night, the gale, which blew 
from W.S.W. and which was accompanied by thunder and lightning, 
reached its height ; and, until seven o'clock next morning, it did not 
appreciably moderate. The whole of the south of England suffered ; 
and the damage done in London alone was valued at a million 
sterling ; but the catastrophe is chiefly memorable on account of the 
terrible losses which it occasioned to the Navy. The following is a 
list of her Majesty's ships which perished, and of the number of lives 
sacrificed in each of them. The destruction wrought was, upon the 
whole, greater than the fleet has ever experienced, before or since, 
within so brief a period, either in peace or in war ; and the magni- 
tude of the disaster is even to this day portrayed in many of the oral 
legends and traditions of the seafaring populations of Kent and 
Sussex. (See Table on opposite page.) 

Twelve vessels were thus, at one time, totally lost to the Navy. 
In addition, the Arundel, 40, Captain Unton Dering, and the 
Lichfield Prize, 40, Captain Peter Chamberlain, went ashore, but 
were got off again ; and numerous other ships were dismasted or 

' To take an instauce : the Frince George buried upwards of sixty men in t'oui- 
months, and, although her complement was seven hundred, anchored in the Downs 
with so few fit for duty that the ship was hardly manageable. ' Life of Capt. Stephen 
Martin.' 



1703.] 



THE GREAT STORM. 



389 



Ships. 



Tous. GuHS Compt.2| Lost. 



Comniauders. 



Fate. 



Mary 

Neivcastle . 
Reserve . 
Vigo Prize . 

Mortar, bomb ' . 

Eagle, advice boat 
C a n terb ur y, 
storeship . 



Vanguard . 
Restoration . 
Stirling Castle 
Resolution . . . . 
Northamherlund 1 , 050 



1,357 
1,032 

f 885' 



90 
70 
70 
70 
70 

60 



628 50 
576 50 
.. 50 



18 



391 

' 276 

221 

220 


391 
206 

220 


272 


269: 


233 

\ 222 


193 
175 


65 


, , 


45 






? 


1,519 



(Not in commission) 

Fleetwood Ernes ^ . 

John Johnson ^. 

Thomas Lyell . 

James Greenaway ^ 
fRear-Adm. BasiFl 
Beanmont' > 

[Edward Hopsonn J 

William Carter^ 

John Anderson. 

Thomas Long . 

Baymond Raymond* < 
Nathaniel Bostock . 
Thomas Blake ^ 



Sunk in the Medway. 
Lost on the Goodwin. 
Lost on the Goodwin. 
Lost ofi Sussex. 
Lost on the Goodwin. 

Lost on the Goodwin. 

Lost at Spithead. 
Lost near Yarmouth. 
Lost at Hellevoetsluis. 
Wrecked on the 

Goodwin. 
Lost oif Sussex. 

Lost at Bristol. 



1 The A'ortar, though stranded on Nov. 2'7th, was not actually lost until Dec. 2nd. 

2 I.e., number of officers and men apparently borne at the time. The regular complements were, in several 
cases, higher than those here given. 

3 Perished with their ships. 

■1 Captain Eaym(,md, though reported in nearly all histories to have been lost with his ship, is noted in the 
contemporary lists as having commanded her until Dec. 2nd, 1703 (when she seems to have been finally 
abandoned) and as having commanded other vessels for many years afterwards. He is believed to have 
died in 1718. 



otherwise seriously damaged. Moreover, the Vesuvius, fireship, 
Captain George Paddon, which was stranded, and for the safety of 
which most determined efforts were made, had to be abandoned on 
December 19th. The number actually destroyed has commonly 
been overstated. As here set forth it is, however, sufficiently 
serious, and is, moreover, believed to be accurate. The loss of 
material was quickly made good, and more than made good, thanks 
to the patriotic action of the House of Commons ; and it is 
satisfactory to be able to add that special provision was made for 
the families of those seamen who had perished. 

A month before the great storm. Sir George Eooke, with a small 
squadron, had proceeded to Holland, in order to convoy to Spithead, 
whence he was to be escorted to Lisbon, the Archduke Charles, the 
candidate of the Allies for the throne of Spain. The Vigo Prize, 
which figures in the above list, was one of the ships of that squadron. 
Sir George returned to Spithead in December, and King Charles 
landed at Portsmouth on the 26th. 

The first business of the allied fleet in 1704 was to carry King 
Charles to Portugal. With Sir George Kooke in command, it sailed 
on January 6th, but was driven back by continuous foul weather. 



390 MAJOB OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1704. 

Sailing again on February 12th, with a very large convoy, it reached 
Lisbon on the 25th ; and King Charles landed a few days afterwards. 
At Lisbon, on March 2nd, Vice-Admiral Leake, with a further force 
of ships, and with transports and troops in company, joined the 
Commander-in-Chief. Sir George, leaving Leake in the river Tagus, 
departed on a cruise on the 9th to annoy the enemy, and to satisfy 
himself of the safety of the homeward-bound merchant fleet from 
the Levant. He returned on April 9th, and found awaiting him 
orders to proceed up the Straits and to render assistance to the 
cause of the Allies in Catalonia and the Eiviera. 

Sir George Eooke left Lisbon towards the end of April with 
seventeen English ships of the line, four fourth-rates, one fifth-rate, 
one sixth-rate, and four fireships, besides fourteen Dutch sail of the 
line, and with some troops under the Prince of Hessen-Darmstadt. 
He had not long sailed when a French fleet, bound southward, 
under the Comte de Toulouse,^ was seen off the mouth of the Tagus. 
The English minister to Portugal persuaded one of the frigate 
captains who had been left in the river to follow Sir George with 
the news ; but the Commander-in-Chief, who had already detached 
a squadron ^ in chase of other French vessels which had been seen 
off Cape Palos, was far on his way to Barcelona, where, after 
summoning the Philippist governor of the city to surrender to the 
representatives of King Charles, he landed troops and Marines on 
May 19th. Barcelona was bombarded in a desultory way on 
the 20th ; but, it being then thought that a continuation of the 
operations might alienate King Charles's adherents in the city, 
the bombardment was stopped, the troops and Marines were re- 
embarked, and, on the 21st, the fleet weighed and set sail for Nice, 
which was understood to be in great danger from the French army. 

Kooke never reached Nice. On the 27th, his look-out ships 
reported a fleet, believed to be French, making for Toulon. He 
tacked and stood after it during the night ; and next morning he saw 
about forty sail ahead of him. Thereupon, as was his custom on all 

' Louis Alexandre de Bourbon, Comte de Toulouse, legitimated sou of Louis XIV. 
and Mme. de Moutespan. Born, 1678. Admiral of France, 1683. Commander-in- 
Chief of the fleet of 1704, with Victor Marie, Comte d'Estrees, as chief of the staff and 
virtual dry-nurse. Died 1737. 

- This detached squadron did not get up with the French, who, however, instead of 
continuing to the northward, whither they were bound to co-i)perate in the siege of 
Nice and Villa-Franca, went to Cadiz to join the Comte de Toulouse. On their way 
thither, they fell in with, and chased, Kear-Adm. Wishart, who was following Sir 
George, and who safely joined him on May 18tli. 



1704.] liOOKE'S REMISSNESS. 391 

such occasions, he called a council of war, which decided that the 
chase should be continued ; but the delay allowed the enemy to 
increase his distance, and on the 29th, at sundown, the French were 
within ninety miles of Toulon and almost out of sight. Thinking 
that they would probably be reinforced, the Commander-in-Chief 
then relinquished the pursuit and, deterred from proceeding to Nice, 
steered back towards the Strait of Gibraltar. 

A careful examination of the accounts of these events suggests 
conclusions which are unfavourable to Rooke, but, as the matter 
was never publicly inquired into, the Admiral's motives can perhaps 
never be entirely known. At least three days before he sighted the 
enemy, Eooke, warned by the frigate which had been dispatched 
after him from Lisbon, had been made aware that a French 
squadron was on its way round from Brest and would seek to enter 
Toulon. He had received confirmatory intelligence from other 
sources ; and all the accounts were to the effect that the enemy 
was in force not superior to his own. Yet he apparently made no 
attempt whatsoever to find and fight this squadron ; and when, by 
chance, he fell in with it, instead of following it up with energy, he 
wasted his time over a council of war, and suffered it to escape 
and accomplish the intended junction with the Toulon fleet. He 
neglected the advantage given him by the fact that he held an 
interior position between the French and their port : he sacrificed 
a magnificent opportunity of winning a complete and possibly an 
easy victory. But, as on a previous occasion in the course of his 
career, Fortune, taking no notice of the way in which this spoilt 
child had spurned her, offered him almost immediately a fresh 
chance. She had let him retrieve at Vigo the fiasco of Cadiz. 
Similarly, she let him retrieve at Gibraltar the failure of the Gulf of 
Lions. Seldom has commander-in-chief, competent or incompetent, 
been so steadily favoured. Mahan has insisted upon the "luck" of 
Nelson. The "luck" of Rooke was far more extraordinary. Nelson 
ever wooed Fortune, and never neglected her ; whereas Eooke ever 
neglected her and never, save as a young officer, wooed her. Eooke 
commanded at Vigo, but the glory was really not his so much as 
Hopsonn's. Eooke commanded also at Gibraltar, but again his was 
not the leading figure. Nelson, commanding at either Vigo or 
Gibraltar, would, we may be sure, have commanded in a very 
different and much more immediate manner. 

Eooke watered his fleet at Altea Bay, seizing and destroying a 



592 



MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. 



ri704:. 



fort there ; and on June 14th he passed the Strait. Off Lagos, on 
the 16th, Admiral Sir Clowdisley Shovell's squadron joined. 

Shovell had left England in May with belated instructions to 
endeavour to intercept the French fleet, bound from Brest to Toulon ; 
to provide for the safety of the trade ; to convoy certain vessels to 
Lisbon ; and, if he missed the enemy, to reinforce Sir George Eooke. 

The Admirals at once held a council of war and decided to look 
for the French in the Mediterranean. Eear- Admiral Byng was 
first, however, detached to Cadiz to effect an exchange of prisoners. 
He rejoined Sir George off Cape Trafalgar on June 29th ; but 



EURO 




OldlaliyUT 



THE STRAIT AXD BAY OF GIBRALTAR. 



adverse Avinds, and then false reports of the presence of a large 
French squadron near the Strait, delayed the fleet, which, by 
Jul}' 17th, had not advanced eastward of Tetuan. In consequence 
of suggestions which had been sent to him through the English 
minister at Lisbon from King Charles of Spain and the King of 
Portugal, Eooke on that day held another council of war, which, 
after discussing various projects, determined to make a sudden 
attempt on Gibraltar, which at the time was held in the interests 
of the French candidate for the Spanish crown. The plan of action 
involved the landing to the northward of the town of the English 
and Dutch Marines, under the Prince of Hessen, who would sever 



I70i.] 



THE CAPTURE OF GIBRALTAR. 



393 



communications between the place and the mainland ; and the 
reduction of the fortress by means of the fire of a squadron of ships, 
placed under the command of Rear-Admirals George Byng and 
Paulus van der Dussen. The composition and order of battle of 
this squadron were as follows : — 



Ships. 






GunsJ 


Wapen van Vriesland 
Wapen van Utrecld . 


64 

64: 


Veluwe . 




64 


Amelia . 






66 


Veere . 






60 


Katwijk . 






72 


Monmouth 






70 


Siffolk 
Essex . 






70 
70 


Ranelagh ' 
Grafton . 
Montagu . 






80 
70 
60 


Eagle . 

Nottingham . 
Nassau . 






70 
60 
70 


Siviftsure 






70 


Bfrwick . 






70 


Monck 






60 


Burford . 






70 


Kmgston . 
Lenox 






70 
70 


Yarmouth 




70 


3 bombs (Dutcl 


!)• 







Commanders. 



C. Middagteu . 

— Bolck . . 

R.-Adm. P. van der Dussen 

C. Beeckman , 

P. Schrijver . 

J. C. Ockeisse 

John Baker . 
Robert Kirton 
John Hubbard 
John Cowe 
Sir Andrew Leake 
William Cleveland 
Lord Archibald Hamilton 
Samuel Whitaker 
Francis Dove . 
Robert Wynn 

Robert Fairfax 
James Mighels 
Kerryll Roffey 
Edward Acton 
AVilliam Jumper 
Jasper Hicks . 



To attack the Old Mole. 



To attack the town and 
the south bastion. 



To attack the New Mole. 
This division did not sail 
with Rear-Admiral Byng, 
but crossed with the 
main body, and joined 
him on the 22nd. 



1 Flag of Rear-Admiral George Bj-ug (R.). 

On the night of July 20th the Commander-in-Chief signalled to 
the squadron to proceed. On the following morning the squadron 
entered the Bay and anchored there. In the meantime, an easterly 
wind having sprung up, the main body of the fleet had also crossed 
the Strait. In the afternoon it took up a position in the bight of 
the Bay, off the rivers Palmones and Guadaranque, and awaited 
events. 

As Byng dropped anchor the town fired ; but most of the shot 
flew over him, though the Banelagh's mainmast was wounded. 
The ships made no reply, it having been determined not to attack 
until the Prince of Hessen, with the Marines, should have landed 
and summoned the place. But the squadron was ordered to warp 
a little farther out. The Marines, to the number of about eighteen 
hundred, were then quickly landed on the neck, the onty opposition 



394: MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1704. 

coming from a party of fifty horsemen, who speedily retired with the 
loss of one trooper. Having posted his men, the Prince of Hessen 
summoned the governor to declare for Charles III. The Spaniard, 
after some delay, replied that, having taken the oath to Philip V., he 
and the garrison would defend the place for that monarch with their 
lives. On the morning of the 22nd, before this answer had been 
returned, Byng began to station his vessels for the intended bom- 
bardment ; but, as it was nearly calm, they had to be warped into 
their assigned positions. * This operation occupied all day, the town 
occasionally firing, but not being able to interfere with the carrying 
out of the plan. During the night, while the process of warping in 
still continued, Eooke, to make some diversion, ordered Captain 
Edward Whitaker, of the Dorsetshire, to man and arm boats, and to 
destroy a French vessel that lay within the Old Mole ; and Byng, at 
the same time, threw a few shells into the towai from his bombs. 
By daybreak on the 23rd such vessels as had not succeeded in 
reaching their assigned stations were directed to place themselves to 
the best possible advantage ; and the Banelagh herself pushed close 
in until there was little if any water under her bottom. 

At 5 A.M. the fortress began the action, and the Allies forthwith 
repHed so vigorously that many of the inhabitants immediately fled 
from the town to points high up the Eock. The smoke soon grew 
dense, and, as there was little air to carry it off, Byng ordered his 
ships not to fire unnecessarily and to use only their lower deck guns 
as being the heaviest. Towards noon he sent word along the line 
by Captain Edward Whitaker, who had gone on board the Banelagh, 
that firing was to cease altogether, in order that he might observe 
what effect had been produced. Whitaker passed southward from 
ship to ship, until he reached the Lenox, which was the nearest 
ship to the New Mole. From her deck he and Captain Jumper 
noticed that several of the Spanish guns in that neighbourhood were 
dismounted or silenced; and, returning to the Banelagh, Whitaker 
reported this, and suggested that if the boats were manned and 
armed they might seize that part of the works. 

Byng accordingly made a signal for the boats to be got ready, 
and also dispatched Edward Whitaker to Sir George Kooke with a 
request for the co-operation of the rest of the boats of the fleet. In 
the meantime he ordered such boats as he had to proceed to the 
southward of the head of the New Mole, and to place themselves 
under the command of Captain Jasper Hicks, the senior officer of 



1704.] 



THE CAPTURE OF GIBRALTAR. 



305 



the southern division. Hicks was directed to make the suggested 
attack, should it appear to be practicable. 

Eooke, upon receiving Byng's message, approved of the design 
and sent back word that Edward Whitaker was to lead the attack. 
Byng thereupon appointed Captains Fairfax, Mighels, Eoffey, and 
Acton to assist Captain Edward Whitaker in the attempt upon the 
New Mole : but Captains Hicks and Jumper ^ had already proceeded 
in pursuance of the Rear-Admiral's earlier orders, and, pressing 
ashore with their boats, effected a landing long before the other 
captains could come up. 

The enemy resisted and sprang a mine," which killed or wounded 
a great number of officers and men, and caused so much discourage- 
ment that a retreat in the direction of the boats began. Happily 




iMEDAL COMMEMORATIVE OF THE CAPTURE OF GIBRALTAR, 1704. 
(From ail original kindhj lent bij H.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Battenherg, R.N.) 



Captain Edward Whitaker, with more boats, arrived in time to stay 
the flight ; and froin that moment the advance experienced no check. 
The English flag was quickly planted on a redoubt half-way between 
the New Mole and the town. 

When he saw that the landing parties had securely established 
themselves, Byng, by direction of Sir George Eooke, went ashore to 
Captain Edward Whitaker's position, and summoned the fortress. 
At the same time, the Prince of Hessen, advised of what had 
taken place, sent in another summons from the northward. In 
the evening the governor ^ replied that he would capitulate on the 
following morning ; and he accordingly surrendered to the Prince of 

^ His name is commeinorated in Jumper's Bastion. 

^ This mine did as much damage to the Simniards as to their foes. 

^ Don Dieo;o Salinas. 



396 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1660-1714. [1704. 

Hessen, as representing Charles III., on July '24th, and received all 
the honours of war. The Marines marched in towards evening ; 
and Byng then re-embarked most of his seamen, leaving about 
two hundred and fifty ashore only pending their relief by additional 
Marines. 

Thus fell this famous fortress, which ever since has been a 
British dependency. But it should be observed that in 1704 it did 
not cease to be, in theory at least, an integral part of Spain. It 
was surrendered by the partisans of Philip V. to the partisans of 
Charles III. ; and if the War of :the Spanish Succession had resulted 
in favour, not of Philip, but of Charles, the place might have ever 
remained Spanish. Philip, however, was the successful candidate ; 
and when at length, in 1713, the Allies were induced to recognise 
him, part of the price which he had to pay for peace w4th Great 
Britain was the cession to the British of Gibraltar. 

It was an important capture, but it was by no means a difficult 
one. The Spaniards had, it is true, upwards of a hundred guns 
mounted in it, and the place has always been of immense natural 
strength. On the other hand, the garrison, at the time of the attack, 
numbered no more than eighty officers and men,^ a force obviously 
insufficient to hold so extensive a position, or even to work one-third 
of the guns. The Spaniards, taken thus at grievous disadvantage, 
fought, nevertheless, extremely well ; and the Allies were not masters 
of the fortress until they had lost sixty-one officers and men killed, 
and about two hundred and sixty wounded. In the former number 
were included two lieutenants, and in the latter, one captain and 
seven lieutenants.^ 

Leaving the place in charge of the Prince of Hessen and of the 
Marines, whose services at Gibraltar are for ever commemorated 
upon the badge of the British corps, the allied fleets stood over to 
the coast of Barbary, Eooke having first detached Eear-Admiral 
van der Dussen, with five sail of the line to Lisbon, and thence to 
Plymouth, to bring back forces destined for service in Portugal. 

^ This number agrees with the best accounts ; but some writers place the garrison 
at 100, and others at 150 men. Tlie ' Mems. relating to (Byng) Lord Torrington ' put 
the number at 80 only. 

^ Authorities for the capture of Gibraltar : Gazettes, 4044, 4045 ; * Mems. relat. to 
(Byng) Lord Torrington,' 137-146 ; and Journ. of liev. T. Pocock, quoted therein ; De 
Quiucy, ' Hist. Milit.' iv. 121 ; Journs. of Callenburgh, Van der Dussen, and Wasse- 
naer ; Letter of Ed. Whitaker, in ' Nav. Chron.' iv. 383 ; 'Anns, of Q. Anne,' iii. 106 ; 
Wageuaar, pt. xvii., 225 ; ' Meic. Hist, et Polit.' xxxvii. 339 ; ' Hist, of the Stuarts,' ii. 
339 ; ' Life of Capt. Stephen IMartin,' 75 ; 'Hist, and Proc. of Ho. of Lords,' vii. 575. 




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1704.] THE BATTLE OF VELEZ MALAGA. 397 

The ships, after watering at Ceuta, proceeded to Tetuaii, and thence, 
on August 9th, all of them but twelve steered again for Gibraltar. 
That morning the Centurion, which was scouting to the eastward, 
reported that she could see the enemy in force to windward. After 
the fleet had been ranged in order of battle, a council of war was 
held, and it was determined to lie to the eastward of Gibraltar, and 
if possible, to re-embark half the Marines who were ashore. The 
French showed no immediate anxiety to engage, their galleys being 
at the time at Malaga, whither they went to fetch them ; and, in the 
meantime, a thousand Marines were brought off from the Eock, and 
the twelve ships which had been left watering, rejoined without 
interruption. On the 10th and 11th, the Allies plied to windward, 
seeing nothing of the enemy's fleet, yet occasionally hearing his 
signal guns. On the 11th, a small French tender was driven ashore 
a few miles eastward of Malaga, and burnt by her crew. In the 
afternoon Sir George stood to the N., and at night to the S.E. 
Still failing to sight the French, and fearing lest they might slip 
past him to the westward, the Commander-in-Chief again stood to 
the N., and, early in the morning of August 12th, called another 
council of war, which decided that, since Gibraltar had but a weak 
garrison and had not been rendered properly defensible, and since 
victuallers and other craft had been left ill-protected in the bay 
there, the fleet should continue the search for the French only until 
nightfall, and, failing to find them, should then return to the Eock. 

The French, however, had by that time picked up their galleys 
at Malaga, and, never having intended to permanently avoid an 
action, were already looking for the Allies. They missed and passed 
by them, owing to Sir George having stood to the S.E. ; and they 
were thus to leeward, when at about 11 a.m. on the l'2th, they were 
discovered in the N.W. near Cape Malaga, going large, with a small 
but intermittent gale from the eastward. 

Sir George Eooke called in his scouts, formed the line of battle, 
and bore